On 22 February I returned from a trip to Japan, Korea and China with Associate Professor Rob Scollay, in which we met researchers of food policy, food trade and food security (see inside). That was the day that the second major earthquake struck Christchurch, unleashing enormous damage.

In the next few days I received a large number of emails, especially from friends in Japan, who had seen the images on Japanese TV, and were very concerned about whether family or friends had been caught up in the disaster. One of the emails, from a friend in Shizuoka, was titled ‘From the next mega earthquake centre.’ Tragically, he was right, although the earthquake of 11 March was centred off the coast of Tohoku rather than Shizuoka. The earthquake and subsequent tsunami brought carnage, compounded by radiation leaks from Fukushima’s No. 1 nuclear power plant.

We rely on the media for our understanding of such events. A number of things struck me about reporting of the Japanese tragedies. First, on 11 March itself, I was struck by how much concern (at least on the radio) was directed to possible tsunami havoc in the rest of the Pacific, such as Taiwan and Hawaii, with very little being said about Japan itself. Second, a couple of days later a Reuters report (filed from Beijing, presumably by a reporter based in Beijing) cheerily predicted that, as Japan had bounced back from the Kobe earthquake, and other disasters in developed countries typically posed temporary setbacks at worst, Japan would soon recover from the unfolding events. Third, there was relatively little reference to people – ordinary Japanese people caught up in the disasters – and where there was, they were typically portrayed as disciplined and restrained – almost automatons – as they had been well drilled for such occasions. Even in the face of a potential nuclear disaster, discipline did not crack. This reminded me of intercultural communications research, which suggests we attribute in-group behaviour to differentiated, human motivations, and out-group behaviour to patterned, stereotypical responses. In fact, the responses in Japan were very human, even if they were comparatively restrained. And debate, both private and public, exists in Japan as elsewhere. The nuclear power industry in Japan, for instance, has long been contentious, and one point of contention has been the siting of the power plants, as was made clear by comments from Dr Rumi Sakamoto at an NZAI seminar on the Japanese disasters on 16 March.

On top of their human toll, the effects of which are long lasting, natural disasters generate economic demand and supply volatility, highlighting geographical and structural interdependencies in unexpected ways. The Tohoku region is not a historical centre of Japanese manufacturing, but over the past 25 years many auto and electronics parts factories have been built there, resulting in significant disruptions to domestic and indeed global manufacturing since 11 March. Even before this, researchers were pointing to increased global volatility in both energy and commodity food prices, as well as the strong possibility of higher prices becoming more enduring. Food security is thus becoming a more important political and policy issue, but different perspectives inform the debates. In China, food safety is a central concern of food security, but so are food imports and exports. In Japan and Korea, a stronger association is made between food security and self-sufficiency ratios, and protection of domestic small-scale farmers is strong. Post-war land reforms which entrenched the right of those tilling the fields, unleashing rural productivity growth, resulted in holdings which are typically less than one hectare (for rice farmers). Rising average farmer ages – 66 for rice farmers in Japan – and rural depopulation, with increasing abandoned land add to a sense of fragility, but also the need for further reforms. Free trade agreements in this context are contentious, and the recent debates in Japan about TPP have served as a lightning rod for opposing views. Whether the damage wrought by the tsunami in Tohoku, which also has fertile agricultural land, will propel or impede reform remains to be seen. But it does seem clear that we will have to make greater allowance for unpredictable events such as natural disasters in our research of economic and business models, and relatedly, that issues like food and energy security will become more central concerns.
Time to bring back Indonesian

Histories can have their use as well as their interest - Nicholas Tarling reports. My account of Asian Studies at the University, Imparting Asia, published by the Institute last year, might be alleged in evidence, at least in the case of the study of Indonesia, the largest of South-East Asian states, the largest Muslim nation and now the tenth largest of New Zealand’s trading partners.

The history recalls that Indonesian language and literature was taught at the University for over 30 years, along with courses in the history and politics of South-East Asia. It was also taught at Victoria, but only at Auckland was it possible to advance the subject to masters level. Substantial library and research collections were built up and are still, of course, preserved, but the language is no longer taught at either university. Indeed it cannot be studied in degree courses in New Zealand.

What is thought to have delivered the final blow was the crisis that enveloped Indonesia in the late 1990s as a result of the financial crisis of 1997-98, the fall of Suharto and the ethnic violence with which it was associated, and the conflict over the future of Timor. Is it not time to review the position? Those factors are now ten years in the past and New Zealand is dealing with a very different Indonesia as well as an independent Timor.

In 2000 Victoria stopped its teaching and it seemed that Auckland would follow suit. Undergraduate enrolments were insufficiently numerous to meet the criteria for continuing to teach the courses. That position was controverted. Too rigid an application of numerical criteria, it was argued, would surely be unfortunate not only for Indonesian, but for any minority subject or any innovation. One of the advantages of a large university was surely its ability to encompass swings and roundtables, rather than merely applying numerical criteria. Dropping it, too, would not only be odd, but look odd, at a time when New Zealand had soldiers in East Timor, as a result both of its direct interest in the region, and of the indirect interest it has on account of its relations with Australia. Perhaps the Tertiary Education Advisory Commission should have a role not only in respect of introducing subjects, but in considering their disappearance. Could not additional funding be provided for a further test for their viability?

The matter reached the prime minister of the day, Helen Clark. Whatever the reason for the fall-off in interest, she wrote, “Indonesia is too important to our region not to attempt to attract more New Zealanders to acquire an understanding of the country and its people”. She favoured a discussion among stakeholders, including academic institutions and business interests, “about what might be done to create a climate of opinion more favourable to the pursuit of Indonesia studies”. She hoped The University of Auckland would initiate the discussions, “bringing together those who share the perspective that the absence of Indonesia studies in the New Zealand education system is not in our national interest”.

Following a meeting at the University, a roundtable was convened in June 2001. It endorsed continuing to teach Indonesian, and it also endorsed an ”Indonesian Project”, “a coordinated research, advisory, policy and outreach effort” to raise the profile of Indonesia studies and to provide a national focus for the study of Indonesia. But the teaching was abandoned and the project did not get off the ground.

Can these ideas be revisited ten years later? The expert staff has largely dispersed, but the research resources remain. Special funding would be needed to try the experiment, since the funding models provide a little latitude for experiment. But the chances of winning support for an Indonesia Project – in the context of which the courses might flourish and attract enrolments – are surely now better than they were.

Maybe this historian can risk recalling the words he offered Asia Info five years ago when he wrote about offering “Asian” subjects at the University. “Perhaps it was never realistic to hope that these would be other than ‘minority’ subjects in educational curricula, even at university level, and I am not sure that even in the pioneering days were expected any more. We did, however, recognise that such subjects had a value both actually and potentially, and that it was something of a duty – as well as a pleasure – to provide them, not only in respect of academic enrichment, but in terms of social and political significance. The flexibility and largeness of mind that permitted us to do so seem now to have been driven out of the system by the rigid application of funding formulae based on a market-driven approach. Yet even business – when led by forward-looking people – does not merely look to the short-term nor do supermarkets simply focus on popular lines.”
Agriculture, food chains and TPP in East Asia

A recent two-week research visit to Japan, Korea and China by Professor Hugh Whittaker and Associate Professor Rob Scollay was aimed at surveying views in the academic and business communities on agriculture and food trade issues from trade policy and business perspectives.

Dr Scollay reports that their consultations with research institutes and university academics covered the full range of views from advocates of liberalisation and reform to defenders of protectionist policies, especially in Japan and Korea, where the contestation between the two sets of views was directly related to debates over the future of trade policy in each country. In China the focus was much more on issues related to internal economic development.

In Japan the pressure to maintain the status quo in agriculture clashes head-on with the perceived imperative of increasing Japan’s integration with the regional global economies. This integration forms part of a strategy aimed at achieving the improvements in productivity and competitiveness needed to sustain economic growth in the face of the formidable challenges posed by Japan’s rapidly aging population and the increasingly unsustainable fiscal position of its government.

Against this background the debate over whether Japan should join the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) has assumed the tone of a fundamental clash between two visions of Japan’s future. Both sides have been intent on heightening the sense of a crucial turning point in Japan’s economic development, with business interests and some politicians presenting the TPP as Japan’s large chance to keep pace with its neighbours and competitors, while the even louder voice of JA (“Japan Agriculture”) is proclaiming the destruction of Japanese agriculture if Japan joins the TPP. The TPP might herald the end of the status quo in Japanese agriculture and the decline of JA’s power, as well as the birth of a new and more competitive model of Japanese agriculture.

Korea faces many of the same issues but is further along the road to agricultural reform and restructuring, having developed an understanding that the agricultural impact of new trade agreements must be compensated by effective adjustment support to agriculture. Japanese commentators attribute Korea’s apparent greater ability to overcome agricultural opposition to new trade agreements to the advantages of Korea’s presidential system of government over Japan’s cabinet system. Korea however shares with Japan the difficulty of differentiating support policies that will promote necessary restructuring from those that will merely assist in perpetuating the status quo.

Korea is much more relaxed about the TPP than Japan, having already concluded FTAs with the United States and the European among others, although a decision by Japan, and even more by China, to participate in the TPP would quickly capture Korea’s attention. Agricultural interests are much more concerned about the threat to sectors of Korean agriculture posed by a possible FTA with China, which is increasingly seen by business and trade analysts as the vital next step in Korea’s FTA network.

The focus of agricultural researchers in China is very different. A key concern for them, as it is for other economists concerned with Chinese development, is the debate over whether China has reached its “Lewis turning point”, or point at which the apparently unlimited supply of low-cost migrant workers from the rural areas to the urban industrial heartland is exhausted. The end of this model of development based on massive rural-urban migration has vital implication for Chinese agriculture as it does for the entire process of China’s economic development, its social policies, and its role in the global economy. Agricultural researchers are concerned with the implications for provision of education, health and other social services to rural communities, with structural policies to maintain productivity in China’s agriculture, with the relationship between supply and demand across products and geographic regions, and with the balance between domestic supplies and international markets in satisfying both the levels and patterns of China’s future demand for food products.

Business meetings provided many insights into the development of value chains in the international food business, and into the degree of involvement of New Zealand producers in these value chains. A persistent impression gained from a range of participants in these value chains, including local importers and distributors and multinational operators as well as representatives of New Zealand interests, is that, with some conspicuous exceptions, New Zealand producers are insufficiently engaged at the distribution end of these value chains. A persistent impression gained from a range of participants in these value chains, including local importers and distributors and multinational operators as well as representatives of New Zealand interests, is that, with some conspicuous exceptions, New Zealand producers are insufficiently engaged at the distribution end of these value chains.

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Doing business in China: Supply chain characteristics

Globalisation and the influx of information and communication technologies have seen logistics supply chain management becoming an important tool for companies to synchronise supply with demand and compete effectively both locally and globally.

China, being the second largest economy, the “World Factory” and a leading luxury market, bears heavily on the structure and performance of the world supply links. Consequently, how its logistics develops will have a direct and significant impact on world business. To help the New Zealand business community and trade and development policy makers get a grip on China’s logistics, the NZAI and the New Zealand Centre for Supply Chain Management jointly sponsored a breakfast forum on 3 February on the current status and future prospects of the logistics industry in China.

The event featured three speakers, Visiting Professor Liu Yanping from Nankai University, Professor David Robb from Tsinghua University and The University of Auckland and Dr Gloria Ge, NZAI’s Associate Director.

Professor Liu’s comments indicate that logistics is still a new frontier in China’s industrialisation effort. There are now over 700,000 logistics providers in China, most of which are small and able to provide only a single service of either transportation or warehousing. Standardisation is thus a daunting challenge. The problem with transportation has already hit the crisis level as the double “over” – overload and over-limit – has caused stifling gridlocks on highways in many development centres.

One solution lies in the coordination and streamlining management among foreign third-party, private third-party and state-owned logistics enterprises; and the rail, road, sea and air transportation. Yet since these logistics providers are entangled in an enormous “guanxi”-government complex, Professor Robb does not think their consolidation will come soon. An immediate consideration for businesses is thus “location, location, location”. In other words, they should focus more on supply clusters than low labour costs.

For those who want to do business in China, Dr Ge advises that they should understand its regional differences and how its domestic emerging companies compete in the market. This may help them choose the right place, find the right partner and choose the right management team for their investment.

The place of diverse ethnic communities and business innovation in transforming Auckland

Initiated in November 2009, this multi-disciplinary research project took off in September 2010 with a grant from the Transforming Auckland Fund programme.

This study undertakes scoping work towards answering the question of whether the contemporary ethnic diversity of Auckland promotes positive socio-economic transformation of the city, enhances innovation and fosters engagement between New Zealand and Asia. The research question will be addressed through secondary data, key informant interviews and neighbourhood-based observational research to deepen understandings of Indian and Chinese transnational communities in Auckland. The study proposes a bi-directional empirical inquiry into the sustainability of society and economy.

Underlying the project is the recognition that, in seeking a sustainable future, the weight of emphasis tends to fall on “hard” infrastructure. Yet, Auckland is not only a physical but also an “imagined” place. This project hence stresses links between sustainability and social infrastructure such as facilitative networks, community cohesion and public perception. This work is aimed at informing sustainable socio-economic transformation, deepening the public understanding of well-being for the ethnic population under consideration, and laying the groundwork for a forthcoming Marsden application.

The principal investigators include Professor Robin Kearns and Dr Ward Friesen from the School of Environment, Professor Manying Ip from the School of Asian Studies and Professor Hugh Whittaker from the Business School and NZAI. The project will be administratively assisted by Dr Xin Chen from NZAI. Interested PhD students have been invited to participate in survey design, data collection and analysis, and final report writing.
The economic dominance of the United States after the war became the story of the rest of the century.

To a lesser extent, the Asian Crisis of 1997-98 precipitated the accumulation of massive surpluses by the affected countries which many Western commentators now blame for the current Global Crisis, hardly a decade into the twenty first century.

Whatever its causes, this present crisis is already signalling the re-emergence of China as an economic superpower, although not yet the equal of the US.

How China deals with each major economic crisis has implications not only for its own wellbeing but also for its Asian neighbours. What has been the nature of China’s response?

The Great Depression occurred at a time when China was in turmoil – there was economic mismanagement, an ongoing power struggle between the Nationalists and the Communists, and Japanese troops poised to invade Manchuria.

Whether its silver standard was a lifeboat for China to escape the worst effects of the 1929 crisis, the Great Depression, argues Tomoko Shiroyama (2008),* saw the semi-closed economy shifting from laissez faire to greater state intervention. This process ultimately politicised not only its entire economy, but also its involvement in the world economy.

The Asian Crisis, on the other hand, came upon a very different China, one that was resurgent, confident and ready to contend for a leadership role in Asia. Practically unscathed by this crisis, China was able to play and, more importantly, was seen by Asians as playing, a positive and helpful role in ravaged Asia against the backdrop of Western-backed IMF measures.

The current Global Crisis curtailed China’s spectacular growth, cutting deeply its exports. However, amidst the ruins of the “decoupling thesis”, China’s economy was the first in the world to revive, thanks to its massive fiscal stimulus. Can this response be sustained? What does this say about the efficacy of state-led capitalism?

Criticism of the developmental state and of the exceptionalism of Asian values that reached its height during the Asian Financial Crisis has become muted as the recent global crisis shows the limitations of the neoliberal market ideology, and possibly even the economics discipline itself.

China and other Asian countries that were lectured about the need to free markets now witness the failures and excesses of the greatest free market economy of all. The engines of current growth are those countries that never abandoned completely state regulation. How should these economies chart their long-term development?

To address these issues, the New Zealand Asia Institute initiated in February 2010 a two-year joint research project titled, “Crisis, economy and state: China and its East Asian neighbours”, in association with the Asia Centre at the Seoul National University, the Institute of China Studies at the University of Malaya, the Centre for Asian Business Studies at Korea University, and the Centre for China Studies at the University of Indonesia.

Fifteen scholars from New Zealand, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, India and Australia were invited to study China’s evolving role as it responds to crises, and as it seeks to leverage these events to position itself in its relations with the rest of Asia.

After several months of investigation, the research members met at the Seoul National University in September 2010 to present their case studies and preliminary findings.

The main themes were political economic contexts of crises, managing transitions during crises, development models and roles of the state versus the market. In the next phase, project members will reconvene at the University of Indonesia to present their conclusions for publication as an edited volume.

Making sense of Asian nationalism

This year marks the 100th anniversary of China’s 1911 Revolution.

At his seminar at the New Zealand Asia Institute in March, Professor Anthony Reid from the Australian National University stated that the mid-twentieth century marked one of the greatest watersheds of Asian history. In essence, when the region emerged from World War Two, most imperial constructs were declared to be nation-states, the sole legitimate model of twentieth century politics, and nationalism became the main story of Asia’s twentieth century. If any upheaval could be said to have created a model in Asia, as the revolution of 1789 did for Europe, the Chinese revolution of 1911 would be the strongest candidate.

Prof Reid stated that 1911 mattered for Asia because of the history and importance of the Manchu Empire, and the dispersal of Chinese in other countries, particularly in South-East Asia. Specifically, the notion of what a revolution and a revolutionary were became known through this act. Its spectacular success of overthrowing an ancient empire and clandestine mobilisation of a revolutionary organisation was appreciated and reverberated throughout Asia. While the violence and illegality of revolution were already divisive, the most powerful ideal of 1911, nationalism, was even more so. Prof Reid emphasised that the mobilisation of “overseas Chinese” on behalf of a new community imagined as engaged in a racial struggle for survival created not only some emulation in Southeast Asia, but more importantly competition. In other words, the new “Chineseness” began to be imagined as incompatible with the other newly imagined communities struggling into being, and in many situations on the ground, for example in Indonesia, competitive with them. In Prof Reid’s opinion, 1911 can therefore be seen as a particular parting of the ways for Chinese Southeast Asians, the consequences of which are with us a century later.

Professor Reid concluded that while the growing literature on nationalism suggested that the winners from the collapse of empires would have to be ethnically homogeneous nation-states, each major Asian state looked like an anomaly, failing to undergo the kind of culturally homogeneous national assertiveness that broke up empires in Europe and the Americas under the new pressures of industrialisation and print capitalism. Imperial borders were sanctified by China, India, Indonesia, Burma and the Philippines, though each experienced modernity under radically different conditions.

Professor Nicholas Tarling turns 80

The New Zealand Asia Institute celebrated the eightieth birthday of Professor Nicholas Tarling, in February of this year, an occasion celebrated by more than 50 colleagues and friends from universities and the wider community.

Sir Paul Reeves, former Governor-General and Visiting Professor at the NZAI, spoke at the celebration along with Emeritus Professor Barry Gustafson from Political Studies, who was acting director of the NZAI from 2003-06, and Dr Richard Phillips from Asian Studies.

The occasion was also marked by a display of aspects of Professor Tarling’s academic achievements at The University of Auckland Library, including his contribution to the study of the history of South-East Asia. He is the author of more than 40 books on politics, history, education, student welfare and the arts.

Celebrating of the 80th birthday of Emeritus Professor Nicholas Tarling Ltd (Cambridge), MNZM

Nicholas Tarling is Emeritus Professor of History at The University of Auckland and Fellow of the New Zealand Asia Institute.

At The University of Auckland he taught history from 1988 to 1996 and served as the Head of the Department of History, Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Deputy Vice-Chancellor and Public Cretor.

Professor Tarling has published more than 40 books and numerous journal articles, especially on the history of Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Burma in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and British policy in and toward these countries.
Multiculturalism and Korean nationalism: An uneasy co-existence

Dr Changzoo Song, School of Asian Studies

Two decades ago Korea used to be known as the most homogeneous nation in the world (together with Japan), and Koreans themselves were generally proud of the nation’s homogeneity.

This notion, however, needs to be revised now. More than one million foreigners are residing in South Korea and they include Chinese (both Han Chinese and Korean Chinese), Vietnamese, Americans, Filipinos, Indonesians, Japanese, Thais and Mongols. Almost 15 percent of these foreigners are "marriage migrants", who are mostly women who are married to Korean males. The number of migrant brides is growing continuously, and with their high fertility rate, they are literally changing the face of Koreans.

In face of this reality, Korean society now perceives itself as a “multicultural” nation and the Korean government formally accepts a multiculturalism ideology. Consequently, the last few years have seen a sudden increase in writing in Korea on these issues across many academic fields: social and demographic changes of Korea, current state of multiculturalism in Korea and ways to educate the general public with multiculturalism.

While multicultural realities seem to be a natural consequence of the globalisation and social, economic and demographic changes of Korea, it also brings serious challenges. Though not many scholars have paid attention, introducing multiculturalism to Korea may not be a simple question not only due to the country’s strong tradition of ethnic nationalism and homogeneity, but also due to the "unfinished" national task of reuniting the divided nation.

In particular, the multiculturalism ideology conflicts directly with the ideal of Korean unification, which is firmly based on ethnic nationalism. No wonder the North Korean government has strongly denigrated South Korea’s multicultural realities. As far as the reunification of the two Koreas is an important task for Korean nationalism, however, this question of harmonising the multicultural realities of South Korea and the national task of reunification is unavoidable.

At the moment, the two conflicting ideologies of multiculturalism and ethnic nationalism seem to be put under one blanket without their conflicting nature being realised. In my mind this is a very important issue that Korean Studies scholars should consider more seriously.
Scholarship ties with Asia

Recent seed funding toward the establishment of a fully-endowed, Singapore alumni-funded PhD scholarship marks a new stage in efforts to strengthen ties between New Zealand Asia Institute and the Business School and Asia.

A $25,000 gift, by Singapore-based University of Auckland alumnus Chuang Seng Lee, along with two $5,000 gifts from Yew Kwong Leung and Raphael Chin respectively, will attract one-for-two matched funding from the Hutton Wilson Trust, providing an additional $17,500 boost to kick-start the endowment.

The donors all hold influential positions in Singapore, with Lee chair of engineering consultancy Beca’s Asia hub and an alternate member of the Beca Group Board. Lee joined Beca in 1989 as Director in Singapore and in 2002 became CEO of Beca Asia. Leung is a Partner in the tax division of the Singapore-based Wong Partnership law firm and Chin is Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Controller for ST Engineering, a global aerospace and electronics firm also based in Singapore.

*This source of funding is significant. We have a large and growing alumni footprint in Asia, but until recently have received little financial support from our graduates there,* the Business School’s Development Manager Brad Weekly, says.

Economically, socially and politically, the rise of Asia can’t be ignored. New Zealand’s proximity to the region and the export-driven nature of our economy means that it will only grow in importance.”

“New Zealand signed the world’s first Free Trade Agreement with China and both the Business School and the New Zealand Asia Institute are positioned to stay at the forefront of the nation’s engagement with Asia.”

As at March 2010, some 1580 students from the region were enrolled at the School – 37 per cent of the total number of students from Asia enrolled at The University of Auckland. Among them were 389 Chinese students (60 per cent of all those studying at the University), 440 Hong Kong students (45 per cent), 320 from Malaysia (31 per cent) and 140 from Singapore (31 per cent).

Brad says the new scholarship, which will be funded by graduates from Singapore, will enable Singapore students – some of whom may already be studying in New Zealand – to undertake postgraduate research at the Business School. Once the fund reaches its total goal of $600,000, each scholarship will be able to cover three years of PhD study.

“We are actively pursuing the same model in Malaysia, and looking to establish similar programmes in Hong Kong, China and Vietnam.”

“Hopefully, these initiatives will strengthen our reputation in Asia and further our efforts to attract more international students from the region.”

Bridging the gap between Asia-savvy graduates and potential employers in New Zealand

Just how Asia-savvy graduates can contribute to New Zealand businesses and society will be a key theme at a conference at The University of Auckland Business School in September. The NZAI is supporting the student-led “Asia-savvy New Zealand Asia Conference” from 2-3 September 2011. Focusing on students instead of invited experts, the conference will provide a stimulating platform for dialogue between businesses, leaders and some of the best and brightest young minds from disciplines including business, medicine, science, engineering and law.

The student organisers recognise the importance of Asia to New Zealand businesses and vice versa, so the conference will facilitate debate and discussion by students and experts. Conference proceedings will also be published afterwards.

Experts and stakeholders will address the conference and participants can share their views at plenary sessions and parallel track sessions, ending with panel discussions after each session.

Around 100 students are being invited from universities throughout New Zealand and will be selected on the merits of a written submission addressing one of the four conference themes:

• where jobs are for Asia-savvy graduates
• how Asia-savvy graduates can create new opportunities for NZ businesses
• what Asia-savvy graduates value in their relationship with New Zealand
• how universities can enhance the ‘Asia-savviness’ of students

The conference website (www.asia-savvy.com) is available from May 2011 and for further information, please email info@asia-savvy.com

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