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Chapter Fifteen

If Free Will Did Not Exist, It Would Be Necessary to Invent It

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[15.0] Back in the good (or depending on your point of view, the bad) old days, philosophy was a perilous profession. When Socrates was executed for corrupting the youth of Athens, or the Paris parliament decreed in 1624 that any person teaching a doctrine contrary to Aristotle would be put to death, people really took their philosophy seriously. Nowadays, an academic philosopher might well perceive that the worst potential consequence of espousing one idea over another could be denial of tenure. But in this, I think they would be selling their profession short.

[15.1] Even in the age of junk food and reality TV, ideas matter. In fact, they arguably matter more than ever, because the internet spreads them more rapidly and effectively than ever and ordinary people have a greater capacity than ever before to act on them. Take democracy, for example—how much blood has been and still is being shed in the name of that idea? Or liberty, equality, fraternity—all are nothing more than ideas. One might argue that these are big ideas, with big ramifications. Although it would be perfectly possible to make good logical arguments against any of them, one wouldn't want to do that, because if people were to take those arguments seriously and hence stop believing in the desirability or even the existence of liberty, equality and fraternity, the world would change for the worse.

[15.2] Does this also apply to the idea of free will? Would a general disbelief in the idea of free will make any difference? *A priori* there are (at least) two possible answers:

[15.3] a. No, free will doesn't really have much in the way of consequences or ramifications. All that would happen if people stopped believing in it would be that they would be forced to adopt a little seemly humility, which would be no bad thing. Evidence against this claim is discussed in Section 1.

b. Yes, it would make a difference—but never mind the consequences, [15.4] the truth is always better than a comfortable lie. There is much to be said for this somewhat puritanical approach, and for that reason Sections 2 and 3 are devoted to discovering what science has to say about “the truth” of this matter. If the currently standard arguments that free will is illusory were to turn out to be overblown or inconclusive, we might legitimately avoid finding out what would happen if everyone stopped believing in free will.

1. BENEFITS OF BELIEVING IN FREE WILL [15.5]

The scientific evidence on this matter takes the form of experimental results [15.6] showing that if people are induced to disbelieve (at least temporarily) in the existence of free will, their behavior becomes more antisocial. In one study (Vohs and Schooler 2008), reading a passage in which Francis Crick claims that scientists now believe free will to be illusory caused participants to (a) report a weaker belief in free will and (b) cheat more on subsequent tests than subjects who had read a similar passage about something neutral. No difference between the two groups was observed in mood, or in beliefs about fate, chance and scientific causation—the cheating was specifically contingent on a disbelief in free will. In another set of experiments (Baumeister et al. 2009), subjects were assigned to read material that either did or did not support free will and were then presented with scenarios in which they had the opportunity to help other people. The clear result was that those who had read the material claiming free will is illusory were significantly more aggressive and less likely to say they would help others. Interestingly, a control group who read free-will-neutral material produced helpfulness scores indistinguishable from those of the pro-free-will group. This was taken by the authors to indicate that the default position for subjects in this experiment was to believe in free will. Again there was no significant difference between any of the three groups on tests of mood valence or arousal.

Of course, “free will” was not actually defined in either of these sets of [15.7] experiments, so it is not clear whether the subjects’ default position was to believe in

1. a compatibilist form of free will (which basically says that if nobody is [15.8] holding a gun to your head, you’re free to do as you will)

2. a stronger, incompatibilist form of free will (which could only exist if [15.9] causal determinism were an illusion) or

[15.10] 3. a libertarian form of free will (which demands the production of truly originated acts: acts that have no physical antecedents at all).

[15.11] Perhaps these alternatives were never clearly thought out by either experimenters or subjects, but one possible scenario is that the subjects’ default setting was a belief in option (1), while the version explicitly contradicted by the anti-free will material supplied to them was option (2). The question of what different varieties of “folk” actually do mean when they talk about free will is currently being explored by the new discipline of experimental philosophy (Nichols 2011). But whatever the eventual outcome of these welcome philosophical experiments, the results described above (Vohs and Schooler 2008; Baumeister et al. 2009) show fairly conclusively that authoritative statements to the effect that “free will is illusory” do have the effect of increasing antisocial behavior.

[15.12] Apparently there always was a good sociological reason for the Christian church’s insistence on the reality of free will and one’s ability to use it to mitigate original sin and increase one’s chances of getting into heaven. In more secular terms, it now behooves us academics, as the authority figures of the scientific age, to be quite careful about making firm statements to the effect that free will is illusory.

[15.13] But hold on, we have to tell the truth as we see it, don't we? Well yes, we probably do. But what actually is the truth in this matter? Are we really sure that free will IS illusory? The next two sections investigate this question from a scientific point of view.

[15.14] 2. THE NEUROSCIENCE OF FREE WILL

[15.15] Has neuroscience killed free will? The answer depends entirely on one's definition of free will—and in this case it does not matter whether we are talking about the compatibilist, incompatibilist or libertarian variety. If any of these definitions of free will requires the *conscious initiation* of one action rather than another, then the answer is yes, neuroscience has killed that kind of free will. There is now an abundance of evidence that voluntary actions are not initiated consciously.

[15.16] The pioneer in the matter of bringing the idea of conscious free will into the arena of experimental science was Benjamin Libet. His original experiments (Libet et al. 1982, 1983) are now well known: they show that the event-related potential coupled to a spontaneous action (the readiness potential or RP) starts off the order of 350 ms before the subject reports having consciously willed the action. For many years this highly repeatable and methodologically robust result was taken to mean that voluntary acts are initiated pre-consciously. More recently, Pockett and Purdy (2010) showed that when the same action is made not spontaneously but as the result of a specific decision, the RP preceding the action becomes so much shorter that it starts at about the same time as the reported conscious decision to make the action. This is probably explained by the fact that the earlier-onset parts of the RP relate more to expectation or readiness than to the initiation of a specific act: in the decision condition, the subject is so occupied with actually making the required (fairly complicated) decision that they have no processing capacity to spare for getting ready to move. On the face of it, this result restores the possibility that consciousness does directly cause actions. However, numerous experiments by others show that the time at which [15.17] the subject reports having willed an action is affected both by events that take place after the action (Lau et al. 2007) and by manipulation of feedback to the subject about the time at which the action occurs (Banks and Isham 2009). For example, if the subject is misled to believe that their individual actions happened progressively later than they actually did, the time at which these acts were willed is also reported as being progressively later. These and other experiments (Wegner 2002; Pockett 2004; Aarts et al. 2005; Pockett et al. 2006; Kühn and Brass 2009; Rigoni et al. 2010) strongly suggest that the *initiation* of voluntary actions is not consciously experienced at all. The subject simply infers after the event that they must have initiated their movement shortly before they made it.

This being said, however, there are at least two arguments in favor of the [15.18] position that whether or not actions are consciously initiated is not of major importance to the question of whether or not an individual enjoys one of the three major flavors of free will.

1. It is a reasonable position that an individual—"you"—consist(s) of [15.19] both your consciousness and the unconscious operations of your brain.

If that were not so, all the unconscious processing that underpins your conscious experiences (your vision, for example) would not count as part of “you.” This seems a highly dubious proposition, especially considering that the autobiographical memories generally regarded as making you uniquely “you” are unconscious most of the time.

2. Even if position (1) were rejected, the initiation and control of voluntary (i.e. non-reflex) actions is only part of the equation. The detail of any specific act is relatively unimportant in the larger scheme of things, in that it inevitably depends at least in part on environmental conditions at the time. Arguably more important to the notion of free will in general is the *decision* to carry out an act aimed at a particular outcome, at some loosely specified time in the future. Such decisions are generally made consciously.

[15.21] I therefore argue that, although neuroscience has indeed demonstrated that specific voluntary (willed) acts are not initiated consciously, this does not constitute the delivery of a coup de grace to the whole idea of free will. In fact neuroscience goes even further than this: it also shows that apparently voluntary acts are not controlled (Jeannerod 2006) or often *even recognized* consciously (Pockett 2009). But the conclusion can still not be drawn from this that the human individual *in toto* does not have some meaningful version of free will.

[15.22] 3. THE PHYSICS OF FREE WILL

[15.23] In section 1 three kinds of free will are defined: compatibilist, incompatibilist and libertarian. What does physics have to say about each of these?

[15.24] Compatibilism is simply a definitional choice, and as such cannot be either proved or disproved by any variety of science. Libertarianism, which involves the continued production of acts with no physical antecedents whatsoever, is observably wrong for most of the population. Acts with no physical antecedents whatsoever would be completely random in relation to the outside world and so unpredictable that anyone who consistently produced them would rapidly find themselves in a psychiatric institution at best, or an early grave at worst.

[15.25] So the only kind of free will the reality of which can reasonably be investigated by physics is the incompatibilist sort. On an incompatibilist definition of free will, free will does not exist if causal determinism is a fact. Much confusion and angst about free will results from the common assumption that causal determinism *is* a scientific fact. The next few paragraphs explore that proposition.

[15.26] We should start with a definition. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines causal determinism (hereafter referred to simply as determinism) as “the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature.” This definition immediately suggests that no answer is actually possible to the question of whether or not determinism is a scientific fact.

[15.27] A number of problems arise:

[15.28] 1. We clearly do not know at present (and may never know) what all of “the laws of nature” are. Perhaps free will *is* a law of nature. This latter idea may or may not be dismissed as semantics, but the former statement is undeniably correct.

[15.29] 2. We also do not know (and possibly can never know, in sufficient detail) what all of the relevant antecedent events and conditions are. This means we can never reproduce exactly the same set of antecedent events and conditions twice. This in turn means we can never run the critical experiment that might falsify determinism, which is to see whether the same antecedent events and conditions (together with the same, presumably immutable, laws of nature) produce the same outcome twice. If they did, determinism would be supported (although not, thanks to the Problem of Induction, proved). If they didn’t, determinism would be falsified: but we would have to be very sure that we really had reproduced exactly the same antecedent events and conditions.

3. Apart from these general arguments, physics is undoubtedly the science which should have the most to say about whether determinism is true or false. In fact though, there is not much help to be had from that direction, for the following reasons: [15.30]

a. The deterministic, mathematical equations of physics are [15.31] pretty good at describing the way the world works. At first blush, this might suggest that determinism is true. However, there is one area in which these equations are not so successful. They are all time-symmetric, which means they assume that deterministic causality can operate backwards in time as well as forwards. But all experimental observations of the world suggest that backwards causation does not occur. Weights never fall upwards. Broken vases never spontaneously reassemble themselves. The predictions of quantum mechanical models that do require backwards causation (e.g. Wheeler’s model to explain the experimental results of his delayed choice experiment) are precisely matched by the predictions of similar models that do not require backwards causation (Bohm’s model to explain the same experimental results).

b. Schrödinger’s equation, which accurately describes the evolution of events at the quantum size scale, is certainly deterministic. [15.32] But Schrödinger’s equation never delivers any certainty about the outcome of a particular set of antecedent events and conditions—it only supplies statistical probabilities. The definition of determinism requires that “every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions,” not that “the statistical probability of every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions.”

Hence I claim that causal determinism is *not* an established scientific fact— [15.33] and perhaps never can be.

[15.34] So the truth we were looking for at the end of Section 1 turns out to be that neither neuroscience nor physics has yet killed a form of incompatibilist free will which does not require the conscious initiation of actions.

[15.35] And of course nothing can kill compatibilist free will. Therefore I suggest that it is probably sensible to stop saying that science now definitively shows free will to be illusory. Not only is such a statement sociologically dangerous—it is also untrue.

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