Studying the New Zealand Family: Analytical Frameworks, Concepts, Methodologies and Knowledge Bases

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A web-monograph to elaborate conceptual and methodological problems that emerged while studying the family in New Zealand in The New Zealand Family from 1840: A Demographic History (Auckland University Press, 2007)
We reiterate here the dedication of our book to the late Dr E. G. Jacoby and Dr Miriam Vosburgh, both of whom laid down the major foundations of a systematic demographic knowledge base about the New Zealand family. We also dedicate this technical monograph to them as their contributions extended beyond empirical research. Each of them pioneered what have subsequently become conventional approaches for family research methodologies, cohort analysis and sample surveys and thus they initiated strategies referred to throughout this monograph.
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ARTs</td>
<td>assisted reproductive technologies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBR</td>
<td>crude birth rate</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECE/FFS</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Europe/Family and Fertility Study</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESCAP</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific</td>
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<td>ESCs</td>
<td>English-speaking countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAR</td>
<td>general abortion rate</td>
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<td>GFR</td>
<td>general fertility rate</td>
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<td>GRR</td>
<td>gross reproduction rate</td>
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<td>LAT</td>
<td>living apart together</td>
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<td>MGFR</td>
<td>marital general fertility rate</td>
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<td>MTFR</td>
<td>marital total fertility rate</td>
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<td>NZFFS</td>
<td>New Zealand Fertility and Family Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZW:FEE</td>
<td>New Zealand Women: Family, Employment and Education Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRR</td>
<td>net reproduction rate</td>
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<tr>
<td>STDs</td>
<td>sexually transmitted diseases</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAR</td>
<td>total abortion rate</td>
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<td>TFR</td>
<td>total fertility rate</td>
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<td>WDCs</td>
<td>Western developed countries</td>
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The family is such an everyday institution that often we feel that we know it instinctively and that it thus needs no further conceptual elaboration. In trying to analyse the family, however, this turns out not to be the case. Researchers often have to lay out in further detail technical arguments which may impinge on their story about the family. To avoid this, we have adopted a different approach.

This web monograph is a supporting document for The New Zealand Family from 1840: A Demographic History by Ian Pool, Arunachalam Dharmalingam and Janet Sceats. It is aimed at the specialist reader who wishes to pursue in further depth issues raised more briefly in the book. A second web document, A Demographic History of the New Zealand Family from 1840: Tables, by Arunachalam Dharmalingam, Ian Pool and Janet Sceats, provides detailed data supporting the more summary tables in the book, again as a source for the specialist reader.

The printed narrative with supporting technical documents on the web was a strategy suggested by Auckland University Press director Elizabeth Caffin. The intention is to allow the reader to follow the flow of an argument without being exposed to the full weight of statistical evidence or elaborations on technical issues, yet being able to turn to these if they wish to follow up some issue in more detail.

All three of the chapters here are summarised and referred to in The New Zealand Family from 1840 and, particularly in the case of the first two chapters, there is inevitable overlap. The third chapter here, a detailed cross-comparative analysis, is a more ‘stand-alone’ document. It systematically identifies key areas of analysis on the family and on co-variates of family change, shows how overseas researchers have approached the analysis of these issues, and then reviews and evaluates the New Zealand studies and literature on these areas. It thus shows the knowledge base available to the New Zealand scholar and pinpoints significant gaps. Co-author Susan Singley developed the framework for Chapter Three and was the team member who made the greatest contribution to it when the authors were writing a report on the family for the Ministry of Social Development.

Finally, we would like to thank Maxine Campbell of the Department of Societies and Cultures at the University of Waikato for her comments on an earlier version of this monograph.

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Hamilton, Melbourne and Christchurch
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CHAPTER ONE

Studying Family Change

1.1 TRANSITIONS IN NEW ZEALAND FAMILIES
This monograph elaborates on a number of technical issues raised in an empirical context in a separate book, *The New Zealand Family from 1840: A Demographic History* (Auckland University Press, 2007), by three of the present authors, Ian Pool, Arunachalam Dharmalingam and Janet Sceats. *The New Zealand Family from 1840* provides a demographic analysis of changes in the New Zealand family spanning the 165 years from the start of colonisation until the early twenty-first century. It covers the family transitions of all major ethnic groups; the notion of transition, to be developed below in this chapter, is merely a convenient framework around which to analyse long-term socio-demographic trends in various phenomena, in this case the family. The book also covers key dimensions of family life: family dynamics; family morphologies, further sub-categorised into structures and forms; and family policies (defined below). This monograph provides the book's academic underpinnings, making these available to the specialist or general reader who wishes to follow up particular issues of a conceptual or theoretical nature or that relate to the knowledge base about the family available internationally for societies like our own, and identifies the gaps in our own knowledge base.

1.2 TECHNICAL QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE STUDY OF THE FAMILY
In writing such a broad-ranging history of society’s most pivotal institution, there is always a tension between the need to expound on what is technical detail, essential to the testing of various hypotheses and the explaining of documented trends, and the need to avoid what may be distractions for the non-specialist reader looking for a sweeping, authoritative yet accessible narrative. Our aim for *The New Zealand Family from 1840* was ambitious: to present an academically rigorous history, yet one of interest to the general reader. These tensions become particularly acute when the family is the subject under the microscope because it is an institution that is all too familiar to everybody, yet whose properties turn out, on further examination, to be complex and less evident than a superficial view might suggest.

To resolve these tensions in the book we recorded the more technical information separately in this monograph, where it can be available both to the specialist reader who is interested in problems of family analysis and to the general reader who wants clarification on one or more technical points. This inevitably produces overlaps and some repetition between the book and this web document; this is unfortunate but also unavoidable. Another companion web-document, *The New Zealand Family from 1840: Tables*, presents longer tables, plus some tables that provide supplementary evidence on various points referred to in the main book.

The technical and methodological issues raised in this present monograph fall into several major categories:

1. What are the key concepts necessary for the study of the family? How does one define these concepts, including the term family itself and its virtual synonym, household? Conceptualisation must extend to factors underlying many of the co-variates of family life, notably ethnicity.
2. What are the sources of data available for such research, quantitative and qualitative?

* The word ‘transition’ is used in two very different senses in this monograph. In this chapter, following demographic convention, it refers to a major societal transformation. A ‘family’ transition is merely one example of such a set of changes followed at different times by each major New Zealand ethnic group. A second usage follows statistical conventions and relates to changes of individuals or cohorts from one ‘state’ or status to another.
3. What then are the analytical strategies, the techniques and methodologies that we can employ for such data?

Ours is primarily a demographic study that deals with the family at a macro level, and not with individual households. Thus it looks at rates of change for family dimensions at a population or sub-population level. In the case of structures it analyses the percentage of all households that fall into various categories. That said, the family or the individual person is the unit of reference for survey data and in some historical studies – where these are available – that use expository methods. But we still analyse these data by aggregating them into categories – historians and others do, of course, also cite individuals, and we do the same for some of our survey data coming from sources such as focus groups. We must therefore ask what the advantages are of adopting this macro-level strategy which is the primary approach of this study. In part that question is almost rhetorical as there are few other data available – in New Zealand we do not yet have the genealogical data analyses available, for example, to our British peers, nor, as Chapter Three shows, do we have the rich and diverse data sets available in many other Western developed countries (WDCs), especially the United States. Simply importing results from American or other analyses is not a solution for this problem, as our trends may be very different. To take a simple case, the media and the public have uncritically accepted the parameters Americans have established for their Baby Boom, a signal social event. Their data drive our views on this, yet their Boom ended perhaps a decade before ours and thus has very different policy – and market – implications.

5. A related very important major question is: do such macro-level analyses report fairly on the realities of family life?

6. We also ask how extensive the literature on the New Zealand family is. We do not look at the child development literature as we see that domain as being largely outside the scope of our study; nor do we look at some processes that impinge on household life, such as family court and mediation proceedings coming from family breakdown. Moreover, we do not address social-emotional dynamics, in part because they are outside the scope of what is a macro-level study, but in part because there are, anyway, surprisingly few data on these aspects of New Zealand family life. Had they been available, we would have turned to them in order to enrich our explanatory frameworks, but because of severe knowledge-gaps this option was more or less closed to us.

7. To set guidelines for what is essentially a knowledge-base review of New Zealand family studies, we make a cross-comparative analysis with other similar WDCs, asking how well has research in New Zealand covered family life? This then allows us to ask the related question: where are the knowledge gaps? This exercise is weighed towards American analyses for the very good reason that the United States has by far the most systematic, developed data-bases and research in this area. It is also a country that falls into the English-speaking (ESCs), neo-European block of WDCs, that cluster of states closest to New Zealand in terms of socio-demographic characteristics.

In this monograph, Chapter One focuses on defining the family and the different dimensions that we study. Chapter Two takes a more multi-variate approach by looking at family change and its determinants, and transitions over time. It formulates an analytical framework for the study of changes in the family, Figure 2.1, which relates to all family morphologies,* further sub-categorised into family dynamics, family structures and forms, and family policies. Chapter Three is focused on the knowledge-base review noted above.

The present study – that is, both the book and the two related web documents – reports on what are arguably among the most important of all social phenomena, for the forms and structures of the family constitute the morphology of what, essentially, are society’s building blocks. In order to make some introductory comments, we define the key terms as follows. The *forms* are the statuses of the family and its members (e.g. marriage or consensual union; marital status; dependent child, adult, relatives), and its living arrangements (e.g. two-parent, sole parent, couple-only or single-person households). The *structures* are its size and residential patterns (e.g. number of adults and children; age-composition; geographical links to other parts of the family) (these and other constructs are elaborated further below).

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* The word morphology is borrowed from the biological sciences to describe all of dynamics, forms and structures.
The story that will emerge here relates to the normative structures and forms of family life. That is, it deals with modal trends: those prevalent among most households, or at least among a significant minority of them. Inherent in mapping these is the phenomenon ‘family formation,’ the socio-demographic processes of forming unions and having children by which families are shaped. The societal significance of the structures and forms is derived from the roles the family performs, and thus its basic responsibilities to the wider society, most notably how this contributes to the fertility rates of the population. But, equally, the family itself is also affected by social, economic and cultural transformations in the wider society.

By their very nature social phenomena, such as family life or the values relating to this, do not lend themselves easily to reductionism and branding. Yet, it is generally agreed that the family is society’s most pivotal primary unit, and that, in this role, it performs a set of fundamental functions for the wider society.

Reproduction and thus societal maintenance – where each couple has sufficient children to replace themselves – is indisputably one such key function, perhaps the most important. Changes in the demographic dynamics of families – the processes of family formation involving the establishment of a union, parenting, and then the dissolution of a household through children leaving home and/or breakup or widowerhood – become the essential determinants of societal vitality. These events also affect the forms and structures of families themselves. The family also plays a major role in the nurturing and socialisation of each new generation; and, beyond this, so it can be argued, it is the keystone of civil society and contributes to social cohesion.

To do all of these, the family must have at its disposal appropriate tools and material assets. As a result, one of the more enduring political and social debates is whether or not the family has the capacity to serve society in these ways and, conversely, how the wider society and economy can help it perform its roles more effectively. This takes the form of providing back-up services and often of direct assistance, all of which fall within the purview of family policy.

1.3 ELABORATING KEY CONCEPTS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF FAMILIES AND HOUSEHOLDS

This study employs some key concepts, a number of which have been referred to already but are further elaborated here, and others of which must be defined here. The umbrella term family morphologies, which encompasses processes as well as forms and structures, was defined earlier.

In this section of the chapter the focus will be on conventional definitions, primarily in statistical data series, and conceptual problems that arise. Then in later sections of the chapter the follow-up question will be raised: do these definitions and the data they attempt to capture reflect family realities?

1.3.1 FAMILY DYNAMICS

This term includes all ongoing processes in family patterns, trends, interactions and transactions, and behaviours, including psycho-social dynamics that are outside the scope of this study. This definition also encompasses values, norms and mores, albeit at the macro-level at which this analysis is undertaken. The focus will be on structural factors rather than attitudinal variables. Family structures and forms are essentially outcomes of particular dynamics, most importantly those of family formation (defined above; see also below). These changes in turn are not only interrelated with, or determined by, (i) norms and values and (ii) familial interactions and transactions, but are also affected by (iii) the wider social and economic environment.

Structures and forms, to be defined below, manifest themselves, both as behaviours and values (what Cameron 1985a calls ‘values structures’), although perforce, because of the available data, our research generally limits itself to the more manifest behaviours rather than the more latent values structures. Nevertheless, it is essential to recognise that the value system is also an integral part of the social and economic contexts that drive, or are co-variates of, shifts in family dynamics, and thus in structures and forms.

This said, the value system constitutes a set of factors on which it is extraordinarily difficult to provide precise information. First, values do not remain stable, even over short periods, and depend on the context operating at a given moment. Secondly, in surveys, whether qualitative or quantitative, perceptions, at-

* Throughout this study demographic terminology is used for words such as fertility (= live births), fecundity (innate capacity to reproduce) and fecundability (probability of conception in any inter-menstrum in the absence of fertility regulation). See Grebenik and Hill 1974; also Pool 1991: Glossary. The conventions in English-language demography for fertility and fecundity are, for some curious reason, the opposite of those employed in biology and in the Romance languages.
attitudes and mores may well be driven more by community and cultural prescriptive ‘norms’ (what people should or might do) than by the actual values held by respondents. In a study such as this, it is more useful to focus on the other sort of ‘norms’ (what people have done, or report that they have done). Even then, it must also be recognised that the recording of what people do or claim to do involves some important methodological problems, particularly of a classificatory type such as defining different sorts of family structures.

Thus, the value system is not addressed in detail in this macro-level historical study. But ultimately reference to it is limited by the practical fact that the New Zealand knowledge base does not contain a diverse and well-developed literature on this, either survey-based (except for the survey New Zealand Values Today, Gold and Webster, 1990 which covers only a limited part of the period here) or from micro-level qualitative studies. Cameron’s work (e.g. 1990), or that of Toynbee (1995), Sears (e.g. 2003) or a scattering of historians would be notable exceptions to this lacuna (discussed further in Chapter Three).

1.3.2 FAMILY FORMATION: OVERALL

The significance of family formation as a driver of family dynamics in general is so fundamental that it is the most important organising principle for a major, seven-volume, multi-national study, *Family Change and Family Policy in the West*, coordinated by the University of Mannheim’s Centre for European Social Research, and edited by two very senior American social policy analysts, Sheila Kamerman and Alfred Kahn. The first volume, covering New Zealand and three other ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries, is explicit about this issue both in the introduction (Kamerman and Kahn 1997) and in its case studies (for example, New Zealand, Shirley et al. 1997; Canada, Baker and Phipps 1997 and Great Britain, Ringen 1997).

Unlike structures and forms, the problem with much of family formation is not so much conceptualisation as measurement. In this regard, as we will discuss in detail in Chapter Three, the New Zealand information base lacks the richness of those seen in most other WDCs, although in terms of core data we are not too badly off. Thus data accuracy and coverage of the core data is a key question, an issue that we will touch on below. But family formation also involves studying statuses as well as the occurrence of events: whether or not events occur that cause or allow an individual to make a transition from one life-cycle state to another – the second meaning of the word transition – and each state relates to a family form that must be conceptualised.

In employing the term family formation, our study draws on the demographer Paul Glick’s classical concept, used in all basic sociological texts on the family, and elaborated for New Zealand by Pool and Crawford (1979) and Swain (1985). It is important to note that Glick included in the family life-cycle, and thus in his model of family formation, decrements through events such as children leaving home, union dissolution and reconstitution, as well as increments coming from forming unions and having children. Reconstitution, where previously married persons form a new union, often bringing with them children from previous unions, was a less important phenomenon at the time he wrote, although through widow(er)hood it had been in previous decades. Clearly it has once again become a critical factor, because of separations and divorce, and must be analysed for recent periods.

Thus, this study uses the term family formation in its conventionally accepted sociological and demographic sense to mean both the incremental phases of the family life-cycle (e.g. marriage, first birth, . . . , to last birth), the decremental stages (e.g. the ‘empty nest’ stage, dissolution through widowhood or divorce), and any reconstitutive phases (implying new incremental phases) that may follow decrements. The use of the word formation for decremental or reconstitutive phases may at first seem illogical, but in reality at each of these phases the family forms, or re-forms, a new structure. As children leave home, for example, a childless couple constitutes a newly formed family structure with rather different familial behaviours (transactions and interactions) from those occurring previously when the children were still at home.

The reason why family-formation processes play such a critical role in shaping family structures and forms is that they are highly deterministic, typically sequential events (Santow 1989). They then set in train in an inexorable way other family dynamics and also determine subsequent structures and forms, and even may play a role in shaping future familial events (Kamerman and Kahn 1997; Koopman-Boyden and Hillcoat-Nalletamby 2000). For example, consider the following two truisms that are highly deterministic yet have enormous analytical import:

- that birth cannot occur without exposure to the risk of conception;
- that a younger or older age at first pregnancy will affect the remainder of the family life-cycle and the ages at which key stages are reached. Parents who have a first birth at age 20 years, before they
have built up much equity, might have limited material resources with which to produce adequate outcomes for their children. But such parents could well see their children leave home when the parents are still at labour-force ages in their forties. In contrast, births to women aged 35 years or older carry with them implications about child dependency for the parents when the latter are in their late fifties and sixties. A shift from earlier to later modal ages of childbearing will thus effect societal transformations far beyond the merely demographic.

1.3.3 FAMILY FORMATION: NUPTIALITY

The various stages of family formation produce new family statuses or forms, such as becoming a partner in a union, taking on the role of a parent, or entering the state of widowhood. Some family-formation-generated statuses can be formalised in a legal sense (e.g. registered marriage), although the reporting of these family forms is itself rather problematic. These are all events that are comprised in the term ‘nuptiality’ which thus cross-cuts all the dimensions of family formation and family forms, and underlies some aspects of family structure.

The study of nuptiality and the defining and measuring of union formation and dissolution is fraught with difficulties. Data on nuptiality come from censuses, marriage registration and surveys. The term ‘nuptiality’ ‘deals with the frequency of marriages [and cohabitation] . . . ; with the characteristics [and statuses] of persons united in marriage [or cohabiting]; and with the dissolution of such unions’ (Shyrock and Siegel 1976: 333, quoting the Multi-lingual Demographic Dictionary, United Nations 1958). ‘Thus nuptiality involves processes (family formation), but also formal and structural aspects (size, age, statuses, living arrangements).

An attempt has been made in recent New Zealand censuses to capture the differing levels of union formalisation by asking persons to report de facto unions, but this approach has been only partially successful. In contrast, retrospective data covering the histories of women aged 20–59 years from the 1995 survey New Zealand Women: Family, Employment and Education (NZW:FEE) (Marsault et al. 1997) do allow us to explore questions of union formation and breakdown more precisely – to take an example, we can relate a divorce back exactly to the marriage from which it came – but, unfortunately, only for part of the reference period of this study (back to the 1950s). Some censuses overseas and in New Zealand now also attempt to report same-sex unions (see Chapter Three).

Among other things, the NZW:FEE results show that cohabitation levels for recent years are far higher than census data on de facto unions would imply. This may mean that there are now three sorts of union status in New Zealand, cohabitation, a consensual relationship lasting for a few months or more, de facto unions, which may be longer and involve more commitment, and de jure registered marriage (Pool 1998: 326). We are not alone in recognising that cohabitation is not some singular form of union but has many variants. Thus the distinguished French social demographer Roussel used ‘legal status and the presence of a child’ to distinguish between a consensual union (‘union libre’) where a couple live together outside marriage with a child, and cohabitation, involving ‘a man aged less than 25 years and a single woman living under the same roof’ (Roussel 1993).

But because there are also links between cohabitation and marriage, Villeneuve-Gokalp has identified five forms of cohabitation and consensual union (both cited in Burch and Belanger 1999: 33–34). Burch and Belanger also show that there are major semantic differences between English and French in questions posed in the two linguistically different versions of the same survey in Canada, and also between surveys (1999: 31–33), making comparability very difficult. Beyond this, the NZW:FEE shows that significant numbers of younger New Zealand women are in another form of consensual union, ‘living apart together’ (LAT) (Pool 1998: 326); what the French call ‘Living as a couple, each one at his/her own place’ (Villeneuve-Gokalp 1997, ‘Vivre en couple chacun chez soi’).

For earlier periods much of this is academic as our study is entirely reliant on two sets of data on statuses:

- marriage and divorce registration; and
- marital statuses as reported in censuses (throughout for Pakeha; since 1926 for Maori).

* A. Dharmalingam is an author of the chapter on reproduction in the revised version of this classical methodological text.
† Because of migration this cannot be done with registration data – a marriage registered overseas may be dissolved in New Zealand; a marriage registered in New Zealand may be dissolved overseas. But in the survey one has recourse to data on the respondent for their marriage and their divorce.
Registration data record defined nuptial events as these occur. It is a juridical process with checks on the veracity of the declarations, and sanctions for false reporting. But registration data do not exactly measure either the formation or the dissolution of unions, but merely the formalisation and legitimation of these. Divorce can occur only for a legal marriage, although recent civil union legislation will have changed this to a degree. As the registration system is essentially one imported to New Zealand from the United Kingdom it had less direct relevance to Maori who already had their own processes of legitimation (see also Pool and Sceats 1981: Section 5).

Beyond that, registration data record other family-formation (but not conjugal) events as they occur, such as births, deaths and abortions, from which status changes can be calculated. The shift from parity zero to parity one is exactly a case in point for the mother concerned. Some censuses also have other data that infer statuses: children ever born alive; dependent children; relationships to the person who is the ‘occupier’ of a household and to whom all others are referenced (Pool and Sceats 1981).

Censuses also collect marital status data that are subject to recording problems. Most notably they depend on self-reporting, and, over and above the collection of data on de facto unions, this has led to a tendency towards the inflation of the category ‘married’ itself, so that it does not only record those who are legally married but includes a minority of people in other forms of union (Pool 1992, 1997). This issue is important as perceptions about marital status are often based on census data.

1.3.4 FAMILY FORMATION: OTHER REGISTRATION AND CENSUS DATA
Some vital events, above all births and deaths, have an inherent and highly desirable statistical property: they are virtually self-defining. In their case, the key issue is not conceptualisation but measurement. In this regard, the basic registration data are reasonably accurate in New Zealand today. For Pakeha, who migrated to New Zealand from countries that had virtually complete systems by the 1860s, the registration of vital events was compulsory from early settlement and has been accurate in terms of overall coverage at least from the 1870s and probably earlier (Tiong 1988; confirmed for deaths by Pool and Cheung 2004). For Maori it was only in the early twentieth century that registration was made compulsory, and for a key factor, births, complete coverage did not occur until just after World War II (Pool 1991). A more severe problem is that, by comparison with some jurisdictions, for New Zealand some key variables, critical for analysis and explanation of trends, are poorly recorded. Perhaps the most notable is the case of parity data (any previous offspring of the mother of a live birth), the information for which is reported in a very badly designed question, no better today than it was in 1981 (Pool and Sceats 1981); parity data are almost unusable. Other data may be problematic not in terms of coverage but in the way that coding is carried out, or for statistical reasons such as the inadequate links between numerators and denominators; for example, the coding of ethnicity has a impact on abortion data by ethnic group which we employ in later chapters. Moreover, in that case the numerators are inflated by the inclusion of temporary residents (notably Asian students), whereas the denominators refer only to normal residents.

Censuses record a range of family data, notably those on marital statuses mentioned above and those on living arrangements (see below). Among other information is that on dependent children, a question asked more or less systematically, and of major use when one is looking at the burdens and capacities of households. Another critical question for many purposes is that of children ever born alive to adult women, but in New Zealand there has been a real failure to maintain systematic time-series data on this question. This is a major lacuna for researchers, because this census question is the only source of data that permits detailed socio-economic and socio-cultural studies of this aspect of fertility.

When this information is collected effectively and systematically analysts can prepare n-way tabulations (or conduct multi-variate analyses) on various sub-populations, at both a national and sub-national level looking for changes over time; no sample data set can ever replace this function as the sizes of data cells will be too small and thus detailed disaggregation cannot be carried out. A most unfortunate decision was taken by Statistics New Zealand to cycle the question on numbers of children born alive to adult women, asking it in the 1970s, in 1981, but not in either 1986 or 1991, again in 1996 and in 2006, but not 2001. The absence of these data from the 2001 census was particularly ill-timed. This was a period in which total family sizes were not changing greatly, but in which massive shifts-shares in patterns of childbearing by age and for almost every socio-economic characteristic were occurring, affecting all the processes of family building in New Zealand. This thus created a major gap in analyses of changes in the New Zealand family at a very crucial moment.
1.3.5 FAMILY FORMATION: FERTILITY REGULATION

Finally, family formation relates not merely to states in the family life-cycle but also to fertility regulation as it covers one set of instruments by which some aspects of family formation occur. It governs the transitions (in the statistical sense of this term) from one state to another; for example from parity zero to parity one, parity one to two, etc. Fertility regulation not only includes contraception, sterilisation and abortion, but also, in the words of Kingsley Davis and Judith Blake (1956) factors that affect ‘exposure to intercourse’ such as whether or not men or women are in unions and engage in sexual relations, and the proportions remaining single; this latter set of factors played a very significant role in historical periods when effective modern means of contraception and sterilisation were not available and norms surrounding sexual relations outside marriage more effectively governed this behaviour. These conditions held true in New Zealand in earlier historical periods. Even after World War II, until the early 1960s, contraceptive techniques were not very effective by comparison with what is now the norm. There are also involuntary factors that affect the risks of conception and fetal survival (see Pool and Sceats 1981 that models the Davis-Blake framework for New Zealand).

1.3.6 FAMILY STRUCTURES

Perhaps the most important attributes of families or households are their structures, as these set the parameters for the way households perform their roles and functions. The structures include a size dimension that relates not just to members of nuclear families, but also household structures, and those of wider families. In the last case a critical aspect of the functioning of families is the maintenance of networks of kin and affines.

Intimately linked to these factors is an age-structural and tempo dimension that also affects family functioning. This dimension includes the age at which a couple has children, and the timing and spacing of the births, but is far more extensive than this and includes the ages of other family members and the tempos at which family events have occurred for them. Beyond this, there is an intergenerational dimension that is interlinked with the phenomenon of networks and residential patterns noted earlier, thus affecting functions and roles.

1.3.7 FAMILY FORMS

The various dimensions of family forms have already been noted, and problems relating to those aspects comprised within the rubric of nuptiality discussed above. But one further aspect, the living arrangements dimension, must be discussed in detail here.

Clearly the living arrangements of households enhance or limit their capacities to perform their roles and functions. To analyse living arrangements, the only long-running systematic data set comes from the census questions relating to dwellings, families and households. Dwellings in New Zealand typically contain one household composed of one family. But a dwelling, say an apartment block, may comprise more than one household. Households are also a broader unit in that they might contain more than one family, or relate to non-family units (see below).

Whether he or she is employing the term ‘families’ or ‘households’ the analyst using official data sources is still faced with two other problems:

- The research must be entirely at the macro-level: it does not deal with families/households per se, but with the proportion of families/households that have certain characteristics. This problem would not be immutable were it possible in New Zealand to gain easy access to census and other unit-record data, but at present this is not permitted.
- Regardless, many of the collective characteristics of families/households are based on the attributes of one individual, the so-called occupier: for example, his/her age, ethnicity, occupation (the issue of ethnicity will be raised later in this chapter). Again with individual records this problem would not be immutable, but is certainly an issue for the data used for much of the present analysis (Pool and Jackson 1994: 52–53, 1996; Callister 2003).

Households are seen as comprising three categories defined according to Statistics New Zealand’s classification system that divides them into family and non-family categories, and also into parenting or non-parenting households. Under this classification a ‘non-family’ cannot be a parenting household, but non-family households do include persons living alone, a status that may be the norm at their life-cycle stage (e.g. widows or widowers).
Normally, one family makes up one statistically defined household, but some households have more than one family, and/or take a 'non-family' form. To a major degree, these structures and forms are linked to the individual and family life-cycle stage. For the present study the importance of this point lies in the fact that at a popular level these differences are sometimes not understood. As a result, data on changes in the proportions of households which have non-parenting family structures or non-family, non-parenting forms are sometimes used as indicators of the social health of 'family life'; their growth may be seen as reflecting the breakdown of the wider society, whereas this may be far more due to restructuring because of age-structural and other transitions the population is undergoing and that are exogenous to family life, yet have a major impact on it. The three categories of household structures are:

- 'Parenting families', with three different sub-categories: sole, two parent, parent(s) plus others;
- 'Non-parenting families', with only one sub-category: 'couple only'; and
- 'Non-parenting, non-family households', with two sub-categories: single person, and households – such as student flats – made up of unrelated persons.

1.3.8 FAMILY FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
In this study, functions and responsibilities are seen as the macro-level roles that the institution of the family performs for the society, for societal survival (replacement) and enhancement (nurture and socialisation). The converse of these is the micro-level capacity of families to meet these demands or even burdens. Here only those that relate to caring and to transactions between parents and children and thus outcomes for children are discussed. Micro-level, couple-focused, social-emotional functions and concupiscence are not covered in our research.

This study does, however, also cover functions relating to other transactions involving support or caring, as these may have implications for those activities directed specifically towards children. The identification and measurement of these, directly or by using proxies, allows the analysis of familial capacities and thus inferences to be made about the prevalence of vulnerabilities. For example, the status 'sole parent' is an indicator, albeit imperfect, of the potential impairment of those functions relating to the parenting, nurturing, material capacity and socialisation of children.

Some aspects of these functions can also be seen as 'responsibilities', or even as legal obligations. For example, following the 1991 Budget some functions relating to the care of family members aged sixteen years or eighteen years and under, and in some cases below 25 years (for example, in full-time study), were legislated as legal obligations for those families with adequate financial means (Jackson 1994a, 1994b, 1994c).

1.3.9 FAMILY POLICIES
The constituent elements of ‘family policy’ are difficult to define, but certainly go beyond family income support and might include access to childcare and formal education, and the provision of adequate housing and health care. Family policy can comprise any measure that addresses the problem of maintaining levels of family well-being. But often it goes further by seeking to achieve goals of social equity, and of nurturing and socialisation. Such initiatives are not purely altruistic, for, as implied above, an underlying concern is the degree to which families can provide the foundations for social cohesion, and thus the extent to which familial capacity can underpin social democratic traditions and civil society.

Family policy directly impinges on the formation, structures and functions of families, and to the inter-relationships between them and the broader society. In this regard such policy can be directed at families per se, or can be 'an instrument to achieve other objectives in other social policy domains. For example,. . . to achieve labour market objectives' (Kamerman and Kahn 1997: 6–8). In this regard the official statistical definition of family discussed earlier vary from that which is central to policy. To Kamerman and Kahn, 'Family policy . . . suggests . . . a definition of 'family' that allows for drawing distinctions, while encompassing a variety of types, structures, roles, and relationships usually involving at least one adult and one child' (Kamerman and Kahn 1997: 7). This definition has a significant limitation: it excludes persons in (or outside) households who interact with or require support from their family or whanau. An elderly widow living alone would be such an example. In official statistics a couple with no resident children would be another. If, however, one downplays the purely spatial limitation of co-

* Here Statistics New Zealand categories are used. These accord reasonably well with international protocols.
residence inherent in official data, most statistical ‘families’ and households fit reasonably well with what is needed for family policy studies.

1.4 A REFLECTIVE ANALYSIS

1.4.1 CAPTURING THE COMPLEXITIES OF FAMILY LIFE

There must always be concern whether a broad sweeping review such as the present one gives a picture that reflects social reality or whether it describes a construct divorced from what Cameron (1985a) calls ‘everyday life’. Nowhere is this issue likely to be more significant than in analyses relating to the family and to households, especially their forms or structural elements (Jackson and Pool 1996). The reasons are simple: in ‘everyday life’ the two terms are used interchangeably; and the same word ‘family’ will be employed to refer to very different phenomena (for example, in the same sentence, to a nuclear family structure and then without any apparent contradiction to an extended or whanau structure). Over and above this, there are cultural and other differences in the use of these concepts and in the norms ascribed to the behaviours of persons within these structures, and even to the structures themselves (for example, what functions they are expected to perform). These norms and expectations change over time producing or responding to observed shifts in structures, and to transformations in the social and economic context of family structural changes.

Moreover, it may be far more difficult to set limits to a seemingly simple structural construct, the nuclear family, than might appear to be the situation at first glance. Indeed by the end of the period covered in our study, although still the most common family structure, the classical nuclear family seems to have constituted only a minority of all households. The press and popular sociological commentaries are constantly emphasising the point that the conventions of family life are changing, and that the family as we know it is extremely complex. For the researcher about to set out on a voyage of discovery employing the available data this is all very sobering, but does it in its turn reflect reality?

Complicating this issue is the fact that the analyst is typically dependent on data sets that have pre-defined categories. The New Zealand census, the major data source used here to analyse structures and forms, follows international conventions. As noted earlier, it enumerates dwellings, within which there may be one or more households, which in turn may each consist of one or more families, and/or one or more families with non-family members. Households conventionally are divided into two categories: family and non-family.

In choosing between families and households for this analysis the latter construct was decided on, for reasons that have been documented in detail by Jackson and Pool (1994: 45–50; see also Jackson and Pool 1996). Most important among these is the fact that households give a wider and more comprehensive view on the proportions of family units having different living arrangements, and the shift-shares between them (see also Davey 1998: 4, who adopts this strategy). The use of the more narrowly defined data on families can produce misleading interpretations of family life. The construct ‘family’ comes down to us from the Baby Boom, when it was the most important form of basic social unit, very typically a nuclear grouping of two parents and their children. Today, however, this narrowly defined use of the word ‘family’ restricts analyses because the construct excludes many numerically large forms of units. Indeed, because of radical changes in the age patterns of family formation, families per se more and more comprise childless couples, units that have had children who have left home or that are delaying having their first child, rather than parents and their children.

This issue is more than merely semantic and often has other ramifications. For example, popular stereotypes of sole parents revolve around seeing them as isolates, usually young women, bringing up children alone. This impression is not always correct, but it shows why it is necessary analytically to relate families of various types to households within which they are located. Such an analysis shows that, for example, many sole parents, of all ages and ethnic groups, will be embedded in far more complex households, typically ‘parent plus others’ (Pool, Jackson and Dickson 1998). To take another case, many of the shift-shares in family and household structures in recent years have come through an increment in the prevalence of
single-person households. This results from increasing numbers at older ages who are mainly widows, a status that is a norm at older stages in the life-cycle, yet is a living arrangement that is defined as ‘non-family’ (Davey 1999) – even though many widows will be embedded in ‘families’ that span several households (see section 1.4.2 for discussion).

This sort of problem leaves the present study with some major questions:

- Whether or not the macro-level data (and micro-level supporting analyses) provide a picture that correctly reflects the ‘family’;
- Whether or not statistical and other definitions create constructs that do not exist in reality;
- Whether or not these definitions cover most, or certainly the more common, forms of ‘family’; and
- How one reconciles a very inclusive and fluid definition of the type formulated, for example, in a document prepared by the Ministry of Social Policy (1999),† with the more compartmentalised constructs developed for statistical purposes.

Essentially the analysis of family forms and structures, whether involving qualitative or quantitative research, must attempt to put some sort of conceptual order into the complex phenomena being observed. As noted above, the fear still remains that the resultant ‘family’ might be more an artefact of the definition employed than of social reality. This is because data collections and analyses of family or household structures usually adopt one or other broad frameworks for their definitions:

- ‘Co-residence (same dwelling, or sharing the same eating facilities, or some similar criterion)’; or
- ‘Kinship and affinity (here termed kinship)’ (ESCAP 1986: 6).

The former tends to be the format used in statistical data collections. The genealogically based construct tends to be more commonly used in qualitative analyses, although the anthropologist Murdock’s definition also relates to ‘A social group characterized by common residence. . . ’ (cited in Cameron 1985a). But both sets of criteria may be exact or, equally, exclusive.

1.4.2 NEW ZEALAND RESEARCH ON THESE CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

The key problems are that the co-residence definition excludes persons who are geographically distant, but who may closely interact with other ‘family’ members. Yet, the definition based on genealogical ties assumes that kinship and affinity also carry with them the fulfilment of family obligations, whereas such a ‘family’ may include members of the kinship group who do not participate at all in any active way. This becomes critical when there is a shift towards neolocal residence. There is also the major methodological problem of where to set outer parameters for kinship and affinity (ESCAP 1986).

Fortunately there are New Zealand data available on this issue from a survey directed by one of the co-authors. It formed part of a seven-country study carried out by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP 1986). To explore conceptual problems relating to households/families the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific set up a working group in the late 1970s, a member of which was Ian Pool. He played an instrumental role both in a New Zealand component and in the overall programme (see ESCAP 1986) and was principal investigator for the New Zealand study in which Edward Douglas and Jan Cameron each directed a component. The ESCAP Committee commissioned seven multi-disciplinary, cross-comparative country studies, the first of which was a pilot study carried out in New Zealand by the Population Studies Centre, University of Waikato, and funded under the New Zealand Foreign Aid budget as it was designed to provide protocols across the region.

Because of the likelihood that family concepts will be affected by cultural norms, the opportunity was also taken with the New Zealand pre-test to survey two independent samples: Maori and non-Maori. The

* Now Ministry of Social Development.
† The tendency is to equate a kinship approach with the anthropology of Third World societies. But a recent study on Pakeha family life from 1900 to 1930, for example, shows the importance of this factor in family dynamics even in the modern era. Indeed, the author extrapolates from her research to muse that the policy and economic shifts of the late twentieth century may have renewed its importance (Toynbee 1995: passim).
pre-test, and the Asian surveys which followed, used both quantitative and qualitative research strategies, based around core protocols and, for the quantitative component, a core survey instrument. The qualitative component was designed to verify the quantitative survey results but also to investigate issues which cannot be studied using sample surveys. These included factors such as the intensity, strength, effects, degree of intimacy and ideology of interactions (as against their frequency), plus the interplay of cultural norms and familial values (Cameron 1981; Douglas 1981; ESCAP 1986: esp. 12; Pool 1981). We will return to this dimension of the ESCAP study in Chapter Two.

The ESCAP study attempted to allow the definition of family to emerge out of the interview process by permitting the respondent to nominate people with whom they had interactions. The resultant family was called the 'family of obligation,' the notion being that the 'Identification of acts of obligation or responsibility comes some way towards rectifying the structural inadequacies of conventional definitions of family' (ESCAP 1986: 8 quoting Cameron 1985a). The results were interesting and relevant to the present study:

- Obligations, and thus interactions to achieve these, as stressed in cultural norms were in fact less often honoured in practice than in principle.
- A corollary to this was the surprising result, across all seven countries (Asian plus New Zealand), that non-kin, even in very conservative countries, often played a more important role in terms of familial-type interactions than did kin.
- Not surprisingly, family networks were important in all the studies but, to cite the Maori survey, there was an almost tautological result, a 'statistically significant relationship between the number of categories/persons with whom there are interactions and the size of the family of origin' (ESCAP 1986: 16). This finding has been verified from data in the New Zealand Women: Family, Employment, Education Survey of 1995, in an analysis of Pakeha–Maori differences in support networks (Hope 1997).
- There were differences in the patterns and intensity of interactions across the life-cycle.
- Finally, and again this is almost tautological, place of residence was found to be an important factor – the further away from other persons with whom there might be interactions, the lower the frequency and intensity of interactions. For Thailand, where there are high levels of out-migration from rural areas, this actually necessitated concluding with a typology that was based on residential criteria, running from 'nuclear neo-local,' to 'extended families living in the same dwelling' (ESCAP 1986: 14).

Above all the ESCAP survey attempted to review whether or not differing definitions allow researchers to capture data that reflect the complexities of family life. The general lessons to be learnt from this ESCAP study summarised here are very important for the present study:

- First, and most importantly, family formation, including the size of the family of origin (i.e. how many siblings the parents had) is a critical determinant of other family dynamics (both macro-level and micro-level) as well as structures. It has even wider implications for the society (see Blum 1984) as it is the basis of population replacement.
- Secondly, kinship approaches may not be as indicative of 'everyday family life' as might be expected; families are often dispersed, and relationships do not guarantee that obligations will be fulfilled.
- Thirdly, co-residence, the baseline for census data, may not be a perfect base for defining family structures, but it certainly seems to be the more useful, if only because it determines that some type of contact will occur, however functional or dysfunctional this may be. This is a critical factor for reconciling the complex variety of possible family structures and the data most commonly available to study them.

While there are minor problems reconciling these structures to social reality, in general, as the 1986 ESCAP study showed, in the case of the majority of families, the statistical categories conform relatively closely to 'everyday families and households.' There is another dimension to this. In practice, the overwhelming majority of New Zealand families do in fact live in census household categories that fit reasonably well with living arrangements that are appropriate for their family life-cycle phase, although, of course, there will be a minority of units that is difficult to classify. Where data on such diverse family forms are collected, typically in non-official data sets, they often relate to living arrangements, or family status
categories (for example, cohabitation versus marriage) that are rather significant for the present study. Fortunately, as Chapter Three will show, recent national surveys on New Zealand throw some light on this (e.g. cohabitation; extended families), beyond what is available through official data sources.

Recently at a national level, censuses in North America have attempted to obtain more inclusive and less discriminatory data on family statuses other than those around which information was conventionally collected in the past (e.g. on same-sex unions) (see also Chapter Three). In New Zealand attention has been given in the census to statuses such as *de facto* unions; or in national probability surveys (NZW:FEE) to cohabitation and the common problem of LAT couples (as these people are called in Europe). The possibility of reporting same-sex partnerships was allowed for the first time in both the 1996 New Zealand census and in the NZW:FEE, but was not availed upon to any degree. Small-scale qualitative or non-probability surveys are more likely to produce satisfactory data on these structures. Given, then, that there are not systematic data-bases on a diverse range of possible family structures, the data on statuses in this study are restricted in the main to census categories and those available from large-scale surveys.

1.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown that, for New Zealand, data are available that permit the study of family morphologies. In this chapter we have identified their strengths and weaknesses, and we have pointed to conceptual problems that must be addressed when these data are used.

Most importantly, the resort to some extant New Zealand research allows us to make a very important conclusion about the utility of the basic data sources. These analyses show that family researchers can with a significant degree of confidence employ census data for their studies. Thus the census data categories do permit broad sweeping analyses of New Zealand families and households to be carried out. For vital data the issue is less important because they report events as they occur, they are bound by juridical conventions, and, in any case, some of these events are almost self-defining.

In Chapter Three we will show that a major constraint in attempting the sort of synthesis we are undertaking is the lack of family analyses of a type common in Europe and North America, and even in neighbouring Australia. New Zealand lacks the rich resources of other countries. Nevertheless, while some of our knowledge base on the family suffers significant gaps we still have sufficient data to look seriously at the basic features of family life over very long periods.

This study fills what is a major gap in the New Zealand historical literature. No one has yet attempted to write such a broad-sweeping analysis of family life covering so many decades and so many facets of family life. In fact, for the modern period such an exercise is rare or even unique internationally. There are edited works whose components cover different periods and different dimensions, there are time-series analyses of particular facets of family life and there are the exercises that report on pre-nineteenth- or twentieth-century European family history back to the end of the medieval period, but not a study like this one, covering both the colonial and post-colonial period of a population from the moment that the colony was founded.

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* For example, telephone surveys in Auckland on behalf of the NZ AIDS Foundation have been able to get such data (Saxton et al. 2002; Reid et al. 1998; Worth et al. 1997).
† One thinks immediately of the studies carried out by the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Society using family reconstitution techniques.
CHAPTER TWO

Conceptual and Analytical Questions

2.1 INTRODUCTION
The last chapter had a ‘uni-variate’ focus: on defining the different dimensions of the institution, the family. The present chapter moves to the ‘temporal and multi-variate’ dimensions. It asks: how does a researcher study macro-level changes in this institution over time, allowing for the fact that these may be as much due to shifts in family behaviour per se as to changes, instead, in the composition of the population – the proportionate growth or decline in particular groups? Thus the analyst has to develop strategies by which differentials in family behaviour can be studied both at any one time, synchronically and, as these change over time, diachronically. In turn this raises other issues largely of an analytical nature, such as those that follow on from the fact that the focus in this study is at the macro-level.

But the problematic aspects of the research do not end there, for researchers are also charged with attempting to explain trends and differentials. They must first of all look at those explanatory factors that are endogenous to the family itself, then those that may be proximate determinants, and then those that are exogenous and causally more remote. Figure 2.1 is an analytical framework that can be used to study the relationships between these various endogenous and exogenous factors.

The emphasis in Figure 2.1 is on how family differentials and changes are driven by various determinants, but there is another side to this. There is widespread concern about the impact of the family on the wider society. Later in this chapter we outline the major concerns in WDCs, distinguishing between the ESCs and the others. We also make a distinction between manifest concerns that at times express themselves in the form of moral panics, and latent concerns that, in the end, may be more fundamental to the family and the wider society.

2.2 SETTING THE ANALYSIS DIACRONICALLY: TEMPORAL ISSUES
Substantively, the analyses in the empirical book must address a major issue: that the patterns of family formation, and the family structures and forms prevalent in the early twenty-first century may well be historically unprecedented. But a question remains as to whether some morphologies that seem widespread in contemporary New Zealand have antecedents in past periods, and whether or not perceptions, whether ill-founded or based on fact, about ‘traditional family life’ inform popular opinion today. This then raises the question of whether the family policies operating today are unprecedented or not, and also the degree to which perceptions about ‘traditional family life’ also have an impact on policy formulation. Underlying these questions is the broader one of how family changes occur.

Chapter Two of the present monograph sets the parameters for the analyses that will address these issues. This requires frameworks for two crosscutting dimensions of family change. First, there are transitions over time in family life. We first outline a general model for these so as to provide a baseline by which to analyse New Zealand empirical data in our book. Secondly, there are the determinants of change, which we model in Figure 2.1, again to provide a framework for the empirical analyses.

Looking at the diachronic dimension here, and in our later review of the overseas literature, we developed a theoretical framework that was built around two sets of hypotheses. First, in preparing this study – this monograph, the book and the data tables – we postulated that in different periods the various dimensions of New Zealand family life coalesced, to a degree, into four distinct stages of what might be called a family transition, a model of which we have constructed specifically to provide a framework for our study. There is nothing radical in proposing a transition model for this institution, for demographic science has seen the emergence of a number of such frameworks: the demographic, epidemiologic, mobility and age-structural transitions and the sectoral transformation of the industrial labour force. We follow this convention by positing several stages for our model.

Secondly, we also postulate that the experiences of societies overseas fit, grosso modo, into this model.
In our empirical analyses this is sustained for the WDCs to which we constantly cross-refer, especially the ESCs. But New Zealand is not a mono-cultural society; it is also a demographic laboratory that, over long periods of time, has seen two very different demographic and age-structural transitions played out, the Maori and the Pakeha (Pool 1991, 2003). This carries across, we would postulate, to family transitions, and thus New Zealand models may well have relevance beyond the WDCs in countries undergoing delayed but rapid transitions, more or less following the Maori model.

The following then are the stages we would postulate for a family transition:

**Stage One: The Era of Large Families**
At this stage patterns of family formation were intense – both in terms of tempo (early and universal marriage for women; widow(er) remarry) and quantum dimensions (large family sizes), and these factors determined the modal structures. This was a period of large families, frequently with extended multi-generational structures, in which were embedded couples who were ‘married’ – ex-nuptial births were rare – and their children. The extended family was basic to Maori social organisation. Indeed, the term whanau, as defined then, still carries much the same conceptual weight today even in formal policy settings (e.g. the family and youth court systems). Because of the migration process extended family structures were perhaps less prevalent among Pakeha.

**Stage Two: The Era of Family Size Decline and Neolocalisation**
These structures began to be eroded through changes in patterns and levels of family formation, initially driven by shifts in marriage patterns, producing declines in fertility. Yet there was also marked reproductive polarisation – that is, accentuated differences between cohorts, age-groups and socio-economic and socio-cultural groups – in this case particularly between couples having numerous children and those with few, and many households still remained quite large. Polarisation occurred in another way: between those women who married and had children, and those who remained single and continued their careers. It is important to stress that family formation and structures were the *loci* of changes at this time. But this stage also saw the fragmentation of extended structures through a shift by Pakeha to neolocal households. In fact, the Pakeha immigration process had often already produced ‘neolocalisation’, a rupture between immigrants and the parts of the family still at the place of origin, normally in the British Isles. The structure that emerged was most commonly the couple and their children, the Pakeha nuclear family that came to seem as the New Zealand norm.

More recently the massive movement of Maori to the cities led to the neolocalisation of Maori families. Accompanying this for both Pakeha and Maori was suburbanisation to owner-occupied dwellings, conditions that allowed a temporary reprise of somewhat higher Pakeha fertility. But this trend then returned to a continuation of the downward shift in levels of reproduction as processes of family formation changed.

**Stage Three: The Era of Family Diversification**
While changes in structures and in patterns of family formation continued during this stage, the highest-profile shifts occurred in family forms, especially in their status dimensions. This spilt over into living arrangements.

**Stage Four: The Era of Family and Reproductive Polarisation, and Small Families**
At the fourth, and last (but see below), stage the trends that had been emerging at the third stage become more entrenched. Perhaps more critically, levels of family formation reach historic lows. Diversification takes on new forms as reproductive and other aspects of familial polarisation occur.

In New Zealand, as in other societies, especially the other neo-European WDCs, this transition is not as tidy as this outline might suggest because the migration process, an important aspect of demographic replenishment in these countries, often affects family formation and structures. Equally, of course, in a multi-cultural society each ethnic group may be at a different stage, while the tempo and velocity of transition stages vary by culture.

As for all transition models, two major philosophical issues arise. First, there is the question of whether or not the last observed stage represents the real end of the transition (Demeny 1997; Jones and Douglas
Secondly, and related to this, is an even more critical issue: if the fourth stage is the last one, or if low fertility, at rates already well below replacement (an index measured as 2.1 births, where each couple has 2+ births to allow for their own replacement), drops even further, then family structures will no longer be able to sustain societal viability.

Thus this story is one fundamental to the future of the society: a shift above all from large families to small, with the changes in forms that dominated Stage Three, significant as they were, being almost a sideshow in what was a continuing drama. This brings one back to a postulate raised earlier: that it was these lower-profile changes in family formation and structures that were ultimately more significant in determining the viability of the family than the higher-profile changes in forms, such as increases in divorce and cohabitation.

It should not be forgotten that these transitions are, in turn, constituents of much broader demographic transitions. In fact, over recent years the so-called demographic transition ‘theory’ has been dominated by concern over shifts in family formation (see Jones et al. 1997, especially Jones and Douglas 1997; Demeny 1997).

Society and the economy themselves are undergoing social, cultural and economic transitions or what are termed transformations (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1994; Kelsey 1999; Lutz, Sanderson and Scherbov 2001; Newton 2001; Papastergiadis 2000; Therborn 2000; World Bank 1994) in their structures and underlying value systems – these are what can be termed the ‘context’ of family change. They also have an impact on family morphologies, and will be looked at later in this chapter.

2.3 SETTING THE ANALYSIS SYNCHRONICALLY: DIVERSE FAMILY MORPHOLOGIES

New Zealand society is not homogeneous in terms of trends in family morphologies. One must always recognise that at any one time the profile of the ‘family’ in a multi-cultural and pluralistic society is being driven by the family behaviours of several different major ethnic streams, and numerous minor ones, and by the diverse patterns of various socio-economic groups. At any particular time, moreover, there may be family and reproductive polarisation, and this may vary from era to era. Thus, the title of the different components of our research is somewhat misleading as it refers to ‘the New Zealand family’. Instead there is diversity throughout much of post-colonial history revolving around the key concepts of ‘familism’ and ‘whanaungatanga’ (Douglas 1981). Both legislation and popular parlance recognise this by moving interchangeably between the words ‘family’ and ‘whanau’. Any analysis must therefore trace and compare Maori and non-Maori patterns of formation and changing structure, which remain very different even in the face of forces favouring convergence: very fluid ethnic relations involving high levels of interaction and inter-marriage (Pool 1991: Chapt. 2 and passim). Over recent periods, at least since the 1970s, this has been further complicated as members of two other ethnic groups, although here in small numbers in New Zealand from the nineteenth century, have come into greater prominence: Pacific peoples and Asians.

The diversity of family structures, especially along ethnic lines, raises major methodological questions. Above all this shows that New Zealand research must deal with culturally different family forms (see below), as well as varying perceptions about family building and family structures. Fortunately, over recent decades the data collection exercises of official agencies have attempted to cater for such differences.

There is, however, another aspect to this. The internal dynamics of family life, especially social-emotional interactions and how the structures actually operate, cannot be captured in a macro-level study such as this review (see below). This question was addressed in Chapter One that showed that the structures being analysed using official data sources’ – or data available from large-scale surveys – conform, more or less, with the everyday reality of New Zealand families. But to refer to New Zealand is to average out diverse cultural patterns. Thus a related question discussed later in this chapter is whether these same data sources also allow adequate analyses of the family behaviours of different ethnic groups.

Finally, a macro-level analysis must deal essentially with normative behaviour at the population level, as this is generally what is available in the data sources. But fortunately this is also the level at which most broader policy initiatives are directed. The study does not address the various types of structures that may produce dysfunctional families or those which affect very small numbers of people (for example, communes), even though such family morphologies may be over-represented at a social welfare case-management level or in stories hitting the media. A macro-level analysis cannot draw much on knowledge bases that explore the

* For example, vital statistics, censuses, but also many management information systems.
complexity of individual family life or the dynamics of particular groups of families. This is beyond the scope of the present study; much of this exploration, in fact, is done better by literature than by social science. But in any case, as our literature review in Chapter Three shows, New Zealand is not well served even with regard to social and psycho-social studies on family life.

2.4 EXPLAINING CHANGE AND VARIANCE: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

INTRODUCTION
The social researcher must both describe and attempt to explain changing family morphologies. These are the product of socio-economic, institutional, attitudinal and normative contexts (termed here determinants) as these operate at various times and in different cultures and social groups. But, equally, changes in family forms and structures result in changes in the wider society and in its value systems. These links are shown in Figure 2.1, which also introduces the notion of transmission of effects through 'proximate determinants', a point to be discussed later.

![Figure 2.1: An Analytical Framework for the Study of Changes in Family Structures and Forms](image)

This framework highlights several points. First, it distinguishes the proximate determinants from causally more remote determinants (Bongaarts and Potter 1983), which can include any social, cultural and economic factors or policies, or norms and values that might have an impact on families. By contrast, the proximate factors are essentially demographic in nature, and include changes in marriage and childbearing patterns, and changes in exposure to intercourse and conception, as affected by behaviours such as abstention, contraception, sterilisation and abortion (see Pool and Sceats 1981). The proximate determinants act then to transmit the effects of causally more remote factors to produce family changes, and also to translate changes in family structures and forms across to broader societal transformations occurring in various ways in a wide range of social and economic sectors and institutions.

* Pool and Sceats's (1981) study fits the classical Davis-Blake framework (1956) to the New Zealand situation and identifies key variables for New Zealand analyses.
Secondly, family formation and the intimately interlinked mechanism of fertility regulation constitute the ‘proximate’ determinants of family structure; that is, patterns of family formation have a direct effect on structures, as this latter construct is used here. In contrast, changes in family forms, as this term is defined in this study, come about both as a result of the processes of family formation, and the so-called ‘causally more remote’ determinants – the less immediate drivers of changes in family forms. For example, shifts in society-wide value systems in the 1970s allowed cohabitation to replace marriage as the preferred ‘form’, or status, for first unions among New Zealand couples (Lapierre-Adamcyk et al. 1997; Carmichael 1996; Dharmalingam et al. 2004).

The links just noted are not necessarily uni-directional: family formation is also determined by family structures and forms. For example, a sole parent not involved in any form of conjugal union or intimate relationship is not exposed to intercourse or to the risk of conception. Moreover, as was noted in Chapter One, the processes of family formation are also multi-directional: they can involve family-building (incremental); or the full or partial dissolution of a family through union breakdown, by the death of a spouse or by the ‘empty-nest’ syndrome (decremental); or the forming of a new family (reconstitutions), particularly through the ‘blending’ of parts of other families or by the return of adult children to the household – the so-called ‘crowded-nest’ syndrome.

Thirdly, the causally more remote determinants, especially as they are mediated by the wider value system, comprise all of the more material, social-emotional and socio-psychological behaviours. They are also the locus for the factors of social construction that are extremely important in the way society views different family forms. In this regard, societal norms and mores are never static and never adhered to universally: the marriage of Eliza Doolittle's father in *Pygmalion* was to meet prescriptions set by middle-class norms in the sense of 'model' behaviours, but his agreement to marry did not necessarily represent the 'modal' behavioural norms of the working class to which he belonged. The importance of this observation becomes even more apparent when any analysis is made of British antecedents to Pakeha family behavioural patterns.

The gap between what 'should be done' (the social construction of norms) and what 'actually happens' is best exemplified by referring to the behaviours of a significant minority of Pakeha couples, over much of New Zealand's history – in the period until the early 1970s. For example, prior to that decade pre-marital intercourse and conception were far from uncommon, but typically pregnancy resulted in the woman concerned (especially a teenager) being sent off to a single-mothers’ home to bear and adopt out the baby through a closed adoption. Alternatively, it led to a quickly organised wedding at which the bride's pregnancy was a 'secret', to be followed several months after the marriage by a 'premature' nuptial birth. In the 1970s these norms and the behaviours that sustained them changed radically, towards a more open acceptance of ex-nuptial conception and birth. But a residual effect of the shifts in norms in the 1970s is the way many commentators still depict 'ideal family values', basing their ideas on the marital childbearing of the past but ignoring the patterns of ex-nuptial conception followed by nuptial birth that often occurred then. This becomes problematic, particularly when twenty-first-century family forms are being compared with those in the Baby Boom.

THE OUTCOMES, OR DEPENDENT VARIABLES
It is useful to view structures and forms as 'outcomes' of changes in the proximate and causally more remote factors although, as has been noted, this is not a one-way relationship. Moreover, the boundaries between structures and forms are not water-tight as some elements affect, or are closely linked to, attributes of both of these. We have already defined what we mean by these terms, but it is necessary to take this conceptualisation a little further by looking at some of its sociological implications.

Family morphology is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. A family or whanau can range from a couple with/without children to a wider group, to a lineage. This categorisation covers, however, only one set of structural dimensions. There are also other dimensions that relate (1) to quantum; that is, to aspects of size; (2) to what we term here the 'age-structural' dimensions; (3) to the tempo of changes in structures within a

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* Family formation patterns by accident or design often have the effect of determining fertility regulation (age at marriage in societies in which pre-marital sex is strongly discouraged is one example). But they are often also dependent on fertility regulation (eg the use of contraception to delay childbearing within a union). We argue here that for structures family formation, in all its manifestations, is the sole proximate determinant, whereas for family forms the value system also plays a role. The structural variable residential patterns, such as neolocalisation, will be determined by shifts in family life-cycle stages.
family, as for example when in the normal reproductive span formation commences; and (4) to the tempo of family formation (timing and spacing of marriage and births). Finally, (5) there are wider structural factors that are termed here 'residential patterns'. Neolocalisation is an example of this.

Neolocal residence occurs when a couple (or a sole parent) sets up an independent household as they start their own family of adulthood, typically a nuclear one. As Maureen Baker notes in her wide-ranging, cross-comparative review of aspects of the family in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, 'Most Australian, New Zealand and Canadian marriages are neolocal, which means that the newly married couple establish a home separate from both [parental] kinship groups.' Citing Canadian researchers (Tepperman and McDaniel 2000) she also notes that 'Most young couples prefer to establish a separate residence and lifestyle from their family of origin' (Baker 2001: 31).

Within the broader concept of morphology we have seen that family structures are different from 'family forms'. Nevertheless, they share an important attribute: both can be affected by causally more remote factors, either directly, or working through the proximate variables. Moreover, they are not mutually exclusive factors. For example, if in practice marriage is the only status permitting exposure to intercourse and conception, then it has dimensions both of structure and form. To take another case, neolocal residence, a structural variable and undoubtedly the most common form of residence in New Zealand, typically involves nuclear families (forms). There are other types of geographical arrangement, but most others imply some sort of conjoint residence with persons outside the immediate nuclear family, or else close contact on a frequent basis.

Family forms, as has been noted, also include a number of elements:

(i) the union statuses of the people involved in family formation (e.g. whether they are in formally constituted or consensual unions);
(ii) the statuses and relationships characterising members of a given household structure (e.g. parent, offspring, relative, non-related person); and
(iii) living arrangements (e.g. single-person household, sole-parent or two-parent family, multi-generational family; a nuclear or an extended family form).

For living arrangements a key factor is whether or not the family is 'nuclear'. For Pakeha at least, this is the form most frequently taken as the benchmark for the family in popular discourse. Yet the notion of a nuclear family is itself not without problems. Superficially it is a simple concept – normally the couple and their children. But does this have definitive geographical boundaries? What about if there is a 'granny flat/papakainga' nearby or attached? Or if grandma/grandpa live next door, or just around the corner, or just across the marae? If the grandparents are in a separate and distinct residence, is theirs a 'nuclear family' appropriate at their stage of life? Although their grown-up offspring might have left home and perhaps have their own children, an older couple may still see them as a part of 'their' nuclear family. And what about a childless couple who have yet to start their family?

One could go on in this way, but the point here is that what seems at first to be a simple and commonsense construct may in fact be more complex to define and dissect analytically. Yet it is the nuclear family as commonly perceived that sets the parameters for 'normative' family life in much popular discourse. Perhaps, therefore, it is more useful to go back to the sociological concepts of family of orientation (the one you grew up in) and family of procreation (the one in which you parent your own children). But this still brings co-resident and/or dependent children back into the equation and leaves undefined, as it were, other family types.

There is yet another factor that, strictly speaking, is contextual and yet is a structural factor intimately linked to family life – the type and tenure of the dwelling in which the household lives. Any study of the family must pay heed to the form that this takes because it has immediate impacts on household dynamics. Apartment living, as in much of Continental Europe, is very different from residing in separate dwellings in a suburban street in New Zealand. Moreover, a dwelling unit can be in dispersed or nucleated settlement types; and they may be owned, with or without a mortgage, rented, or available through some form of 'grace and favour'.

THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

From the framework in Figure 2.1, and from the preceding paragraphs, it will have become clear that macro-level analyses must be restricted to the demographic drivers and manifestations of family life. For this reason our study does not address the more micro-level issues of family dynamics, and, as a
consequence, there is no attempt here to ground our analysis in the various theoretical schema that conceptualise families and their behaviours; these have been summarised succinctly by Baker who also identifies their implications for New Zealand research (2001: Chapt. 4). The intention instead is to bring together extant empirical information to provide a map of New Zealand family changes over the last 165 years so that scholars have a baseline from which to examine these theories.

This is not to infer that our work is somehow atheoretical, although some of its theoretical underpinnings may not be very familiar territory for some social scientists versed in social psychology and sociology. Our work can be firmly grounded in bio-social theory, most notably the work of scholars such as Davis and Blake (1956), whose framework was applied to New Zealand by Pool and Sceats (1981; see also Bongaarts, e.g. 1982). Underlying this work is a large body of demographic theory, often shared with biology and the health sciences, to which one must make reference from time to time. But far more importantly for our purposes here, social, cultural and economic theory, drawn on eclectically, helps inform the bio-social constructs. In this context it is important to note that Chapter Three here also reviews both the empirical literature on WDCs and on New Zealand, having direct relevance for our research and reports on its different theoretical underpinnings.

Were we asked to encapsulate in a phrase our research’s theoretical roots, we would probably cite the significance of three sets of explanations for the demographic behaviours permeating our analysis, and which will be called upon as appropriate (outlined in articles in the *International Encyclopaedia of Population*, 1982, by Ronald Freedman, John Bongaarts, Gavin Jones and Norman Ryder). These explanations are:

1. Those that emphasise ideational factors determined by values and experiences shared within generations and cultures, as shaped by socialisation, the generational dimension and its temporal context, and coming very much from a demographic perspective;
2. The frameworks that focus on economic variables, both in the wider environment and in the household itself, as these are shaped by policy initiatives; and
3. Demographic and bio-social determinants, such as the life-cycle and family life-cycle, age, gender, differences in ages between brides and grooms, the biology of reproduction and patterns of fertility regulation that have a direct and significant bearing on trends in family life.

### 2.5 ETHNIC AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

Among the most persistent differentials in patterns and trends of family life in New Zealand are those between Maori and Pakeha, and more recently between them and Pacific peoples and Asians. Thus no serious studies of families and households in New Zealand can be undertaken without closely examining ethnic and cultural differences, the analysis of which is fortunately a convention of very long standing here. In contrast, this was a realisation that Britain was only just coming to in the 1990s when it started to recognise, in more than a superficial way, ethnic differences in family structures (Murphy 1996).

It is also important to approach the study of ethnic differences with a great deal of methodological rigour, for data and analyses in this area really do inform public opinion, yet their underlying premises have not always been clear to casual users. Moreover, substantive factors may also confound comparisons. For example, cultural differences in preferred ages for common family-building events have other ‘impacts’ (as this phenomenon is called, Jackson 2000). To take one case, Maori women, on average, have babies at younger ages than do their Pakeha peers; thus this affects average age at which sole parenting may occur and this has other consequences (Jackson and Pool 1996, citing analyses on Maori sole-parent families). Finally, there is the further issue that the problems faced when classifying ethnicity cross-cut those pertaining to the definition of family morphologies.

Defining ethnic categories is a major quotidian issue in New Zealand, not least because New Zealand is one of a quite small number of countries – perhaps the leader – that not only attempt to record ethnicity (this is common) but also to recognise the fact that many people have affiliation to more than one group. Thus since 1986 census respondents and, since the mid- to late 1990s, respondents in other data collection exercises have been permitted to answer in this way.

In our work we generally use the terms Asian, Maori, Pasifika and Pakeha for the four main New Zealand ethnic groups. Sometimes where coding of data requires this, we use Asian and Other, and non-Maori (when the only other category is Maori). As Pakeha constitute the overwhelming majority of non-Maori for most of the period from 1840 to 1970, this simpler term is generally preferred over non-Maori.
Pakeha are of European descent, but we prefer the former term to the latter, as European is ambiguous: most Pakeha are not from Europe. We also do not use the term ‘Caucasian’, which is a hangover from Victorian attempts to classify ‘races’ and was used in racist legislation in some American states. Thus this term should have no place in modern New Zealand. There is also the not unimportant question of confusion with persons from the Caucasus – if one takes some police reports literally, then the small number of Armenians, Georgians, Azerbaijani and others of their geographical origin are responsible for a disproportionate percentage of the crimes in New Zealand.

Prior to 1986 for all demographic purposes but not in other areas such as electoral or the Maori Land Court, ethnicity had been defined in terms of ‘degree of blood’. With high levels of formal and informal inter-marriage over many years, indeed since the end of the eighteenth century, for a very long time this pseudo-genetic classification had not worked as intended. People responded in fractions that were appropriate to what they felt to be their cultural identity not their biological descent. Because of this and by default, as it were, the past situation probably produced reasonable data, and there was some degree of consistency across demographic data sets (Pool 1991: Chapt. 2). This, it must be stressed, was in spite of the classification, not because of it.

The censuses in the recent period from 1986 on, which have looked at cultural belonging and also allowed multiple responses, have been better in some senses in that the question used has been closer to social reality. It has, however, created other problems:

1. Once multiple responses are permitted, there are difficulties categorising answers; they are useful as a means of demonstrating how rich the society is, but they raise problems for any follow-up exercise relating to allocation (e.g. electorally); or to determine needs for the obtaining of services (Pool 2000c).
2. The solution adopted, and probably the only viable one, was to formulate a hierarchical system for ‘prioritising’ and coding responses. The problem here is that any such system must end up favouring one group at the expense of another or others. The system adopted is as follows:
   - Persons Maori, or Maori plus any other recorded group, are classed as Maori;
   - Persons Pacific peoples or Pasifika plus any other recorded group, other than Maori, are classed as Pasifika;
   - Persons Asian or Asian plus any other recorded group, other than Maori and/or Pasifika, are classed as Asian; and
   - Pakeha/European are the residual.

There was a growing non-response category.

3. The survey of the Population Studies Centre, NZW:FEE (discussed further in Chapter Three) collected data using the census question, followed by a probe that asked persons responding with two or more categories to rank these. The results of this probe were analysed by Tahu Kukutai (2001) who showed that dual-identity (Maori–Pakeha) respondents split evenly into seeing themselves primarily as Maori or primarily as Pakeha. Another 20 per cent said that they could not respond. Of interest was the fact that those seeing themselves as primarily Maori had attributes similar to persons identifying themselves as solely Maori, while those primarily Pakeha in identification tended towards persons reporting their identity only as Pakeha. There was, however, a marked tendency among all but ‘solely Pakeha’ to regard their offspring as Maori only. A review of these data also raised two other issues (Pool 2000c):
   - the respondents’ ranking does not fit well with the hierarchy adopted by Statistics New Zealand. This means inter alia that Maori are over-represented in any single category analysis (and most tabulations are in that form) emanating from the census or other statistical data; and
   - a significant group could/would not rank their ethnic identity a tribute to the fluidity in New Zealand society.

4. The other official statistical data collections have not fitted well with the census over the period 1986–96, and even today the fit is imperfect.

5. The data collection processes also vary. The census is reported by the respondents themselves, or their agents (e.g. if they are children). Births are usually reported by the mother, but are then coded by officials according to the parental ethnic profile. This creates a severe disjunction between numerators (registration data coded as noted) and denominators (census coded as noted in point two
above). Other statistics such as hospital admission and arrests depend on the reception/police station clerk’s perception or propensity to ask the patient/arrestee. Other collections (e.g. deaths, school data) use other processes.

6. Population projections start from a base that over-represents Maori principal ethnic identity, and then move increasingly towards a ‘descent base’, thereby further exaggerating the results (Pool 2000c). Separate projection exercises using Pacific peoples or Asians as the top rank in the hierarchy further confuse this picture.

7. For family household data the ethnicity of the unit is based on that reported by the ‘occupier’, and may or may not accord with that of the majority of occupants whether in a ‘family-household’ or a ‘non-related household’. To confuse the situation further some analyses have used other criteria for coding these units (Jackson and Pool 1996).

8. The Pasifika ethnic category is very diverse, yet in most analyses different ethnic groups are combined. This is important, for Carmichael (1982; 1996), who did disaggregate this population group, showed that there are major differences in some aspects of family formation (e.g. cohabitation, ex-nuptiality) between east and west Polynesian groups.

9. The category Asian and Other is a polyglot group made up of several major Asian-origin groups (Chinese, Indian, Korean, etc.) and minor non-Asian groups and thus has limited analytical utility, but will generally be employed here as a residual category. Most Pacific peoples come from Polynesia (e.g. Tonga, Samoa), but there are smaller diverse communities of Micronesians and Melanesians.

10. A further confounding factor is that some ‘Fijians’ may be Fijian Indians rather than indigenous Fijians (Krishnan et al. 1994).

11. To add to these complications, recently, for the 2001 census and for registration data, Statistics New Zealand has started reporting what they term ‘total responses’ – that is, results covering every person who reported a particular ethnicity as one only or as part of multiple categories. This seemingly simple solution has created major problems: data series are not comparable over time, and the total population exceeds 100 per cent of the real total. For national-level analyses the most statistically robust alternative would be to report sole ethnicity and combinations separately, but at a sub-national level this produces unwieldy data sets.

Wherever data are available, Maori and non-Maori should be considered separately, and combined to make up the total population. There can, however, be only a limited review of other ethnic groups, for two reasons. First, disaggregated historical secondary data on these ethnic groups typically do not exist, and, secondly, where they do exist for recent years, systematic analyses are available only for the three major groups – Maori, Pasifika and Pakeha – or for Maori and non-Maori, but less frequently for Asian and Other. In any case, for Asians in the nineteenth and early twentieth century relatively low proportions had ‘normal’ family lives, for most were men on their own who frequently could not bring their wives to New Zealand (Ip 1990: 14–16). Nevertheless data on these groups must be analysed for recent years for both Asians, and Pacific peoples.

To what extent do census and other official data on family formation and structures reflect the realities of such cultural differences? The ESCAP study of the early 1980s noted last chapter allowed the following point for Maori and Pakeha to be tested rigorously; that

the factor deemed ‘familial’ might also be a function of the cultural milieu of the respondent. The family is a primary agent of socialization in that it transmits both its own ideology and the norms and values of the wider culture of which it is a unit (ESCAP 1986).

To decompose these effects, the ESCAP study in New Zealand was divided into two sub-surveys: a Pakeha one and a Maori one. The Maori survey was further sub-divided so that it covered two randomly selected, interpenetrating sub-samples, one of which was interviewed using a core instrument designed by an ESCAP expert committee, the other an instrument (termed whanaungatanga) developed by Edward Douglas, ‘in collaboration with Maori social scientists, Maori elders and other Maori, . . . to conform closer to Maori cultural values relating to reproduction and the family’ (ESCAP 1986; Douglas 1981).

This test concluded that there were few differences between the two approaches applied in the Maori

* A senior member of the New Zealand ESCAP survey team.
survey, either in terms of the results relating to family structures and forms, or in relation to whanau interventions towards couples on issues involving family structures and forms. Nevertheless,

A broad understanding of the Maori world view as it relates to the family [i.e. perceptions about values relating to formation processes and to structures] and socialization of children could be gained from the whanaungatanga questionnaire (ESCAP 1986: 10).

This last point has two implications for anyone studying the New Zealand family, and indeed for our work. First, our research will not deal with socialisation per se, as it is outside the scope of the analysis. Secondly, and in contrast, ‘an understanding of the Maori world view’ is extremely important for the central concerns of our study that relate to family formation, structures and forms. For example, at a population or macro-level, value systems are manifested by the ways in which the patterns of registered marriage and family formation in general, and the structures of Maori and Pasifika families in particular, are different from those of Pakeha (Pool and Screats 1988: 52; Pool 1991: Chapt. 2; Jackson and Pool 1996; and Pool et al. 1998; Kukutai 2003). There is yet another dimension to this that results from the interaction between Maori and Pakeha. It has been argued that throughout the early colonial period ‘Marriage jurisdiction and law in the creation of public order, including the production of a homogenous nation . . . and embracing particular notions of gender . . . were increasingly constructed and policed to assimilate . . . Maori’ (Seuffert 2003: 186).

2.6 SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL CONTEXT OF FAMILY STRUCTURES AND FORMS
What might be termed the ‘socio-economic context’ comprises the drivers and co-variates of shifts in structures and forms. In Figure 2.1 they constitute many of the causally more remote factors that, in an analytical sense, provide ‘explanations’ for many observed changes in family behaviours. In this situation changes in family patterns are seen as being determined by other explanatory factors.

Explanations are of different orders (developed further in Chapter Three):

1. First-order explanations are proximate and come directly from the shifts in family formation and their associated structures noted above. For example, a decline in fertility will decrease family sizes.
2. Second-order explanations come from shifts in other social and economic structural factors (for example, shifts in rates of female labour-force participation), which have a direct impact on structures and forms, or which affect patterns of family formation (for example, prolonged education and delayed marriage).
3. A higher order of explanation might relate to shifts in values and norms. European social demographers have been particularly innovative in linking second- and third-order explanations to changes in family formation and structures. Among other considerations, they have been able to relate cohort shifts in value structures to changes in family formation and in family structures. They argue, for example, that recent parental generations have been characterised by their pursuit of individualistic values, whereas earlier generations were more in favour of collectivistic attitudes. This change has had implications in terms of the way different cohorts have viewed childbearing. (van de Kaa 1987, 1988; Lesthaeghe 1991; Lesthaeghe and Moors 1995).

As is also true for data on family morphologies per se, what is often available in terms of explanatory information in New Zealand is also merely a skeleton. Recourse to analyses derived from retrospective micro-level data (for example, the 1995 survey NZW:FEE) allow some flesh to be added to this skeleton, but at best there can be only speculation about underlying or co-varying values structures. This can be inferred by mapping sequences or interrelationships between events or behaviours and then postulating what they may suggest about values and norms. At the level of aggregation at which this study primarily operates, this strategy is the only one that is feasible.

The cross-comparative knowledge-base exercise that follows in Chapter Three will indicate that, even in jurisdictions that are more advanced in terms of data, this is still often the analytical strategy adopted by researchers. The big difference between New Zealand researchers and their overseas peers is that the latter have access to richer and more systematic banks of data than are available here for both first- and second-order explanations.
Even though one may envy overseas scholars for their capacity to draw on extensive data sets, they still often encounter the major problems noted earlier relating to values and other data. To ‘explain’ trends in family structures one needs data from, or recourse to, cross-comparative studies that have been able to make such explanatory analyses, and then by analogy to apply the results to the society in which interest is focused. This far-from-perfect strategy has been adopted, for New Zealand, with (at best) limited success by Pool (1992).

In the end, even with observed behaviours, one is reliant on co-variance – but this is not causality. This point is particularly critical in the present context when a wide-sweeping macro-level review will be carried out. By analysing some rather deterministic sequences of behaviours, it is possible to argue that causal links exist between one set of behaviours and another, and then perhaps to extrapolate these findings up to the macro-level. For example, European micro-level survey data show that women who become pregnant tend to leave the labour force; or inversely they show that women who are working are generally very effective family planners (Federici, Mason and Sogner 1993).

But when one turns to seek explanations from data on values (assuming, of course, that these were even available), such causal links are more difficult to trace. Take the Baby Boom, for example. It is impossible to say whether it was triggered by a desire on the part of Pakeha to consummate marriages, delayed from as far back as the Depression and then more immediately by war service, or whether it was an outcome of the brief period of euphoria and hope following the end of the war. These events may have then produced a shift in the value system in favour of family-formation strategies (early and almost universal marriage) leading to a major transformation in New Zealand (and Western) family structures or a shift in the value system may have come first. Indeed, in the case of New Zealand, the Baby Boom can be seen instead as constituting a reprise of strongly pro-natalist Pakeha pioneer values of the late nineteenth century, and family-formation behaviours (and thus family structures) that set Pakeha apart from their European cousins.

A macro-level study can, of course, look only at those co-variates about which there is secondary-level information. These will be factors such as changes in the labour force, shifts in patterns of use of contraception and sterilisation, changes in individual and family incomes and, where data are available, shifts in norms and values. The latter may have to be posited from analyses of trends in formation and structures that cover what could be seen as normative behaviours. Because of the lack of a well-developed New Zealand knowledge base, this mainly has to take the form of describing co-varying trends for a number of these factors, but explanations based on New Zealand data will be offered where these are available. The discussion in Chapter Three will use a brief comparative review of overseas studies to raise questions about trends and the explanations for these.

Explanation is an essential element in the analysis of family trends, but explanations also spill over into public discourse on the family and thus any policy that might be informed by this. A particular problem relates to debate over whether or not family structures and forms are vulnerable to the effects of economic and social trends. For New Zealand, much of the contemporary discourse on the family revolves around what has happened over the last two decades. There is also concern over the apparent recent increases in disparities in household incomes and other inequities, and evidence that poverty falls disproportionately on parenting-families and thus on children. These factors are sometimes taken as evidence of inefficiencies in the apparatus of the welfare state.

A related question is whether families are buffeted by exogenous forces driven by the wider society and economy or whether the roles and functions the family might play are threatened more by behaviour patterns endogenous to family life itself, particularly by changes in its structures and forms. This has important implications for perceptions about family life and for policy. This is because breakdowns in the internal dynamics of families, of so-called ‘family values’, are often viewed as the prime causes for what are perceived to be failures on the part of families to ‘carry out their responsibilities’. Such a view is based on an apparent increase in manifest, high-profile, widely publicised changes in family forms in the last four decades, in ways perhaps not seen in earlier periods – one must say perhaps because, as we have noted, moral panic is not unique to the dawn of the new millennium. Most often quoted in this regard are shifts in those forms defined by status, indicated by increases in rates of cohabitation, separation and divorce, and sole parenting, all of which are viewed as antithetical to desirable ‘family values.’ They are frequently

* Terms such as ‘family values’ and ‘responsibilities’ are seldom clearly defined, but cluster around factors that are seen to ensure a stable environment, above all for the raising of children. First, two-parent, husband-wife families fit this norm. But, secondly, for many commentators, an essential element is seen to be entry into formal marriage as against cohabitation.
cited as factors that put families ‘at risk’ in terms of their capacity to fulfil basic functions. This in turn is seen as undermining societal viability.

But co-varying in time with recent high-profile shifts in forms are also other more latent structural trends. These are very significant, yet in recent public debates they seem to have been accorded a less instrumental role in determining societal risk than shifts in form. The structural changes include factors such as in the size and composition of households, the parenting age-distribution and the preferred residential patterns. These changes are endogenous to family change. However, co-varying in time also are structural trends that are exogenous to family life yet have a major impact on it most notably in terms of changes in income and wealth, and participation by family members in the labour force and other external institutions.

Much of family policy, and indeed social policy in general, revolves around reconciling the family and work, and other external factors. As concern over this has emanated in particular from labour economics, the directionality has been reversed. It is now seen as the ‘work–life balance’, with the emphasis on workplace efficiency rather than the vulnerability of families, or the access of the workforce to leisure and other non-remunerated activities.

Thus an important issue is to determine the relative roles of shifts in family form that might result merely in superficial changes versus the impacts of fundamental structural shifts on functions that allow families to meet their ‘responsibilities’ to the wider society. A working postulate for our research is that high-profile changes in form have had less impact on family capacity than less publicised normative demographic structural changes.

Overseas in contrast, for example in Continental Europe and Japan, the demographic structural changes endogenous to the family, especially low levels of sub-replacement fertility, are seen today as major policy issues critical to societal survival. But in the ESCs these are given less attention than are shifts in family forms which are seen as antithetical to the adequate functioning of the society and the economy.

This is more than a mere academic difference – in a philosophical sense it represents a canyon-sized gap that has broader implications. From one perspective, this focus leads into the argument that the responsibility for the family ultimately must be underwritten by the collectivity, typically seen as the state, the community or the wider society, a burden it bears to ensure that families function effectively for the public good. From the other side, the onus is seen to rest with the family itself to develop the structures, dynamics and functions that will ensure that it is not a burden on charity, or welfare; shifts in forms are seen as the key to any failure to function well. In the latter case, moreover, the accent is placed on the family: culpability, it is argued, rests with the family itself, not with exogenous factors such as economic restructuring or policy changes. In extreme cases of family disintegration or ‘deviance,’ especially where violence or other crimes may be involved, welfare agencies are often blamed for failing to act effectively.

In the ESCs, and New Zealand is certainly no exception to this, much of the family policy debate focuses on so-called ‘dysfunctional families,’ a term that is usually ill-defined. Its application may include the labelling of whole classes of families (e.g. sole-parent) as dysfunctional simply because they do not fit with some notion of what a ‘normal’ family might be like. Or it may be applied specifically to a small number of families reputed to be over-represented in crime and other statistics of social deviance, a term that is very difficult to define as it is a social construct shaped by culture, class and any number of other factors.

In our approach to studying the family we have put the accent instead on what might be termed normative trends – changes that are modal, that is, pertaining to most families in the society in which they are occurring. Such an approach looks for systematic trends over time in the population or in sub-populations, and it focuses on the more manifest aspects of family life for which there are data. It is thus the ‘big picture’; its conclusions might be seen as postulates for further in-depth quantitative and qualitative work that we hope will be stimulated by our study, research that will confirm or reject our conclusions. Thus our study does not in any sense constitute the definitive work on the New Zealand family, but is merely a synthesis – a starting point for analyses that will address this most important of social institutions and will remedy a significant problem: the limited amount of researched evidence, compared to ideologically driven treatises, on the New Zealand family.

* Even the bio-social factors associated with delayed childbearing, and the related question of the way fertility might counter population ageing, at present receive limited attention. A by-product of these questions, assisted reproductive technologies is, however, gaining more and more coverage in the media.
The family is society’s most basic institution, and thus explaining how social organisation and change affect family life is an essential element of any study of the family – the family is not some isolate immunised from the society and economy. But, equally, as we developed this theme we recognised, more and more, that the family’s role in turn is not merely a dependent, passive one – its changes also have an impact on the wider society.

2.7 EFFECTS OF FAMILY STRUCTURAL CHANGES ON THE WIDER SOCIETY

A word of caution is necessary at this point. Analyses of the impact of the family on trends and patterns of organisation in the wider society risk becoming polemic exercises. The reason is simple and explains why we have spent so much time conceptualising and defining daily phenomena. Any analysis is confounded by the fact that public discourse confounds varying strands of the empirical evidence relating to trends in family forms and their structures and the determinants and consequences. There are overlaps, for example, in most discourse between childbearing by co-habiting couples resulting in ex-nuptial births, teenage childbearing that may be within marriage and true teenage ex-nuptial childbearing – this is a good example of such loose usage. It is of little import when the discussants share a common set of information and working definitions, but it is another question when such usage enters the public oration of, say, a senior politician, when it may affect policy formulation.

To add to this, analysis of impacts normally requires the services of some sort of comparator, another society or, more typically, past patterns and trends in the society to which a commentator belongs. Such comparisons will often be based on nostalgic views about the strengths of the family of yesteryear by comparison with those of today. These perceptions may or may not correspond to reality. It is easy to forget that past eras were far from exempt from moral panics about the capacities of families and the behaviour of their members. Interestingly, such panics typically revolved around demographic aspects of family life – its size and issues of reproduction. Thus, a first important undertaking for any serious study is to map the different trends over time, to attempt to disentangle some of the definitional and conceptual issues, and also to provide empirical evidence on family structures and forms as these have changed over time.

Much of the debate about the effects of the family on the wider society revolve around its impacts on social organisation and particularly on negative and anti-social behaviours, and even on societal breakdown. But the reality is that all major social transformations are interlinked with shifts in family morphologies: modernisation, urbanisation, globalisation, the increases in consumerism, the media revolutions, the empowerment of women, and so on. But these relationships between changes in the wider society and shifts in family behaviour are not one way.

To take an example, a population-wide age-structural transition is produced primarily by changes in birth cohort sizes. These are clearly an outcome of shifts in family formation, although changes in migration and, to a lesser degree, patterns of survivorship can affect cohort sizes as they then progress through the life-cycle. An age-structural transition itself then may have an impact on the population and society, especially when, as is the case of New Zealand, it takes a more turbulent form because of what are termed ‘disordered cohort flows’. These flow-on effects include, for example, changes in the age-distribution of the labour force and of the population at reproductive ages. If waves of such cohorts are disordered this will bring pressures on human capital resources and on most areas of public policy, but also will have an analogous effect on family structures. Structural ageing, when the percentage at older ages increases, is merely the last phase in this transition (Pool 2003).

Age-structural transitions emanating mainly from changes in family formation will have an impact on most if not all factors of production and reproduction. The single most significant long-term change facing New Zealand society – ageing – is due to a shift in patterns of family formation and thus in family structures. In New Zealand, because age-structural transitions driven by trends in birth cohort sizes have been particularly rapid, and have involved severe fluctuations, the new shifts in both population-wide and family structures, and the attendant paths to ageing, are not only complex and turbulent, but have major implications for policy (Pool 2000b; Pool 2003). Familial capacities will be challenged by the multi-generational effects of this process of ageing (Blum 1984; Sceats 1988a).
2.8 LEVELS OF AGGREGATION IN SOCIAL ANALYSIS: MACRO AND MICRO

MACRO–MICRO LINKAGES
As noted above, we have approached this study of the family essentially at a macro-level. Changes in the proportions of families with various attributes can typically be related to other macro-level social and economic shifts. But clearly this relationship operates through intermediate factors that are often micro-level. Individuals, couples and families will be subject to attitudinal changes and other inter-personal dynamics, typically involving decision-making (Friedman et al. 1994). Thus the ultimate explanation, as it were, of the macro-level changes often – but not always – resides in these micro-level behaviours and dynamics. Analysis of micro-level determinants is beyond the scope of our study, but we do need to look briefly at the way in which factors at these different levels of aggregation, macro- and micro-, interact behaviourally or substantively. This analytical area is termed ‘macro–micro linkages’.

Some researchers also refer to a meso-level, seeing this as covering community-level factors that impinge directly on individuals and families. The very significant, long-running Caversham study in Dunedin, directed by Erik Olssen and looking at issues of social capital, is at this level of aggregation. But we do not really explore analyses at this level – where we refer to sub-national levels of analysis it is normally by province or region, which are still macro-level entities. Thus we will stick to micro- and macro-levels, and their links.

The question of macro–micro linkage is important in relation to families not only for research but also for policy formulation and implementation. A macro-level analysis does not study the behaviour and characteristics of individual families. It looks at the proportion of families that have any given characteristic (e.g. the percentage of families that are sole-parent units), whether in terms of structural features, forms or family formation. The question of macro–micro linkages is an issue seldom analysed in New Zealand, particularly in the field of family studies, yet is fundamental both for scientific exercises and for policy applications. Overseas much more attention is paid to this issue because of these implications.

To take one New Zealand example, a paper by the Ministry of Social Policy (MSP 2000) defines a number of concepts, two of which are researchable at either a macro- or a micro-level (dynamics, outcomes); the other two of which are researchable only at a micro-level (‘effective and resilient families’). The central factor for the present study, ‘morphology’, can also be analysed at the macro- or micro-level. Our analysis focuses on the macro-level for two reasons: first, because it is a broad analysis; and secondly because for much of the history of family structures in New Zealand, the systematically collected (and thus historically comparable) data available are at the macro-level.

This approach is valuable in another sense: it conforms well to the needs of policy analysts. For policy formulation and policy evaluation purposes the macro-level is the more appropriate (e.g. outcomes for children will be measured by the proportion of this population who have achieved, or failed to gain a particular outcome). For many aspects of policy implementation, however and particularly those involving services, the micro-level will be the more relevant (e.g. helping a particular child or group of children to gain, or assessing whether they have achieved, a given outcome; or helping families gain/assessing whether they have resilience/effectiveness).

MICRO-LEVEL
There is a further dimension to shifts in family structures and forms. As individuals age and as they move through their career, their life-course also involves exposure to different patterns of family life. Family structures and forms evolve over what are termed the ‘individual’, ‘family’ and ‘working’ life-cycles. These constructs developed by demographers and widely employed by other researchers (e.g. Fergusson 1998) constitute major organising frameworks for this study.† The American demographer Paul Glick’s classical framework will be drawn on, as will adaptations based on it, most importantly the more inclusive

* For example, the American Sociological Association devoted a major analysis coordinated by Jean Huber (1991), a retiring president of the association, involving authors covering both qualitative and quantitative domains; there is a major study under way in France at present under Daniel Courgeau of the Institut National d’Etudes Démographiques (see, for example, Courgeau 2000).
† Pool and Crawford (1979) modelled these constructs and fitted New Zealand models to them. Sceats (1988a) then quantified these for different generations, highlighting their intergenerational implications. See also Swain 1985 which explores many conceptual and analytical issues.
and flexible 'life-course' approach suggested by three European demographers, Grebenik, Hohn and Mackensen (1989). The life-course approach examines family life in relation to other aspects of one's life. Thus patterns of family formation for instance are studied by relating family-building to the timing and sequencing in 'individual' and 'working' life-cycles.

The individual life-cycle is the passage of somebody through bio-socially determined phases of their life-course (childhood, youth, early adulthood, late adulthood, old age), and is strongly correlated with chronological and biological ageing. The family life-cycle outlined already when discussing family formation, clearly has some bio-social dimensions, such as differences in fecundability at different ages during the reproductive span of a woman. The working life-cycle is, by contrast, almost entirely a socio-economic construct, although the physical and mental capacities of a man or woman could be seen as bio-social dimensions. The working life-cycle denotes the passage from education and training, to entry into the labour force, promotion and seniority, to retirement.

Of importance for the present study is that the three life-cycles intersect and are intimately interrelated. In traditional societies when the locus of economic production was the family, the links were obvious, and family statuses were also determined by the stages reached in each life-cycle; cross-cutting these were gender differences, as in the sexual division of labour. The separation of the household from the workplace tended to hide these interrelationships by segregating out different roles. This holds true particularly in cash societies where the sexual division of labour saw men as wage-earners and women staying at home, not earning incomes and dependent on their spouses.

Often associated with this is another very important social phenomenon: in such societies women were forced to choose between remaining single and being wage-earners, marrying and staying outside the workforce or between childbearing and work. This becomes most marked where marriage is virtually the only status in which childbearing can occur. As a result female labour participation rates in the remunerated workforce are low, especially for those who are parents. When the participation rates increase in these societies, and if marriage is seen to be incompatible with work for women outside the household, such as for Pakeha in the early twentieth century or in early twenty-first-century Islamic societies (e.g. Tunisia, Iran, see Brahim 2004; Mehryer and Ahmad-Nia 2004), then the proportions of women in unions who then can have children decreases.

Events at one life-cycle stage – individual, family or working – have effects on one’s passage through the others (e.g. a work accident by the ‘breadwinner’ could have an impact on household income; the work-fatality of a spouse means widowhood for the surviving partner). The advent of the welfare-state saw attempts to mediate between the family and working life-cycles so that exposure to various risks in either segment of one’s life would have minimal impacts on the other.

More recently, increasing proportions of women have entered the labour force and often remain in it while at parenting ages. This has produced contradictory effects. On the one hand it has meant that the remunerated labour force has been greatly enriched, and this has had a favourable impact on movements towards gender equality. But it has also raised two major questions of social, economic and policy significance.

First is the issue of work-life balance, particularly as this affects family and working life-cycle interactions, especially in recent years in which the organisation of work has placed an emphasis on 'management efficiency' and 'productivity'. In practice, these often manifest themselves in long hours on the job and in employee insecurity. Labour-market flexibility, which may provide choice for workers in terms of, say, the hours they are at work, may equally give leverage to employers in negotiating unfavourable job conditions that have negative impacts on family life (Sceats 2003; Sceats et al. 2003). Secondly, and for all these reasons, childbearing is being delayed, but reproductive polarisation has re-emerged between those who choose work over childbearing and vice versa (Pool and Sceats 2003 summarise these issues).

COHORT AND INTER-GENERATIONAL ANALYSES

Analyses of the family must adopt both cross-sectional and longitudinal perspectives on passage across the various life-cycles. A time-series analysis of cross-sectionally based rates for key variables measuring family formation and family structures gives snapshots of the New Zealand family at particular periods. Then at times it is necessary to go further by looking at true cohort trends in both formation and structures so as to analyse how generations of families behave collectively. These actions produce a potential for

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* Fecundability is defined as the probability of conception per menstrual cycle in the absence of contraception.
vulnerability at key family and individual life-cycle stages. A cohort is normally taken as a reference group of people who are born at the same time or, sometimes in this study, who marry or commence unions at the same time, and whose patterns and trends of behaviour are followed over time. A generation is simply a group of cohorts.

A cohort carries along with it all the baggage coming from its past experiences. In some cases, these earlier experiences will determine later situations to a high degree, including vulnerable states in which the cohorts find themselves during their life, family or working life-cycles. For example, to have children late in the reproductive cycle, as is true for the present Pakeha parenting cohorts, means that at the same time these parental cohorts are saving for their old age they will still have dependent children, some of whom will be students well into their twenties, and for whom the parents must assume a degree of legal responsibility. Two examples of this are detailed here:

1. In the early 1970s New Zealand mothers were having three births per woman, still at a relatively young age, and the birth intervals between the first and subsequent children were very short. This meant that the average family might have had several children simultaneously, for example, facing the costs of tertiary study in the 1990s (Sceats 1984, 1988, 1999).
2. The cohorts born in the period around the First World War, who became the very old people of the last decade or so, were notable because while some of their mothers had large families, other women of that generation had no children. The entry into the labour force of the daughters of people born in those early years has created issues of role conflict (between being a carer for an older person and being in the labour force). These same daughters in their post-reproductive ages are now taking on the childcare of their working children's families (McPherson 1992).

Reference has already been made to parent–child relationships, but there are also parent–grandparent/parent-in-law relationships, and there may be conflicting demands between these two sets of different intergenerational relationships – especially at a time when grandparents are living longer, perhaps in relatively satisfactory health (Pool 1994; Pool and Cheung 2004). In a world of relatively high levels of conjugal dissolution and reconstitution, and a population that is highly mobile, these issues have become even more complex, not only in terms of vulnerability but also in terms of familial burdens and familial capacities (and their fiscal macro-level analogues). While the emphasis here is on outcomes for children, competing demands within family structures, particularly as society ages, shift the balance forwards, and thus the elderly cannot be ignored.

When studying the family as we are doing for New Zealand one looks at family transitions in the sense that this term was used in Chapter One. But analyses must also refer to two other sets of transitions, in the sense of their use in probability modelling.

- Transitions occurring to individuals as they pass through their individual life-cycle, family life-cycle or working life-cycle.
- Transitions occurring to cohorts as they proceed through the bio-socially determined life-cycle, family life-cycle or working life-cycle.

Such transition probabilities are of major importance for the study of family structures and forms. Their wider significance is that they determine multi-generational family sizes (McPherson 2000), and the intervals between generations. The latter has a major impact on intergenerational relationships and conflicts. The so-called 'sandwich generation' phenomenon is an example of this. Because of differing formation strategies one generation at middle age may end up simultaneously having obligations both to its parents and to its children, whereas this may be less prevalent for other generations (Sceats 1988a; Koopman-Boyden et al. 2000). This effect also has an analogue at the level of the individual family, affecting family sizes, intergenerational relationships, age-gaps between siblings and when in chronological, age and period terms life-cycle stages are reached.

The transitions discussed in this part of the chapter are different from the family transition dealt with at its start, yet in every sense these statistically defined transitions have wider significance. They also affect almost every aspect of social and cultural life. Through the working life-cycle and through consumption and production by family members, they are also related to all aspects of the economy. Thus the statistically defined transitions are the mechanisms, as it were, for the broader transitional phases noted earlier.
2.9 CONCLUSION

For the analyst approaching the study of the family there is an un-resolvable conundrum. On the one hand, everybody in society – an exception is perhaps that tiny minority who have been institutionalised from birth – will have had some experience of family life, so that the researcher is not studying some phenomenon that is foreign to the rest of the population. Research results may be readily understood and one may even be open to the criticism that they contain nothing new, just the patently obvious. On the other hand this very familiarity carries other disadvantages; it is perhaps easier to be authoritative in arcane, abstract or highly technical fields to which most members of the public have not been exposed. Because every member of society will have had their own unique experiences, they will carry with them their own definitions ‘family’ and family dynamics. Everyone around the researcher is thus an ‘expert’ on the family, as it were, and most people whether informally or more publicly can and do comment on the family, whether their own or in general. Moreover, their idea of what constitutes a family and its behaviour patterns will typically be moulded not only by their own experience but also by norms, in the sense of what one ‘should’ do, and ideals of the culture to which they belong. But these may not accord with reality or with the modal behavioural norms as these are being played out and reported by family researchers.

What emerges from research is that the family, and its structures and forms, are complex phenomena. Even an apparently simple construct such as the ‘nuclear family’ turns out on further analysis to be far from clear-cut, to such an extent that it could be argued that use of the term might confound rather than inform public discourse on the family. Indeed the word family itself is conceptually far less straightforward than might be thought to be the case. To add to this, the data available to New Zealand scholars, primarily secondary data from official sources, permit one to cover only selected parts of family life, mainly at a macro-level (this issue will be further developed in the next chapter). But there is a core around which there is broad consensus over what constitute normative patterns and trends in both structures and forms, and the majority of people in New Zealand’s different cultural groups fit some variant close to this consensually derived model.

It is at this point that the macro-level focus bestows a major advantage on the analysis of family life. These data provide us, in fact, with a long-term sweep across major patterns and trends in structures and forms as these evolve over time, over a very long period in the case of this book. Of course, we have to be reasonably certain that these shifts are not merely an artefact of statistical classification and data collection. The discussions in this chapter, supported most robustly by the detailed evidence coming from the ESCAP study (1986) quoted earlier, allow us to conclude that the empirical analyses to be presented in later chapters do describe the modal and manifest normative changes over time to the New Zealand family, more or less as this construct is used in everyday speech, the ‘consensus’ noted above. Allied to this is the conclusion that, to a considerable degree, the official data sets do reflect everyday life. Of course, the absence of micro-level data sets, especially of qualitative data, over much of the period covered in this book (see next chapter), means that our analysis cannot capture the more latent dynamics, nor can it study issues of so-called dysfunctionality. The latter does not pose us a problem because our focus is on the normative – what most families were doing. In any case, defining dysfunctionality is a conceptual mire into which this book has no need to enter. Moreover, what may be cultural and other differences (e.g. generational and period) in the ways that families pattern their lives may be taken by some observers to be indicators of dysfunction; this is an area in which the ‘eye of the beholder’ determines conclusions. In contrast, and provided that they do map reality as we have argued, the official data sets and some surveys at least can lead to reasonably objective analyses.
Developing a Knowledge Base for the New Zealand Family:  
A Comparative Perspective

3.1 CONSTITUENTS OF A KNOWLEDGE BASE

Family morphologies – that is, structures, forms and dynamics – are generally described according to how families fall into various categories depending on: (i) their size; (ii) their family life-cycle stage, an attribute that is in turn a function of past events, such as a first or last birth, that determine the sequence and timing of other events in the individual and working life-cycles of family members; (iii) the form of residence adopted by the household; (iv) the marital statuses and parental statuses of key members (termed here the status dimension); (v) the living arrangements of family members; and (vi) intergenerational factors (e.g. co-residence or not; interactions; competition for resources). But understanding changes in family morphologies requires a much greater amount of information that extends well beyond the data relating to these factors just outlined.

Family morphologies change through the following behaviours and experiences, some noted already:

- union formation through cohabitation or marriage, which determines the family sizes, the age-structure of the household, family statuses and also the living arrangements;
- union dissolution through separation, divorce and widow(er)hood, which affects all of the factors just noted;
- fertility behaviour, the eventual departure of children from the family home, and child survivorship (the probability that offspring will be able to survive childhood eventually to leave home), all of which affect family sizes, age-structures and living arrangements; and
- other transitions into and out of various living arrangements, that are determined more by social needs and values than by family formation (e.g. migration; the type of dwelling in which households live).

Of the factors just outlined child survivorship is seldom seen as a central issue in the analysis of family structures and forms today, yet in high-mortality populations, such as Maori in the nineteenth century, family sizes are very much affected by the fact that a family can lose some, even a majority, of the children born to them before these offspring reach adulthood. For Pakeha, major improvements in child survivorship had been secured to a large degree by the late nineteenth century. Maori increases in survivorship had to wait until after World War II.

At an aggregate level, family morphologies are also affected by the overall age-structure of the population. Indeed, as described in Chapter Two, aggregate shifts in the behaviours and experiences outlined above, along with the overall population composition, can be viewed as first-order explanations for changes over time in observed family structures.

Aspects of family formation are implicit in the behaviours and experiences noted above and thus play two separate roles in the analysis presented here, as was modelled in Figure 2.1. On the one hand, family formation is a proximate determinant of family structures and forms. Yet, on the other, it is also a measure of aspects of family structure – the growth or reduction in family size through formation or dissolution.

As discussed in Chapter Two, a more comprehensive understanding of changes over time in family structures and forms requires one to seek causally more remote explanations for changes in family-related behaviours. Second-order explanations relate to broad-based changes in the socio-economic context, including institutions other than the family, such as a growing or changing economy that opens up or closes off opportunities for particular segments of the population (e.g., women; the more highly educated). Closely related to and intertwined with this are changes in norms and values, which can be considered to be higher-order explanations of changes in family structures and forms. It is increasingly recognized that
individual behaviours that ‘fashion’ family structures are just a few of many interacting processes within an individual’s life-course, including education, employment and residential histories (Courgeau 2000). In addition, these life histories occur in a social, political and institutional context, which together shape individuals’ perceptions and the meanings they attach to their behaviours (Hobcraft 2000). Thus, a full understanding of changes over time in family structures and forms requires a broad knowledge base, including changes not only in family structures themselves but also on first-, second- and higher-order explanations for these changes.

This chapter discusses the data necessary for analysing each of these components. We then compare the New Zealand knowledge base in this area to those of other neo-Europes and Europe itself. Among these countries and regions, the United States has rich sources in the form of government-sponsored surveys and censuses, built up over a long period going back at least to the late 1930s. It provides the most systematic model of a reasonably comprehensive approach to studying all aspects of family structure and the most elaborate and appropriate comparison for an assessment of the New Zealand knowledge base. This analysis will also refer to relevant European, Canadian and Australian research. In many senses, Australia and Canada are our most useful societies of reference; a framework for comparisons with these two populations exists already in a cross-comparative analysis that outlines a wide range of factors of family formation, organisation, structure, dynamics and policy (Baker 2001).

3.2 FAMILY STRUCTURES

3.2.1 DATA NEEDED TO UNDERSTAND CHANGES IN FAMILY STRUCTURES AND FORMS

Structures and forms – as compared to processes and to dynamics – are static concepts, referring to the composition and interrelationships among component parts: in this case, family members, or sub-units of a household, or even of a whanau or extended family. Analysts describing changes over time in the structures of families and households typically employ a series of cross-sectional sample survey, census or other population data. These provide a snapshot of the living arrangements and interrelationships of family or household members. At a bare minimum, an analyst needs to know the sex, age, marital status and parental status of the ‘occupier’ (or ‘household head’) and of the others in the household, as well as their interrelationships. But, in order to capture more fully the structural elements described in Figure 2.1, a researcher requires more information on the status dimension of forms:

- whether the couple is cohabiting, in a *de facto* relationship or married;
- if they are married, whether this a remarriage for either/both partners;
- if cohabiting or *de facto*, whether this an opposite- or same-sex couple;
- whether the children are the natural children of both parents or stepchildren of either; and
- whether this is a ‘reconstituted’ family or not and, if so, what constitutes its structures and networks.

Beyond this there are other issues of emerging importance in the policy domain. Among them are questions that relate to inter-generational links and dynamics, and the way cohort differences in the timing and spacing of births may affect the age-structures not only of the current parenting generation but also differences in the ‘mean length of a generation.’ The ramifications of this manifest themselves in phenomena such as the ‘sandwich generation’ of popular sociology. As the population ages, so too do family structures, but these are is mediated by each generation’s history of birth timing and spacing.

The availability of such data is not only important as a baseline for the description of structures and forms. It also constitutes the very information necessary for micro-simulation techniques for the modelling and projecting of family and household structures, and the networks stemming from the range of traditional and emerging family forms (e.g. Wachter 1997; Keilman 1988). As family and household structures and forms are key components of the data-bases used for economic, social and fiscal planning, developed

Recent or impending law changes in some jurisdictions allow same-sex marriages and also give cohabiting couples many of the legal protections of marriage. Although a recent high-profile issue, there are no New Zealand population-level data available on same-sex couples (see Chapter Two).

† A co-author of this monograph, Arunachalam Dharmalingam, attended the first by-invitation-only workshop on these methods at the Max Planck Institute in Germany in 1998.
countries are looking to such new techniques. For reasons that will become obvious in this chapter, New Zealand’s knowledge base is far below the minimum needed to avail ourselves of these techniques.

3.2.2 NEW ZEALAND KNOWLEDGE BASE ON FAMILY STRUCTURES AND FORMS

As noted earlier, New Zealand’s knowledge base on what are the core aspects of family structural change is relatively well developed, but some data series have been collected over a much longer time than others. For example, for Pakeha, very generalised, virtually complete, nationally representative data on family formation are continuously available from vital registration from the 1870s and earlier; on marital statuses starting with the 1858 census; and on fertility from time to time in censuses. In this regard the New Zealand researcher is better off than their United States and Canadian counterparts, and their Australian peer has to confront the data sets of different colonies, whereas ours was virtually unified from the start of data collection. The destruction of individual census and some other records (see below) puts us far behind the British, at least for studies using that level of aggregation, and means that the New Zealand researcher is dependent on those tables selected for publication by some bureaucrat in the past. Moreover, our data are more detailed for deaths than for births (even the most important birth question, age of mother, was not asked until 1913, although ‘illegitimacy’ was carefully recorded earlier), as was true in the mother country of the nineteenth century, reflecting Farr’s preoccupation with ‘healthy districts’ and the evils of urban living.

For Maori, a mix of vital registration and census data on statuses are available from the 1926 census, and some basic data are available going right back to early settlement. Although vital registration was instituted in 1913 (see below) it was incomplete, so one has to rely on estimates until after World War II. Rates on Maori family sizes have been indirectly estimated for as far back as the mid-1840s (Pool 1991: Chaps 4 and 5), and a parallel series also back to the 1840s has been computed for Pakeha (Pool et al. 1998: Fig. 1). Unfortunately, until quite recently the same was not true for quantitative nationally representative data on the living-arrangements dimension for either Pakeha or Maori.

In recent decades, however, and as is conventional internationally in family sociology and demography, New Zealand researchers have been able to rely increasingly on census data. These permit analysts to report aggregate changes in the living-arrangement dimensions of family structure, and to describe changes over time in the proportions of families or households falling into various broad categories, such as sole-parent, two-parent, couple-only, parent(s) plus others and non-family households, or describing in depth one particular family type, such as sole parents (e.g. Carmichael 1983; Davey 1993, 1998, 1999; Dickson et al. 1997; Jackson and Pool 1994; Jackson and Pool 1996; Mowbray and Khan 1984; Rochford et al. 1992; Rochford 1993; Statistics New Zealand 1998; Stephens 2000). Nevertheless, even with these data, there are limitations, for it is impossible to build time-series analyses over longer periods. For information on dependent children and for most other data on household composition the 1966 census was the first from which such information could be extracted. As computer-readable files are available only from the 1976 census, analyses for 1966 and 1971 in this (and for all historical periods prior to this for all other areas covered here) are dependent on published tabulations. This lack of historical data on families and households has made long-term studies almost impossible to carry out on many aspects of family life.

Less studied, even recently, has been the detailed composition of families and households; examining, for instance, the prevalence of adult children living in the parental home or of elderly parents living in their children’s homes. Estimates of the number of offspring no longer deemed dependent in a statistical sense, however, have been made (Jackson and Pool 1994: Chapt. 8; Dickson et al. 1997: Table 7.2; Hutton 2001), even though there are as yet no comprehensive data sets on this. This issue has become increasingly important because, since the 1991 Budget, parents have been deemed to be responsible, subject to a means test, for unmarried young adults, and thus dependency has been legally extended (see Jackson 1994a, b, c).

Until recently there were no nationally representative comprehensive surveys that could enhance what was available from the census on family structures and forms. The 1995 survey New Zealand Women: Family, Employment and Education (NZW:FEE) and the 2001 follow-up the New Zealand Family and Fertility Survey (NZFFS) have, however, significantly changed this. (Both surveys were generated and undertaken by the Population Studies Centre, University of Waikato, and are to be discussed further below.) As these studies are both retrospective, they also permit insights back over time into some aspects of living arrangements and statuses as well as family formation.’ A further survey, also from the University of Waikato, and

* To cohorts born from 1936 on and entering their reproductive spans in the 1950s, in the case of both the NZW:FEE and NZFFS.
in which researchers for NZW:FEE and NZFFS played a major role, is the national study on mid-life trans-
actions (see below).

Other major data limitations for studying family structures and forms from New Zealand census data
involve the measurement of the family forms that have emerged more prominently in the last 30 years –
cohabiting families, remarriage families and same-sex couples. Respondents have been able to classify
themselves as living in de facto partnerships only since 1981, limiting the time-frame available for analyses.
Also, because the question is asked of individuals, the variable does not translate across well to the family
level. For example, a significant minority of partners disagree on their social marital status (Carmichael
1996; Pool 1992; Douglas 1977). The same issue may make measurement of ‘blended’ families – involving
two remarried partners, for instance – a problem as well. In addition, same-sex couples were classified as
such only in 1996. As noted below, perhaps the biggest limitation of the available census data involves the
form and costs of its dissemination, and thus its accessibility to the public and researchers outside govern-
mental agencies.

The addition in 1995 of the NZW:FEE data-base to the country’s knowledge base on family structures
significantly improves the ability of researchers to study emerging forms of family structure, including co-
habitation and ‘blended’ families. But to be of more lasting value, such studies need to be repeated over
time in order to continue to track trends.

Detailed census data on family structures for Maori have been available only for as long as those for
Pakeha, and are subject to the same limitations. Similar information is now available for recent migrant
groups such as Pacific peoples and Asians. As a result quite complex analyses of family structures have
been attempted (e.g. Ho et al. 2000). Studies examining ethnic differences in family structures since 1976
have pointed to important variations, such as higher rates of sole parenthood, of de facto relationships and
of extended family structures among Maori and Pacific peoples (Carmichael 1996; Statistics New Zealand
1994).

A recent important addition to the literature, filling what had been a notable gap, is a study by Mervyl
McPherson on extended families (2000). Her research was based first on a survey she carried out in Palm-
erston North, a provincial city, but also on an analysis of a range of data sources, notably the census.
Interest in this study centres on the fact that it not only provides a conceptual framework adapted to New
Zealand conditions but also extends the empirical knowledge about this family form and identifies policy
implications.

Geographically defined sub-national studies are more limited in number and scope. Nevertheless, a
series of detailed regional analyses has one chapter on regional differences in household structures and
another on differentials in household incomes (Pool et al. 2005b; Cochrane et al. forthcoming).

3.2.3 COMPARATIVE STUDIES ON FAMILY STRUCTURES AND FORMS
In contrast to the situation in New Zealand, the governments of Australia, Canada, the United States, the
United Kingdom and other Western European countries and many private foundations especially in the
United States, all fund repeated sample surveys and longitudinal studies specifically aimed at tracking
changes in families and households. These countries also provide relatively easy and comprehensive ac-
cess to census data (Coleman 1999). The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN ECE,
a United Nations region, including North America) has greatly strengthened this capacity by developing
a cross-comparative data-base coming mainly from surveys carried out by official agencies, the Family
and Fertility Study (FFS). It has completed its first round. Through the Population Studies Centre at the
University of Waikato, New Zealand’s NZW:FEE (see below) was accepted as an associate member of the
UN ECE/FFS, even though the NZW:FEE was carried out by a non-official agency and New Zealand is a
member-state of another UN regional commission. Participation has permitted New Zealand to have a
standardised instrument, and to carry out directly comparable analyses on critical issues (e.g. Lapierre-

The United States decennial census, and its most easily accessible output the Public Use Micro-samples
(PUMS), and the Current Population Survey (CPS) provide detailed data – available for study at the indi-
vidual level – on the relationships of household members.† As in New Zealand, such data also have limita-

* Statistics New Zealand has recently reviewed this issue.
† Much of this text on comparative US-based data and analyses was written in 1999–2000 when Susan Singley was a post-
doctoral fellow at the University of Waikato.
Historical data have also been extensively analysed in numerous Western European countries. Of particular interest for New Zealand is the available research in the British Isles and especially England and Wales. This uses vital data and censuses, but has also turned to detailed family reconstruction techniques, typically relying on parish registers, the only such source before the 1830s. It is the comparisons with the British Isles in nineteenth and twentieth centuries that are most important for New Zealand, as this country’s baseline Pakeha population came at that time, including historically massive inflows such as in the early 1870s.

The West Europeans have also developed a strong evidence base on a wide range of family structural changes, albeit frequently not as elaborated as the American. Their work has been enhanced by the way that various pan-European agencies, and the United Nations’ regional commission (see above) collate and analyse data sets. Their data draw on surveys as well as censuses and thus their analyses can go well beyond what can be done in New Zealand. Moreover, there is an emphasis often on cross-national studies (e.g. Lesthaeghe 1991). European research has covered, for example, critical issues such as children in households (Festy 1994; Rainwater and Smeeding 1994); household composition, that points, for example, to the interesting fact that because of increased longevity the four-generation family, rare in the past, is more common (Pennec 1996); cohabitation, LATs (Villeneuve-Gokalp 1997); and reconstituted families in relation to vertical and lateral networks (Villeneuve-Gokalp 1999). The cross-comparative capacity has also provided some very incisive analyses on European couples, including data on both behaviours and value systems (Malpas 1999), and on households and their wider networks in two different settings (Gierveld et al. 1997).

Historical data have also been extensively analysed in numerous Western European countries. Of particular interest for New Zealand is the available research in the British Isles and especially England and Wales. This uses vital data and censuses, but has also turned to detailed family reconstruction techniques, typically relying on parish registers, the only such source before the 1830s. It is the comparisons with the British Isles in nineteenth and twentieth centuries that are most important for New Zealand, as this country’s baseline Pakeha population came at that time, including historically massive inflows such as in the early 1870s.

The family demography of England and Wales has been analysed rigorously for these periods (Garrett et al. 2001; Szreter 2002 edition; which also builds up theory on the links between fertility, social class and other factors, Woods 2000), but less comprehensively in the case of Scotland or Ireland (but see, for example, Anderson 1998; Blakie 1994; Flinn et al. 1977; Fraser and Morris (eds) 1990: vol. II; Guinnane 1997). By good fortune New Zealand joined the ‘Empire’ census programme at the 1881 census and used a fairly standard schedule like those in the United Kingdom. Moreover, at the 1911 censuses almost the same questions on family and fertility were asked, thus a basis in comparison exists.

* These methods first developed by Louis Henry in France have been widely used, not commonly in Roman Catholic countries, and most comprehensively in Quebec.
The work on the ‘modern’ British Isles is part of a rich set of studies generated in particular by the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure covering these countries, primarily England and Wales, from the post-medieval period to the twentieth century. This shows that in early modern England and Wales growth was slow, but accelerated in the eighteenth century. This research was synthesised two decades ago in a seminal paper by Tony Wrigley (1981) that covers a period, 1700–1820, before the Pakeha settlement of New Zealand occurred. Despite this, it is a very significant paper for us because it puts forward conclusions – which he carefully calls collectively an explicandum, rather than claiming that he has achieved a definitive explanation – that are critical for the present book. This explicandum can help us to interpret not only what happened in late nineteenth-century Pakeha society, but also identify the possible genesis of the underlying value systems that may have set in place a number of patterns and trends in family formation that have persisted in New Zealand, and perhaps other neo-Europes, until at least the 1970s. Most notable among these are norms and behaviours surrounding ex-nuptial conception and extra-marital birth in relation to fluctuations in general fertility rates.

Australia too has been ahead of New Zealand in launching survey-based data collection on changing family structures and family formation (see Carmichael 2000). The Australian Institute of Family Studies, established in 1975, carried out a longitudinal survey in 1981/82: the Australian Family Formation Project. Two other surveys were also undertaken: the Family Re-formation Project, focusing on union dissolution and remarriage; and the Children in Families Project. These surveys were aimed at getting a better understanding of family formation and structure: in terms of ethnic differences in family formation (Khoo 1985), couples living in de facto relationships (Khoo 1986, 1987), young people leaving home (Khoo 1987) and first-marriage patterns and trends (Carmichael 1988a). In addition the Australian Bureau of Statistics has carried out periodic surveys: the Family Surveys of 1982 and 1986 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1984; Australian Bureau of Statistics 1988) and a Survey of Families in Australia in 1992 (Castles 1993a; Castles 1993b) which help throw further light on the changing family structure in Australia well into the 1990s. In 1986 the Australian National University launched a national survey, the Australian Family Project (Bracher 1987). This survey complemented the work of the Australian Institute of Family Studies and the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Data from the Australian Family Project has provided further insights into union formation and dissolution (Bracher 1990; Bracher et al. 1993; Santow and Bracher 1994) and family composition (Santow, Bracher and Guoth 1988; Bracher and Santow 1990).

Australian researchers have also looked into historical aspects. Some work at a national scale has been carried out looking at nineteenth-century Australian family patterns by comparison with their British counterparts (McDonald 1974; Coghlan 1903; Royal Commission NSW 1903). The decline in fertility recorded by Coghlan and the NSW Commission has been analysed recently, drawing on newer methods and contributing, inter alia, to what was to become a major body of theory, John Caldwell’s Theory of Fertility Decline (Ruzicka and Caldwell 1977; theory elaborated in Caldwell 1982). Australia provides a comparison of the first order for New Zealand; reflecting this, one important demographic study covered Pakeha in both countries, but paid more attention to other aspects of population change, such as migration (Borrie 1994).

Ethnic differences in family structural patterns have already been noted for some countries overseas (for Australia see Khoo 1985; Khoo 1987). In some ways, though, at least for certain dimensions of family structures, New Zealand is ahead of other countries. As noted above, family size for both Maori and Pakeha has been estimated back into the nineteenth century, and the age-structural and status dimensions have been covered since the 1926 census (Pool 1991: passim). In the UN ECE/FFS, New Zealand is one of only two countries whose standard country report has ethnic differentials (Johnstone et al. 2001; Estonia is the other).

In order to gain a more comprehensive picture it is necessary to study changes in family morphologies over time. For example, an historical census data-base has allowed researchers to establish that in the United States higher rates of single parenthood, of children living without either parent and of extended family living arrangements among blacks compared to whites date back to the nineteenth century (Ruggles 1994).

In New Zealand, however, ‘we destroyed the individual census schedules once tabulations had been completed by census officials, and historians enjoy no second chances. Thus the ‘difficulties of studying work and family are particularly great . . . ’ (Thomson 1998: 6). Consequently, historical analyses have generally turned to expository techniques, although some other strategies have been employed. In the first case, in what its cover note appropriately calls a ‘remarkable study’, Charlotte Macdonald used micro-level, unit record-linkage techniques coupling together numerous different sources to reconstruct (or ‘trace’, as she called it) the lives of some 4000 single women who came to the Canterbury province as assisted mi-
grants in the 1850s and 1860s. This comprises a very large data-bank on the personal and family lives of a sample chosen from what was a very significant migration stream: around 1860 there were only about 60,000 Pakeha in total, among whom were roughly 12,000 women, in all provinces who had migrated independently. In the Vogel period of the 1870s one-fifth of all migrants came from this source (Macdonald 1990: 11–14). This research thus gives us valuable insights about Pakeha family dynamics at an early period of Pakeha settlement. On a more macro-scale, employing aggregated data and by resorting to retro-standardisation methods, Tiong (1988) and Pool and Tiong (1989) addressed related issues at a sub-national/provincial level. They were able to study regional differences in the family size transitions of Pakeha in the late nineteenth century coming primarily from differential changes in patterns of marriage and thus family formation. Using indirect estimation techniques Pool (1991: Chaps 4 and 5) also followed the Maori family size transition in the nineteenth century, both nationally and by region and tribe, when changes in the family size differentials came primarily not from fertility but from differences in the survivorship of children. Elsie Jones, using the so-called 'Coale techniques' developed by Princeton University's Office of Population Research, mapped the Pakeha fertility decline and similar trends in the Australian states (1971), a study updated by James O'Neill (1979).

Most of the research here relates to the country as a whole. Nevertheless, where data are available, a secondary-level review of regional patterns will be undertaken.*

3.3 FIRST-ORDER EXPLANATIONS: CHANGES IN FAMILY FORMATION

3.3.1 DATA NEEDED FOR UNDERSTANDING CHANGES IN FAMILY FORMATION

Family formation is a process and thus, as implied above, its analysis requires data on changes over time for individual women and men to cover 'transitions' (see earlier chapters) into and out of various 'states' (e.g. from marriage to birth one, birth one to birth two, etc.) (Allison 1984). As noted earlier, key family processes that lead to various family structures include: union formation (through marriage, cohabitation and remarriage); union dissolution (through separation, divorce, and death of spouse); fertility; the process of children leaving (and returning to) the parental home; and other transitions into and out of various statuses and living arrangements. The data needed are typically collected as retrospective life histories or through prospective panel surveys that record the dates of key life events and changes, such as marriages, births, job changes, location changes and the like. With such comprehensive data on transitions, researchers can analyse issues such as changes in the timing and duration of marriage or cohabitation, the nature of transitions into and out of single motherhood, and the timing of births in relation to both union formation and a host of time-varying characteristics, such as employment.

3.3.2 NEW ZEALAND KNOWLEDGE BASE ON CHANGES IN FAMILY FORMATION

Prior to the 1995 NZW:FEE survey, the New Zealand knowledge base on family-formation behaviours had been limited by a lack of life-history survey data. (See Pool and Sceats 1981 for a comprehensive review of data limitations for studying family formation up until 1980.) These limitations were largely still in place in 1994 (Jackson and Pool 1994). The rest of this section of the chapter looks first at the other data sources and then turns to the developments coming from the NZW:FEE and NZFFS and from another survey on mid-life family transactions.

Essentially, before the advent of the NZW:FEE survey in 1995, researchers had to rely on vital registration and census data. The major problem with this involves the lack of individual-level information on the timing and interrelationship of various events, such as marriage, births and divorce. Moreover, prior to 1980 data on marriage, births and deaths could not be linked together in any systematic way except to study 'nuptial' and 'ex-nuptial' births. Detailed output was lacking, though Shailendra Jain's (1972) collation of detailed data provided a much-needed age-specific time-series on vital data for non-Maori for the period 1921–1967; indeed, his work constitutes a veritable treasure-chest. Beyond this, the late E. G. Jacoby (1958), to whom this book is dedicated, authored a classical marriage-cohort fertility study.† At that stage parity data, although collected by means of an imprecise question ('issue' of this union, thereby not distinguishing stillbirths from live births or taking account of 'issue' from previous unions), was still of utility as

* See Pool et al. 2005b, and also Khawaja (1985).
† This work was carried out when he was a visitor at Princeton University.
most births of any parity were to a first-only union. More recently, once ex-nuptial birth ratios (ex-nuptial: total births) had increased and reconstituted unions became far more prevalent, this imprecision became a major weakness (Pool and Sceats 1981).

Data on ex-nuptial conception (measured by a birth prior to or during the first seven or eight months of marriage) and ex-nuptial childbirth have been available for Pakeha and their British forebears for a very long time. Indeed Wrigley’s (1981) study of eighteenth-century England shows that the antecedents of Pakeha patterns were a well-established cyclical trend in Britain. A number of in-depth analyses on this issue have been undertaken for Pakeha. For example, Jacoby (1961) pioneered this as part of his wider study noted above (see also Trlin and Ruzicka 1977; Pool and Crawford 1980; and, above all, Carmichael 1982). It was Jacoby who first noted the relatively high levels of ex-nuptial conception followed by marital birth occurring among Pakeha as far back as reliable records went. These data are important for analyses both of family size and of family statuses.

**Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce and Remarriage**

Prior to the 1981 census, the only information on cohabitation came from a study of marriage registration data that examined the addresses of marriage-licence applicants to determine how many were co-residing at the time of application (Carmichael 1984). Since 1981, Carmichael has provided estimates of cohabitation based on reported *de facto* couples in census data (Carmichael 1996), though these data provide no information on duration, nor can they track the outcome of cohabitation (long-term cohabitation; marriage; separation). As will be discussed later, they also yield lower estimates of the prevalence of cohabitation than that from survey data.

Vital registration data allow researchers to use conventional techniques to study marriage and divorce. Since 1952 such data have been available only for the total population, (with no ethnic breakdowns).

A major limitation of all data sources prior to 1995 was a lack of information on marriage duration. The census included no such detail and for divorce registration data such details were included only from 1977 (see Pool and Sceats 1981: 49–50). To overcome this, two quantitative studies on divorce manually linked marriage and divorce data (Carmichael 1982; Patterson 1976), three used aggregate vital registration data (O’Neill 1985; McPherson 1995; Pool, Jackson and Dickson 1998) and one qualitative study has investigated the social context of divorce trends and legislation (Phillips 1981). Studies by Carmichael (1985) and Jackson and Pool (1994) also examined remarriage. The advent of NZW:FEE and NZFFS has permitted detailed analyses, based on individual records, of each of these factors and others, as will be discussed below.

**Fertility and Family Size, Levels and Their Determinants**

Prior to 1995, New Zealand had no national-level probability samples on family formation and its determinants, and only four such regional studies, covering the Hutt Valley (Reinken and Blakey 1976), Manawatu (Trlin and Perry 1981), Miriam Vosburgh’s pioneer survey in Wellington (Vosburgh 1978) and a small-scale survey in Auckland (Keys 1969). Although not strictly in this category, one should also note two national-level surveys on women, one urban (Society for Research on Women 1972) and the other rural (Canterbury University Sociology Department in conjunction with the Women’s Division, Federated Farmers, see Gill *et al*. 1976). They employed multi-stage sampling, purposively at a higher level (urban areas; counties) and systematically from electoral lists at the individual level. While the objectives and emphases of these studies were different from ours, some data of interest for our research here were collected.

Fertility variables have been absent from most New Zealand censuses. A limited question on the number of children ever born to women appeared only six times prior to 1981, and then often with major constraints to their utility: in 1911, 1916 and 1921, married Pakeha only, and in 1921 tabulation were published only for women at the mid-point of quinquennial age-groups (e.g. 42 years) but by duration of marriage; in 1945, married Maori only; and in 1971 and 1976 all ever-married women (Pool and Sceats 1981: 44–45). The same question has been asked again only in 1981 and 1996, but not in 2001. Estimates for 2001 employed later in this book come from the NZFFS, but are only sample based.

Before the NZW:FEE and NZFFS results became available (see below; especially Pool *et al*. 1999; Dharmalingam *et al*. 2004) the proximate determinants of family building and family size could be reviewed only by the use of fragmentary data sources. Nevertheless the regional surveys just referred to yielded some data that could be extrapolated to a national level. Sceats (1981) used the Manawatu data to analyse the timing and spacing of births, a study that has been validated more recently using NZW:FEE data and thus covering the same period, but nationally (Morgan *et al*. 2001). Sceats and Pool (1985) and Jackson and Pool (1994) argued from the existing data that it could be inferred that New Zealand women and couples
were, in the main, efficient users of contraception, again a conclusion that has since been verified using the NZW:FEE. But researchers could only speculate about causally more remote determinants (see Pool and Sceats 1981). This weakness has been partly overcome in the last few years in some micro-level studies, using NZW:FEE and NZFFS data and other sources, and most recently by a macro-economic study (Poot and Siegers 2001).

Leaving (and Returning to) the Parental Home, and Extended Families
The census has provided the sole information on the proportion of adult children living in their parents’ home and of the proportions of elderly living with their children. The only New Zealand studies on transitions of young adults into and out of the parental home or on the durations involved are exploratory and are derived from the NZW:FEE (Hutton 2001; Dharmalingam et al. 2004).

Ethnic Differentials
From 1913, Maori birth, death and marriage registrations were added to the existing collection for Pakeha. While virtually the same data were collected on deaths for both ethnic groups, this was not the case for either births or marriages. Vital registration had been compulsory for Pakeha from 1859 (Papps 1985a), but Maori birth data did not become accurate until 1947, and those on mortality until 1961 (Pool 1991: Chapt. 2; see also Sceats and Pool 1985a). For Pakeha births, the age of the mother was obtained from 1913 onwards, while for Maori this information was not collected until 1961. A major limitation of marriage registration data for studying family formation has been the lack of information on ethnicity, except briefly from 1948 to 1952. This left only the census – with all its cross-sectional limitations – for the study of ethnic differentials in proportions married, divorced, with children and other factors.

The 1995 New Zealand Women: Fertility, Employment, and Education Survey (NZW:FEE)
The NZW:FEE, directed by Ian Pool, was New Zealand’s first national-level survey designed to collect life-history data on family formation (described in Marsault et al. 1997). This survey is linked into the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Family and Fertility Study (UN ECE/FFS), a study project that included the United States, Canada and more than 20 European countries, but not the United Kingdom or, unfortunately, Australia. That aside, the NZW:FEE has the great advantage of using internationally standardised instruments and has followed UN ECE prescriptions for a standard country report, prepared by each country in the study (for New Zealand see Johnstone et al. 2000). Data from the NZW:FEE survey are now allowing researchers to establish cohort-based, age-specific patterns of marriage, divorce, cohabitation, fertility and birth spacing across life-courses, and both their interrelationships and their co-variates, including those drawn from the survey itself (e.g. Dharmalingam et al. 1998a; Lapierre-Adamcyk, et al. 1997; Hillcoat-Nalletamby et al. 1999; Pool et al. 1999; the papers in Pool and Johnstone 1999; Johnstone et al. 2001; Dharmalingam et al. 2000; Pool and Sceats 2003; Dharmalingam et al. 2004). The analysis of different birth cohorts as they move through the life-course is vital to understanding changes in family-formation patterns that have led to changes in family structures.

A particular strength is that Maori were oversampled in a multi-stage probability survey. This means that the data on Maori can be used with a considerable degree of confidence.

Unlike most surveys of its genre internationally, the NZW:FEE was innovative in including women who were over the age of menopause (the range was 20–59 years). This allowed the researchers to analyse the family-formation behaviours of the last of the generations starting their childbearing before the Pill became available.

The survey has provided New Zealand with the first comprehensive cohort analyses of transitions into cohabitation, marriage, divorce and remarriage. For example, cohort analyses from the survey indicate that cohabitation as a first union has become increasingly common among more recent cohorts (Lapierre-Adamcyk et al. 1997). The proportion of women married by age 21 began to decline with the cohort born 1956–60 (Dharmalingam et al. 1996), and the overall risk of divorce has almost doubled since the 1960s, though researchers have noted a downturn in the risk of divorce during the 1990s (Dharmalingam et al. 1998a). A recently completed study also covers remarriage and family reconstitution (Dharmalingam et al. 2004). Other important gaps filled by the survey so far have been the analysis of age-related patterns of

* These results confirm those of McPherson (1995), who used official data sources in a robust study, although she was constrained by the limited data available to her.
reproductive behavior among different cohorts of women and variations in birth intervals (at the national level Edmeades 1999; Ball 1999a and b). These national-level analyses have confirmed Sceats’s earlier findings on timing and spacing both by comparison with the United States (Morgan et al. 2001) and by referring to the ECE/FFS data on Canada and some West European countries (Sceats 1999). The determinants and consequences of adolescent birth (Howard 1999a and b) and work–fertility relationships (Dharmalingam, et al. 1998) have also been examined. Data from the survey have also been used in a Department of Labour study on gender differentials in earnings (Dixon 2000).

Recently published monograph based on the NZW:FEE and the NZFFS (Dharmalingam et al. 2004) looks at a wide range of family-formation issues. It also analyses sole parenting, and provides New Zealand’s first study of blended families based on a probability study.

Initial exploratory analyses have also been carried out on fathers in families (Pool and Hillcoat-Nalletamby 1999). NZW:FEE has also yielded data on children leaving home and extended family networks, and on the probability that a father will still be in residence in the household when children reach given ages (Hope 1997; Hutton 2001; Dharmalingam et al. 2004).

The 2000 Transactions in the Mid-Life Family Survey
A further national probability survey, directed by the sociologist Peggy Koopman-Boyden, collected data in two waves on the dynamics of families whose key respondents were aged 40–54 years in 2000. The study covered not only intra-generational dynamics but also linkages ‘up’ and ‘down’ to the generations above and below them. The team included persons who had played a major role in the NZF:FEE.

This mid-life family transactions study covered household and generational structures and networks, by age, gender and ethnicity. Its main focus was how the different structures were related to giving and receiving care to/from their children and giving support to or receiving it from their parents (Koopman-Boyden et al. 2000; Hillcoat-Nalletamby and Dharmalingam 2003). Many of these aspects of family structures and forms are pertinent to the present book; the study also covered others of less direct interest here (e.g. leisure activities). Data collection was first through a CATI survey, using a prior face-to-face survey recruitment process, and then a follow-up using a mail-back questionnaire (Koopman-Boyden et al. 2000; Hillcoat-Nalletamby and Dharmalingam 2003).

The age-group 40–54 years was chosen because it represented three cohorts with very different fertility histories. The oldest group comprised, in the main, men and women who had started their childbearing early, at the very end of the Baby Boom. Those aged 40–45 were among the first cohorts to shift to a new pattern of delayed childbearing. The men and women aged 45–49 years were a ‘bridging’ generation.

Other aspects of this survey are outside the scope of this present book. But it must be stressed that the study did increase significantly the micro-level knowledge base on family dynamics.

The 2001 New Zealand Fertility and Family Survey (NZFFS)
To supplement and extend the 1995 NZW:FEE survey the Population Studies Centre carried out a family formation survey in 2001, directed by Arunachalam Dharmalingam. About 1800 women born during the period 1936–80 were interviewed over the phone. The survey obtained more recent data on some of the issues covered in the 1995 NZW:FEE survey, and new data on emerging issues related to family structures in New Zealand. This survey also collected information on student loans and their perceived impact on family formation and intentions. Questions that interlinked the fertility behaviours of mothers and daughters have allowed us to compare the experiences of teenage childbearing over two generations, to ask whether daughters born to adolescent mothers were or were not more likely to bear a child before they reached age 20 years (Dharmalingam et al. 2004). An analysis of NZFFS data on fertility, family, childcare and women's work provided the base for the planning and implementing of a complementary qualitative study of family–work balance (Sceats 2002; Sceats 2003).

Cross-comparative and other Derivative Studies using the Surveys
Prior to the NZW:FEE, comparative studies of family formation from a New Zealand data-base were rare. As noted earlier, Sceats (1981) had conducted a cross-comparative analysis with Canada using the Manawatu survey. The NZW:FEE has allowed such comparative work to be extended in several ways. First, several papers have already been presented on aspects of family formation comparing New Zealand with Canada (Lapierre-Adamcyk, Pool and Dharmalingam 1997) and the United States (Morgan et al. 2001). Secondly, the Population Studies Centre now has access from the UN ECE to standardised data sets from other FFS surveys and these have been used extensively. Even the standard country reports of the FFS have

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increased the capacity for cross-comparative analyses, and have been employed in an analysis of the impacts of periodicity as measured by factors such as changes in the timing of a first birth (Sceats 1999; Pool et al. 2000) and in a cross-comparative analysis of low-fertility ESCs (Pool and Sceats 2003).

Most importantly, the NZW:FEE and the NZFFS have allowed researchers for the first time to study ethnic differentials in major family-formation behaviors. All analyses to date have looked at Maori–Pakeha differences, drawing on both the main sample and a Maori over-sample which has yielded a robust Maori data sub-set. For reasons of cost this procedure was not followed for Pacific peoples and Asians. Nevertheless, the survey has provided evidence of the family-building patterns of Pacific peoples (Ball et al. 1999). Maori–Pakeha comparisons are available in most analyses (e.g. Pool et al. 1999; Dharmalingam et al. 2004) and in the New Zealand standard country report (Johnstone et al. 2001). For Maori and Pakeha, and to a lesser degree other ethnic groups, there are now analyses on ethnic differences in the timing of shifts in marriage trends (Dharmalingam et al. 1996). Studies to date also show higher rates of divorce among Maori than non-Maori, particularly during the first few years of marriage (Dharmalingam et al. 1998a); and much higher (by a factor of four) rates of adolescent births among Maori compared to non-Maori (Howard 1999; Dharmalingam, Pool and Hillcoat-Nalletamby 1997).

Tahu Kukutai (2003) employed the NZW:FEE for another purpose. The survey not only used the census question on ethnicity but took it a step further by asking those women who gave more than one ethnic identity to nominate which they saw as their principal one. She then used NZW:FEE data to compare the different sub-groups for both aspects of family formation and socio-economic factors. Of particular interest was the ethnic identity assigned to the offspring; only those women who saw themselves as solely Pakeha identified their children as Pakeha (the majority of all others assigned Maori ethnicity to their children).

Other Survey Data Sources
Household economic data on labour-force participation have been available in the Household Economic and Household Labour Force Surveys dating from the 1980s. As a by-product they give data on some aspects of structure. In the 1990s, an attempt was made to survey the care and educational arrangements of children (Internal report to the NZ Department of Labour by Hillcoat-Nalletamby and Dharmalingam 1999). Callister (1999) has also done work on this survey. A more recent survey by Statistics New Zealand on time-use is currently being analysed. Of a somewhat different order are the two longitudinal child-development surveys which started in Dunedin (1972) and Christchurch (1977). The latter has more direct bearing on this study (see Fergusson 1998).

3.3.3 COMPARATIVE STUDIES ON FAMILY FORMATION
As mentioned before, the United States, Australia, Canada and Western European countries all have major nationally representative surveys with which to track changes in the family. They have also exploited more traditional data sets. For example, Carmichael (1988) combined both registration and survey data to analyse first marriage in Australia. Munoz-Perez and Prioux (1999) used individual record linkage to study French ex-nuptial births in relation not only to their legitimation through the marriage of their parents, but also to the attributes of parents and recognition of the birth by the father. For European countries, Roussel (1993), using official data sources, has made a synthesis of the major patterns of change in family-formation trends.

Americans have always very effectively exploited available data from vital registration (e.g. see Ryder 1982), and as a result have a detailed knowledge of the size and age-structural dimensions of families. But they also have available to them comprehensive survey-based data sets coming from numerous nationally representative surveys, dating back as far as the 1950s, with antecedents in the Indianapolis Study of 1941 (Levine 1982) and the Growth of American Families study of 1955 (Freedman et al. 1959). As mentioned earlier, these include the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH), conducted by the University of Wisconsin and containing both retrospective data and several waves of panel data; the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), dating back to 1968 and following the same families annually over time, and the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth (NLSY), which follows a sample of individuals who were 14–22 years old in 1979. Geographical information, linking individual-level data with state, county and metropolitan area information, is available from all three data sets for researchers who fully comply with a confidentiality agreement.

As with the NZW:FEE, these data have allowed researchers to map out the basic trends, which are simi-
lar to those found in other Western countries, including New Zealand, over past decades: falling marriage and remarriage rates; nearly equal increases in cohabitation; rising divorce rates; lengthier periods outside of marriage; and a rise in non-marital births (Bumpass and Sweet 1989; Bumpass, Sweet and Cherlin 1991; Castro, Martin and Bumpass 1989; Cherlin 1992; Goldstein 1999; Manning 1995; National Center for Health Statistics 1994; Smith, Morgan and Koropeczyj-Cox 1996; Tanfer 1987; Thornton 1988). The wealth of life-history and panel data has also allowed for more detailed analyses than have been possible in New Zealand. For example, researchers have examined differing ‘modes of entry’ into stepfamilies (Bumpass, Raley and Sweet 1995); trends in adult offspring leaving and returning to the parental home (DaVanzo and Goldscheider 1990; Heer, Hodge and Felson 1985; Grigsby and McGowan 1986; Weinick 1995); and the living arrangements of elderly parents (Schoeni 1998).

Similar patterns have been found for Canada, Western Europe and Australia, using such data as vital and marriage registration, Canada’s General Social Survey and the British Household Panel Survey and the 1958 National Child Development Study. For example, various studies have documented trends in first-union formation across several WDCs (Goldscheider et al. 1999; Lapierre-Adamcyk and Charvet 1999), and delayed marriage (Dalla Zuana et al. 1998; Belanger and Turcotte 1999; Lapierre-Adamcyk et al. 1999). Elsewhere there are studies on the determinants of divorce in families in the United Kingdom (Berrington and Diamond 1999); including the effects of the propensity of parents who have divorced on their children’s dissolution patterns in adulthood (Kiernan and Cherlin 1999); on the substitution of cohabitation for marriage in Canada and Western Europe (Belanger and Turcotte 1999; Blom 1994; Burch and Madon 1986; Desrosiers and Le Bourdais 1993; Kravdal 1999; Prinz 1995); on the effects of what is called increasing ‘partnership mobility’ (Bernhardt 2000; Statistics Sweden 1994); on reconstituted families (Villeneuve-Gokalp 1999); and on changes in patterns of leaving the parental home, and the emerging LATs phenomenon (Murphy and Wang 1998; Villeneuve-Gokalp 1997). The FFS standard country reports also have a wealth of data on many of these changes (for example, for France, Toulemon and Guibert-Lantoine 1998; Norway, Noack and Orstby 1996; Netherlands, Latten and de Graaf 1997; Sweden, Grandstrom 1997; Canada, Wu 1999; Austria, Prinz et al. 1998; see also Klijzing and Macura 1997).

Much of the United States literature on family formation has focused on ethnic/racial differences. These studies have shown: significant differences in rates of cohabitation; marriage; divorce; adolescent childbearing; and extended family living arrangements. For example, Rendall (1999) demonstrates how differing rates of entry into and exit out of single-motherhood have led to ‘racial’ differences in sole parenthood; Raley’s (1996) analysis shows how the differences in rates of cohabitation account for half of the ethnic gap in first marriage rates; and work by Brewster (1994) and Landale and Hauan (1996) demonstrate racial, ethnic and nativity differences in adolescent sexual activity.

There has also been an attempt to study this question in Australia. Analyses there have shown, for example, that Aborigines are more likely to live in multi-family households than non-Aborigines; that individuals from non-English-speaking countries are less likely to be living together unmarried than those either born in Australia or from other ESCs (Khoo 1986; Castles 1994); and that there are differences in the fertility behaviour between the Australian born and migrants from developing countries and Europe (Young 1991).

Recently across the WDCs there has been an upsurge in interest in issues of low to very low fertility and the related issue of delayed parenting (van Nimwegen et al. 2002). This was the central theme in the FFS Flagship conference in 2000 in Brussels, a major meeting bringing together Western and Eastern European countries, and at which two papers generated by the NZW:FEF were presented. As if to underline the importance of this issue, one of the leading theoreticians of reproduction, John Caldwell, has just published a major theoretical paper on this topic (Caldwell and Schindlmayr 2003). Concern at a policy level is very strong in much of Western Europe and Japan. As a result the Japanese government has launched a number of policy conferences covering aspects of this issue, *towards which deals with the role of production (and related factors such as migration) and touches the sensitive question of the very viability of society. A related question of interest is why ESCs have higher fertility, relatively speaking, than the other WDCs*, whereas the props for reproduction, notably in the family policy area, fall well below what is available in

* When referring to US studies the term ‘racial’ (rather than ‘ethnic’) will be employed, as it is a convention there.
† eg Pool and Scents (2003); see also papers to 8th Welfare Policy Conference: ‘Population Decline and Immigration Policies: Japan’s Choice’ (Tokyo, December 2003). At this meeting, and following the lead of the UN (2001), changes in marriage patterns and a return to somewhat higher fertility through addressing work–life balance issues were seen as more viable longer-term policies than massive immigration flows.
France and across much of north-western Europe (Chandola et al. 2002; Pool and Sceats 2003).

3.3.4 EFFECTS OF FAMILY FORMATION ON INTERGENERATIONAL LINKAGES

Using a range of data (vital statistics and the Manawatu survey, see above), Sceats (1988a) pioneered for New Zealand the demographic analysis of dynamics of intergenerational relationships in New Zealand. She showed that there were birth cohort differentials in timing and spacing and when the last child might leave home, a factor she estimated from the fragmentary data available to her. The data did allow her, however, to make some comparisons with Menken’s classical study (1985).

Another discussion of this issue was based on data drawn from the Transactions in the Mid-life Family study (Hillcoat-Nalletamby 2000; Hillcoat-Nalletamby and Dharmalingam 2001). This built on much earlier work on the elderly by Koopman-Boyden (1978).

3.4 SECOND- AND HIGHER-ORDER EXPLANATIONS: SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND NORMATIVE CONTEXTS

Critical to explanations of changes in family structures is an understanding of the driving forces behind the changes in key proximate behaviours noted above. These are factors that fashion the size, age-structural and status dimensions of family structures and forms, including shifts in ages at marriage and childbearing, increasing cohabitation and growing rates of divorce. The key questions revolve around the underlying trends that have contributed to these broad-based changes. Explanations for shifts in family-formation behaviours thus centre on changes in the wider economic and social contexts (for example, for European countries see Ermisch 1994), involving a range of both macro-level changes that are highly intertwined and their micro-level co-variates.

When one turns to living arrangements, but also to some forces driving shifts in the profiles of family statuses, there is a need to assess a wide range of factors. Some are behavioural and of the order just noted above, but also they will typically involve questions relating to values and norms.

3.4.1 SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND NORMATIVE CONTEXTS

In the United States, the dominant theoretical paradigm for explaining structural changes in the family has been an economic one that emphasises the changing economic roles of women and men. Two hypotheses have dominated. The ‘women’s independence hypothesis’ focuses on the changing economic roles of women. Here the focus is on economic analyses, but a not-too-dissimilar literature on power relationships within marriage deriving its impetus from exchange theory (bartering, coming out of the sociology of work) had been developed by sociologists such as Scanzoni (1972). This thesis suggests that, with the rise in women’s labour-force participation, wives and husbands have fewer distinct ‘goods’ to trade and the benefits of marriage thus decline (Becker 1981), leading to marriage delay, alternate forms of relationships (e.g. cohabitation), and divorce. Following the same reasoning, some, typically those adopting an extreme neo-conservative position, have argued that the greater welfare provisions that were part of the United States’ ‘War on Poverty’ have lessened women’s need for marriage as well as men’s incentive to provide (Murray 1984).

A second and alternative hypothesis is that on ‘male marriageability’ (Wilson 1987; Lichter et al. 1992) and the related ‘economic-provider’ hypothesis (Bulcroft and Bulcroft 1993; Cooney and Hogan 1991; Koball 1999). These authors argue that the economic situation of males is central to union formation behavior. The rationale for this is the long-held norm that men must be in a position to provide well enough for a couple to form an independent household. This hypothesis has been invoked especially to explain delayed and foregone marriage among the United States black population. For example, Wilson and Neckerman (1987) suggest that the decline during the 1970s and 1980s in manufacturing jobs that once offered a ‘family wage’ to semi-skilled male workers led to a decline in marriage among inner-city Blacks.

Often Europeans have taken a different viewpoint by focusing on attitudinal factors. Ronald Lesthaeghe argues that a ‘fundamental transition’ has occurred involving Western values and norms, affecting family structures and forms. He suggests that recent changes in family formation and structure, such as the decline in fertility, delays in marriage and increases in cohabitation should not be treated as independent phenomena, but rather as ‘successive manifestations of a long-term shift in the Western ideational system,’ particularly the rise in individualism, secularism and post-materialism (Lesthaeghe 1983: 416, 429; see also 1991; see also van de Kaa 1987, 1988).

Interestingly, a far more centrally demographic argument has recently been raised. Anna Cabre and Albert Esteve (2004), looking at the Spanish experience, have argued that a key factor may well be a ‘mar-
riage squeeze' coming from the gender ratios, by cohort, affected by the tendency for women to marry men, say, three years older than them. This issue has been raised in New Zealand for recent decades (Jackson and Pool 1994: Table 5.14), and over an apparent ‘surplus’ of women aged 25–49 years at the 2001 census, as has a related topic – a surplus of males in the late nineteenth century.

3.4.2 SECOND-ORDER EXPLANATIONS AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Most individual-level United States studies have found a positive effect of women’s independence (employment status) on marriage propensities rather than the hypothesised negative effect (Cherlin 1980; Goldscheider and Waite 1986; Bennett et al. 1989; Lichter et al. 1992; Oppenheimer and Lew 1995). Likewise, Swedish research examining first union formation (Bracher and Santow 1998) and repartnering after divorce (Bernhardt 2000) finds that the most economically self-sufficient women are the most likely to form a partnership, and that highly educated mothers are least likely to divorce (Olah 2001).

Aggregate-level studies of the male marriageability hypothesis have generated mixed results, leading to only partial support for this theory (e.g., Ellwood and Crane 1990; Lerman 1989; Testa et al. 1989). A multi-level analysis, linking NLSY and census data, found a strong effect of the pool of full-time employed men on individual women’s propensity to marry (Lichter et al. 1992). Grossbard-Schectman and Granger (1998) have shown, however, that the relationships between the labour market and what they call the ‘marriage market’ are not only complex, but also are affected by a distinctly demographic phenomenon: the size of the cohorts to which people belong.

Finally, the effect of welfare benefits on marriage rates and non-marital childbearing is weak – there is a small effect but it is not large enough to explain the increase in single motherhood in the 1980s (Ellwood and Crane 1990; Lichter et al. 1997; Moffitt 1992). In contrast, cross-comparative studies of the effects of family benefits of various sorts on family-size levels support, at least in part, the hypothesis that an impact of these measures is pro-natalist (Gauthier and Hatzuis 1997, an econometric analysis of data from four groupings of countries: Anglo-Saxon, Southern European, Continental and Scandinavian; Gauthier 2002; see also Poot and Siegers 2001, which compares the Netherlands and New Zealand).

Recent studies, not only from the United States but also from Sweden, highlight the need to (i) examine the determinants of both male and female union formation behavior, and (ii) account for cohabitation in studies of changes in marriage formation. The main findings from this research suggest that the difficulty and pace of men’s career entry process is critical to their marriage behaviour (e.g., Oppenheimer et al. 1997 using NLSY data). Economic factors are more important in explaining the transition from cohabitation to marriage among men than among women (Manning and Smock 1996; Smock and Manning 1997). The determinants of re-partnering after divorce are similar for men and women but women are more likely than men to have characteristics, such as having custody of children, which predispose them to remain un-partnered (Bernhardt 2000). Papers from Australia published over the last few years demonstrate, however, that even homogamous marriages of the better qualified may be vulnerable financially and thus willing to entertain the avoidance of reproduction, because, for example, of the widespread effects of student loan debts. Increasingly such borrowing will not be by one partner, but by both (Jackson 2000b; see also Carmichael 2000).

Some of the interest is directed towards the policy issues surrounding low fertility in the WDCs, the question that was raised earlier. This is an important question for us; it is not something that is remote. While rates in New Zealand are higher than in most WDCs (exceptions are France, the US, Iceland) we seem to be drifting at sub-replacement levels.

A paper noted earlier (Caldwell and Schindlmayr 2003: 257–58; this paper has generated a major debate in the journal Population Studies, March 2004) raises at a theoretical level important questions, of which the most challenging was a point first raised long ago by the late Kingsley Davis (1937). He argued that high fertility may be incompatible with the life-styles of modern industrial societies, among them the mix of work patterns, consumerism and urbanisation. Of particular concern are work–life or work–family interrelationships, along with associated factors such as labour-market ‘flexibility’. Entering this equation is the extent to which policy interventions can affect a balance that favours both the ‘factors of production’ and the ‘factors of reproduction’ (Castles and Mitchell 1993; Kamerman and Kahn 1997b; Gauthier 1996, 2002;
In this area there appears to be a gap in the international literature; a lack of studies in male attitudes about these conflicts. When looking at ‘policy’ on work–life balance there is a need to recognise that this is likely to be formulated at various household decisions and fear of domestic violence, are also important factors. Concerns, such as whether men will participate in housework, how marriage will limit their control over their economic situations in assessing the desirability of marriage, but that other large impact on individual women’s decisions about marriage and divorce. Collectively their work suggests formation may have led to delays in marriage and increases in cohabitation. Qualitative work by Forste at an aggregate level, decreases in religiosity and increases in acceptance of alternative forms of family structure. These lead to racial differences in opportunities for marriage and for alternatives to early childbearing, such as neighborhood levels of poverty and joblessness (see Booth and Crouter 2000; Coleman 1988; Fossett and Kiecolt 1993; Hogan and Kitagawa 1985; Lichter et al. 1991; South and Crowder 1999).

3.4.3 HIGHER-ORDER EXPLANATIONS AND EMPirical RESEARCH IN OTHER COUNTRIES

Empirical research examining the thesis that changing values, attitudes and norms have driven the dramatic changes in family formation seen in the latter part of the last century in Western countries has taken two forms, one at a macro- and the other micro-level. Macro-level studies across Europe and North America examine concurrent changes in major institutions, such as religion and the family, and have found support for the idea that a broader type of change has been under way in the value systems of societies (Klijzing and Macura 1997; Lesthaeghe 1983, 1991; Ermisch 1994).

Supporting this work is micro-level research, mainly from the United States, that suggests that differences in parental religiosity and attitudes toward family-formation behaviors affect differences in behaviors among young adults (Axinn and Thornton 1993; Thornton 1989; Thornton et al. 1992). Parental pressure may even influence the type of union entered and the propensity to enter (Barber and Axinn 1998).

At an aggregate level, decreases in religiosity and increases in acceptance of alternative forms of family formation may have led to delays in marriage and increases in cohabitation. Qualitative work by Forste and Tienda (1996), Fernandez-Kelly (1994) and Edin (2000) indicates that changing gender roles have a large impact on individual women’s decisions about marriage and divorce. Collectively their work suggests that women do look at men’s economic situations in assessing the desirability of marriage, but that other concerns, such as whether men will participate in housework, how marriage will limit their control over household decisions and fear of domestic violence, are also important factors.¹

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¹ When looking at ‘policy’ on work–life balance there is a need to recognise that this is likely to be formulated at various levels. Most notably what may be termed ‘meta-policy’ tends to be the prerogative of the state, whereas there are also policies at the corporation, enterprise or workplace level (Comments by Pool and Sceats to a Labour Market Policy Group consultation on this issue, 19 November 2003, Hamilton). Work by Sceats (2003) shows, however, that, regardless of the policy framework, implementation often depends on interactions within work units (for example, unsympathetic supervisors may play a more powerful role than the policies that ostensibly guide their actions).

‡ In this area there appears to be a gap in the international literature; a lack of studies in male attitudes about these conflicts (Anna Cabre, director of Spain’s largest demographic research centre, personal communication). The present authors are attempting at the moment to launch a CATI survey and focus group surveys on this topic. A pioneer survey on this issue was carried out on a Ghanaian male sample by Ian Pool in 1965–66 (Pool 1970).
But a new element has emerged. As delayed parenting is becoming more prevalent, an emerging literature cites new sources of conflict between a career and childbearing. Historically, as was noted earlier, the choice was between a career and marriage; now women, whether in formal unions or cohabitating, are often faced with choosing between motherhood and vocational pressures. This tension seems more marked in English-speaking low-fertility countries than in some other WDCs (e.g. the contrast between France and Gt Britain demonstrated by Eckert-Jaffe et al. 2002). With this comes reproductive polarisation, and accompanying that there are emerging undercurrents of neo-eugenicist views that also often oppose family welfare systems (see international citations in Pool 1996, including a New Zealand example, Richardson 1995; see Bassett 2003a, b, for more recent New Zealand examples).

While much of the work on second-order contextual effects on racial/ethnic differences in the United States has examined structural determinants, other researchers have carried out qualitative work to understand differences in the meaning various racial and ethnic groups place on family life (e.g. Forste and Tienda 1996). Oral history data have also been exploited, demonstrating clear differences between blacks and whites in the norms surrounding family life during the 1930s (e.g. extended definitions of who is considered part of the family; community acceptance of ‘illegitimate’ children) (Pagnini and Morgan 1996).

3.4.4 New Zealand Knowledge Base on Second- and Higher-Order Explanations for Trends in Family Formation

The New Zealand knowledge base notably lacks studies that explore explanations for trends in family structures and formation. The study of determinants requires measures of the explanatory power of temporal and spatial factors that are among the hypothesised antecedents of family-formation behavior, and whether these associations are more direct or less direct. Thus, the two main sources of New Zealand data on family formation and structures – census data, which measure all variables at one point in time, and vital registration data, which virtually lack explanatory factors altogether – have been insufficient a base on which to build more precise explanations. The 1995 NZW:FEE and the 2001 NZFFS surveys have added to New Zealand’s knowledge base covering this level of explanation, but much work remains to be done on this aspect of these studies.

So far, results from these surveys have shed the most light on the ‘women’s independence’ hypothesis by examining the link between women’s education and work histories on union formation, and thus on family statuses, living arrangements and fertility behaviour (and thus family sizes). The results tend to conform to what has been found in the United States. For example, this research has found that tertiary education lowers a woman’s probability of forming a first union – both marriage and cohabitation – compared to having a lower or no educational qualifications (Dharmalingam 1999). However, once married, highly educated women are less likely to divorce compared to those with less or no education (Dharmalingam et al. 1998a).

Also indicated is a widening duration gap between women’s first jobs and their first births: the age at first job has remained relatively stable, while age at first birth has become increasingly older (Dharmalingam et al. 1996). It appears that differences among birth cohorts in parental age at first birth (indicating later age at first birth among more recent cohorts) are driven largely by cohort differences in work duration. Finally, the links between childbearing, and entry and re-entry to the workforce, as mediated by support resources, has been analysed from NZW:FEE data (Hillcoat-Nalletamby and Dharmalingam 1999).

One final qualitative study of in-depth interviews with women aged 20–40 years in a range of work and family situations in New Zealand, Australia and England was commissioned by a Japanese government agency. It provided cross-comparative data on the impact of policies on parental leave and childcare on fertility and family-building decision making (Sceats et al. 2003; Sceats 2003, 2006; Sceats and Kukutai 2005).

Thus, these surveys have allowed researchers to link family-formation behaviors with individual-level determinants that are presumed to be linked to more macro-level socio-economic structures, such as changes in the demand for labor, or in the organisation and funding of education. The link between individual-level variables and their macro-level correlates cannot, however, be empirically demonstrated.

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* The term in New Zealand, used here except where quoting other authors, is ‘ex-nuptial’. Illegitimacy as a status was eliminated from the statutes in 1969 (Cartwright 1985).
† The study was first carried out in 2002 in Hamilton, Melbourne and London and was commissioned by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Tokyo. It included women in long-term relationships with no children, and with one, two or three children with the youngest under age six years, and who were not working, or working full or part time. This baseline survey was extended in subsequent years, and also to include Auckland and Wellington.
in any sort of definitive way. This is not a problem unique to New Zealand, although researchers in other countries have been able to make more progress in establishing micro–macro links. Meanwhile, researchers in New Zealand have only recently been able to study the individual-level links themselves.

So far only indirect evidence is available on the ‘male marriageability’ and similar hypotheses for New Zealand. Callister (1998) finds that prime working-age men (25–59) with no formal qualifications were less likely than better qualified men to be part of a couple and to be in paid work. This suggests that men with no formal qualifications may be disadvantaged in both the labour and marriage markets, as has been shown in an Australian study (Birrel and Rapson 1998).

Research on other aspects of men’s involvement in families in New Zealand is limited. Some issues of fathering, drawing mainly on the NZW:FEE, have been analysed, but as yet only in an exploratory way (Pool and Hillcoat-Nalletamby 1999; Hutton 2001).

Another notable gap in New Zealand’s knowledge base involves the link between micro-level family behaviour, especially reproduction, and either micro- or macro-level, attitudes and values (see Pool 1992 for discussion). Important exceptions are qualitative work by sociologist Jan Cameron (1990; 1997), who examines ideas and values about parenthood and the family in general, and Sceats’s (2003, 2006; Sceats and Kukutai 2006) analysis of work–life balances at the start of the twenty-first century. Other important exceptions are a study by historical sociologist Claire Toynbee (1995), based on retrospective interviews relating to the period 1900–30. It looked at family and kin, particularly as they affected factors of the household economy and work. Another study, by May (1995) on life histories, yielded the baseline data for an analysis of family dynamics in the post-World War II period.

For the most part, however, the best that researchers have been able to do is suggest links between broad, macro-level trends and individual-level behavior. For example, Ball’s (1999) finding from the NZW:FEE survey that non-religious respondents have lower first-birth probabilities between the ages of 20 and 29 compared to their religious counterparts, coupled with Young’s (1997) finding of increasing secularisation over the past several decades, suggests that broad-based value shifts may have contributed to the observed pattern of later childbearing among more recent cohorts. Pool et al. (2000) demonstrated that the 1970s were a period of rapid change in New Zealand in both a broad range of family-formation behaviors and macro-social contextual factors.

While the NZW:FEE and NZFFS have greatly increased the New Zealand knowledge base on ethnic differences in family structures and forms, the research from that survey has not gone as far in examining in depth the reasons behind these ethnic differences. New Zealand lacks completely the type of data used overseas to study contextual (e.g. neighborhood) effects of ethnic differences in family structural patterns, including adolescent birth, sole parenthood, and cohabitation. Also missing is qualitative work linking empirically cultural differences in family processes and structural outcomes.

Finally, the analyses of the impacts of policy interventions on the family have tended to be indirect and based around temporal co-variance of policy changes and shifts in structures and forms. Little direct evidence exists. Much of the research on family policy has focused on operational aspects. Moreover, as was noted in Chapters One and Two, it has been directed towards a minority of ‘dysfunctional’ families, and less toward the majority of families, some of which may be vulnerable. Nevertheless, recently a number of more refined studies using management data have looked at that segment of families that are dependent on welfare benefits (see Barrett, Krsinich and Wilson 2003; Barrett, Krsinich and Wilson 2002; Ball and Wilson 2002; Mayer 2002).

### 3.5 SUMMARY

From this review of the New Zealand knowledge base on family structures, one major impression emerges. By comparison with most WDCs New Zealand faces marked lacunae both of data and of research findings. Paralleling this, it has been shown that in the policy arena there is far more on operational aspects than on outcomes and more on micro-level factors of service delivery than on macro-level policy impacts.

### 3.5.1 FAMILY MORPHOLOGIES

New Zealand lacks a comprehensive and systematic historical data-base on family structures and forms, but starting in 1976 changes in these, at least at the most basic level, are reasonably well mapped. In part, researchers wishing to carry out more refined and powerful analyses have been constrained because access to census data is limited and costly, curtailing New Zealand’s overall research output on families and households compared to other countries. Knowledge of higher-profile family forms that seem to be
increasing in prevalence – cohabiting couples, blended families, same-sex partnerships – is even more limited. As in other countries, census data do not provide a reliable time-series for these new family forms. However, New Zealand is faced with the further constraint of a lack of historical, national-level surveys that could fill this gap in data. Analysts of the NZW:FEE and the NZFFS are beginning to provide estimates of some of these emerging family forms.

3.5.2 FAMILY FORMATION
Trends in family-formation behaviours (the building blocks of family structure, but also information on its size, the age-distributions of households, family statuses and living arrangements) such as union formation and dissolution are becoming better understood with the NZW:FEE and NZFFS. Prior to 1995, rates in various behaviours could be established, primarily by resort to vital registration, but inter-linkages between behaviours, cohort-based trends, and ethnic differentials were severely curtailed due to lack of data. Thus transitions into the ‘newer forms’ of family – cohabitation, reconstituted and/or blended families – are understudied due to a lack of data, though analyses of the NZW:FEE and the NZFFS have partially filled this gap.

Even with the NZW:FEE and NZFFS, New Zealand lacks an historical, longitudinal data-base with which to study family transitions. In this regard more work needs to be done with data collections to fill existing gaps, and this is under way. For example, there is a need for analyses of cohabitation throughout the life-course; for research on cohort differences in the complexity of women’s partnership histories; and of detailed examinations of transitions into and out of various family structures (a first step has been made in various papers and in Pool et al. 1999 and Dharmalingam et al. 2004).

A particularly critical gap comes from the fact that New Zealand lacks national, longitudinal data on men, and their family and work lives. The importance of studying both men’s and women’s family behaviour has been reinforced by recent studies in both the United States and Europe, and the need to document men’s involvement in families as well as in the family–labour-market interface will only increase in years to come.

More waves of the NZW:FEE and NZFFS are needed, particularly to follow up on trends emerging in the 1990s to be discussed later such as declining rates of early cohabitation and divorce among younger cohorts. The lack of a fertility question in the 2001 census, in a period of extremely rapid change in aspects of family formation, structures and forms has proven a severe lacuna.

3.5.3. EXPLANATIONS FOR TRENDS IN FAMILY FORMATION, STRUCTURES AND FORMS
It is in terms of explanations of trends that New Zealand’s knowledge gaps are most evident and place the most severe constraints on research and policy. For example, empirical links between micro-level indicators of macro-level variables (e.g. employment, education) and family structures have only recently been established with the NZW:FEE and NZFFS. But this is insufficient as New Zealand is lacking a systematic data set that links micro-level outcomes with macro-level socio-economic determinants, including neighborhood or other area characteristics, that might influence (especially) ethnic differentials, so as to research questions seen to be important in overseas research. In this regard, data on values and attitudes, both at the individual and aggregate level for representative samples, are almost entirely absent. An exception is the New Zealand Values Study but it does not have the power, and is far less systematic, than data sets available in, for example, some Western European countries. Linking its results to fertility analyses is also problematic.

There is some qualitative work that asks individuals about the attitudes and motivation behind certain family behaviors. However, without complementary quantitative work,‘it is difficult to establish the representativeness of small, qualitative studies. The issue of representativeness becomes most critical when research findings are being extrapolated to policy analyses and to policy formulation.

The importance of men’s economic situations on male and female union formation, and thus family statuses, and on dissolution behaviour has been demonstrated in both the United States and Sweden. At present, such studies could not be carried out in New Zealand due to lack of data.

There are also lacunae both in terms of data collection and research on the direct links between policy and family structures and forms. Both of these gaps are now being systematically addressed by the Ministry of Social Development’s research groups by drawing together both management data sets and informa-

* Work by Sceats has started to address this gap by comparing NZFFS results with qualitative data.
tion in official collections.

3.6 CONCLUSION

The present authors, and others conducting any secondary-data-level analysis of family patterns in New Zealand, thus face major constraints in attempting to provide a rounded picture of the ‘changing New Zealand family’. New Zealand’s lack of national-level family surveys and the difficulties analysts face in using census data have left many gaps in its knowledge base on family structures and forms (Toynbee 1995: 9). As the recent book on families edited by Adair and Dixon (1998; see also Koopman-Boyden 1978) demonstrates, research into the family in general has been strongest in qualitative, micro-level domains of psychology and child development studies,’ and on issues related to family law (see Smith and Taylor 1996). A lack of data has left a rather large gap in New Zealand’s knowledge of broader-based issues, such as overall trends in family-formation behaviors and their links to macro-level changes, both economic and normative. The undertaking of the NZW:FEE and NZFFS surveys fills part of this lacuna, but a great deal of work remains to be done, much of which will need to await the collection of both new waves of such surveys and new types of national-level data.

This review has also identified a major gap. There is an absence of studies on the internal dynamics of families, especially of those that fit modal categories and are not facing some sort of crisis. What the ‘everyday’ New Zealand family does in its internal interactions and relationships is, at best, an academic territory that is only partially explored.

To return to the distinction made by Wrigley (1981) and cited earlier, New Zealand has the bases for an explicandum of family morphologies. But much remains to be done even merely to build on and elaborate this; and we have a very long distance to travel before we can attempt robust, evidence-based explanations of most family phenomena. And while our work can present the broad framework, the skeleton, as it were, there is an urgent need for more micro-level studies, quantitative and qualitative, on family dynamics. Without these, no macro-level analyst can change their explicanda to explanations.

* Both of the two panel-type longitudinal studies, that have been running for more than 20 years – the Dunedin and Christchurch studies – relate primarily to child development. Of the two, the Christchurch study has a wider coverage of family issues.