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Casting a wary – and increasingly fatalistic – eye over the daily news, it is not a massive stretch to believe that humanity’s collective inheritance is a one-way ticket to hell in a handbasket. Indeed, the Enlightenment-era belief in humans’ inexhaustible capacity for progress and rationality seems more dubious by the day. If anything, many communities around the world appear worse off owing to the unjust and often deadly consequences of decisions made in a distant time or place. The sheer magnitude of acute global crises such as climate change, war, staggering poverty levels, and the cult of so-called ‘alternative facts’ can easily seem both incomprehensible and insurmountable.

Yet, relegating ourselves to the position of sitting ducks is neither inevitable nor productive. Karl Marx (admittedly a questionable choice for a prophet) offers a surprisingly poignant explanation: people, he tells us, ‘make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please’. ¹ In other words, although we humans are constrained by the limitations of our time, place, and beliefs, we also have the capacity to meaningfully negotiate and change the world we have inherited.

The exemplary essays in this year’s edition of Histeria! explicitly engage with people’s capacity for action in the face of crisis, both perceived and actual. Whilst we have made gentle edits to grammar, formatting, and clarity, the style and substance of these students’ work remains their own. Each seeks, in some form, to evaluate the marvellous potential and very real restrictions of human agency within a variety of historical contexts. Whether negotiating the destructive reality of colonisation, resisting civic discrimination, or creating new meanings from inherited knowledge, the diverse human actors surveyed in these essays act within a

constellation of beliefs and circumstances largely determined by chance. Nevertheless, they also demonstrate a remarkable – if not always fully successful - capacity for flexibility, innovation, and persistence in the face of immense obstacles and adversity.

In a more practical sense, the selected works in this year’s Histeria! stand as a testament to the importance of how we interpret and represent the past. These exemplary pieces of work are a stark reminder that writing history can and should ‘change the way we act in the world’. As historians, we must endeavour to challenge simplistic myths, embrace multiplicity, and accept the messiness that is human experience.

This year’s Stage One essays explore different kinds of human agency. Lisa Lawford convincingly posits that ‘pornography’ can be used to reveal the historical specificity of ideas about sex in different contexts. For Lawford, scholarly agency – that is, the historian’s subjective selection, interpretation, and organisation of sources – has a significant role to play in exposing assumptions about both the past and the present. Whilst Lawford implicitly engages with ideas of individual agency, Melodee Panapa shifts her focus to the actions of the collective. Panapa brilliantly argues that although the history of the Pacific since the nineteenth century has largely involved colonial encroachment and Indigenous dispossession, its peoples have also demonstrated remarkable cultural resilience and flexibility. Jasmine Fraser, alternatively, explores agency through the lens of ideas: specifically, through the development of different historical explanations for Māori origins. Tracing the spread of three ethnographical discourses since the 1760s Fraser beautifully illustrates how each school of thought is both a product and a producer of its historical context.

Our Stage Two contributions emphasise the role of agency in negotiating prescribed or inherited ideas for practical ends. Luca Basso demonstrates that, although many German

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citizens formally endorsed Nazi gender ideologies, there was a significant disconnect between the regime’s imposed ideologies and people’s lived experiences. Implicitly, such ‘bottom-up narratives’ provide an important qualification to assumptions about the totality and rigidness of a given society’s ideals and rules. Caitlin Moffat-Young also examines the interplay between cultural norms and lived realities, but in the vastly different context of late-twentieth century Aotearoa New Zealand. Her skilful examination of Ngā Tamatoa’s activism around the Treaty of Waitangi describes a deft – and sometimes controversial – balancing act: whilst campaigning for the recognition and preservation of tikanga Māori, members of Ngā Tamatoa also mobilised a unique identity as cosmopolitan, urban activists. Helena Wiseman similarly focuses on the adoption and adaptation of existing cultural ideas. Wiseman examines the idea of *jihād* and its role in Islamic expansion before c.1150 CE. She confidently argues that *jihād* was (and remains) a malleable concept that could be applied to a variety of contexts.

This year’s Stage Three submissions delve more deeply into historians’ agency in creating narratives about the past, and their responsibility to do so both transparently and accurately. Hanna Lu opens this section with an excellent discussion of how historians actively construct narratives. Histories, Lu rightly reminds us, are impacted by the time and place of their writing, as well as the historian’s own interpretations and beliefs. Leigh Fletcher examines the specific case of the American Civil Rights Movement, demonstrating how history can be used as a tool for both justice and injustice. Crucially, Fletcher argues, the first step towards racial equality and justice is to allow African Americans to control and retell their own narrative of the Civil Rights Movement. In a similar vein, Olivia Maxwell asserts that there is no single narrative of the American past. Maxwell explores different phrases used to define the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, asserting that each is value-laden and necessarily privileges certain elements of America’s past over others. In other words, historians have a very real impact on the way in which their readers interpret the past and, in turn, the present.
Finally, our postgraduate submissions explore agency as a response to a predicament or crisis. Kieran van Leeuwen explores three very different instances of translators’ opportunism and creativity within significant linguistic and cultural constraints. In particular, he examines three case studies: Jesuit missionaries’ translation efforts in sixteenth-century China, the translation of the Treaty of Waitangi into te reo, and the translation of an eighteenth-century Dutch medical text into Japanese. For Harriet Winn, ideas and concepts transposed from Judeo-Christian cultures served as sources of resistance to colonial authority in nineteenth- and twentieth-century New Zealand and Palestine. Winn’s narrative not only focuses on the agency of Indigenous peoples, but also explores the benefits of a comparative approach to history. Last but not least, Tom Stephenson offers a piercing book review of David Wetzel’s *A Duel of Nations: Germany, France, and the Diplomacy of the War of 1870-1871*. Stephenson focuses on the personalities and decisions of individual European statesmen, detailing how many separate political choices snowballed into a tense diplomatic stand-off. Agency, in other words, manifests itself in diverse and often unexpected ways.

Each of the essays featured in this journal work together to emphasise the value of the study of history. Whilst historians make poorly qualified fortune-tellers, we are uniquely equipped to explain and engage with crises in the present. After all, we cannot understand how we got to where we are unless we look back to the past. In order for a time of crisis to become a time of stimulus, historians must critically reconsider the limitations and meanings of agency for different social actors in varying contexts. We hope that the essays included in this collection will provide a fruitful contribution to such a response.

What is the role of pornography in the history of sex?

Pornography is a subject fraught with argument. There are arguments about its definition, when it began, the moral nature of being involved in its production and consumption, whether it is inherently beneficial, harmful, or neutral. The argument this essay aims to make is to show pornography’s multiple roles in the history of sex. Specifically, pornography can be a record of sexual acts that have taken place. It contributes to our understandings of period-specific sexual constructions. It both influences and is influenced by those same sexual constructions. Pornography is impossible to separate from the history of sex, though it can be a difficult resource to interpret.

To talk about pornography, a working definition is necessary as a universal definition has yet to emerge. Defining pornography in our present time poses a challenge and defining pornography in all its forms over the last centuries even more so, let alone deciding when pornography was invented. Lisa Sigel recommends stepping over that hurdle by focusing on the definitions relevant to the specific period under study so that we may show ‘what [pornography] meant to a particular group at a certain moment in time’. Just as constructions

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of sexuality have changed over time, so too have constructions of pornography.\footnote{Robert Darnton, ‘Sex for Thought’, in Kim M. Phillips and Barry Reay, eds, \textit{Sexualities in History: A Reader}, New York, 2002, p. 215.} This essay will use Lynn Hunt’s definition of pornography as ‘the explicit depiction of sexual organs and sexual practices with the aim of arousing sexual feelings,’ bearing in mind the nuances of pornography in each period.\footnote{Kim M. Phillips and Barry Reay, \textit{Sex Before Sexuality: A Premodern History}, Cambridge, 2011, p. 113.}

Jeffrey Escoffier, in his article on male homosexual porn in the seventies, argues that pornography adds substantial value to the history of sex by providing a record of actual sex acts.\footnote{Jeffrey Escoffier, ‘Sex in the Seventies: Gay Porn as an Archive for the History of American Sexuality’, \textit{Journal of the History of Sexuality}, 26, 1, 2017, p. 94.} In researching constructions of sexuality, there is frequently a dearth of research on sex acts. This gap is understandable as there are few historical sources that provide information about the kind of sex that took place during different constructions of sexuality.\footnote{ibid.} Escoffier’s sources of pornographic films showed the staging of sexual roles and silent ways of communicating between partners - details that would be missing from a legal or medical text.\footnote{ibid., p. 92.} It would be remiss to assume these films were true-to-life representations of sex in the seventies, just as it would be to assume a mainstream blockbuster film was a documentary. However, there is both a challenge and value in distinguishing the ‘fantasy script from […] society’s prevailing sexual scripts’.\footnote{ibid., p. 98.} Separating fantasy from reality in pornography can help to contribute to historical understandings of sexual constructs. As such, it is important to understand the context that the pornography was created in and the feelings it was intended to arouse.

Understanding the context of a specific example of pornography and the constructions of sexuality at the time it was created are essential for using porn to build upon the history of

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sex. Not only has pornography itself changed over the course of history but the mental framework within which it was meant to be understood has also changed. Robert Darnton explores this concept in his chapter ‘Sex For Thought’. He posits that the modern world has different ‘assumptions, values, and cultural codes,’ which inherently affect the interpretation of a reader or viewer of historical pornography.\footnote{Darnton, ‘Sex For Thought’, p. 215.} For example, students in a modern classroom studying stag films from the seventies found them ‘merely quaint’ rather than arousing, and were more surprised that people back then had sex in positions other than missionary.\footnote{Linda Williams, \textit{Porn Studies}, Durham, 2004, p. 15.} Seventies stag films more easily fall under a modern definition of pornography than sources from the medieval period, but modern viewers still cannot watch them without context and expect to feel the same emotions the films intended to arouse.

Though it may seem contradictory, it is the differences in our responses to the same material that helps illuminate sexual constructions of the past. The sexualised body in art and literature can teach us of the ‘sexual values of the society that creates it’.\footnote{Bette Talvacchia, ‘Erotica: The Sexualized Body in Renaissance Art’, in Bette Talvacchia, ed., \textit{A Cultural History of Sexuality in the Renaissance}, Oxford, 2011.} This sexual insight can be seen in artwork from Renaissance Europe, where fat bodies were the beauty ideal and arms were a particularly erotic feature.\footnote{Darnton, ‘Sex For Thought’, p. 215.} Even if premodern ‘pornography’ does not fit our modern definition of porn due to differences in intention, it still eroticises bodies and actions in ways difficult to find in sources legal, medical, or strictly political in nature. The information on what was eroticised, even if it was not intended to arouse, helps to contribute to an understanding of the period’s construction of sexuality.

Comparing pornography from different past eras is useful for further highlighting changes in constructions of sexuality. It may be relatively easy to assume that pornography is different now than it was fifty or even two hundred years ago. However, comparing different
types of past pornography can show significant changes in ideas around obscenity and sexuality. Paula Findlen suggests that the very history of pornography ‘charts changing attitudes towards [...] bodies, sexual practices, and their respective representations’.15 The same caution we use when comparing modern pornography to past explicit work must also be applied to comparing past pornographies to each other if we are to successfully chart these changes. Sexually explicit statues meant to carry a moral message to medieval viewers in English churches were viewed as ‘filth’ several generations later.16 The explicit statues, known as Sheela-na-gigs, cannot be called pornography by our modern definition because of how unlikely it is that their intention was to arouse sexual feelings.17 However, early modern audiences found them offensive. It is still unlikely they were found to be arousing, yet the difference in how the same images were perceived by people of two time periods highlights how their constructions of bodies and sexuality had changed. Certainly, modern constructions of sexuality have changed enough that Sheela-na-gigs are mentioned in a chapter describing pornography before pornography, a choice that may not seem logical to a medieval contemporary.18

Another example of difference in sexual constructs perceived through pornography is the work of an anonymous erotic author who rewrote older pornographic stories for a twentieth-century audience. The story The Scarlett Pansy has three different versions: the original version from the 1930s, an edited version from the 1950s, and a 1990s edited version.19 In all three versions bodies are eroticised in different ways, reflecting the different attitudes towards sexuality. The thirties version emphasised effeminacy in homosexuality; the fifties version cut

16 Phillips and Reay, Sex Before Sexuality, p. 118.
17 ibid.
18 ibid., pp. 112-133.
approximately twenty four percent of the original content and removed several crude references; and the nineties version used a ‘hybrid of hypermasculinity and effeminacy’. Another novel rewritten by the same anonymous author, *Sins of Cities*, originally featured a protagonist who was fourteen years old. The author rewrote the story so that all characters engaging in sexual acts were eighteen and over, in keeping with the moral norms of their time. This practice of editing demonstrates a clear change in what society finds sexually acceptable, as what was considered appropriate for publication and arousal is deemed inappropriate and taboo in another time.

*Sins of Cities* was also written in a way that allowed for fluid sexual construction. Characters did not have exclusively heterosexual or homosexual sex and played with gender and sex roles throughout the novel. The rewritten nineties version has a more ‘monolithic idea of gay sex’, changing character identities and sex roles to reflect a more fixed idea of sexual identities. This normative shift helps build upon sexual construction theories from both periods: ‘pornographers’ in the early-twentieth century began to categorise and pathologise sexual behaviour, and those in the nineties firmly established sexuality as an inherent identity. Though neither written work should be taken as accurate historical record, they both contain ideas and representations of a wider sexual mentality. Furthermore, comparing them to each other helps to build a timeline between changes in sexual constructions. Such comparison is best achieved with the aid of other types of sources, such as legal and medical texts, to help provide a context for interpreting the differences between pornography of different times.

If context is not taken into consideration, a faulty understanding of sexual constructions might arise. The 1985 American Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography deliberately

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20 ibid.
21 ibid., p. 267.
22 ibid.
23 ibid., p. 268.
misrepresented pornography, showing a disproportionate amount of niche porn and relying on the idea of realism to imply the ‘material shown was accurate and therefore [...] representative’. Images depicting sadism, masochism, dominance, and submission were specific targets. The commission itself proved, then quickly suppressed, that violent depictions of mainstream pornography were rare. The commission also did not include testimony from members of the BDSM community or the growing literature about the emphasis on safety and consent required in these practices. In some ways, the deliberate manipulation by the commission adds to an aspect of understanding the sexual construct of conservative Americans in the 1980s - a useful aspect for the historian of sex. It also provides a warning that scholars could likewise misunderstand pornographic, erotic, or explicit sources in a way that compromises their understanding of sexual constructions. However, provided accurate information about both the material and period are used when studying pornography, contextual research can play an important role in furthering our understandings of sexual constructions and the history of sex.

Pornography plays a significant role in the history of sex. It is one of the few sources available where physical sexual acts are recorded. Even works that do not fit a modern definition of pornography with the intention to arouse sexual feeling are valuable for what they teach us about the perception and construction of bodies in previous eras - a significant part of understanding sexual constructions. Works that do intend to arouse sexual feeling teach us what was considered erotic, not only in bodies but in actions. Comparing past pornography to our own definitions of sexuality and porn helps to highlight differences in sexual construction. Comparing pornography from different time periods can do the same, though both exercises

25 ibid.
26 ibid., pp. 368-369.
should be done with the aid of other sources to build the context of the period. Understanding the context in which pornography was created and the intention behind it is key to avoiding misunderstandings, deliberate or otherwise, which set back the work of historians. It would be difficult to argue that pornography is an historically accurate account of real events. However, when pornography is used in context and in conjunction with other historical sources it is possible to acquire a more balanced idea of previous sexual constructions than it would be without it.
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History tells us that the nineteenth century brought liberalism and industrialisation to the powerful nations of the world and more opportunity for the average man to ascend to prosperity. As men went in search of riches, the South Pacific became a target of enterprise. As sandalwood drew lots of ambitious traders to the South, European and American settlements brought the imminent threat of colonial rule. Several Christian factions emerged in Great Britain and the United States, and missionaries sailed to the South Pacific, desperate to save the souls of ‘savages’. As Pacific people were baited by the British and Europeans with iron and cloth, accepting their influence became increasingly inevitable. This essay aims to analyse how Pacific people accepted British, European and American influence, arguing that Pacific people were manipulated into accepting it through trade, government and religion. This acceptance resulted in a devastating loss in population, land and resources, self-determination and culture.

European traders largely manipulated Pacific chiefs into accepting unbalanced trade agreements whilst exploiting resources and causing an immense loss of population through disease. The decision to accept such deals was mainly made because most Pacific countries were still pre-industrial. When trading ships offered to trade iron and cloth for food and
hospitality, Pacific people relished the new technology. According to Dorothy Shineberg, sandalwood became a major export out of the Pacific at the beginning of the nineteenth century.\(^\text{27}\) Sandalwood led ambitious traders to venture to Fiji, New Hebrides, the Loyalty Islands and New Caledonia, to name a few. As exploration of the South Pacific was complete by the end of the eighteenth century, it was already common knowledge amongst Europeans that ‘the regular mode of contact…had been to win through gifts the support of a powerful’ chief.\(^\text{28}\) Sources of sandalwood were feverishly exhausted before the mid-nineteenth century, with Fiji ceasing trade in 1816 and the Marquesas Islands taking a mere three years to do the same.\(^\text{29}\) There was no further mention of whether these trees were replanted or replaced. As traders and seamen freely disembarked their ships and socialised with Pacific peoples, they carried diseases like syphilis, smallpox and measles which caused mass infection and death. Without official census records, the population of the Marquesas Islands is thought to have decreased from approximately 50,000 at the beginning of the nineteenth century to 2,255 by 1926.\(^\text{30}\) Under the guise of iron and cloth offerings, European influence skated past distracted chiefs and into the lives of Pacific people, effecting exploitation and a loss of population, while opening doors for colonial settlement.

The historical literature of scholars and Pacific peoples suggests that European or British voyagers used cunning and forceful methods to colonise Pacific countries, which caused loss of both lands and self-determination. Once the Pacific Islands had become active participants in international trade, they attracted European investors looking to settle. Land was needed for plantations and to ensure ongoing exports out of the Pacific. When settlers were not given what they required, they took it by force and cunning. In the late-nineteenth century


\(^{28}\) ibid.

\(^{29}\) ibid.

Hawai‘i became an important place of trade and a valuable war post for the United States of America. Despite efforts of resistance, in 1893 Queen Liliu‘okalani of Hawai‘i was overthrown and imprisoned by the United States government soldiers. 31 Hawai‘i was later officially annexed in 1898 by the U.S.A. 32 The annexation led to the complete loss of self-determination when Hawai‘i became the United States’ fiftieth state in the mid-twentieth century. In New Caledonia, French colonialists imposed regulations that expropriated vast grants of land of up to 25,000 hectares to emigrant settlers, miners and penal administrations. 33 Similarly, in New Zealand iwi in the Waikato suffered from huge amounts of land being sold and up to three million acres of land being confiscated by colonists. 34

In light of these atrocious acts, it is not difficult to draw the assumption that some Pacific people had little to no choice in the matter, and were violently and aggressively forced to accept European influence. Upon analysing the European influence on Pacific government and land settlement, it is clear that historical literature with explicit details about claiming land or the overthrow of dynasties is somewhat limited. Significantly, it often skips over details where violence or criminal intent is involved. Although these atrocities of taking land are common knowledge in present times, it might be understood that there is little written from the nineteenth century that contributed to contemporary understandings. Missionaries, on the other hand, provide significant accounts of violence and aggression. Their work can be seen as validating these actions and demonstrating their opinions of superiority over the ‘savage’ Pacific peoples.

32 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
European missionaries from several different Christian denominations targeted Pacific chiefs or spiritual leaders as missionaries to increase conversion. This strategy caused rapid conversion and the adoption of Western social practices which led to the loss of cultural practices and indigenous values. According to Raeburn Lange, spiritual leaders possessed high status and considerable influence and thus became a focal point of conversion with missionaries.35 With disasters of disease and treachery associated with white men Pacific people were recruited as a strategy to dissociate Christianity from white people. After the success of Pacific missionaries, a Methodist European missionary wrote that his first objective was to train native preachers and pastors to set an example that would be copied by villagers.36 Pacific countries like Samoa were first visited by Tongan and expatriate Samoans missionaries which later provided acceptable entry for white missionaries in 1830.37

In addition to Christian teachings missionaries enforced their ideas of righteous social practices on to Pacific communities. According to Benjamin Sack some missionaries criticised the Samoan recreational festivity of Malaga as a ‘noxious parasitism that impeded missionary work and improvement projects’.38 Cricket was introduced by Europeans to replace Malaga because it was in line with their expectations of correct social behaviour. In other parts of the Pacific, like the Cook Islands, tattoos were considered an art form and used to symbolise ‘a sense of self and belief structures’.39 This art form had flourished throughout the nineteenth century, until it came to an abrupt halt with the arrival of the missionaries.40 Once again it can be understood that Pacific people were manipulated into adopting Christianity by following the

38 ibid., p. 42.
40 ibid.
example of fellow Pacific Islanders who were missionaries. In present times Christianity has become a big part of Pacific identity, but not as the original missionaries may have intended it. Despite the overwhelming pressure of European influence rife in the Pacific, there was innovation and adaptation taking place where existing indigenous beliefs and social structures were intertwined with western influences.

When analysing Pacific acceptance of European influence, it is important to recognise the extent of adaptation from Pacific people that occurred in light of colonisation. Sacks highlights that missionaries were often surprised how Christian practices were woven into existing Samoan belief systems: a “Samoanisation”, in a sense.41 An example of this is the incorporation of the customary gifting of fine mats and presentation of pigs to guests into Church life. In terms of recreation ‘Kirikiti’ evolved from Cricket, and was adapted by Samoans by changing the rules to suit them.42 In response to Western influence on trade and land the Bua tribe of Fiji established sale of land without detriment to existing social systems and people involved.43 Some Māori iwi in New Zealand found a solution to the land crisis by developing a system of incorporation, enabling groups of people to work together in order to strengthen local Māori assets.44 These examples are only a few instances of Pacific adaptation and innovation. They ultimately show that, even though European influence had been accepted, there was still a desire from the people to keep Pacific cultures and practices alive despite the efforts of the colonisers.

In an analysis of Pacific peoples accepting European or British influence, manipulation and force come to the forefront. The recurring theme that surfaces throughout this study is the superior attitude that European traders, colonialists and missionaries assumed towards Pacific

41 Sacks, ‘Running Away’, p. 51.
42 ibid., p. 43.
44 ibid., p. 14.
peoples. This attitude led Europeans to use manipulation and force which left many Pacific communities with hardly any choice but to buckle down and accept what was being dished out. Though trade started out with Pacific peoples benefitting from exciting new technologies, chiefs were cleverly blinded by gifts as traders took advantage of resources. Colonial settlers came not to peacefully negotiate but came armed with the intent of claiming land. The missionaries, although peaceful, were strategic in targeting chiefs, spiritual leaders, and Pacific people to convert and soften hostility so that white missionaries could gain unopposed entrance. All of these factors resulted in massive losses: of population, of land, of self-determination, and of people. If there is one ray of light that shone through this study, it would be the adaptations and innovations of Pacific peoples. Woven within European practices, indigenous cultural practices and values seem like hidden messages sent to future generations to say that, when faced with domination, we the Pacific adapt and survive with strength.
Bibliography


Discuss and evaluate the different approaches and explanations for Māori origins. What challenges face historians attempting to come to conclusions?

The question of Māori origin has posed a challenge to historians for centuries. Over the years, several different approaches have been utilised to explain where the indigenous people of New Zealand originated. This essay will discuss three broad explanations which have been employed by historians. Firstly, it explores the idea that the roots of Māori lay outside the Pacific Ocean and specifically were of Semitic origin. The notion that Polynesian people, such as Māori, were of Aryan descent will next be examined. The essay then turns to the third and current notion: that of the emergence and spread of an Austronesian culture from Southeast Asia to Pacific islands, including New Zealand. As these explanations are evaluated chronologically, it will be demonstrated that the single greatest challenge facing historians exploring Māori origins has proved to be that of hindsight. Historical explanations are unfailingly culturally determined by the period in which they were formed and, for this reason, must be continuously challenged.

Between 1760 and the 1860s the dominant ideology was that Māori originated from a homeland outside of the Pacific Ocean: specifically, the Mediterranean region. German ethnologist Georg Forster, who was on Cook’s Pacific voyage, conducted a comparative study

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on the languages spoken in New Zealand, Tonga and other Pacific islands. Importantly, Forster identified what is now known as the Austronesian language family. The study established that, due to many similarities, there was likely a shared point of origin among these Pacific peoples.\textsuperscript{46}

However, historical explanations of origin took a turn in the 1800s. Specifically, the arrival of Evangelical Missionaries in the Pacific introduced the notion that the people of Polynesia had Semitic origins. Missionary Samuel Marsden described Māori as one of the ‘Lost Tribes of Israel,’ and asserted that they originated from dispersed Jews that made their way from the Mediterranean region to islands in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{47} This contention was based on the observation of various Māori customs and alleged similarities between their island legends and biblical accounts of creation and the flood.\textsuperscript{48} Missionary Thomas Kendall also proliferated this ‘Semitic Polynesian’ idea. Kendall’s declaration that Māori had come out of Egypt was based on their beliefs and carvings, which he asserted contained ideas reminiscent of the biblical Old Testament.\textsuperscript{49}

Evaluation of this approach to explaining Māori origins demonstrates stark cultural bias and exemplifies the challenge that explanations are notoriously constructed to reflect societal values. The Egyptian or Mediterranean explanation of origin stemmed not from archaeological and linguistic evidence, but from a range of imperial and racial values prominent at the time.\textsuperscript{50} It supported the colonial ideologies that European societies were superior and at the peak of civilisation due to their ‘spiritual and moral excellence.’\textsuperscript{51} This theory framed Polynesian people as ‘degenerate remnants’ of Mediterranean descent which gave them both a certain

\textsuperscript{46} ibid., p. 33.
\textsuperscript{47} ibid., p. 38.
\textsuperscript{48} ibid.
\textsuperscript{49} ibid., p. 40.
\textsuperscript{51} Howe, \textit{The Quest for Origins}, p. 37.
‘fundamental humanity’, and a point of relatability in the eyes of the European due to their familiar origins. Moreover, it also provided the missionaries with a crucial role in helping such a ‘depraved’ people to return to their former biblical roots and standards of morality.\(^{52}\) This construction of Māori origins served to further the racist views and imperialistic goals of colonialists and missionaries in New Zealand. It also denied Māori some of their own cultural past and identity.\(^{53}\) In hindsight, the ability of historians to accurately construe Māori origins was evidently tainted because they were constrained by current societal lenses.

Between the 1860s and 1940s the waning missionary influence and rise of comparative science and Social Darwinism led to the coining of new explanations for Māori origins: namely the notion of Aryan or Caucasian descent.\(^{54}\) Philologist Max Muller – a leading scholar of the time – concluded there was a single Aryan ancestry that was shared by most Europeans and Indians.\(^{55}\) European linguists thus looked into potential connections between Malayo-Polynesian and Indo-European language families. Eventually, ethnologist Abraham Fornander and scholar Edward Tregear drew conclusions linking Māori and other Polynesian people to Aryan origins. Basing their findings off Muller’s work and their own research of Hawai‘ian and Māori people they asserted there was evidence of endurance of such an Aryan/Indian heritage.\(^{56}\) Their theory stated that ancient Aryan people left high plain areas east of the Caspian Sea in two migrations: one moving west into Europe, and one moving over Persia, India, Southeast Asia, and then, eventually, to the islands of the Pacific.\(^{57}\) Academic John Macmillan Brown corroborated this theory in the twentieth century, using comparative techniques to argue

\(^{52}\) ibid., p. 40.
\(^{53}\) Howe, ‘Māori/Polynesian Origins and “New Learning”’, p. 310.
\(^{54}\) Howe, *The Quest for Origins*, p. 42.
\(^{55}\) ibid., p. 43.
\(^{56}\) ibid., p. 45.
\(^{57}\) ibid.
that Polynesian languages, such as te reo Māori, relate to the primeval form of Indo-European languages.

Evaluation of the ‘Aryan/Caucasian Polynesian’ approach to explaining Māori origins undoubtedly also reflects societal prejudices and priorities of the time. Understanding Māori and other Polynesian people as having Aryan ancestry presented Europeans with a way of framing a culture that was otherwise fearfully foreign and incomprehensible to them.\textsuperscript{58} Significantly, the most assertive declarations of this theory came from academics in the two extensively colonised areas of Hawai‘i and New Zealand.\textsuperscript{59} Subsequently, historians today have suggested that perhaps discussion of Aryan origins was an effort to promote intellectual fusion and annexation of the colonists’ new lands.\textsuperscript{60} These ideas of origin are criticised as being diffusionist as Māori and other Polynesian people were assumed to have Caucasian origins and culture which then ‘degenerated’ over time in the Pacific.\textsuperscript{61} Diffusionist discourse was widespread and implied the need for British colonial rule and the imposition of the ‘elite culture’ to fix Polynesian moral ‘decay.’\textsuperscript{62} It also rejected the idea that Polynesian culture could have developed in isolation in the Pacific Islands, portraying the people as incapable of their own development.\textsuperscript{63} This analysis demonstrates the aforesaid challenge for historians that explanations of origins are products of the time in which they were formed.

Current explanations of Māori origins centre around the idea that a generalised Austronesian culture came out of Southeast Asia, developing and adapting throughout the Pacific Islands over thousands of years.\textsuperscript{64} Taiwan has been proposed as the homeland of the Austronesians, with scholars using radiocarbon dating to estimate the arrival of Austronesians

\textsuperscript{58} ibid., p. 46.
\textsuperscript{59} ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} Howe, ‘Māori/Polynesian Origins and “New Learning”’, p. 308.
\textsuperscript{62} ibid., p. 301.
\textsuperscript{63} ibid., p. 310.
\textsuperscript{64} Howe, \textit{The Quest for Origins}, p. 61.
in Taiwan from China at around 4000 BC. Subsequent evidence has shown movement to the Northern Philippines around 2000 BC and, from there, migration throughout Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Linguistic evidence attests to this model, with all the major languages of Southeast Asia and the Pacific belonging to part of the same Austronesian language family. Māori words such as ‘waka’ for canoe can be traced all the way back to the Philippines and have the same origins and definitions as Malay words such as ‘wangka’. DNA evidence allows similar conclusions. For example, early genetic studies of Polynesian mitochondrial DNA carried in the female line showed strong connections with aboriginal Taiwanese DNA. Polynesian oral traditions themselves also support this explanation of origins. Māori oral traditions such as Tane – the god who separates sky from earth – stemmed from early Austronesian cultures where images of a sky-lifting god are widespread and date back 6000 or more years.

Although this is seemingly the most accurate explanation of Māori origin to date, it still proves challenging to historians who attempt to come to precise conclusions. Firstly, there is a variety of difficulties with evidence. Further studies of DNA evidence have complicated initial conclusions. Studies of the Polynesian Y chromosome don’t show the obvious connection to Taiwanese people that original genetic studies showed. Such results indicate that the current explanation isn’t clear and perhaps there were multiple waves of migration from a variety of places. Furthermore, archaeological evidence of transported plants and animals often contradicts the idea of migration from Taiwan. In addition, contrary to what would be expected

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66 ibid., p. 64.
67 ibid., p. 65.
70 Irwin, ‘Voyaging and Settlement’, p. 98.
71 ibid.
if this theory was right, no Austronesian words for grains or agriculture reached the Pacific.\textsuperscript{72} The presence of sweet potato or kumara in New Zealand added to confusion due to its Peruvian origins. However, it is currently explained as being the result of Polynesian explorers returning from South America.\textsuperscript{73} Further challenges lie in animal genetic histories. Indeed, the spread of dog and chicken remains indicates that Pacific island populations originated not in Taiwan, but in the mainland of Southeast Asia.\textsuperscript{74} There is also lack of early archaeological evidence of sailing in Southeast Asia, leaving many mysteries for historians.\textsuperscript{75} As this essay has demonstrated, however, along with the difficulties posed by evidence, there is the overarching problem that notions of origin are notoriously culturally determined. It is highly probable that current interpretations of Māori origins are just as much products of their era as in earlier times. That is, they reveal our current social values and preoccupations.\textsuperscript{76}

To conclude, this essay has chronologically discussed and evaluated three prominent explanations for Māori origins, elucidating the challenges posed to historians by conflicting evidence. However, the greatest and most timeless challenge is the struggle to keep explanations bias-free. Time has shown that ‘evidence’ is found to support theories of origin that reflect current societal views and priorities. Consequently, it is important that when historians seek answers to questions of Māori origin, a critical and sceptical lens is employed.

\textsuperscript{72} Anderson et al., \textit{Tangata Whenua}, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{73} Howe, \textit{The Quest for Origins}, p. 81.
\textsuperscript{74} Anderson et al., \textit{Tangata Whenua}, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{75} ibid., p. 16.
\textsuperscript{76} Howe, \textit{The Quest for Origins}, p. 24.
Bibliography


How well did Germans abide by and fit into the gender stereotypes created for them by the NSDAP?

The ideology of the German Nazi Party (National Socialist German Workers' Party, or NSDAP) around sexuality and gender provides a unique opportunity for bottom-up historiography by looking at the experiences of real men and women in Nazi Germany. To assess how well German men and women abided by and fit into the respective gender stereotypes created by the NSDAP, it is necessary to consider the Party’s means of controlling and enforcing norms alongside evidence of the population’s willingness to comply. Instances of failure to adhere to gender norms must also be examined along with explanations for this non-compliance. The dichotomy between the NSDAP’s ideology and its execution in reality suggests an important point: while a majority of Germans internalised and supported the values around Nazi gender roles, the NSDAP was ambivalent towards universal compliance and failed to strictly enforce gender norms in practice. Therefore, the NSDAP was willing to forsake absolute practical success in favour of ideological and cultural faith, for which the regime has become infamous.

By creating stereotypes for men and women to aspire to, the NSDAP’s ultimate goal was to achieve a strong and thriving volksgemeinschaft, or community of people. The racial component of Nazi ideology meant that the NSDAP’s gender stereotypes were created with the Party’s Aryan German constituents in mind. This process of social reform and pervasive
control over gender and sexuality is described by Nicole Loroff as ‘the human body’s newfound recognition as a public site’.\textsuperscript{77} Women were held to the gender stereotype of the traditionalist wife, whose domestic prowess and child rearing ability defined their highest purpose. This confining of women to the private sphere began as early as the 1920s when Adolf Hitler proclaimed that ‘the German girl will belong to the state, and with her marriage become a citizen’.\textsuperscript{78} Natal policy was a prevalent manifestation of this ideology that showed the NSDAP’s efforts to ensure women fulfilled their role as child-bearers. Control over the sterilisation of both men and women demonstrated the ‘primacy of the state over sphere of marriage and family’.\textsuperscript{79} However, Party welfare organisations like the National Socialist People's Welfare (NSV) showed the NSDAP’s willingness to help pregnant and unmarried women find employment and kindergartens.\textsuperscript{80}

In terms of abiding by the gender stereotype, Claudia Koonz suggests that lower-middle and middle class women opposed the idea of emancipation due to its divergence from the ‘age old role of wife and mother.’\textsuperscript{81} For example, this reluctance is demonstrated by the dominance of women voters for the NSDAP after 1928.\textsuperscript{82} Women also embraced their assigned gender role as wife and mother due to its connection to the more combative elements of Hitler’s philosophy. By encouraging other women to adopt this domesticity and motherhood, Aryan German women could better subordinate non-Nazi rivals within their social sphere by further proliferating the NSDAP’s ideology.\textsuperscript{83} Clifford Kirkpatrick describes the strength of the women’s support for the NSDAP’s gender norms as the ‘collapse of the feminist fortress’,

\textsuperscript{77} Nicole Loroff, ‘Gender and Sexuality in Nazi Germany’, \textit{Constellations}, Vol. 3, 1, 2011, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{78} Claudia Koonz, \textit{Mothers in the Fatherland}, New York, 1987, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{80} ibid., p. 178.
\textsuperscript{81} Koonz, \textit{Mothers}, p. 126.
\textsuperscript{82} ibid.
\textsuperscript{83} ibid.
exemplified by women’s rights organizations like the Federation of German Women’s Associations (BDF), yielding to the Nazis on issues like married women’s right to work.\textsuperscript{84}

For men, ‘manliness’ was not derived from ordinary life but from offering sacrifice through heroic involvement in war, government, and public service. A prevalent and recognizable manifestation of this gender norm is the ‘military masculinity’ associated with the role of a soldier. This role embodied the duty of men in the public sphere and was also described as intrinsic to masculinity itself: Ernest Hunger described men as ‘compulsive sexual beings who prove themselves in war’.\textsuperscript{85} Compliance was encouraged by the NSDAP’s indoctrination via education that instilled into young girls and boys the value of becoming mothers and soldiers.\textsuperscript{86} Hitler also encouraged a new status quo that allowed working men to see themselves as contributors to the regime, while simultaneously enforcing the role of men as executors of the NSDAP in the public sphere. The energy of the Party’s supporters during the downfall of the Weimar democracy was moved off the streets and into offices in order to maintain discipline and stability within the regime.\textsuperscript{87} Subsequently, business and military service became the two biggest sectors of male occupation.\textsuperscript{88} In this sense, the compliance of men with their role as the NSDAP’s actors in the public sphere very much continued a long-standing patriarchal framework that defined masculinity in terms of domination and hegemony.\textsuperscript{89}

Although German men and women demonstrated compliance with Nazi ideals through political support and lifestyle changes, the NSDAP’s vision of an unblemished volksgemeinschaft did not manifest in reality as a set of universal and uncompromising gender

\textsuperscript{84} ibid., p. 178.
\textsuperscript{85} Loroff, ‘Gender’, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{86} ibid.
\textsuperscript{87} Koonz, Mothers, p. 180.
\textsuperscript{88} ibid.
stereotypes. For example, Germany’s transition to a wartime economy exposed a hypocrisy between the values of docility that women had shown support for, and their need to expand into the public sphere. Koonz describes how this tension produced the revelation that ‘keeping mothers in their homes lasted only as long as economic necessity made it advantageous’.  

Similarly, many women chose to compromise between their public activity and their assigned gender stereotype by involving themselves politically as supporters but not as enactors of change. Koonz notes that women have been ‘among the strongest pillars of Hitlerism from its very inception; the portion of women at Nazi meetings was surprisingly large’. Maternalism’s failure in practice was also shown by the shortcomings of the NSDAP’s pronatalism campaign. Natal policy that encouraged Aryan women to bear children couldn’t influence the birth rate’s stagnation and decline after 1933, with the only marked increases being attributable to couples breaking free from the Depression years in the early 1930s.

Regarding men’s roles, the military masculinity espoused by the NSDAP was circumvented by soldiers who engaged with the ideal of ‘comradeship’, which involved supposedly feminine qualities like empathy. This tension is described by Thomas Kuhne as an open and welcome contradiction to the need for undoubted heterosexuality and emotional hardness. For Kuhne, this ‘imagined femininity’ performed a stabilising function by offering the emotional supplement that family bonds would have provided. The letters that soldiers wrote home also documented a shifting understanding of their roles: namely, from seeing themselves as protectors of the feminine sphere to wanting to protect their right to engage with feminine notions of comforts and relaxation. These factors that resulted in men and women

90 Koonz, Mothers, p. 182.
91 ibid., p. 140.
92 ibid., p. 145.
95 ibid.
96 ibid., p. 170.
straying from their assigned gender stereotypes in practice suggest that the NSDAP’s commitment to these norms was only to the extent of maintaining faith in their legitimacy; it did not necessarily entail going above and beyond to ensure universal compliance.

As the practical failures to enforce Nazi gender norms demonstrate, the circumstances of the time played an important role in their negotiation. Additionally, the NSDAP’s tolerance for non-compliance furthers the argument that gender norms were deliberately exaggerated beyond practical efficiency. In spite of the ideals of ‘hard masculinity’ that used propaganda to demonise elements of femininity and weakness in war, Kuhne describes a ‘protean, flexible masculinity’ that arose in practice. Specifically, he suggests that the Nazi elite were aware that very few men could live up to the NSDAP’s exaggerated expectations. In the case of the Einsatzgruppen killing squads, a high tolerance was shown to men who shied away from massacring Jews, and the men who could not perform conceded that they were too weak to do so. These men did not question the gender order as laid out by the NSDAP but, instead, recognised themselves as exceptions to the rule, thus internalising the legitimacy of the norm even further.

The tolerance for women failing to adhere to norms also suggests that the norms were knowingly exaggerated by the NSDAP in favour of a sound ideological faith. The emphasis on domesticity was not always realistic in practice, as shown by the ‘primacy of rearmament’ during the war that brought women into the workforce, as well as civilian branches of war preparation. The NSDAP’s awareness of this unrealistic ambition is demonstrated by the dichotomy between Doppelverdiener propaganda denouncing women working in spite of a working husband, and the Party’s exemption of highly-qualified and low-paid women from

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98 ibid.
99 Stibbe, ‘In and Beyond’, p. 175.
this requirement.\textsuperscript{100} The Party’s tolerance of women breaking gender stereotypes was also shown by the issuing of permits for women to cross-dress. This point is significant in light of public campaigns demonising women like Erna K, who was taken into custody in 1938 for ‘endangering public security’ by wearing men’s clothing.\textsuperscript{101} While the ideology was clear about gender norms and women’s associated conduct, Jane Caplan notes that police were not entirely consistent in handling women who blurred gender boundaries.\textsuperscript{102}

Although the NSDAP was adamant in its public decree on the role of men and women, and Aryan German audience supported the underlying ideology, there were failures to adhere to the norms in practice. This disconnect between thoughts and actions is not only a testament to the ideological and cultural prowess of the regime, but also a demonstration of the Party’s approach to social control. By ensuring an unshakeable faith in the ideas of the Party, the NSDAP allowed people to act in ways that were necessary in practice without losing their grasp on the hearts and minds of the people, and thus, their legitimacy.

\textsuperscript{100} ibid.  
\textsuperscript{102} ibid.
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The Treaty of Waitangi and Māori activism exist side-by-side in the history of Aotearoa—where one goes the other follows. Ranginui Walker describes the Treaty of Waitangi as being the genesis of Māori activism, arguing that protest and dissent began when Māori realised the fraudulent nature of the document.\textsuperscript{104} The activist group, Ngā Tamatoa (The Young Warriors), was born into the core of modern Māori activism, holding the Treaty at the very centre of its doctrine. Its members concerned themselves with three main campaigns: Treaty recognition, land, and language. The whakataukī (proverb), ‘toi te kupu, toi te mana, toi te whenua’ embodies the traditional values that Ngā Tamatoa adapted and evolved: kupu (speech) with its te reo Māori language campaign, mana (power and authority) with its Waitangi Day protests, and whenua (land) with its land movement.\textsuperscript{105} Ngā Tamatoa’s activism was carefully orchestrated, with each protest forcing the New Zealand Government to recognise its consistent breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi. By challenging the myths of racial harmony and peaceful colonisation that the Treaty of Waitangi represented, Ngā Tamatoa had a unique impact on the

\textsuperscript{103} Rendered in English, this proverb reads: ‘Hold fast to our culture, for without language, mana, and land, the essence of being a Māori would no longer exist, and would not do justice to the full body of Māoritanga.’


broader modern Māori protest movement. Ultimately, Ngā Tamatoa contributed a radical voice to contemporary Māori issues and debates surrounding the Treaty of Waitangi, helping to redefine its place in New Zealand society.

Modern Māori activism emerged in the 1960s amidst an international rise of political protest and social consciousness. Many different groups and movements surfaced in this period with membership strongly overlapping between each. In 1970, after the Young Māori Leaders Conference at the University of Auckland, Ngā Tamatoa was formed. Ngā Tamatoa members were young, urban, university-educated Māori united by the desire for a more militant and radical approach to historical and contemporary Māori grievances.\(^\text{106}\) Ngā Tamatoa grew a reputation for its militancy and radicalism, becoming the new face of Māori activism and, therefore, a target for criticism.\(^\text{107}\) Some Māori condemned Ngā Tamatoa for embracing a European style of activism, challenging Māoridom, and impeding Māori rather than helping them.\(^\text{108}\) This created a distinction between ‘conservative’ and ‘radical’ Māori activists, firmly placing Ngā Tamatoa in the latter category.

Despite differences in methodology, both conservatives and radicals held the Treaty of Waitangi at the centre of their kaupapa (agenda), uniting them in a common cause.\(^\text{109}\) Ngā Tamatoa members became the ‘icebreakers’ of modern Māori activism, carving a path for others to follow.\(^\text{110}\) They captured media and public attention with internationally influenced ideas of ‘brown power’ and Māori liberation, but their core values remained centred around the Treaty: attempting to recover Māori authority and reverse the injustices of colonisation.\(^\text{111}\) Treaty recognition, land alienation, and the loss of language were the three main issues that

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\(^{107}\) ibid., p. 48.
\(^{110}\) Scott, *Travesty*, p. 72.
underpinned the ideologies and protests of Ngā Tamatoa. Although separate claims the Treaty of Waitangi remained at the heart of each, grounding Ngā Tamatoa’s protest around a central theme. Tiopira McDowell attributes the arrival of Ngā Tamatoa in protests about land, language, and the Treaty as a turning point that pushed these issues onto the national agenda, standing as ‘testimony to the effectiveness of direct action, [...] the genius of Ngā Tamatoa.’

In 1971 Ngā Tamatoa published an article calling for enforcement of the word and spirit of the Treaty of Waitangi, signalling the start of their Waitangi Day protests and the beginning of Ngā Tamatoa as a force to be reckoned with.

Waitangi Day protests and demonstrations have become embedded in New Zealand’s political culture, occurring annually since Ngā Tamatoa’s inaugural protest at Waitangi in 1971. Syd Jackson, one of Ngā Tamatoa’s leaders and founding members, articulated that taking their protest to Waitangi was an obvious choice as the Treaty was the foundation of both their principles and issues. The protest began as a response to the Government’s Waitangi Day propaganda films that were distributed overseas to consolidate the myth of New Zealand’s cultural harmony. Ngā Tamatoa wanted to disrupt proceedings enough to render footage useless and show the true reality of Māori-Pākehā relations. Its members treated Waitangi Day as a funeral, mourning instead of celebrating, and wearing black armbands to commemorate the loss of Māori land. This powerful symbolism, combined with direct action, was a feature of Ngā Tamatoa that made its protest methods unique and helped it to gain media attention.

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113 ibid., pp. 29-30.
115 McDowell, ““Riria””, p. 29.
116 ibid., p. 29.
117 Harris, Hikoi, pp. 26-27.
relations enough to scare the Government into turning to the Māori Council for assistance. The Council responded by citing fourteen statutes that they saw to be disregarding the Treaty of Waitangi, with their findings resonating the message of Ngā Tamatoa.119

In 1972 Ngā Tamatoa’s perspective shifted from mourning the Treaty to boycotting Waitangi Day celebrations altogether, arguing that Māori had no reason to celebrate their loss of land and culture.120 Within two years, the way Ngā Tamatoa debated and portrayed the Treaty evolved yet its message remained the same—no longer would the Government be able to ignore its promises under the Treaty. Historian Michael Belgrave notes that ‘the issue is not so much whether the treaty is supported or opposed but how it has been defined.’121 Ngā Tamatoa’s Waitangi Day protests redefined the Treaty as a fraudulent document full of broken promises, thus challenging the portrayal of the Treaty in New Zealand culture.

Fresh off the success of its Waitangi Day protests, Ngā Tamatoa turned its attention to land—an issue fundamentally entwined with the Treaty of Waitangi. Article II of the Treaty guarantees Māori ‘full exclusive and undisturbed possession’ of their lands: a promise repeatedly broken throughout history.122 Land loss had been a feature of Ngā Tamatoa’s Treaty activism over the years but, triggered by the 1967 Maori Affairs Amendment Act, the Māori land movement emerged as its own distinct campaign.123 Ngā Tamatoa protested the Act in 1971 at Waitangi and published press releases demanding the return of Māori land, arguing that the scale of land lost proved continual breaches of the Treaty.124

In 1975 land became Ngā Tamatoa’s main focus with the formation of Te Roopu Ote Matakite—the organisation that, headed by kaumatua (elder) Whina Cooper, would lead the

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120 McDowell, “‘Riria’”, p. 30.
121 Belgrave, *Historical Frictions*, p. 93.
124 McDowell, “‘Riria’”, pp. 35-36.
1975 Māori Land March.\textsuperscript{125} The march began on the 14th of September from Te Hapua and finished in Wellington almost a month later. Protestors carried banners with slogans such as ‘Not one more acre of Maori land,’ and spread their message at each stop, resulting in the widespread politicisation of Māori throughout the country.\textsuperscript{126} The pan-tribal nature of the 1975 Māori Land March shows the power and influence that Ngā Tamatoa held in its ability to bring Māori together. Māori—young and old, radical and conservative—joined as one to protest their rights as tangata whenua (people of the land) under the Treaty of Waitangi. Not only were Māori united under a common cause, but their large-scale involvement in a single event reflected a critical mass that the Government could no longer ignore. Although protestors did not always make specific references the Treaty of Waitangi, if the Treaty had been ratified and Article II honoured then the issue of land loss would not exist, making the two undeniably linked.\textsuperscript{127}

Loss of language joined loss of land in Ngā Tamatoa’s protest against breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi as its members were from a generation of Māori who grew up unable to speak te reo and felt a loss of their identity as Māori because of it.\textsuperscript{128} In 1971 they organised a petition, signed by 44,000 people, asking for te reo Māori to be included in the education system.\textsuperscript{129} When faced with the response that there were too few capable teachers, Ngā Tamatoa promptly called for a year-long training course that would turn native speakers into teachers.\textsuperscript{130} Ngā Tamatoa’s efforts were successful and the course was established, along with the first bilingual school in 1978 and the first kōhanga reo (Māori language preschool) in 1982.\textsuperscript{131} Linda Tuhiwai Smith, secretary of Ngā Tamatoa and a heavily-involved activist in the

\begin{footnotesize}
\bibitem{125} \textit{ibid.}, p. 19.
\bibitem{126} Walker, \textit{Ka Whawhai Tona Matou}, p. 214.
\bibitem{127} McDowell, ““Riria””, p. 32.
\bibitem{128} \textit{ibid.}, p. 50.
\bibitem{129} \textit{ibid.}, p. 17.
\bibitem{130} Walker, \textit{Ka Whawhai Tona Matou}, p. 211.
\bibitem{131} McDowell, ““Riria””, p. 17.
\end{footnotesize}
Māori language campaigns, said that ‘it took a group of people who didn’t speak Māori, to put Māori language onto a national agenda.’\textsuperscript{132} Comparatively, Syd Jackson argued that, as well as having the right to learn their own language in their own country, he wanted Māori to be ‘strong, proud, and arrogant in who they are, in what they are.’\textsuperscript{133} Ngā Tamatoa saw language and identity as one and the same: Māori language was the foundation of Māori culture and, therefore, the exclusion of te reo was in breach of Treaty rights. In the 1986 ‘Te Reo Māori Report’, the Waitangi Tribunal asserted that te reo Māori was a taonga (treasure), and, therefore, that Māori language had protection under Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi.\textsuperscript{134} Albeit after the grunt of Ngā Tamatoa’s work to restore Māori language in New Zealand, the Tribunal’s report shows what Ngā Tamatoa demonstrated—language loss is a breach of Māori rights under the Treaty.

The Treaty of Waitangi was the central focus of all modern Māori activism but Ngā Tamatoa especially challenged and changed the portrayal of the Treaty, both within the context of Māori activism and in society itself.\textsuperscript{135} The organisation’s politics drew upon the Treaty as its members took up issues of Treaty recognition, land, and language and forced them onto the national political agenda. Ngā Tamatoa was dedicated to honouring the Treaty, aiming to create a society where Māori rights as tangata whenua were recognised by the government. Ngā Tamatoa’s dedication resulted in success, making it one of - if not the most - influential groups of the time, leaving behind a legacy that continues to define the Treaty in today’s society. Ngā Tamatoa perfectly embodies its tohu (mantra), ‘tama tu, tama ora, tama noho, tama mate, tamatoa.’ Its members were activists who stood up and took the lead in modern Māori protest.

\textsuperscript{132} ibid., p. 50; Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples, Dunedin, 1999, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{134} Allen Bell, Ray Harlow and Donna Starks, Languages of New Zealand, Wellington, 2005, p. 111.
\textsuperscript{135} McDowell, “Riria”, p. 29.
portraying and debating the Treaty of Waitangi in new ways, whilst still holding true to their historical roots and values.
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Between the prophet Muhammad’s death in 632 CE and 1150 CE, Islam expanded rapidly. Through conquest and time, Muslim power and culture spread through new territories with phenomenal speed. How was victory over the Byzantines and Sasanians and, then, the Islamic way of life established so effectively? To some extent, the concept of jihād was an important means. Literally translated as to ‘strive in the path of God’, jihād is a very fluid idea. One conception justifies military expansion as an enactment of God’s will to spread Islam. This version of jihād was an important motivating cause of Islamic expansion. However, the idea was often latent and shaped by necessity. Other external factors also offer explanations for the spread of Islamic culture, such as pragmatism and political expansion. Yet, jihād can be difficult to extricate from these factors. Ultimately, the importance of jihād in the conquests shifted depending on context and interpretation, but was nevertheless a pervasive and underpinning theme of expansion.

The spread of Islamic culture can be understood, at least in part, as the result of conquest. Following Muhammad’s death, state structures founded on Islamic beliefs began to develop in areas previously controlled by the Byzantines and Sasanians, including Syria, Egypt,
and Palestine. Islam became the reference point ordering social life, hierarchy, custom and law. Over the course of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties Muslim culture, which often focused on knowledge and art, developed. As John Esposito posits, acculturation (often assimilating ideas from other groups) was defined by the Muslims’ role as colonisers: that is to say, their power. Islam established this power through conquest. Conquest was in many ways shaped by ideas of jihād.

The importance of jihād in motivating conquest is illustrated by Qur’anic instructions that have been interpreted as authorising military jihād. Force was seen as a method of spreading Islam through the realm of the unbelievers. This duality, between those who believed and those who did not, developed a conception of a ‘constant state of war’ with infidels. This belief supports interpretations emphasising God’s command that Islam should become the sole religion on Earth. For example, Qur’anic verse 2:216 states that ‘prescribed for you is fighting, though it be hateful to you’. Verse 9:5 instructs believers to ‘kill idolaters wherever you find them’ unless they repent. Classical schools of law, in both the Sunni and Shia traditions, interpret this verse as identifying holy war as an obligatory form of jihād. In support of this idea, Patricia Crone notes, is the use of the derivative of qītala, meaning ‘to fight’. The obligatory character of these interpretations illustrates the importance of jihād in Islamic expansion because it provides scriptural basis to motivate and justify soldiers in their conquest.

There is evidence that military jihād, as divinely-willed war, was an important motive for Islamic expansion. Linking fighting the infidels to jihād characterises violence as the will

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137 ibid., p. 52.
139 ibid.
of God, which would be rewarded in the afterlife. Michael Bonner argues that this belief in eternal reward is supported by evidence from observers of the conquests. For example, a Chinese source claimed that the Arabs stated they would be ‘borne in Heaven’ if they were killed, and rewarded for killing their enemies. The source observed ‘therefore they are usually valiant fighters’. Regardless of whether Muslims actually made such statements, the source is still a valuable indicator of the opinion of external groups: from the perspectives of ‘infidels’, Muslims felt that their wars were divinely justified and were compelled by the promise of Heaven. In support of this thesis, Crone mentions an Arab commander who invoked the idea of jihād when addressing his troops at the Battle of Qādisyya in 637 CE. He told them that the land they were about to conquer was their ‘inheritance and what God has promised you’. The invocation from an authority to motivate soldiers suggests that military ideas about jihād were an important tool for expansion.

It is difficult to assess the extent to which each individual felt motivated by ideas of ‘holy war’. However, in a religious society, it is plausible that the promise of eternal reward and the justification of godly authority would be compelling. This belief is akin to the idea of martyrdom. However, some Muslim scholars counter that at the time the Qur’an had no term for ‘martyr’ with such meaning. Bonner contends that the promises attached to jihād might explain how ‘a people who had lived so long on the margins’ could ‘so suddenly’ defeat superpowers. Arab sources of the time actually portrayed very new forces as well-organised, because of high morale. Further, the success of the conquests reinforced the belief that God’s

143 ibid.
144 ibid.
145 Crone, God’s Rule, p. 366.
146 ibid.
148 Bonner, Jihad, p. 61.
149 ibid.
will was being performed.\textsuperscript{150} Framed in this way, ideas of jihād were a powerful tool for directing soldiers’ wills. As religious ideas they were important in motivating people who were predisposed to construct meaning for actions according to faith.

However, the Quran’ic authorisation of military jihād is a contestable interpretation. More internally-focused interpretations place less importance on expansion through conquest. Asma Asfaruddin suggests that Western historians have over-emphasised the military meaning of jihād and have imposed upon it a Western worldview of martyrdom. In contrast, Asfaruddin claims that there are many verses emphasising other elements of jihād, such as prayer, and hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), which hadith suggests is ideal for women.\textsuperscript{151} Jihād is a ‘polyvalent idea’ and is not encompassed by ‘holy war’.\textsuperscript{152} Rather, its internal elements are key. An extract from the Book of Jihad supports this, instructing the faithful to ‘put the jihād against your souls ahead of the jihād against your enemies’.\textsuperscript{153} If jihād’s meaning is primarily to strive against your own sin, internally, then this diminishes the importance of the idea for the spread of Muslim power through conquest. However, these other conceptions of jihād were not totally unimportant for the spread of Islamic power. The efforts made to engage in Muslim faith, and teach others how best to do so, can be cast as striving in God’s name internally. Muslim culture spread through the practice of Islam and is, therefore, a valid meaning of jihād.

Asfaruddin also argues that the military meaning of jihād was not a vital motivation for expansion, as it was actually a defensive obligation. In hadith where ‘fighting’ is a component of jihād, Asfaruddin emphasises the context of the Medinan period, where Muslims had been forced to flee Mecca and were persecuted for their faith. Therefore, fighting was only authorised ‘in defence of religious freedom’. Supporting this view, Parviz and al-Sayyid claim

\textsuperscript{150} Crone, God’s Rule, p. 366.
\textsuperscript{152} Asfaruddin, ‘Competing Perspectives’, p.15.
that the great scholar Malik viewed only defensive jihād as obligatory.\textsuperscript{154} When the context of the transition from Mecca to Medina is considered, this seems like a strong argument. It is also a more holistic interpretation of the Qur’an, which is valuable in a modern context where ideas of jihād are politically charged. This argument, that most Muslims only conceived of defending religious freedom in their homelands as obligatory jihād, is of little importance for expansion. However, it also enforces the point that the meaning of jihād was heavily shaped by context. Its importance rose as needed, which is reflected in the stories of the concept being invoked before battle.

Other historians have minimised the importance of jihād in the spread of Muslim power by arguing that the Arabs had other expansionist motivations. In the period immediately before the conquests the twin external pressures of loss of habitation and overpopulation can be seen as motives that led the Arabs to expand.\textsuperscript{155} Additionally, Bonner claims that continual exposure to these pressures of scarcity had conditioned Arabic tribes as strong fighters. There is evidence for this in the defeat of two empires, the Byzantines and Sasanians. Modern Arab scholars who seek to downplay the role of jihād emphasise this point.\textsuperscript{156} The fact the Muslims made almost no attempt to convert the people they conquered would also support the view that the spread of Muslim power was motivated more by pragmatic considerations than the desire to spread Islam.\textsuperscript{157}

Another explanation for the surprisingly rapid success of the conquests is that the Arabs encountered weak opponents. At the moment the Arab peninsula became unified and armed, after Abu Bakr shut down attempts of secession, the Byzantine and Sasanian Empires were

\textsuperscript{155} Bonner, Jihad, p. 62.
\textsuperscript{156} ibid.
\textsuperscript{157} Esposito, Islam, p. 35.
fragile. Having fought each other, both were ‘mutually exhausted’. To compound this, many people that the Muslims had conquered experienced an improvement in life conditions under Islamic rule. Under Byzantine or Sasanian rule many Christians had been harshly oppressed. Thus, they actually paid less tax and enjoyed more freedom under Islam. As such, Muslims often faced little resistance as the implemented power and culture in the form of law and custom. The concurrence of Muslim strength and Byzantine and Sasanian weakness is therefore an external factor, other than jihad, that was important to consider.

Additionally, the Abbasid Dynasty demonstrates other methods for establishing Muslim culture. Esposito posits that in this period, beginning in 750CE, the spread of culture was ‘based not on conquest but on trade, commerce, industry and agriculture’. There is evidence for this in the manner with which Muslims utilised Jewish and Christian ideas and expertise. For example, there was Christian leadership in the translation centres - institutions that were characteristic of Islamic culture’s emphasis on knowledge and the Arabic language. The head of the House of Wisdom centre was Hunayn ibn Ishaq, a Nestorian Christian. The relative importance of these collaborative, non-military ideas over those of jihad is further supported by the fact that it was in this period that the definitive shape of Islamic culture emerged: Sharia law, commitment to the arts, and literature. Again, however, there are meanings of jihad incorporated in these pursuits. They can be defined as ‘striving’ for God’s word and thus creating translation centres to spread the Islamic way of life to spread, for example. Jihad was such a fluid idea as to be important in many different ways, with various connotations.

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158 Bonner, Jihad, p. 57.
159 Esposito, Islam, p. 54
161 Esposito, Islam, p. 52.
162 ibid., p. 53.
163 ibid.
This definitional flexibility underscores the point that *jihād* is a pervasive idea. To a considerable extent, its importance cannot be extricated from these other external explanations. Muslim power and culture were spread by the formation of political states but these political movements used Islam as their ordering principle. Crone and Esposito both offer the argument that even political motivations had ideas of *jihād* at their core: Crone calls the conquests not missionary wars but ‘divinely-enjoined imperialism’.

Crone’s point unites the ideas that the Arabs wanted to expand their power and reap rewards through trade, and that they were divinely entitled to do so. It also encompasses the way in which ideas about *jihād* were latent, able to be shaped and employed when needed or desired.

In conclusion, there is cause for caution in retrospectively attributing the spread of Muslim power to ideas of *jihād*. In modern times, characterisations of Islam have encouraged a view of *jihād* as not just permanently military, but theologically definitive. In reality it is difficult to know how *jihād* was defined at any one moment by any given person. Such is its complexity and the variety in its interpretation that the soundest argument might be that it was an idea that was always able to be employed as a motive of expanding Muslim power and culture. Certainly, that use was often militaristic but other conceptions were also important. Ultimately, Muslim ideas of *jihād* were varied and latent: they lay behind and interacted with other factors and were employed as and when necessary. When invoked, these ideas could be important causes of the spread of Muslim power, but they were neither permanent, nor the only factors at play.

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‘The profession has developed innovative techniques which have expanded the range of artifacts that it recognizes as evidence. And it has more or less agreed on rules for how to evaluate them. But there is no training and there are no rules for the process of constructing a story out of the disparate pieces of evidence. None of the conventions of historical discourse which signal that we are writing about the real past and not a fictive past address this dimension of our craft; critical practices within the profession set standards for making inferences from evidence, and footnotes offer a mechanism whereby scholars can verify the existence and content of each other’s sources. But when it comes to creating a coherent account out of these evidential fragments, the historical method consists only of appealing to the muse.’ Discuss.

-Ellen Somekawa and Elizabeth A. Smith, ‘Theorizing the Writing of History, or “I can’t think why it should be so dull, for a great deal of it must be invention”’, 1988.

Ellen Somekawa and Elizabeth A. Smith put forward a view in ‘Theorizing the Writing of History’ on the expansion of history’s range and its evaluation, and on the lack of rules around constructing a coherent story out of pieces of evidence. This essay will discuss these ideas, illustrated through different themes in the study of history. Firstly, I address the techniques that
have brought in more evidence and contestation and, then, the meaning of ‘agreement’ in the evaluation of evidence. This discussion is followed by a refutation of that concept of ‘agreement’ through the changing modes of interpretation, as well as how this divergence leads to the authors’ same conclusion: that the task of constructing an account out of pieces of evidence is up to us entirely. The rest of the essay is dedicated to this idea, covering several key points: namely, the merit of history as a selection of evidence dependent on our inspiration; how this process is mitigated by our historical awareness and recovery of contextual meaning; the way our practice as historians forms the basis of a system with practical rules that prevents pure freedom with the story; and, finally, a recognition that diversity in the process of history creates the need for historiography.

Somekawa and Smith’s first assertion — that historians have ‘developed innovative techniques which have expanded the range of artifacts that it recognizes as evidence’ — can plausibly be seen as a representation of the possibilities opened up by the development of technology and the extension of attention to different populations. Jim Sharpe describes the difficulties involved in studying the non-elite ‘history from below’ and historians’ strategies around the lack of lengthy written evidence. Such approaches include making use of court cases, wills and tax lists to explore past experiences, explicit actions and implicit assumptions. This process of analysis often involves large-scale quantitative analysis aided by the advanced counting capability of technology. In a more complex sense, technology can visualise unwieldy data, such as railroad freight rate tables: it can connect them to relational meaning.

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167 ibid.
merge images of different types and created at different times, and map fragments and ephemera in a way that generates new questions.\textsuperscript{169}

This process of expansion, however, has limits. Not all evidence is recognized as such. ‘Minority histories’, as described by Bain Attwood in the example of Aboriginal history, exist outside the analytical framework of history in their parochial focus on self and kin, and in the lack of separation between past and present in their mix of history and memory.\textsuperscript{170} There is a conversation on what Attwood’s judgement implies for certain forms of Western history and the types of evidence deemed worthy of inclusion. The relevant point for the purposes of this essay, however, is that development of historical technique has significantly expanded the recognition of evidence along the axes of population, space and size, and that these boundaries are still contested.

Next, the statement that historians have ‘more or less agreed on rules for how to evaluate the evidence,’ deserves some clarification.\textsuperscript{171} Excluding the issue of contested forms, Somekawa and Smith appear to be stating that we have standards for the meaning drawn out from individual pieces of evidence. There is a process for verification of sources, and the authors state that there is a feeling of certainty brought about by the ‘physicality of our sources,’ and the conventions that aim towards variety, completeness and objectivity.\textsuperscript{172} What we do and how we analyse pieces of evidence are non-issues, but they are also not enough on their own to create a history. The rest of the article is devoted to the invention involved in putting the


\textsuperscript{171} Somekawa and Smith, ‘Theorizing’, p. 152.

\textsuperscript{172} ibid., p. 153.
fragments of evidence and their conclusions together.\textsuperscript{173} However, the basis of this thread of argument needs to be questioned — historians are not in agreement on evaluation.

Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum’s study of witchcraft in Salem is an example of the changing modes of interpretation of evidence. From a former focus on elites and dateable events, this historiographical turn is a shift to the study of social bonds and cultural structures, and dynamics involving youth and gender. It is true that the authors make use of the conventions of footnoting, variety, and the consideration of biases, but their evaluation is different. Looking at the accusations of witchcraft, they see past outsider reactions and resulting events to focus on the pattern of occurrence and escalation.\textsuperscript{174} In comparison to the neighbouring Northampton, the authors draw out the shared catalyst of groups of young people spending time away from home, the reversal of their subservient role to become moral authorities, and the different responses of their community.\textsuperscript{175} They study not just the details of the accusations, but also their sequence and their locations.\textsuperscript{176} New evidence from the seventeenth century does not surface at a rapid pace. Yet, by evaluating existing sources in a different way, Boyer and Nissenbaum are able to change our grasp of Salem’s history from a purging of the deviant to an unfortunate combination of circumstances in a religious revival movement.\textsuperscript{177} Methods for evaluation are therefore not set; re-analysis through good practice can draw new meaning from what we know.

The idea that the rules for evaluation can change diverges from Somekawa and Smith’s thought. Nevertheless, there seems to be nothing that prevents the implications from leading to a realignment with their declaration that the task of constructing a coherent story is up to us

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{173} ibid.
\textsuperscript{175} ibid., pp. 27-8.
\textsuperscript{176} ibid., pp. 33-5.
\textsuperscript{177} ibid., pp. 26-7.
\end{flushleft}
entirely. Interpretations of the same evidence can change — demonstrating the power of historians’ imposed structure. Along this line, Alun Munslow describes history’s ‘real character as a literary undertaking,’; not as an objective process but as representations of a past that ‘none can claim to know’.178 The radical epistemological sceptics of the linguistic turn suggest that our temporal placement in the present means that we can never know what past texts meant.179 Evidence, itself inanimate and proving nothing, is always invested with meaning by a historian, creating a story where there might not have been one before.180 Somekawa and Smith likewise state that the historical method is only one of personal creativity, with historians imposing meaning ‘like novelists choose plot structures’.181 This is an unsettling proposition that puts historians close to authors of fiction, but it is an idea that is worth examining.

The merit in the concept of historians as heavily involved in story-constructing correlates with the nature of history as a conscious selection of evidence. E.H. Carr observes that ‘the facts only speak when the historian calls on them’.182 Changes in our ‘muses’ can change the way we do history, creating different accounts that do not prove the preceding ones untrue but create a different narrative — as with the example of gender. Joan Wallach Scott articulates that the writing of gender into history not only implies a new history, but also the rejection of separate and subjective identities: it is a taking down of the boundaries between categories of analysis.183 This approach to selecting evidence reveals new connections: the rejection of the feminine upon which masculinity rests in a personal and political sense, in the setting of Greek and Islamic power; the prominence of gender in the rule of both kings and queens; and the focus of authoritarian regimes on the control of women through political participation and

180 ibid., pp. 150-2.
181 ibid., p. 154.
abortion where it would have otherwise had no practical purpose.\textsuperscript{184} Gender brings a different mode of construction to the story by providing new perspectives, redefining old questions and allowing the use of previously-separated evidence. Its creation, as well as its prevention, rested on historians’ construction.

But construction does not extend as far as Somekawa and Smith state. Historians do not just pluck pieces out of the past to create an invented story: we attempt to recover its meaning in the context of its time in a way that is considerate of our own difference. John Tosh and Peter Burke describe this as an ‘historical awareness’ of ‘otherness’; that is, working against anachronism by recognising that contexts and cultures are constructions that need to be learned, and the intention of meanings need to be studied.\textsuperscript{185} Clifford Geertz’s study of cockfights in Bali is a reading of a cultural event with this awareness as a priority. Geertz makes few assumptions and the analysis is wide-ranging: the roosterish imagery of the language on the male side of moralism; conceptions of authority and the strict pockets of its release; animality in society, and the role of the cocks as ‘surrogates for their owners’ personalities’.\textsuperscript{186} There is an awareness in the analysis of the role of cockfighting in the context of a society in which social status cannot change as a temporary, aesthetic movement that, more importantly, has a role in the articulation and maintenance of that society.\textsuperscript{187} These historians demonstrate the recovering of a story, not an invention of our own.

History as a field exists because there is value in historical integrity. There are methods used by historians that are separate from those of fiction authors, sociologists or economists, helping us reconstruct real past experiences. It is not true that the only rules are that we can

\textsuperscript{184} ibid., pp. 39-47.
\textsuperscript{186} Clifford Geertz, \textit{The Interpretation of Cultures}, New York, 1973, p. 419; 423-6.
\textsuperscript{187} ibid., pp. 443-51.
only ‘ask questions with 250-page answers’ — a defence best illustrated by historians’ criticism of a work from outside the discipline.\textsuperscript{188} Robert William Fogel is an economist whose work promotes the revolutionary power of quantitative history in changing understandings of slavery in particular.\textsuperscript{189} *Time on the Cross*, written in collaboration with Stanley L. Engerman, has been heavily criticised by Kenneth M. Stampp for a multitude of reasons. Some examples include: a failure to give credit to other scholars who have done more thorough work; quoting out of context; preserving pro-slavery arguments; and ignoring the human aspect of black resistance.\textsuperscript{190} Fogel and Engerman do not annotate their arguments so readers cannot trace their conclusions.\textsuperscript{191} Footnotes (one of Somekawa and Smith’s agreed rules) are more than a rhetorical device: they have a purpose, distinguishing real scholarship from that of, for example, Holocaust revisionists.\textsuperscript{192} Historians are by no means the only ones with the ability to address complex problems. However, there is value in the historian’s practice of building on knowledge, the use of scholarly sources, and the focus on human unpredictability, all of which ensure a grounding in reality.

Perhaps the core of Somekawa and Smith’s problem is an inability to reconcile diversity in the writing of history. One incident can be written many ways by many biased primary sources, and those sources can be analysed in different ways by many different historians.\textsuperscript{193} The training and the rules are not all-encompassing. The writing of history does change, and its method needs to be continuously interrogated, thus creating the need for the study of historiography. Good history is messy. It cannot be corralled into a neat, chronological sequence in which one event anticipates another, and irrationality and conflict exist as an

\begin{footnotes}
\item[188] Somekawa and Smith, ‘Theorizing’, p. 156.
\item[190] Stampp, ‘Introduction’, pp. 10-1; 19; 27.
\item[191] ibid., p. 9.
\item[193] Somekawa and Smith, ‘Theorizing’, p. 158.
\end{footnotes}
Historians will always operate on diverse fronts, speaking to multiple audiences. They may tell stories that are different, but with care, the stories that are told will be true.

This essay has discussed Somekawa and Smith’s ideas around history’s practice and construction. I approached first the expansion of evidential range and its limits through technology, ‘history from below’, and minority history. This was followed by the idea of agreement on evaluation of evidence, and refutation of that idea through changing interpretations of witchcraft in Salem. Somekawa, Smith, and Munslow theorise that the writing of history is like that of fiction. I discuss the merit in this idea in the effect of selection and structure placed on evidence in the example of gender, as well as the difference of history in its tethering to and recovery of context, exemplified by Geertz’s Bali cockfights. The value of historical integrity is illustrated through Fogel and Engerman’s lack of it, and the balance of all of these ideas help us negotiate history’s diversity and create the need for historiography. History is not a simple plundering of the past for pieces to invent a story; there is a basis to our practice.

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196 Evans, Defense, pp. 249-50.
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Leigh Fletcher

Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi asks, ‘Is it possible that the antonym of ‘forgetting’ is not ‘remembering,’ but justice?’ How is this question relevant to memory and the Civil Rights Movement?

How nation-states remember, commemorate, and celebrate their histories is indicative of a prescriptive collective memory. Historical memory both preserves and propels a grand narrative surrounding the nation which is used to set a political agenda, and assert its place in present global perception. The Civil Rights Movement is at the core of one of the most distorted American historical memories. This essay agrees that the antonym of forgetting is justice. Considering how a movement characterised by economic struggle and white violence is preserved in historical memory as a marker of non-violent racial unity is fundamental to understanding present-day racial relations. The constructed memory is a result of the American political agenda, an agenda which enables racial disparities to continue. There can be no justice until these disparities no longer exist.

The first indicator of this distortion is evident in the limited memory of African American civil rights activism. America, as a nation state, remembers this activism as part of ‘the Civil Rights Movement’ – a period which unified Americans and broke down racial barriers occurring between c. 1954 – 1978. There are two key problems with this narrative. The first is that remembering the Civil Rights Movement as a short-term movement removes

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recognition of its fundamental long-term context. For example, it is important to understand the failures of Reconstruction in the South after the American Civil War in order to understand why certain issues became central to the Civil Rights Movement of the mid-twentieth century. The federal government failed to ensure African Americans had land, access to education, and broader racial equality: that is, freedmen’s supposed rights did not materialise. White Southern alienation during this period undoubtedly contributed to the legacy of white supremacy faced by the Civil Rights Movement of American historical memory (‘the modern movement’).

Historical memory also deprioritises egregious examples of white violence in the post-Reconstruction period in the South. Dramatic increases in lynching numbers show that white violence was part of ‘the new racial order’: Adam Fairclough argues that ‘nothing more starkly illustrated the decline in the status of black Americans’. Sexual violence was also an equally widespread concern for African American women. As Eric Arnesen describes, ‘justice, for southern blacks, was an elusive ideal at best’. Evidently, the murder and sexual assault of African Americans by white people remains problematic. Forgetting this context is part of what creates the backward social attitudes that allow this violence to happen. Justice is ensuring that the most fundamental rights of bodily autonomy and safety exist for African Americans in practice.

The second problem with the ‘Civil Rights Movement’ as a term is that it traditionally juxtaposes, for example, Martin Luther King, Jr. against Malcolm X and the Black Panthers in a relatively successful attempt to erase them from popular historical memory. King is seen as

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199 ibid.
200 ibid., pp. 5–6.
201 ibid., p. 23.
a ‘good’ civil rights leader, juxtaposed with the ‘threatening’ Malcolm X. This contrast both devalues efforts for economic justice for African Americans, and delegitimises self-defence as a valid and real part of African American activism. As poverty and threats to safety necessitating armed self-defence remain core issues for present-day African Americans, forgetting how significant these aspects of the modern Civil Rights Movement were continues the vicious cycle of race-based classism and white violence. These are areas where there is no justice.

The term ‘civil rights’ itself suggests that there was not an equally, or arguably more important, struggle for social and economic rights during the long Civil Rights Movement. Civil rights are effectively theoretical without the socioeconomic frameworks required to ensure that they functioned and protected African Americans. Economic rights are at the centre of everyday racial struggles. The failure to provide the land freedmen were promised and housing discrimination in the post-slavery era is echoed in the economic struggles of the generations of African Americans that followed. For example, in post-World War II America, many African Americans held menial jobs, demonstrating a widening gap between ‘skilled’ or middle-class workers and the ‘unskilled’ or unemployed. By the time of the modern Civil Rights Movement, race-based class tensions were dominant.

The erasure of economic rights as a core focus of the modern Civil Rights Movement fits within the constructed division between ‘Civil Rights’ and ‘Black Power’. The Black Panthers, a civil rights group outside historical memory, were committed to grassroots work and social programs: that is, they were ‘concerned with the process of change’. Juxtaposing

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204 Raiford and Romano, *The Civil Rights Movement*, p. xviii.
groups like the Panthers with Martin Luther King, Jr., ‘sterilises’ King, creating ‘collective amnesia’ about who he was – a critic of capitalism, and an advocate for those in poverty.\textsuperscript{208}

The lack of discussion of the economic dimension of the Civil Rights Movement in American historical memory can also be attributed to the way institutions use a positive image to, quite literally, sell themselves. Corporations use images of the Civil Rights Movement to sell their products and image.\textsuperscript{209} Of course, it is not in these corporations’ interests to discuss how class and economic dominance were used as tools of white violence when they are engaging in capitalism. However, this also shows that it is not in America’s interests to consider economic rights as part of the Civil Rights Movement. The Civil Rights Movement is lauded in American memory as a great success for racial unity, as is American capitalist dominance (including its self-belief that it ‘won’ the Cold War). A memory of capitalism failing American people – especially in this context of celebrated successes for equality and justice – is completely oppositional to America’s ideological agenda.

Non-violent civil disobedience is lauded in historic memory of the modern Civil Rights Movement as the acceptable method for gaining civil rights. Non-violent protest and using legal and political avenues were how race relations supposedly improved. Conversely, armed self-defence is seen as a marker of the Movement’s ‘downfall’ into a separate Black Power era, thus fitting into the broader ‘declension model’ of the long 1960s.\textsuperscript{210} Traditional accounts of Black Power, particularly the Black Panthers, illustrate a group of young, Northern African Americans ‘filled with rage and looking for a way to affirm themselves’.\textsuperscript{211} It is these accounts

\textsuperscript{208} ibid.
\textsuperscript{209} Raiford and Romano, \textit{The Civil Rights Movement}, p. xiii.
\textsuperscript{211} Spencer, ‘Inside the Panther Revolution’, p.301.
that have made the Black Panthers appear militant as opposed to proponents of the Second Amendment.

As aforementioned, historical memory has constructed a clear, unequivocal distinction between the Civil Rights Movement and Black Power despite their common ‘quest for African American freedom’.

This artificial distinction necessarily exaggerates African American support of non-violence as a strategy. Rather, African Americans recognised the threat of white violence, particularly in the South, and how armed self-defence could be necessary, not merely practical. Many also saw value in both non-violence and self-defence. For example, Leilah Danielson argues that civil rights activist James Farmer is an example of two things: an African American whose outlook shifted over time, and an African American who illustrates that strategy and ideology existed on a spectrum.

Farmer was initially a pacifist. However, he grew to recognise that armed self-defence could contribute positively to the movement. His stance was that African Americans adopted non-violence ‘as a strategy rather than out of morality,’ and he agreed it was effective. However, he also believed African Americans had the right to armed self-defence – it was ‘justifiable, and in some circumstances, even constitutional’. Clearly, there is more nuance to the development of Farmer’s ideology than simply an outright rejection of non-violence and direct action. Farmer and other members of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) provided critiques of non-violence and their own past viewpoints, arguing that colour-blindness deprioritised ‘the legitimacy of black distinctiveness and culture’. It is these developments and criticisms that allowed for an evolving approach to civil rights issues.

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213 ibid., p. 441.
214 ibid.
215 ibid.
216 ibid., p. 448.
Farmer’s example also indicates a lack of homogeneity, even amongst a smaller group or individual’s views over the course of the movement. Forgetting the tensions and agreements between groups and the complicated relationship of people to civil rights on individual and community levels has led to injustice. For example, the gun law debate is white-centric and forgets that, for centuries, African Americans have used guns to feel safe; simultaneously, unarmed African Americans are still shot by police officers because they ‘pose a threat’. Justice is to recognise why armed self-defence is something many African Americans support and to ensure that their constitutional rights are protected. Simultaneously, it is working to regulate gun control and hold white perpetrators of racial violence accountable.

Why is the historical memory of the Civil Rights Movement short-term, non-violent, and non-economic? Effectively, prescriptive historical memory is a tool for agenda-setting. The Civil Rights Movement needed to fit into the Great American Legacy – a master-narrative of key events (such as the American Civil War), and their place in America’s self-image as a nation of freedom and justice for all. On a surface level, a world where African Americans are disproportionately affected by poverty and gun violence does not fit with the idea that the Civil Rights Movement ensured racial equality and African American freedom. But the agenda is more complex than that.

Martin Luther King, Jr., provides an example. King exists in historical memory as a figurehead - part of a narrative that mythologises the reality of African American freedom struggles. King’s efforts to gain economic rights for African Americans do not fit into this mythology. The Cold War and McCarthyism clearly established America as the great capitalist state, and King’s criticisms contradict America’s legacy of freedom and equality (particularly

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as its political agenda, especially during King’s most prominent period, was to juxtapose this freedom with communist states).

Focusing instead on King’s interactions with white leaders and efforts for legislative change ‘shapes historical memories to suit [politicians’] perceived political and ideological agendas’.\textsuperscript{218} This means that King has become a facet of the white authorship of black history if we accept that the Great American Legacy is inherently white. King’s image has been manipulated to make the Civil Rights Movement a more comfortable topic for white people and, more insidiously, to place the Civil Rights Movement in a more simplified past.\textsuperscript{219} At the point King’s memory is a way for Presidents to sell their political agendas we must question the legitimacy of such memories.

Forgetting the legacy of African American history – and by extension, white physical, political, and economic violence – has caused race relations to remain tense at best. Part of how this selective amnesia presents itself is in white discomfort with or antagonism towards African American communities and spaces. Applying Jurgen Habermas’ theory of the public sphere provides a useful explanation of why space is so important to the formation and retention of community.\textsuperscript{220} African American spaces are counter-publics: they conflict with the white, bourgeois, public sphere and are repressed, if not destroyed completely, to retain dominance over the social landscape. \textsuperscript{221} This conception of space is important, as the continued marginalisation and destruction of African American spaces leads to cyclical disadvantage that allows greater white violence and control.

\textsuperscript{218} Romano and Raiford, \textit{The Civil Rights Movement}, p. xvii.
\textsuperscript{219} ibid., p. xxii.
\textsuperscript{221} ibid., pp. 10 – 11.
A clear example is housing, and how the market was manipulated to create racially divided neighbourhoods and a larger racial wealth gap. White-controlled capital markets in the North were used as a way to ‘legally’ discriminate against black people, keeping neighbourhoods ‘A-grade’ – lacking ‘a single foreigner or Negro’.\textsuperscript{222} The dream of property ownership – especially for black migrants, who had their property and capital stolen in the South – was thwarted by illegitimate mortgage practices, manipulative contract sellers, and broader racism.\textsuperscript{223}

To achieve justice for African Americans, it is important to understand the limitations of collective memory without undermining the legitimate successes of the modern Civil Rights Movement. Legal change does provide some footing for African Americans to have civic and political rights. However, for these rights to exist in practice, we need to recognise that the Civil Rights Movement continues until equality exists in both law and fact. Historical memory of black leaders, like Martin Luther King, Jr., and later, the Obamas, focuses on the black achievement they symbolised.\textsuperscript{224} The power of symbols should not be underestimated: Black Power, reclaimed terminology, and Barack Obama’s presidency, as Ta-Nehisi Coates notes, represent black Americaness - something which white violence continues to try to oppress.\textsuperscript{225}

These symbols’ ability to empower is ineffective without financial and political capital. Economic change is needed for there to ever be racial equity in America.\textsuperscript{226} A core step towards such equality is including in historical memory how economic disadvantage was created via white capitalist dominance.\textsuperscript{227} A future with more leaders like Barack Obama requires that

\textsuperscript{223} ibid.
\textsuperscript{225} ibid.
\textsuperscript{226} Coates, \textit{The Case for Reparations}.
\textsuperscript{227} ibid.
more black people have access to his advantages: for example, education at two Ivy League schools.

It also requires remembering how these symbols must fight for prominence against America’s present-day socio-political climate. As Coates notes, ‘an eight-year campaign of consistent and open racism’ against Obama allowed for the rise of neo-fascism and, eventually, to the election of President Donald Trump. The knowledge that an African American individual can ‘rise to the same level’ as a white individual is inspiring, but that knowledge must coexist with the knowledge that the number of individuals who do so is small. Coates describes this effect: ‘the gate is open and yet so far away’. A collective historical memory of the Civil Rights Movement enables white backlash of this kind. Forgetting that this violence is a systemic pattern that has continued since America was colonised is forgetting that there is a fundamental issue that must be addressed to ensure African Americans have even the most basic of rights. To do justice requires addressing that violence, especially in a world where America’s president legitimises and promotes xenophobia and racism, and actively works to undo social services and protections.

Collective historical memory of the Civil Rights Movement shows that the antonym of forgetting is not remembering, but justice. The exclusions of armed self-defence and efforts towards economic rights point towards an inaccurate, homogeneous depiction of civil rights activism. This wilful forgetfulness contributes to a broader mythological construction which limits the period of civil rights in collective memory. Moreover, this construction draws a false distinction between non-violent, civil rights activists and Black Power, suggesting the latter is evidence of the end of civil rights activism. This characterisation is framed by the American

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228 Coates, *My President Was Black.*
229 ibid.
230 ibid.
political agenda, fitting the Civil Rights Movement within the Great American Legacy of freedom and justice. This historical memory is inherently designed for white, nationalist comfort, and does not address white violence or socioeconomic issues that continue to disproportionately affect African American communities. Recent historical events show that the options of white appeasement versus white backlash both result in violence and negative outcomes for African Americans. It is also clear that alleviating economic disparity and sociopolitical disenfranchisement is not straightforward. Nonetheless, for racial equity to truly exist for African Americans this historical memory needs to be expanded and reshaped to present a realistic interpretation of civil rights. Allowing this collective memory to become a narrative controlled and retold by African Americans is the first step towards justice.

Bibliography


**HISTORY 357 – Making Modern America**
Historian Richard Hofstadter described the period of the United States history from 1865 to 1919 as an ‘age of reform’. Robert Wiebe saw the defining feature of this period as Americans’ ‘search for order’. Nell Painter saw Americans ‘standing at Armageddon’ during these years. And Jackson Lears saw in these years the ‘rebirth of a nation’.

Which phrase best captures the history of the ‘Gilded Age and Progressive Era?’ (Note: you may create your own phrase but be sure to justify it and explain American history from 1865 to 1919 in terms of it).

The history of United States between 1865 and 1919 is unquestionably characterised by constant change. Many historians have neatly summarised their own takes on the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, in an attempt to capture the confusion and complexity of these years in a single, digestible soundbite. Robert Wiebe, for instance, sought to capture the era as a ‘search for order’, while Nell Painter offered a more dramatic take with her view that Americans were ‘standing at Armageddon’ during these years. Richard Hofstadter and Jackson Lears identified ‘an age of reform’ and the ‘rebirth of a nation’ respectively. Each of these summary phrases has a clear grounding in historical events that unfolded across these years, but all four tend to be particularly well tailored to a subset of themes, rather than to the era as a whole: ‘standing at Armageddon’ lends itself well to the crisis of urban growth and the declensionist narratives surrounding immigration, for instance, but is an ill fit for the emboldened visions of imperialism; a ‘search for order’ succinctly captures many of the contemporary concerns with race, but is not such a good match for the disruptive aims of progressive movements. Likewise, ‘reform’ and ‘rebirth’ both speak strongly to the dramatic contrasts between America in 1865
and America and 1919, but in doing so, they minimise the surprisingly linear, perhaps even inevitable, way in which these developments unfolded. In all likelihood, the true character of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era lies somewhere in the middle of these framings: neither a series of disruptive pivots toward some unknown future, nor a settling into stability, but a constant struggle between the two: a tug-of-war between order and progress.

The fundamental nature of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era can be explored across a range of thematic areas. As a first port of call, this essay addresses the theme of conquest and colonialism, especially in the early part of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. Perhaps the easiest default narrative to fit here is a ‘search for order’ amidst ‘uncivilized’ new territory – to label it thus, though, would be to take an exclusionist approach, which privileges the experiences of ‘white America’ above all others. As Philip Deloria has pointed out, historians often exclude or misrepresent the experience of Native Americans in a quest to fit ‘master narratives’. For instance, Native American acceptance of American citizenship has often been characterised as succumbing to assimilation – part of a narrative of decline - when it more likely represented just one part of a pragmatic strategy for gaining political rights and legitimacy. This example indicates that, while there was a very real campaign to impose order and colonial norms on Native Americans, this endeavor was in constant competition with the progressive aims and strategies of Indigenous groups. Moreover, Patricia Nelson Limerick’s case study of the Modoc tribe indicates that even the idea of ‘order’ within narratives of conquest and colonialism has its limits: in their rush to make rapid gains of conquest or to avenge wrongdoing whites acted impulsively, communicated poorly, and therein, proceeded inconsistently. That is, their ability to impose order was in constant

232 ibid., pp. 3–12.
233 ibid.
competition with the desire for rapid progress. A better characterisation of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, at least in terms of this thematic area, is a tug-of-war between order and progress: this notion captures the fundamental sense of indeterminacy and uncertainty, and alludes to the multiple narratives that compete and intersect with one another.

Michael Kazin identifies capitalism, industrial and financial, as the ‘driving force’ behind almost all of the vast change in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. The shifting legal approach to capitalism over time exemplifies the same narrative of a tug-of-war between order and progress that was present in the colonial conquests of the early Gilded Age. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 14th Amendment in the 1880s guaranteed legal personhood to corporations, and in doing so enabled progress that was largely unencumbered by state regulation. As a result, in combination with the possibilities of scale inherent in industrial technologies, corporations quickly became the dominant force in the American economy. And yet, existing in increasing tension with this unrelenting narrative of progress, were growing fears of a lack of order: tax-exemption, monopoly, unregulated working conditions and more, reaching a head in the enactment of anti-trust laws in the closing years of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. The Southern Populist Critique of Capitalism was born out of this unresolved tug-of-war between order and stability, and progress and growth, seeking a solution to the imbalance between capitalists and labourers in the form of the middle classes. The aim of this movement was not to eliminate capitalist progress, but to ‘give every man a fair chance’ to obtain it.

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236 Ibid., pp. 451–452.
237 Ibid.
240 Ibid., pp. 41–42.
regulation or the free market again speaks to a sense of unresolved internal tensions: an ongoing tug-of-war.

Hand in hand with industrial capitalism as a key thematic area of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era are urban growth and urban disorder. With rapid industrialization, the end of the 19th century saw nearly five times the number of Americans living in urban centres than in the early 1860s. The resulting unsustainably cramped housing conditions of the working classes, highly segregated along lines of wealth and immigration status, created tinderbox conditions in both the metaphorical and literal sense. The Chicago fire, specifically the dual narratives of response to the Fire, offer a visceral demonstration of the tensions at play here. On the one hand, narratives of divine punishment for a saturation of sin and moral decline were prominent, made vivid in legends of ‘refined ladies’ jostled with ‘harlots and scum’ on the Sands. All pointing toward an urgent need for order. This framing would appear to lend itself neatly to Nell Painter’s characterisation of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era as ‘standing at Armageddon’. However, to adopt such a characterisation would be to neglect the other core narrative that arose from the ashes: the growing spirit of hope and faith, embodied in stories of ‘humanity to the rescue’, cumulating in the idea of divine anointment – a glowing opportunity for progress. Again, as with the thematic areas of conquest and capitalism, there is space to understand these competing narratives of urbanisation in terms of a tug-of-war between order and progress.

Intersecting with the crisis of urbanisation was the crisis of workers and working conditions within it: that is, the question of free labour. Here, perhaps, a narrative of ‘reform’

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242 ibid., pp. 91–110.
244 Smith, Urban Disorder, pp. 35-48.
or ‘rebirth’ might seem like a good fit for the events of unionisation and industrial action. However, such labels, although pertinent, neglect the fundamental sense of contradiction within the free labour debate. The key strength of the ‘tug-of-war’ framing in this context, then, is that it captures the sense of a dynamic, seemingly-paradoxical reckoning between freedom of labour and freedom of contract. Themes of order and progress pervade both sides of the issue. Workers and trade unions pursued progress and ‘freedom’ in the form of stability and order, standardized wages, better working conditions and, crucially, collective bargaining (in order that the employee could negotiate from a stance of equal power to the employer). And yet, this agenda of apparent progress and order itself bought workers into direct contradiction with one of America’s most fundamental ‘progressive’ doctrines: individual freedom of contract. Moreover, by disrupting the practice of replacing workers with the latest batch of cheap, pliable immigrant labour the labour movement could be understood to have worked against economic progress. For example, strikes, especially in key industries such as the railroad, actively created disorder to the point of breakdown. In short, each side’s respective understanding of progress and freedom brought it into direct conflict with the other’s sense of order and stability. At every level, then, the issue of free labour was characterised by a tug-of-war between order and progress.

Intrinsically linked with the thematic areas already discussed – capitalism, class, and labour – is another major thematic area of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era: race. Curiously, when it comes to the paradigm of race the idea of a tug-of-war between order and progress can be understood from two angles. The most obvious interpretation would see African Americans, Irish Americans and other immigrant groups as seeking social and economic progress,

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246 ibid., pp. 27-28.
247 ibid., p. 28.
249 ibid., pp. 25-33.
enfranchisement, and civic rights. Such aims existed in competition with white America’s desire to retain the existing order of things and, thereby, the existing power dynamic. The repeated obstacles facing African American boxer Jack Johnson (especially denied opportunities to fight the white world champion on American soil) could be understood in this framework, although Johnson preferred not see it that way. Hierarchical and taxonomical thinking offered different racial groups a way to navigate this tension. In particular, it allowed communities to create space for their own progress while still retaining a crucial semblance of structure and order over other groups. Alternatively, the progress-order dynamic in a racial context could be understood from the opposite direction entirely: as African-Americans seeking stability, order and shelter from lynchings, violence, and post-abolition uncertainty. In opposition to this search was white America’s goal of racial ‘progress’ embodied, for instance, in the Jim Crow laws. In either case, the idea of a tug-of-war between order and progress captures the sense that there were multiple narratives at play in the paradigm of race during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. On the one hand, these were narratives of power, insecurity, and fear that captured an obsession with order and control; on the other were narratives of oppression, struggle and vision embodying an alternative vision of progress.

In the diverse responses to the growth of a new American culture of consumption and commercialised recreation, the continued tug-of-war between order and progress is abundantly clear. This tension is neatly exemplified by the case of Coney Island. Entrepreneurs like George Tilyou co-opted everything that was modern - mass consumer culture, capitalist thinking and industrial technology - to produce a high-paced entertainment that matched the newly intense conditions of industry faced by working classes in their day-to-day lives. Modern recreation,

252 ibid., pp. 92–93.
then, epitomised progress and future-oriented change in a way that conventional Victorian entertainments could not.\textsuperscript{254} And yet, to Coney Island’s critics, the same sense of colourful chaos, technological thrill, and sexually-charged freedom which captivated artists of the day (such as Joseph Stella and Reginald Marsh) represented the ultimate threat of moral decline and a loss of social control.\textsuperscript{255} In these two clashing responses, the overarching sense of a back-and-forth reckoning is clear: a tug-of-war between two opposing interpretations of excursion culture. The response of Progressives to Coney Island represents a particularly interesting microcosm of this perpetual wrestling between order and progress. Progressives saw the mass culture embodied by the amusement parks, dance halls and theatres of Coney Island as regressive: a form of escapism without intellect; pleasure co-opted for profit.\textsuperscript{256} And yet, they recognized in this excursion culture the possibilities of social engineering.\textsuperscript{257} Their response, advocating expert supervision and government regulation in the form of the ‘Play Movement’, represents the collision of imposing order and pushing for progressive evolution in entertainment.\textsuperscript{258}

In fact, Progressivism in general, as the name would suggest, was central to historical developments in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, especially in its later decades. The clashes between Progressives and their political opponents offer one of the most clear-cut demonstrations of the tug-of-war between order and progress that exemplifies the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. Glen Gendzel lays out the extensive historiographical difficulties in defining who the progressives were. Their aims were diverse to the point of contradictory and

\textsuperscript{256} ibid., pp. 98-101.
\textsuperscript{257} ibid., pp. 104–106.
\textsuperscript{258} ibid., pp. 101-104.
they embodied many different groups across many different causes.\textsuperscript{259} What Gendzel points to as the defining feature of a ‘progressive’ across that expanse is the endorsement of positive statism: the idea that the state could and should intervene to help shape a better future – that is, to create progress.\textsuperscript{260} This idea brought Progressives into direct opposition with Conservatives who, in general, applied positive statism only to issues of commerce: on all other topics, they asserted, the state should not intervene and the existing order of things should be maintained.\textsuperscript{261} The experience of reformers in Hull House speaks to the back-and-forth shift of power across this political divide. Hull House and its substantial coalition of unions and other organisations experienced fluctuating success and failure. For instance, its members successfully solicited the support of wealthy Chicago women for anti-sweatshop legislation in early 1893, only for the Illinois Women’s Alliance to dissolve under Conservative pressure later that year due to economic depression.\textsuperscript{262} This small example illustrates how a ‘tug-of-war’ remains a useful characterisation in the context of Progressive movements’ journeys, too. In this case, it manifested as a tug-of-war between social change and management, and the Conservative desire to maintain the order of the things.

One particularly prominent theatre in which Progressivism was debated was gender. Changing ideas about gender during the Gilded Age and Progressive era reflected a constant state of tension: an ongoing push-and-pull between a desire for stability, security, and order on the one hand, and a sense of possibility and progress on the other underscored at every turn by narratives of economic and social change.\textsuperscript{263} This contest in shifting understandings about gender is apparent in, for instance, the alternately celebratory and damning response to the

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{260} ibid., pp. 332-339.
\textsuperscript{261} ibid., p. 333.
\end{footnotesize}
perceived promiscuity of mass entertainment culture (especially dances, shared rides and purposefully titillating theme-park shows). At a more concentrated level, a micro-version of this tug-of-war narrative between order and progress was playing out within the institutions of the women’s movement itself. Specifically, it manifested in the conflict between equality and expediency-oriented factions. Activists who campaigned for women’s suffrage based on a principle of universal equality are generally understood as the more radically progressive faction within the two movements. Conversely, those who preferred an expedient solution sought to emphasise women’s differences from men. Such women noted their ‘womanly’ skills such as municipal housekeeping and home economics, and were often willing to campaign at the cost of African-American suffrage. In that sense, expediency campaigns can be understood as aiming to maintain the existing order and hierarchy of gender and racial relations within society. Thus, the fluctuating tensions between the different strands of the women’s suffrage movement – most prominently, the formal ‘divorce’ and eventual reconciliation of the national suffrage organisations at the end of the nineteenth century – can be characterised as a ‘tug-of-war’ between order and progress.

In turning now to theme of imperialism that emerged during the latter half of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, it may be tempting to understand these developments as part of a narrative of drastic change: ‘reform’ or ‘rebirth’. However, to do so would neglect the clear parallels between early-twentieth century imperialism, and late-nineteenth century colonialism and conquest. Just as westward-moving conquest represented a tension between a vision of frontier-shifting progress and a desire to impose order over indigenous peoples, so too did the acquisition of an American Empire represent a tension between the ideal of exporting progress

265 Derleth, “‘Kneading Politics’”, pp. 450-474.
266 *ibid.*, pp. 451-453.
267 *ibid.*, pp. 453-457.
268 *ibid.*, pp. 451-453.
269 Derleth, “‘Kneading Politics’”, pp. 451-453.
to the fringes of the world, and the reality of bringing them under control for American economic gain.\textsuperscript{270}

Taking these similarities into account, the clear theme that emerges is not ‘rebirth’ but an ongoing reckoning between progress and order. This tug-of-war characterisation of American Imperialism during the Gilded Age and Progressive era is illustrated in the example of the Spalding World Baseball Tour. Players were, on the one hand, ‘civilising’ agents of progress, bringing superior American virtues and principles to the world; on the other, they were unable to resist reinforcing regressive racial hierarchies in the treatment of their own mascot.\textsuperscript{271} The perceived ‘crisis of overproduction’ that formed a substantial motivation for American overseas expansion can itself be understood as part of this ‘tug-of-war’. American commercial growth, especially in the consumer goods space, was a poster-child for progress, to be upheld at all costs. Yet, it also heralded, in the political imagination at least, critical risks to the economy and to workers that must be bought under control.\textsuperscript{272} Economic imperialism represented a solution to this tension.\textsuperscript{273}

Sitting outside of America’s ordinary imperial assets, the role of the Philippines as an extended experiment in the use of systematic surveillance at a state level is another clear example of the persistence of a ‘tug-of-war’ between order and chaos through the end of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. American attempts to control the Philippines through intensive surveillance, heavy police presence and legal repression represented a dramatic contradiction with the constitutionally-enshrined progressive rights to freedom. This example demonstrates that the United States struggled with the tension between the two, only finding

\textsuperscript{273} ibid.
relief in wartime as a justification for similar infringement on individual freedoms back home.\textsuperscript{274} In general, the United States’ evolving position of influence in world affairs speaks to the seemingly-contradictory chasm between its theoretical love of freedom at home, and practical campaign for hegemonic power and control internationally.\textsuperscript{275} Once again, then, when examining the Gilded Age and Progressive Era through the theme of world war and the surveillance state, it is clear that the early decades of the twentieth century represent a reckoning: an identity crisis where values of freedom and progress, and order and control, were held in constant tension. This ‘tug-of-war’ between progress and control continues to dominate the rhetoric of American policy today, especially in relation to international affairs.\textsuperscript{276}

In the century since the Gilded Age and Progressive Era drew to a close, historians have attempted to summarise the fundamental nature of the era with a wide variety of phrases: a ‘search for order’, an ‘age of reform’, the ‘rebirth of a nation, and ‘standing at Armageddon.’ It is clear that each of the aforesaid phrases has substantial value for capturing the nature of developments across a handful of thematic areas. Yet, none of the phrases are without their limits as a universal characterisation for the Gilded Age and Progressive Era as a whole. Instead, across the key thematic areas of race, class, gender, labour, urban growth, culture, progressivism, imperialism and capitalism, the resounding narrative that persists is one of tension. At every turn, where one group of thinkers pushes ‘for progress’, another pushes back, ‘against decline’. For example, where a political boss sees economic growth, a worker sees reduced labour controls. Thus, in order to adequately encapsulate the core character of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era without privileging the experience of one group over another, any summary phrase must acknowledge the idea that this era saw multiple narratives unfolding

\textsuperscript{275} ibid.
\textsuperscript{276} Kazin, ‘Why the Gilded Age and Progressive Era Still Matters’, p. 452.
in parallel. Different notions and trajectories of progress, therefore, overlapped and intersected in complex ways. For that reason, the period of American history between 1865 and 1919 is best characterised as a tug-of-war between order and progress.

**Bibliography**


The three case studies of China, New Zealand and Japan offer examples of the most commonly discussed area of translation: interlingualism. In translating a source text interlingual translators seek to create a representation (the target version) which communicates the ideas or reproduces the effect of the original text within a different culture. The essential focus of these translators is to seek linguistic and cultural equivalents in order to communicate information. While the three case studies are selected according to country it makes more sense to evaluate them by purpose: religious translation (by missionaries in sixteenth-century China and nineteenth-century New Zealand), political translation (of the Treaty of Waitangi and the events surrounding it), and medical translation (of an eighteenth-century medical text from Dutch to Japanese). Each type of translation, despite the common need for equivalents, was dictated by the objectives of the translators, the methods available to them, and broader considerations of the societal contexts in which they were operating.

The modern field of translation studies, in its broadest strokes, is a poor fit for the translation processes in China, New Zealand, and Japan. While the development of the discipline has some relevance the general thrust has been aimed at translating art and literature.277 To that end, it sees practitioners examine translation in attempts to recreate the effect that a given work had within its source culture. This means creating a representative text

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277 Susan Bassnett further notes that translation studies tends to focus more on poetry than prose, see Susan Bassnett, *Translation Studies*, 3rd edition, Oxon, p. 110.
which operates in as similar a manner as possible within a foreign context while staying as true to the form of the original as the translator can accomplish. There is a sense of futility in such a task: a feeling that even the most skilled translator can never accomplish both of these standards to the satisfaction of all. These concerns do not apply to these historical examples. The case studies are about communication, not art. The place of effect and style is not as central. While many of the modern principles and concepts of translation can still be applied in retrospect to evaluate them, the translators in China, New Zealand, and Japan had a much simpler task than many of the translators usually examined in modern translation studies. Their translation was about information and intention, whether that information was religious, political or medical. Translation in order to communicate information means that content is the priority; style and effect (in the artistic sense of the words) can be discarded in order to better target the desired outcome of communication. These translations are more often mechanical than creative and need to be evaluated as such.278

Missionaries could not operate in foreign countries at will: they generally had some sort of protection, patronage or sponsorship. This reality comes across more clearly when translation is thought of as a process of cultural contact. Missionaries needed a somewhat stable place in society in order to operate effectively. Without such stability, any efforts at translation would be largely wasted. Indeed, missionaries would be hamstrung, unable to continuously communicate with potential converts and provide them with translations of the Bible or other texts. The first breakthrough in China, for example, came in 1579 when Michele Ruggieri was permitted to live outside the capital and learn the local language.279 Joined by Matteo Ricci, a period of noteworthy success began as missionaries prioritised a top-down approach, including seeking the patronage of the emperor.280

278 ibid., p. 12.
Religion in China was not separate from politics: it was, due to the spiritual conception of the cosmic role of the emperor, an essentially ‘political matter’. Christianity, as an external religion, essentially presented a threat to the place of the emperor by calling into question his heavenly mandate to ‘impos[e] order’ and the global nature of this order. Chinese writers were thus critical of God’s place as the ‘single Master of Heaven’, above even the emperor, and any concept of separation of cults and the state was dismissed as an audacious ‘aberration’. In order to assuage the concerns of the elite missionaries attempted to demonstrate that Christianity did not present so serious a threat to the established order, depicting it as benign and submissive. This strategy managed to convince some of the Chinese elite. Having done so these figures were able to advocate on behalf of Christianity, making arguments based on Chinese frameworks. They pushed the idea that Christianity was not only politically and scientifically useful but also compatible with Confucianism. Christianity was also seen as a way to denigrate heterodox sects. Here, Christianity became acceptable as missionaries and members of the Chinese elite reframed it to conform to political needs. While such adaptation was not without compromise, it was necessary to develop a solid base in China from which to operate.

In early nineteenth-century New Zealand, missionaries also felt the need to ingratiate themselves with the local population, although they did not need to adapt to centralised, rigid political structures. Instead of an emperor, the highest authorities were tribal chiefs. This state of affairs also meant that responses to missionaries’ efforts varied throughout the country due to regional cultural differences. Rather than going for a directly top-down approach

282 ibid.
283 ibid., pp. 107-108.
285 ibid., pp. 110-111.
286 ibid., p. 111.
287 ibid., p. 112.
missionaries sought conversion of the population while recognising the potential benefits of obtaining patronage and engagement on the part of chiefs. Henry Williams, for example, once described Te Koki as the ‘liege lord’ of Paihia missionaries.\(^{289}\) Local protectors were not the only way to establish a base from which to build – missionaries that were able to operate self-sufficiently enjoyed similar stability.\(^{290}\) They enjoyed greater status as a result of not being economically reliant on the people that they sought to convert. The political situation made establishing a foothold easier in New Zealand than in China, with separate missionary groups able to focus on their own local efforts without national concerns affecting the efforts of all in the same way.

One of the best methods available to all translators is the use of neologisms. By creating the equivalent to a term in the target language they can avoid the potential confusion of incorrect connotations or an awkward fit. Loan words are an extremely common approach in general: in sixteenth-century China, translators used transliteration to render Christian concepts in Chinese language.\(^{291}\) In early nineteenth-century New Zealand missionaries also applied this approach to political concepts: for example, *kawana*, *mihanere*, and *komite* referred to European social roles foreign to a non-European society.\(^{292}\) Using neologisms seems to be the best approach for maintaining this inherent ‘foreignness’ to certain concepts. Furthermore, it demonstrates missionaries’ acknowledgement that these roles come from their society not that of the target culture. Neologisms allow an explanation of religious concepts without reducing them to familiar expressions.

A desire to maintain a sense of separation might align with missionaries’ goals of seeking conversion and imposing their culture upon the local. However, in both China and New

\(^{289}\) ibid., p. 76.
\(^{290}\) ibid., p. 131.
Zealand missionaries ultimately recognised that, especially for the most important concepts, neologisms were not enough. Rather, properly conveying the sanctity of their religious concepts required drawing on concepts of respect within the target culture. The Chinese judged European ideas by their own criteria, only accepting what was able to be easily integrated. Missionaries drew on Confucianism to impart a sense of legitimacy on some of their most important terms, applying terms that they found within Chinese Classics, such as ‘Sovereign on High’ and ‘to serve Heaven’. They were also able to draw on Buddhist terms which later became useful when they were able to twist this further and claim their Christian doctrines as ‘corrections’ of Buddhist teaching.

A similar tactic was used by missionaries in New Zealand. The ‘maintenance of the Sabbath’ was seen as a vital part of their task but missionaries were initially frustrated by both open Māori resistance and their own failure to impart the importance of the Sabbath. Greater success was found with use of the Māori concept of tapu, which enabled missionaries to explain the value that they placed upon the Sabbath. Using indigenous concepts helped missionaries to overcome Māori resistance. Tony Ballantyne suggests that the Sabbath in 1820s New Zealand represented a common interest and engagement between Europeans and Māori. Māori embraced not only the importance of the Sabbath, but also engaged with missionary attempts to impart European culture including missionary teaching, wearing European clothes and treating the Sabbath as a day of rest. By equating the value of Sabbath with the similarly sacred quality of tapu, the missionaries were able to communicate their beliefs. When neologisms failed finding equivalents that existed in the target culture was a viable alternative.

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295 ibid.
296 Ballantyne, Entanglements, p. 126; 128-129.
297 ibid., pp. 132-133.
298 ibid., p. 129.
There are two problems that missionaries eventually had to confront which reveal important weaknesses in their approaches. One problem that missionaries faced in China was the rites controversy. In 1704 the Chinese rejection of the successful Jesuit approach was based on three main issues: the use of traditional Chinese terms, the question of whether ceremonies were civic or religious, and relationships between Christians and non-converts. The Chinese backlash saw Jesuit missionaries opt for a more Eurocentric approach which ultimately resulted in Christianity’s status as a legitimate religion being revoked. In part, this revocation was due to concern over popular Christianity becoming connected to indigenous practices. In adapting religious teachings to a new culture missionaries faced backlash from other Europeans which ended the possibility of Christianity fully taking hold in China.

Similarly, missionaries in New Zealand faced problems with their ability to teach. Although they were delighted by the enthusiasm that many Māori displayed for learning and the apparent ease with which they developed new skills, much of their evidence reveals oral repetition that ‘might masquerade as reading’. Even the ‘literate elite’ only had a rough grasp of writing. The issue here was that missionaries were lacking as teachers and were more able to impart the meaning of customs than able to actually teach skills to others. While they were able to indicate that cultural elements such as the Sabbath and writing were important to them the enthusiastic response represented a surface level adoption of these concepts. Actually teaching local peoples meant engagement on their terms. In both China and New Zealand the population had even more control than the missionaries. The Chinese were more interested in science than religion, while Māori were interested in the function of letters and spiritual

300 *ibid.*, pp. 29-30; 33.
301 *ibid.*, p. 31.
303 *ibid.*, p. 171.
power of the Bible more than the religious teachings found within them.\textsuperscript{305} Losing political ground and facing disinterest from the populace were both serious problems that stymied missionary activity.

Translation in New Zealand was not done purely for the purposes of proselytising. Perhaps the most famous example of translation in New Zealand history is that of the Treaty of Waitangi, and generally not for positive reasons. In later years some have come to see the Treaty as a conspiracy or robbery.\textsuperscript{306} Although a more political situation treaty proceedings saw officials and translators build on elements established by missionary translation. For Ballantyne, the British approach to the Treaty of Waitangi represented the end of a sceptical approach to colonisation.\textsuperscript{307} Both economic and religious arguments were made for such changes.\textsuperscript{308} Part of the intention behind the Treaty was to impose laws on unruly colonists and grant Māori further rights in order to protect them from ‘the ravages of uncontrolled contact with Europeans’.\textsuperscript{309} The official colonisation that the Treaty was supposed to bring about was merely a formalisation of the ongoing incorporation of Māori into the ‘commercial, religious, and political networks of the British empire,’ that informed the cross-cultural relationships within the colony.\textsuperscript{310} For the British, this meant a written document. There was also some confusion over the two versions of the Treaty. Although the English text should be considered the ‘original’ the Māori version was presented as such to the Colonial Office.\textsuperscript{311} Edward Gibbon Wakefield, writing about politics in relation to New Zealand shortly after the signing, notes confusion regarding both the understanding and use of the rights that it granted.\textsuperscript{312}

\textsuperscript{305} Gernet, ‘Christian’, pp. 15-16; McKenzie, ‘Sociology’, p. 170; 178.
\textsuperscript{307} Ballantyne, \textit{Entanglements}, p. 247.
\textsuperscript{308} \textit{ibid.}, p. 240.
\textsuperscript{309} \textit{ibid.}, p. 248.
\textsuperscript{310} \textit{ibid.}, p. 251.
\textsuperscript{311} Fenton and Moon, ‘Translation’, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{312} E.J. Wakefield, \textit{Adventures in New Zealand, From 1839 to 1844}, 2 vols., London, 1845, p. 59.
entire process, before, during, and after the signing, was riddled with problems that affected both political processes and the actual translation from English to Māori.

It is important to remember that the Treaty was also a spoken agreement – William Hobson had Williams read the Treaty to the chiefs and this explanation focused on the powers that would be granted to the British rather than the intention behind it.\textsuperscript{313} Subsequently, Don McKenzie describes the Treaty as an ‘oral-aural occasion’ for Māori, and the actual documents involved as ‘only partial witnesses to the occasion’.\textsuperscript{314} There was a crucial split between British officials and Māori chiefs on this point. The two Treaties, in two languages, might be thought of as two British treaties. The ‘true’ target-culture of the Treaty was more about the oral proceedings, short as they were. Although the chiefs were encouraged to discuss it this was limited as the decision to end these discussions was rushed.\textsuperscript{315} McKenzie presents this fact as Hobson preventing discussion.\textsuperscript{316}

Looking back to the roots of translation a further issue is obvious. André Lefevere points to the role of interpreters as mediators (generally in trade, but also applicable to politics), where immediate feedback was possible and interpreters were judged by their results.\textsuperscript{317} By preventing discussion and dissent no such feedback was possible, leaving the written Treaty unadjusted. McKenzie notes that there is a separation between the Treaty and such oral responses, and that it is better to think of these as two different types of agreement which were at play during the signing of the paper treaty.\textsuperscript{318} For Māori, the Treaty was essentially oral and the fact that they signed the physical Treaty did not mean unconditional acceptance of the

\textsuperscript{314} McKenzie, ‘Sociology’, pp. 180-181; 184.
\textsuperscript{315} Fenton and Moon, ‘Translation’, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{316} McKenzie, ‘Sociology’, p. 181.
\textsuperscript{318} McKenzie, ‘Sociology’, p. 183.
written version. At the first step, this attempt at translation failed because the focus was on translation, not a broader form of cultural contact.

By 1840, Māori understood the general importance that missionaries and other Europeans placed on the written word. Despite this, neither party properly acknowledged that each saw political agreements as taking place within different methods of communications. For the British, formal recognition in a bilingual treaty was enough, whereas the Māori chiefs believed that the peripheral discussions meant that the agreement was more of an ongoing, fluid relationship. The focus on the written text, rather than its discussion, was one of the biggest missteps made by the British. This basic misunderstanding of political resolutions was not the only problem, however. The process of translating the words of the Treaty was also rife with shortcomings.

Henry Williams, respected and admired by many local Māori, was responsible for translating the Treaty (along with his son, William). His local connections would have helped him, but could also be exploited in order to deceive the chiefs. While the father was not only fluent in Māori but aware of contemporary ideas surrounding translation the son was limited in his capacity for operating with both languages and would have been of little help. Even the elder Williams was not the best choice for the task but the process in general was somewhat rushed, leaving officials unable to bring in those more capable of completing the task. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the two sought the aid of a native speaker in performing their task. Clearly, the proceedings were hampered by the need to rush and the difficulty of long-distance communication. Although the translators had some capacity for the

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319 ibid.
320 Fenton and Moon, ‘Translation’, p. 32.
321 ibid., p. 30; 32.
322 ibid., p. 32. His son was, at least, raised in New Zealand, which may have been of some help. Fenton and Moon largely refer to the decisions made in the translation process as that of Henry Williams, who seems to have taken the lead (and had a more important role in the Treaty proceedings due to his relationship with some Māori).
323 ibid., p. 33.
324 ibid., p. 32.
task, the whole process was flawed. Without giving them more time, help, or seeking others to translate altogether, there was almost no chance that the Māori version of the Treaty would not poorly represent the articles of the source version.

The next issue is where the translators actually went wrong. One potentially clever strategy that the two Williams men used was avoiding the use of English terms that lacked Māori equivalents.325 This would have, naturally, streamlined the wording of the Treaty and avoided unnecessary explanation and the potential confusion that could result. However, in doing so, they often found equivalents based on missionary translation of the Bible, thereby rendering political concepts from the source version in a form that was more recognisably religious in the target.326 By opting to translate with this method an extra barrier to understanding was being unnecessarily created. Their selection of terms in general gave the chiefs a false impression of the rights that the British Crown claimed in the Treaty. The Māori term kawanatanga (governorship, which was derived from rendering the English ‘governor’ in the written language) was used for three different political concepts found in the English Treaty.327 John Laurie argues that Williams did not have the words to express important political concepts in Māori.328

However, it is worth noting that there was a precedent for not doing so in New Zealand political translation: the Declaration of Independence. In this document terms such as mana and rangatiratanga had been used, which meant the Māori version had a fuller range of expression than the Williams’ translation of the Treaty.329 Several scholars have suggested that mana would be the more appropriate term to convey the concept of sovereignty to the chiefs, with its association with authority an acceptable association.330 While Sabine Fenton and Paul

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325 ibid., p. 33.
326 ibid.
329 Fenton and Moon, ‘Translation’, p. 34.
Moon points to *rangatiratanga* as a way to introduce the concept of ‘execution of jurisdiction’, McKenzie goes further by suggesting that it would have been a viable word if the translators did not want to use *mana*. By avoiding these concepts the Māori version of the Treaty avoids more serious expressions of political power, giving the false impression that the Treaty lacks the impact that the British ascribed to it. Any notion of Māori sovereignty was ‘extinguished’.

Some translation theorists would have supported the views of these historians, arguing that it is possible to create a target text which is received the same way as the source. The Treaty of Waitangi could have been translated in a way that the same level of power transfer was conveyed in both source and target versions, but this was not done. In referring to *kawanatanga* alone, the impression was created that the Treaty only represented a limited sacrifice of power, not to the level of sovereignty that the British understood.

One common reference in translation studies is to the (originally Italian) expression ‘translator, traitor’ (the Italian terms sound similar, resulting in a pun of sorts). Regarding the Treaty of Waitangi, however, there is the further question of whether Williams was deliberately acting as a traitor while he was working as a translator. Fenton and Moon argue strongly for the view of Williams as a deliberate traitor. They argue that, motivated by both his religion and belief in the causes of the British, he acted as a manipulator rather than a mediator – he was not ‘innocent’. Remember, Williams was not only involved in the creation of the target text but also involved in oral proceedings, to which he added legitimacy due to his connections with local Māori. Williams himself left an account in which he says that he not only explained the Treaty clause by clause but also sought to demonstrate the advantages of British government,

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333 Edwin Gentzler, *Contemporary Translation Theories*, 2nd ed, Clevedon, 2001, pp. 52-9. One proponent of this view mentioned by Gentzler, Eugene Nida, would also argue for ‘dynamic’ over ‘literal’ translation, but the most important aspect for him was that translation invoke the correct response. In this view, then, Williams failed to translate the Treaty well.
334 Fenton and Moon, ‘Translation’, p. 34.
335 ibid., pp. 41-42.
including the suppression of both wars and lawlessness. He also suggests that the chiefs indicated their minds were made up, and the Treaty was signed ‘[a]fter some little discussion and trifling opposition’. William Colenso, by contrast, notes the objection of Te Kamara to the presence of a Governor in New Zealand. William Williams would later suggest that the missionaries had been right to persuade the chiefs to sign, as the words of the Treaty were plain enough to avoid concerns over the double meanings found in it.

However, Laurie pushes back on the scholarly arguments for Williams as a traitor, arguing not only that he did not deliberately mistranslate but that Māori and British understandings of their respective language versions of the Treaty were actually quite similar. In his view, the gap between the two treaties was a product of the essential impossibility of translating the concepts found in the source Treaty. This argument does not seem to hold true – it would have been possible to communicate these concepts to the chiefs, although it may have required better translators, better choices of words, and a little more time. It is, nevertheless, possible that Williams was never intending to betray the chiefs. Translators can face problems with even the most seemingly simple of problems – Bassnett uses the example of two words for “yes” in French. With his limited capacity for translation, he could have done the best job possible and felt that he was acting in the chiefs’ (and their peoples’) best interests. If this is true, all of the various issues with both the translation specifically and the approach to the Treaty of Waitangi in general indicate how badly rushed and inadequate translations can be, made even more obvious by the longevity of the issues that resulted. On

337 ibid., p. 56.
341 ibid., p. 255; 257.
the other hand, if Williams was an intentional traitor, one might cynically conclude that (mis)translation has the potential to be used as a foreign policy weapon, although the issues that resulted again reveal downsides to this strategy.

The translation of Johan Kulumus’ medical text, *Ontleedkundige Tafelen* (Anatomical Tables), into Japanese as *Kaitai Shinsho* is a different type of translation than those in the Chinese and New Zealand case studies. Borrowing Shigehisa Kuriyama’s description, the translation was the product of Genpaku Sugita and his peers’ ‘heroic struggles’ despite a lack of training or experience with translation, working without written aids or precedents.\(^{343}\) The translation was not accomplished entirely without the help of those experienced with the Dutch language, but remains impressive nonetheless.\(^{344}\) Perhaps the most notable difference is that the translators here were native users of the target language, rather than the source.\(^{345}\) Genpaku himself was concerned as to the potential of his efforts due to his lack of ‘literary talent’ and lack of precedents.\(^{346}\) Despite this, they were able to accomplish the task, albeit quite slowly.

While missionary translation also involved collaboration, the group involved here was both more organised and more diverse. Genpaku attributes their success to the group effort.\(^ {347}\) He details how several of the others differentiated from himself in both background and motivation. For most, it began as a ‘trivial, private affair’.\(^ {348}\) While he was a physician by training, the others were part of the translation project due to interest in the Dutch language and European knowledge more generally. Ryōtaku and Jun-an were two such ‘enthusiast[s]’ for Dutch learning’, the former due to interest in the unusual and the latter seeking further knowledge of natural history.\(^ {349}\) It may also be worth noting that Masaka, Ryōtaku’s lord, was

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\(^{345}\) Of course, this is still outside the modern recommended practice of a translator as it is further removed from both the source and target culture but provides an interesting comparison to missionary translation.

\(^{346}\) ibid., p. 46.

\(^{347}\) ibid., p. 48.

\(^{348}\) ibid., p. 66.

\(^{349}\) ibid., p. 12; 40; 42.
sympathetic with such eccentricity – the elite had some interest in obtaining foreign knowledge despite the theoretical closing of the country. Another member of the translation group, Hoshū, seemed to ‘have had no definite objective’ but merely idle curiosity about foreign knowledge - although his interest apparently did not waver or wane. While these translators and others were committed to the project, some only joined the group due to ‘caprice’ and quickly quit.

Genpaku contrasts himself with these others (although he notes that Seian, who joined the group later, was ‘exactly of the same mind’ as him), as his interest was never about the Dutch language or European knowledge in general, but rather correcting Japanese medical knowledge and ‘contribut[ing] something to the practice of healing’. Unlike in ancient Chinese medicine, Genpaku’s focus was medicinal knowledge itself – not initiation into a lineage of textual transmission. Despite this array of motivations, the group was focussed on the same task: understanding the *Ontleedkundige Tafelen*. Their way in, one might say, was dissection, which proved that the images that accompanied the foreign text contained accurate information. It also meant that these images could be used to begin translating almost entirely unknown words, whether driven by desire for developing the capacity to translate in general or for the information in that specific text. The motivations for translation did not matter so much as the commitment to the group effort – sustained cooperation allowed the project to eventually be completed.

Obviously, Genpaku and his colleagues were dealing with medical knowledge rather than religious and political concepts. It seems obvious that this would make for relatively easy translation, with equivalents much easier to establish in the physical world than the conceptual.

350 ibid., 41.
351 ibid., p. 42.
352 ibid., pp. 41-42.
353 ibid., pp. 43-45.
Where missionaries and others sought to communicate through cultural equivalents, medical translators could find equivalents in something more ubiquitous and uniform: the human body. Of course, this requires extra steps such as dissection, and even then this is not to say that this is an easy task: Kuriyama, for one, suggests that even with the use of a guide to navigate the complexity that is a human body cut open, onlookers will still only see what they are looking for.\footnote{Kuriyama, ‘Between’, pp. 26-27.} It was the combined exposure to the body and a foreign medical text that revealed to the group the knowledge gap that inspired their efforts. Without this, they would never have come to believe in the importance of translating and improving Japanese medical knowledge. Japanese dissection practice before Genpaku was essentially a confirmation of what was already known as opposed to the numerous questions asked by his group.\footnote{ibid., p. 26; Genpaku, \textit{Dawn}, p. 30.} In interrogating their understanding by working with a foreign guide Genpaku was, essentially, seeing in a new way.\footnote{Kuriyama, ‘Between’, p. 28.} The use of the physical world, in spite of the limitations to understanding, made translation necessary for the inexperienced group and would also provide the starting point that made it possible.

Despite the questions that Horiuchi raises regarding the significance that Genpaku attributes to his work, it remains an impressive accomplishment.\footnote{Annick Horiuchi, ‘When Science Develops outside State Patronage: Dutch Studies in Japan at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century’, \textit{Early Science and Medicine}, 8, 2, 2003, p. 170.} The actual practice of translation was very slow, and saw the group work begin with illustrations.\footnote{Genpaku, \textit{Dawn}, p. 34.} Having seen how these compared to an actual body they had some understanding that could transcend language barriers.\footnote{This is not to say that images are universal, but rather that the representations in the European text could be understood with reference to a physical body rather than the explanations in Dutch.} Of course, they had more familiarity with the external body and so prioritised these translations of the external anatomy over the interior.\footnote{Genpaku, \textit{Dawn}, p. 34.} Knowledge of the human body clearly helped; Genpaku offers the example of another interpreter, unaware of the thoracic duct, who
confused “gijl” with “gal” as a result.\textsuperscript{362} They faced problems with not only words, but grammar as well, and were able to slowly improve by leaving difficult words or sections aside to return to later.\textsuperscript{363} Although they had no dictionary they were at times able to make use of interpreters and additional dissections (Horiuchi suggests that they ignored Nagasaki interpreters who would have been significantly more capable).\textsuperscript{364} Progress was rather slow, as after a year they were working at a speed of around ten lines per day.\textsuperscript{365} Like many other translators the group created neologisms via transcription.\textsuperscript{366}

As with the Chinese and New Zealand case studies, the Japanese example contrasts against modern theories of translation, particularly in the field of medicine. Marla O’Neill brings up several interesting points in relation to the work of Genpaku’s group. Firstly, she points to the ‘language of medicine’ (jargon) and ‘implicit knowledge’ involved in medical texts, which the Japanese translators had no familiarity with – they were looking at both a foreign language and foreign medical tradition.\textsuperscript{367} Secondly, she discusses who can do medical translation - here Genpaku and his colleagues had the advantage over modern practice. O’Neill indicates that the best medical translation results from the combined efforts of translators and medical professionals, suggesting that it is best to have one edit the work of the other.\textsuperscript{368} Here, not only were multiple medical practitioners involved but all of the group were becoming experts in translation. Yes, they may not have had the background in either that would be expected of modern medical translators but, considering the circumstances, the sustained group effort represents a viable path for successful translation.

\textsuperscript{362} ibid., p. 49.
\textsuperscript{363} ibid., pp. 34-35.
\textsuperscript{365} Genpaku, 	extit{Dawn}, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{366} ibid., p. 47.
\textsuperscript{368} ibid., pp. 75-76. She further notes the benefits that a team can bring in cross-checking to avoid errors.
All three types of translations had unique strengths and weaknesses which translators had to work with or around to establish equivalents between languages and cultures. In the case of translation for religious objectives, the most important task was to find ways to demonstrate the sanctity of the concepts that translators wanted to introduce. They also had to work with both political and popular interests in order to retain their position within the countries they were operating in. In the case of political translation, there were two main obstacles: understanding what political agreements meant to both parties (the issue here being written and oral agreements, and the question of formalisation of the Treaty), and the translation of political concepts. In New Zealand, there was also the further complication of whether Williams was deliberately misleading the chiefs or was merely incapable of communicating the effect of the Treaty due to the circumstances. Finally, despite the obvious advantage that medical translation has in being based upon the human body (and representations of it) rather than the more culturally-specific concepts found in religion and politics, it is clear that Genpaku and his group had to overcome other difficulties, including starting from scratch and properly “seeing” the body as informed by the illustrated guide. In each of these case studies, it is clear that there is no universal approach to translation that will provide perfect equivalents in any situation. Rather, translators must use the methods available to find the best equivalents in accordance with the needs of both the source and target cultures, recognising that they might be unable to properly communicate the necessary concepts and information.
**Bibliography**


The indigenous use of Christianity as resistance to British Empire in Aotearoa New Zealand and Palestine, 1820-1948.

‘In the absence of grand synthetic counter-narratives of protest, resistance and revolution, the presumption of basic stability remains the working premise of British imperial history in its grand narrative forms, especially as it is popularly consumed and understood.’

The supposition of ‘basic stability’ that undergirds the historiography of British imperialism is a misleading and erroneous one. It is also unwittingly dismissive of Indigenous experience of colonialism, and thus not historically rigorous. In this essay I intend to shed light on the instability of British Empire through a discussion of the ways in which Māori and Palestinian people used Christian faith as the basis for challenging colonial authority between 1820-1948.

Before I elaborate on Te Kooti’s defiant iteration of Christian faith embodied by the Ringatu tradition, and on the Palestinian Anglican Church community’s role in critiquing British Mandatory rule, the historical context must be elucidated. My research rests on settler-colonialism, land, and Christianity as ideological vehicles for a comparative analysis of British

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370 ibid.
imperial expansion in Aotearoa New Zealand and Palestine. I demonstrate the specificities of Indigenous Māori and Palestinian interaction with Christianity. In doing so, I illustrate that Christianity did not exist simply as a tool of the coloniser but as a source of liberating theological and ethical values which could be used to resist British imperial oppression. First, though, I will ruminate on some of the theoretical limitations and possibilities posed by the methodology of comparative history.

The terrain of comparative history is a contested one: not all scholars look upon this historical method favourably. However, the value of comparative history lies in its potential to offer nuanced, renewed analysis of social forces which traverse the globe unrestrained by national boundaries. Thus, it is unsurprising that the most common focus of comparative histories is colonialism, particularly the colonial endeavours of the British Empire. Before delving into my subject matter I analyse the challenges, dangers, and benefits, of using comparative studies as a historical methodology.

One of the key challenges posed by comparative history is the need for the researcher to hold a broad understanding of multiple localities at once. Ken Coates has articulated how comparative historians often surrender the pursuit of specialist knowledge in one highly specific area of research in order to engage in transnational scholarship which requires knowledge of multiple places. It is ‘tough’, he argues, ‘to get the history right when one tackles a number of diverse, widely separated countries.’ Emphasis on complex details thus occasionally gives way to imprecise generalisations. Moreover, Raymond Grew has urged comparative historians who rely on social institutions (churches, political parties, and

373 ibid., p. 767.
375 ibid., p. 11.
educational organisations) as the basis for their transnational analysis to maintain awareness that such institutions are temporally rooted: they ‘perform different functions in different societies or at different times.'³⁷⁶ Grew’s critique is pertinent to the research that forms the basis of this essay. It offers a reminder that Christianity is not a cohesive, monolithic force that manifests itself identically from nation to nation; instead, it is a varied, diverse, and often contradictory institution which can be used to uphold disparate social values and political aims.

Perhaps the most poignant critique of comparative histories emanates from Indigenous scholars who have witnessed this methodology being wielded to reinforce erroneous accounts of ‘positive’ race relations within settler-colonial societies. First Nations literary scholar Chadwick Allen has argued that historical comparative studies of colonialism are often ‘settler-driven’ and ultimately antithetical to the important work being done by de-colonial scholars such as Linda Tuhiwai Smith.³⁷⁷ In other words, comparative history holds the potential to bolster colonial values that contribute to the subjugation of Indigenous peoples. Allen identifies that comparative histories of the British Empire have often unwittingly produced ‘hierarchies of Indigenous oppression’ in which the suffering experienced by Indigenous peoples under colonial powers is ranked, compared, and subsequently trivialised.³⁷⁸ This point is ratified by Karen Fox. She asserts that ‘the legacy’ of Aotearoa New Zealand’s colonial past has not yet been ‘transcended’ – put simply, Māori still face pervasive discrimination.³⁷⁹

Yet, historians who have compared the colonial pasts of Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand often conclude that ‘race relations in New Zealand were, and are, better than in other white settler societies.'³⁸⁰ Fox contends that it is crucial for comparative historical endeavours

³⁷⁸ ibid., p. xiv.
³⁸⁰ ibid., p. 427.
to move beyond the desire to seek out ‘good imperialism.’ She asserts that such a scholarly enterprise inevitably ignores Indigenous experience and thus marginalises Indigenous voices in favour of dominant settler-colonial perspectives. Furthermore, one-sided comparative histories that land on a conclusive articulation of ‘good imperialism’ have tangibly dangerous implications. Significantly, these narratives alleviate the moral obligation of white/Pākehā members of society to confront how we benefit in our day-to-day lives from the institutional racism established by colonialism. As historians, then, we must remain aware of how our work is drawn on to ‘serve the business of nation-building,’ and thus holds political resonance. Considering the political resonance carried by comparative histories of empire, I believe a solution to this dilemma is possible: historians must ground their research in Māori scholar Nēpia Mahuika’s astute recognition that all settler-colonial history occurs ‘within a much broader narrative of indigenous occupation and struggle.’ Indigenous critiques of comparative histories are of immense importance to the scholar writing transnational histories of empire as they establish ethical guidelines, further explained below.

Comparative histories are at their most productive when they begin with the scholar locating themselves within their body of research. Alice Te Punga Somerville has asserted that claiming subjectivity demystifies the analytical historical project at hand. I follow Somerville’s precedent by elucidating my own subjectivity and attesting to the importance of eschewing outdated notions of scholarly objectivity. My work can be most productive in urging other Pākehā and British people to recognise our colonial privilege, to confront this

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381 ibid., p. 429.
382 ibid.
383 Nēpia Mahuika, ‘New Zealand History is Māori History: Tikanga as the Ethical Foundation of Historical Scholarship in Aotearoa New Zealand,’ New Zealand Journal of History, 49, 1, 2015, p. 11.
385 Mahuika, ‘New Zealand History’, p. 5.
privilege, and to decentre our own voices from histories of empire and colonialism. Celebratory histories of empire have been written exhaustively. The focus of empire studies now needs to shift to the experiences of Indigenous peoples. I intend on overcoming the ‘Pākehā paralysis’ felt by many settler-colonial historians by drawing on research written primarily by Māori and Palestinian scholars, thus amplifying Indigenous perspectives and engaging in ‘history from below’.  

Allen and Somerville share the conviction that comparative Indigenous histories (what Allen calls ‘trans-Indigenous’) can be beneficial in eschewing simplicity and illustrating ‘Indigenous specificity’ if they are rooted in local Indigenous knowledge. Within the context of Aotearoa New Zealand, Mahuika advocates for historians to ground their research in tikanga Māori. This engagement involves ‘a willingness to be guided by experts in the area’ and Pākehā historians ‘giving up power to be truly empowered.’ Thus, I root my research in work pioneered by Māori historians who have a more nuanced comprehension of the intricacies of their iwi and hapu than myself. In order to honour complexity and avoid generalisations about Indigenous peoples that diminish their mana it is crucial to establish that, within their geographical situation, Indigenous peoples do not form one homogenous group. In Aotearoa New Zealand Māori values, worldviews, and cultural practices vary from iwi to iwi: ‘there is no such thing as Māoritanga… Each tribe has its own history.’ Finally, Allen urges that works of comparative Indigenous history represent Indigenous people across the globe as ‘together (yet) distinct’. Embedded in this articulation is the awareness that Indigenous

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390 Mahuika, ‘New Zealand History’, p. 11.
peoples are distinct, but that the ‘shared heritage of colonial oppression’ is a force of trans-
Indigenous connection.393

There are palpable commonalities between Māori and Palestinian experiences of British imperial expansion: these include Indigenous alienation from land, the arrival of the Anglican Church Missionary Society (CMS) with evangelising intentions premised on ideas of racial and spiritual superiority, and the establishment of settler-colonial societies. However, it is crucial to establish the differences in the cultural, economic, political, and religious manifestations of the British Empire between Palestine and Aotearoa New Zealand before I ruminate on the similarities. At a fundamental level, British imperial expansion into Aotearoa New Zealand began much earlier than in Palestine. As early as 1814 British CMS missionary Samuel Marsden arrived on the shores of the Bay of Islands, in the far north of Aotearoa, to convert Māori to Christianity.394 Marsden was joined by Thomas Kendell, who dappled in musket-trading with Māori much to Marsden’s disdain.395 The Reverend Henry Williams (known by some Māori affectionately as Te Wiremu) - whose celebrity endures in New Zealand today due to his integral role in translating the Treaty of Waitangi into te reo Māori - was another prominent missionary during the early days of interaction between Māori and Pākehā.396 Williams’ translation, Te Tiriti o Waitangi, is widely regarded as a contested document holding disparate meaning from its English version.397

The relationship between Britain and the land inhabited by various Māori iwi which came to be known as Aotearoa New Zealand, was formalised in 1840 at the signing of the

393 Fox, ‘Globalising’, p. 430.
395 ibid., pp. 82-84.
397 Walker, Ka Whawhai, pp. 90-95.
Treaty of Waitangi (and Te Tiriti o Waitangi). While the document symbolised a unique agreement between Māori and the British Crown, Vincent O’Malley has argued that it was ‘less a unique and noble experiment in humanitarianism’ than ‘part of an older and more pragmatic colonial policy.’ Moreover, the Treaty was of crucial import to the British Empire because it signified ‘the formal acquisition of New Zealand’. However, Williams’ translation of the word ‘sovereignty’ to ‘kawanatanga’ (governance) caused inconsistency in the meanings held by the two documents. This act resulted in a fundamental misunderstanding between the Crown representatives and the Māori rangatira who signed the Treaty. The mistranslation meant Māori rangatira thought they were ceding governance to the British, not sovereign control of their lands; this discrepancy brought about centuries of strife for Māori. 1840 thus marks the official beginning of Aotearoa New Zealand as a colonial outpost of Britain. However, the legitimacy of British colonial authority was held in contention, or denied entirely, by Māori whose rangatira had not signed the Treaty (or, Te Tiriti). Indigenous dissent was inherent to Aotearoa New Zealand from its inception as a nation state - a point which Antoinette Burton has argued holds transnational resonance as British imperial power was always ‘shaped by its challengers.

In Palestine, the reality of British colonial expansion differed markedly both temporally and in purpose. CMS missionaries arrived in Jerusalem in 1826 – only twelve years after CMS missionaries first ventured to Aotearoa New Zealand. However, Palestine did not become a formal ‘Mandate’ of Britain until after World War I, on 29th September 1923. British interest

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398 ibid.
401 Walker, Ka Whawhai, pp. 90-91.
402 ibid., pp. 95-97.
403 Burton, Trouble, p. 1.
404 Laura Robson, ‘Church versus Country: Palestinian Arab Episcopalians, Nationalism, and Revolt, 1936-39’, in Heather J. Sharkey, ed., Unexpected Consequences of Christian Missionary Encounters in the Middle East,
in Palestine was strategic: its potential as a naval base, the geographically advantageous position it held to the East of the Suez Canal, and its ubiquitous value as ‘the Holy Land’ – the spiritual centre of the three major Abrahamic religions.\textsuperscript{405} Following the end of World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the League of Nations granted Britain governing authority over Palestine at the San Remo Conference on 25\textsuperscript{th} April 1920.\textsuperscript{406} The founding document of Mandatory Palestine enshrined the expectation that British authorities would be responsible for ‘placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home’. Furthermore, it aimed to ensure ‘the development of self-governing institutions, and [the capacity] for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.’\textsuperscript{407} Thus, at the heart of British governance in Palestine lay the principles of Britain’s 1917 Balfour Agreement: to help facilitate Jewish immigration to Palestine with the overarching aim of Palestine finally becoming the ‘a national home for the Jewish people’.\textsuperscript{408} The document put forth a difficult and somewhat contradictory proposition because the establishment of a Jewish national home in a land which was already inhabited could only come at the expense of its indigenous peoples, the Palestinians.

Herein lies the pivotal connection between British imperialism in Palestine and Aotearoa New Zealand: the establishment of settler-colonial society premised on Indigenous loss of land. The crucial difference, however, is that in Aotearoa New Zealand, the British government actively encouraged its citizens to emigrate: it was to be a settler-colonial society for Britons.\textsuperscript{409} Contrarily, Palestine was never supposed to provide a new home for Britons;

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\textsuperscript{405} ibid., p. 13. \\
\textsuperscript{406} Mahmoud Yazbak, ‘From Poverty to Revolt: Economic Factors in the Outbreak of the 1936 Rebellion in Palestine,’ \textit{Middle Eastern Studies}, 36, 3, 2000, p. 93. \\
\textsuperscript{407} ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{408} El-Eini, \textit{Mandated}, p.14. \\
\textsuperscript{409} Hill, ‘Settler Colonialism’, p. 394. \\
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instead, the British government intended to enable the settler-colonial aspirations of Jewish Zionists to be realised.410

The British imperial administration’s facilitation of settler colonialism precipitated Indigenous loss of land. Land loss was a disruptive and traumatic reality for both Māori and Palestinians, in which the ‘systematic fragmentation’ of Indigenous cultures, wrought by British colonialism is evident.411 By 1839 around two-thousand Pākehā had settled in Aotearoa New Zealand and some were already engaging in negotiations regarding land acquisitions with Māori rangatira.412 Settler-colonialism initially occurred within Aotearoa New Zealand in a somewhat disordered way, with Christian missionaries and independent agents alike seeking to make deals with iwi in order to secure land.413 The reason undergirding Christian missionaries’ acquisition of land lay in their desire to establish a physical base for their evangelising missions, whereas private agents (who were often whalers and traders) held more financially-oriented reasons.414 Thus, both religion and economics were driving social forces of settler-colonialism which contributed to Māori loss of land.

British acquisition of Māori land took on a more formal tone in 1837 following a report received at parliament in London from prominent early British settler, James Busby, who lived with his family in Waitangi.415 Busby claimed that ‘the situation’ had ‘deteriorated’ to such an extent that intervention from the British Crown was necessary in order to ‘control the land-sharks, and to foster peace and civil order among the tribes.’416 Consequently, Captain William Hobson was appointed as ‘Lieutenant-Governor’ to Aotearoa New Zealand in order to establish

411 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples, Dunedin, 1999, p. 28.
413 ibid., p.215.
414 ibid.
415 ibid.
416 ibid.
a formal British colony. This appointment marked the beginning of what would result in decades of strife between Māori and the British Crown regarding land ownership.\footnote{417 ibid., pp. 215-217.}

Between 1845-1872 a series of wars were waged between divergent Māori iwi and the British Crown, primarily concerning disputes over British claim to land which Māori did not agree to.\footnote{418 Virgint O’Malley, \textit{The New Zealand Wars: Ngā Pakanga O Aotearoa}, Wellington, 2019, p. 9..} These came to be known as the New Zealand Wars (Ngā Pakanga O Aotearoa) which were, as James Belich contends, ‘crucial in the development of New Zealand race relations’ and constituted ‘examples of that widespread phenomenon: resistance to European expansion.’\footnote{419 James Belich, \textit{The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict}, Auckland, 1986, p. 15.} The wars took place largely in the North Island, some of the most well-known conflicts within collective New Zealand consciousness being the Northern War of 1845-46 (in which the defendants were Ngāpuhi), the Taranaki War of 1860-61 and 1863-64 (involving multiple iwi), and the Waikato War of 1863-64 (primarily involving Tainui).\footnote{420 ibid., pp. 77-97; 99-10; O’Malley, \textit{The New Zealand Wars}, pp. 37-39.} The consequences of the New Zealand Wars were immensely traumatic for Māori, with the British Crown confiscating three million acres of land after 1860.\footnote{421 ibid., p. 239.} Vincent O’Malley has argued that land-loss was a ubiquitous feature of Māori experience under British colonialism, with confiscation ‘applied indiscriminately across entire regions.’\footnote{422 ibid.} Likewise, Ranginui Walker identified ‘settler-land hunger’ as a key component of social injustice brought about by colonisation, which impacted Māori in a disruptive and destructive way.\footnote{423 Walker, \textit{Ka Whawhai}, p. 105.} CMS missionaries used Christian faith as a tool to further settler-colonial ambitions. This manipulation is unwaveringly evident in the testimony given by a Māori visitor to London in a 1902 edition of
the *Waikato Argus* newspaper: the visitor claimed that missionaries ‘directed our eyes heavenwards, and when we looked down our land was gone!’

Like Māori, Palestinians suffered alienation from their land too, beginning in the mid nineteenth century and extending up until the present day: an injustice which is still acutely felt. British imperial ambitions in Palestine were manifest in land purchases by the Anglican Church (the institution of which CMS constituted the missionary branch) from the late-nineteenth century. The Anglican Church held a keen interest in rooting itself in Palestine due to the immense spiritual significance of the land ubiquitously known as ‘the Holy Land’, where the central figure of Christianity – Jesus of Nazareth – was born, lived, ministered, and died. German historian and geographer Dietrich Denecke aptly asserted that land acquisition was an ‘important component of global Christian settlement and expansion’ and was, therefore, integral to British colonialism across the globe. This was certainly the case in Palestine.

In 1889 Francis Popham Blyth, the fourth Anglican bishop of Jerusalem founded the ‘Jerusalem and East Mission’ (JEM) following a fallout with CMS. JEM, however, fulfilled the same function that CMS had, just under a new name: it would become ‘the new vehicle for missionary activities’ in Palestine. The main distinction between CMS and JEM was that while CMS remained affiliated with, but financially independent from, the Anglican Church, JEM was under the direct authority of the British-based Anglican Church. Under Blyth’s leadership, JEM was responsible for constructing the St George’s ‘compound’ in East Jerusalem, which included a cathedral (the focal point of the Anglican church in Palestine), a

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427 ibid.
428 ibid., p. 103.
429 ibid.
430 ibid.
school, and guest-house.\textsuperscript{431} Moreover, CMS concomitantly established Anglican schools in all of the major cities and townships in Palestine: Bethlehem, Ramla, Nablus, Beit Jala, Jaffa, and Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{432}

British colonialism in Palestine had a distinctive character: the British Mandatory administration was tasked with facilitating Jewish immigration to the land, as opposed to British immigration – as was the case in Aotearoa New Zealand. The Indigenous Palestinian population suffered land-loss all the same. Palestinian Arabs tellingly regarded the Zionist movement as ‘colonialism’s protégé’.\textsuperscript{433} Palestinian activist and poet Mahmoud Darwish described Zionism as ‘a complex and nonreligious settlement movement, which was connected to commercial interests of the West.’\textsuperscript{434} Encoded in Darwish’s words, then, lies the importance of not reverting to simplistic generalisations about Zionism which conflates the movement with Judaism. Zionism certainly served the interests of Jewish people who had experienced centuries of religious and racial anti-Semitic violence in Europe, but at its core it was a politically and economically motivated settler-colonial movement.\textsuperscript{435} Political Zionism was a vision articulated by ‘secularized Westernized Jew’ Theodor Herzl in his 1896 manifesto, \textit{The Jewish State}.\textsuperscript{436} As we shall see, British imperial support for Zionism culminated in widespread Palestinian displacement and diaspora.

Admittedly, the alienation of Palestinians from their land occurred in a later time period than the Land Wars in Aotearoa New Zealand. But the ramifications of the settler-colonialism regimes on the lives of Māori and Palestinians were analogous, involving economic destitution,

\textsuperscript{431} Robson, ‘Church’, pp. 51-52.
\textsuperscript{432} Frantzman, Glueckstadt and Kark, ‘Anglican’, p. 103.
\textsuperscript{433} Robson, ‘Church’, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{435} Yeshurun, “‘Exile’”, pp. 52-53.
physical violence, and landlessness. In 1917, Jews in Palestine constituted less than seven percent of the population and owned less than two percent of the land; by the end of British rule in Palestine in 1948, Jews were almost a third of the population of Palestine and owned around seven percent of the land.\footnote{Mazin B. Qumsiyeh, \textit{Popular Resistance in Palestine: A History of Hope and Empowerment}, London, 2010, p. 50.} During the British Mandate period, violence committed against Palestinians was rife: houses and villages were destroyed, and peasants brutalised.\footnote{Matthew Hughes, ‘From Law and Order to Pacification: Britain’s Suppression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine 1936-39,’ \textit{Journal of Palestine Studies}, 39, 2, 2010, p. 15.} These violent acts were part and parcel of British imperial rule in Palestine and ‘formed part of the official policies designated to break the resolve of the Palestinian peasantry.’\footnote{Ibid.}

Throughout the New Zealand Wars, violence inflicted by the British military forces upon Māori resulted in an ‘incomprehensible level of loss’ of life, with the total casualties sitting at around forty percent of the total Māori population (including those wounded).\footnote{O’Malley, \textit{The New Zealand Wars}, p. 238.} Violence was thus utilised as a tool to further British imperial aims.

However, to return to the issue of Indigenous loss of land, the phenomenon is seen most clearly in the landlessness of the rural agrarian class (the fellahin) and the destruction of Jaffa. Arab-Israeli scholar Mahmoud Yazbak has argued that the British Mandatory authorities played an active role in sustaining the cycle of abject poverty that the fellahin descended into following Palestine’s transition from a subsistence farming society to a market economy.\footnote{Yazbak, ‘From Poverty’, p. 95.} In the process, land became a ‘sought-after marketable commodity’.\footnote{Ibid.} Following the Crimean War in the mid-nineteenth century, private European parties and wealthy absentee Arabs began to buy the land on which the fellahin were dependent.\footnote{Ibid.} Thereafter, the British Mandatory authorities facilitated the transfer of land from private merchants to members of the Zionist...
This policy was evidently an attempt to honour their obligations under the Balfour Agreement, but it ultimately turned the rural fellahin into a ‘a class of embittered landless people.’

While the fellahin were displaced from their land to make room for Zionist settlers, the Palestinian urban class faced a similar plight. In June 1936 large parts of the Old City in Jaffa were destroyed by British forces under the deceptive guise of an ‘act of town planning,’ in which the city would ultimately be improved. The term ‘improvement’ is a misleading one; one that was used to mask the horrors of an act which left six-thousand Jaffa Palestinians homeless and, therefore, destitute. Due to stringent censorship laws the Palestinian press had to resort to irony in their discussion of the devastation of the city: Filastin reported that the ‘operation of making the city more beautiful is carried out through boxes of dynamite.’ Dynamite destroyed between two-hundred-and-twenty to two-hundred-and-forty Palestinian homes during the month of June 1936. Across Palestine, the Indigenous inhabitants of the land were forcibly removed from their homes in schemes devised by the British Mandatory authorities and carried out by the military. All of these actions were executed with the intention of enabling the settler-colonial ambitions of Zionism to be realised.

The British-based iteration of Western Christianity – Anglicanism – was invoked as a tool of the coloniser. This is undeniable and has been demonstrated within this essay, regarding British acquisition of Indigenous land through the Anglican missionary organisations, CMS and JEM. However, within the past two decades there has been a historiographical shift in Aotearoa New Zealand concerning the relationship between Māori and CMS missionaries in

444 ibid., p. 96.
445 ibid., p. 103.
446 Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair, Princeton, 2003, p. 192.
447 Qumsiyeh, Popular Resistance, p. 10.
448 ibid.
449 ibid.
the early years of British colonialism. In 2014 Hirini Kaa argued that the term conversion ‘has been used as a simplistic and instantaneous label to describe a very complex and nuanced response by Māori to Christianity.’ Kaa emphasises the agency of Māori in their early interactions with Christian scripture and theology. In a subversive turn away from traditional historiography which posits Christianity as an overtly oppressive force - to quote Lyndsay Head - Kaa contends that Christianity became ‘politically empowering’ for some Māori. Likewise, Peter Lineham has argued that the Bible ‘gained an acceptance and a place in the life of the Maori, independent of the missionaries.’

Here I will argue that the Māori prophetic leader Te Kooti Rikirangi Te Turuki of Rongowhakaatu descent found political empowerment in aspects of Christian scripture and drew on his faith to resist British colonialism. Disparate, ‘conflicting’ accounts of the life of Te Kooti exist. However, in her authoritative biography of the Māori prophetic leader’s life, renowned New Zealand historian Judith Binney asserted that Te Kooti stood ‘in the long line of Maori leaders who spoke for the mana motuhake’: that is, the independent and continuing authority of Maori in their own land. By the early 1850s a young Te Kooti had come into contact with the three major denominations of Christianity in Aotearoa New Zealand: Anglicanism, Catholicism, and Wesleyan Protestantism. He was an avid student and demonstrated ‘mastery of the scriptures, both the Old Testament and the New’.

Te Kooti’s deep understanding of Biblical scripture undoubtedly informed the basis of the Ringatu faith, which he founded whilst exiled on the Chatham Islands and suffering from

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451 ibid, p. 17.
454 ibid., p.20.
455 ibid.
tuberculosis in February 1867.\textsuperscript{456} It was during his captivity that Te Kooti reportedly experienced a vision in which God proclaimed that he was a descendant of the Israelite patriarchs of the Hebrew Bible: Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and David.\textsuperscript{457} From this point onwards, Te Kooti proclaimed that the plight of Māori under British colonial oppression was analogous to the hardships faced by the Israelites under the Roman Empire. Within the Ringatu tradition, it is told that the Holy Spirit (te Wairua o Atua) came over Te Kooti in February 1867 and told him that ‘he [Te Kooti] had been sent to make known the name of God “to his people who are dwelling in captivity in this land”’.\textsuperscript{458} Thus, Te Kooti’s interpretation of Biblical scripture, particularly the stories of the Old Testament, was intricately intertwined with a personal conviction of the injustice of British colonialism.

Following his escape from the horrific conditions of imprisonment on the Chatham Islands, Te Kooti was pursued by British forces between 1868-72 in what were to be the last battles of the New Zealand Wars.\textsuperscript{459} Though a divisive character among Māori and Pākehā alike, Te Kooti demonstrated imaginative Indigenous interaction with Christian faith. From the fundamental tenets of the stories of God’s chosen people, the Israelites, Te Kooti found empowering scripture which he seized in order to resist British colonial encroachment on Māori land. According to O’Malley, up until his death Te Kooti continually urged his faithful followers to abide by ‘the ways of peace, the law and the gospel.’\textsuperscript{460} Te Kooti’s interpretation of ‘the law and the gospel’ arguably differed significantly from that of his colonial oppressors. Herein lies a vivid account of a man whose faith founded on resistance to the ‘captivity’ of empire demonstrated the divergent possibilities of political deployment of Christian teachings.

\textsuperscript{458} ibid.
Palestinian Indigenous resistance to harsh British Mandatory rule and Zionist settler-colonialism through Christian faith took on a more formal tone than Te Kooti’s grassroots movement in Aotearoa New Zealand. During the British Mandate period Palestinian Anglicans collectively mobilised under the emerging Palestinian Arab nationalist movement. The Palestinian Anglicans used measured methods such as dissemination of political pamphlets and advocacy through their administrative wing – the Palestine Native Church Council (PNCC) – to voice opposition to the injustices inflicted upon them. Theologian Rosemary Radford Ruether has illustrated how the geographical borders, established by British Mandatory authorities in Palestine from 1920, delineated the land as a distinct ‘political unit’ in which Arab nationalism took on a distinctly Palestinian character. Ruether identified that in the nascent days of both the Mandate period and Palestinian nationalist protestation against Zionist settler-colonialism, street demonstrations were led by ‘the local Muslim-Christian associations’. As the British Mandate period progressed, Palestinian Anglicans benefited economically from their uniquely close relationship with British Empire. This state of affairs placed many of the members of the Arab Palestinian Anglican church firmly in the middle class. However, despite their unusually close alignment with British Empire through religious affiliation, Palestinian Anglicans did not stay quiet about the violent hand of British Mandatory rule.

American historian Keith David Watenpaugh argues that the characteristics which distinguish the Palestinian middle class are more than ‘a neutral economic category’. He states that the middle class constituted ‘an intellectual, social, and cultural construct linked to a set of historical and material circumstances’. Watenpaugh infers that Palestinian middle

461 Ruether and Ruether, Wrath, pp. 94-95.
462 ibid., p. 96.
463 Robson, ‘Church’ p. 53.
465 ibid.
class of the British Mandate period was a social identity, not simply an economic disposition. The social identity of middle-class Palestinian Anglicans was rooted firmly in nationalist sentiments which sought ‘full autonomy’ in ‘indigenous community’. At the core of Palestinian Anglican communal values during the Mandate period was a deep desire to fight the injustices of settler-colonialism. This point is ratified by Adeed Dawisha who professes that the ‘Arab nationalist ideas’ of the Palestinian middle class ‘played a significant role in the political struggle against the mounting threat of Zionism’.

The anti-colonial political struggle of Palestinian Anglicans was particularly manifest in the production of ‘political tracts’ following the Archbishop of Canterbury Cosmo Lang’s declaration of support for Zionist settlement in 1937. The tracts were produced with the hope of conveying the Palestinian plight to a wider Western audience. Arab Anglican doctor Tewfiq Kana’an’s pamphlet appealed to notions of ‘British justice’, pleading Briton civilians to take note of the brutality of British Mandatory rule. The pamphlet states that, ‘[w]e Arab Christians of Palestine… are those at present who hate most bitterly the unchristian policy of Great Britain’. Furthermore, prior to Lang’s declaration of support for Zionist aspirations, two prominent Palestinian Anglicans, Shibli Jamal and ‘Izzat Tannus, travelled to London as part of an unofficial Palestinian delegation which met with British governmental officials to reveal their suffering under British Mandatory rule. While in London, Jamal and Tannus made connections with prominent Anglicans in order to gain support for their cause. Palestinian Anglican Christians diplomatically utilised their connections with the wider Anglican Church in an attempt to resist further land alienation by Zionist settler-colonialism.

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467 Dawisha, Arab Nationalism, p. 81.
468 Robson, ‘Church’, p. 59.
469 ibid.
470 ibid.
471 ibid., p. 56.
472 ibid.
and the heavy-handed brutality of British Mandatory rule. Theirs was an opportunistic, tempered, methodically organised and distinctly nationalistic resistance to British Empire through the structural framework of their church institution.

Undertaking comparative transnational historical analysis is a mammoth task. To draw comparisons between disparate nations over a broad timeframe (this essay has traversed the period spanning the mid-nineteenth century through to the mid-twentieth century) seemed, at times, like an anachronistic and overly ambitious endeavour. However, in historical exploration of early settler-colonialism in Aotearoa New Zealand and Palestine, Fox’s perception of a ‘shared heritage of colonial oppression’ among Indigenous peoples in former British colonies and Mandates rings true.473

In my analysis of Māori and Palestinian experience of British Empire, in its latter years, I discovered that settler-colonialism was a key feature of its physical manifestation in both localities, and Indigenous land-loss an interrelated repercussion. The process of Indigenous alienation from their land was particularly injurious to Māori and Palestinians. The worldviews of both peoples conceptualise land as the basis of a symbiotic relationship, not as a privately-owned entity from which to glean financial profit.474 For Māori, connections ‘with land and waters were ancestral and spiritual.’475 Likewise, Palestinian Christian Mitri Raheb has asserted that the physical lands of Palestine ‘do not merely help me live, they are a part of my identity.’476

In assessing the complex methods of Indigenous resistance to British imperial expansion, trans-Indigeneity has been a more useful analytical category than trans-nationalism. While trans-nationalism offers an understanding of the fundamental social, economic, and

474 Mitri Raheb, I Am A Palestinian Christian, Minneapolis, 1995, p. 4; Binney, Tangata Whenua, p. 211.
475 Binney, ‘The Coming’, p. 211
476 Raheb, I Am, p. 4.
political motivations behind British colonialism – such as settler-colonialism – trans-Indigeneity gave me insight into the dissent inherent to British imperial expansion in every corner of the globe. Indeed, as Burton has so aptly argued, to conceive of the British Empire through the framework of a ‘rise-and-fall’ narrative is overly simplistic. Instead, British colonialism was contested from its inception in Palestine and Aotearoa New Zealand. It was contested in imaginative ways, as Te Kooti and Palestinian Anglican Arabs have shown us. Christian theology and scripture, as well its institutional arms, were embraced by some Indigenous peoples in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries amid a global context of British expansion. Māori and Palestinians found that their faith offered them a spirited vision of empowered resistance to the injustices elicited by British imperialism.

The legacy of colonialism is ongoing in contemporary Aotearoa New Zealand and Palestine. Responses to this legacy are evident in the articulation of Indigenous self-determination within Te Haahi Mihinare - the Māori strand of the Anglican church of Aotearoa New Zealand - and in the Liberation Theology pioneered by Raheb. The power held by Christianity as a social and political force is vast, and it has been used throughout history to bolster abundant and divergent political schemes, including colonial expansion. If we are to truly comprehend the complexities of British imperialism which spanned the eighteenth century through to the twentieth century, it is crucial that we strive to understand Indigenous world views and learn about the varied methods of insurgency used to resist colonial injustices. For some Māori and Palestinians, Christianity was a liberating site of intellectual and political stimulation - a far cry from the traditional accounts of British Empire which have imposed a narrative of passive Indigenous conversion.

477 Burton, Trouble, p. 4.
478 Kaa, ‘He Ngākau Hou’, p. 263; Raheb, I Am, p. 112-16.
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A worthy successor, David Wetzel’s *A Duel of Nations* is a continuation of the study of the Franco-Prussian war begun in 2001’s *A Duel of Giants*. Whereas the previous work sought to examine the origins of the war, here Wetzel turns his focus to the diplomacy of the war as well as the hard-fought reconciliation that eventually followed. Writing with verve and almost cinematic detail, he places his reader at the negotiating tables, at the sides of the diplomats and decision makers upon whose shoulders the fates of France, Prussia, and wider Europe rested. Amongst these, Otto von Bismarck emerges as the narrative’s central figure: it is his struggle to achieve swift peace, to stave off international intervention in the war, and to secure the South German border that shapes Wetzel’s account of the war’s diplomacy and subsequent armistice. Wetzel prefaces *A Duel of Nations* with an outline of his rationale in producing the work, in which he states his aim ‘not to record all the significant things that happened but rather to show how they were happening; above all, by revealing by what motives and concepts the key actors were driven...’\(^{479}\) As such, the official documents – government records, conference documents, and so on – upon which Wetzel draws are heartily supplemented by a vast array of correspondences, within and between the belligerent parties.

A Duel of Nations thus places emphasis upon the human element of the diplomacy of the Franco-Prussian war and its troubled resolution, and upon the personalities and motivations of the statesmen who stood at ‘a turning point of the utmost importance’.\textsuperscript{480} This emphasis rests on Wetzel’s claim, articulated from the outset, that ‘those who argue that structures are more important than people deprive humankind of its humanity’.\textsuperscript{481} Moreover, he writes, ‘[c]oncern for those in positions of leadership as the events unfolded makes the telling of what happened here intelligible, understandable, and above all, rewarding’.\textsuperscript{482} His objective, therefore, has been to recreate the mentalities of the leaders and statesmen in question and, in so doing, to illustrate the competing fears and ambitions at play amongst the members of both belligerents and the neutral powers. Each of these characters is introduced with reference to Bismarck, whom Wetzel situates as his protagonist, determined in pursuit of his goal of a secure, united Germany. The reader is invited into the mind of the man beset on all sides by challenges to his diplomatic vision; through Bismarck’s masterful strategy the tripartite threat to German security and solidarity is revealed. The most immediate challenge to Bismarck’s vision— to which Wetzel rightly dedicates the majority of his discussion – derived from continued belligerency on the part of the French who, even following the decisive Prussian victory at Sedan, appeared unwilling to concede defeat. Bismarck’s aspirations for a unified Germany depended upon securing its southern border, including the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. The French provisional government were unwilling to relinquish these, casting blame for the war upon the preceding regime under Napoleon III.

The defeated regime constituted another variable with which Bismarck had to contend. Wetzel again draws back the curtain on his conferences and correspondences with Bonapartist figures, in particular with the deposed Empress Eugenie, by way of illustrating the conflicted

\textsuperscript{480} ibid.
\textsuperscript{481} ibid., pp. xiii-xiv.
\textsuperscript{482} ibid., xiv.
nature of the French state. Similar conflict existed within the Prussian government; whilst Bismarck’s military goals had largely been achieved with victory at Sedan, others were not so restrained. Many, including General Moltke, a commander of the Prussian army, had tasted blood and desired a continued punitive war by which to cripple the long-detested French and replace them as Europe’s dominant power. Wetzel explores this internal conflict through its principal actors; Bismarck and Moltke. Once again, the reader is placed in Bismarck’s corner as Wetzel examines the eminent statesman’s struggle to retain diplomatic control. Chief amongst Bismarck’s motives for a swift peace and the cessation of conflict after Sedan was the threat to his vision of a united Germany posed by the involvement of external powers. Throughout, Wetzel examines the events of the war and subsequent attempts at peace from Bismarck’s perspective, constructing an understanding of proceedings by returning to the motives and agendas at work within each involved party. This approach, although far from constituting ‘bottom-up’ history, represents a focal shift in the historiography of the Franco-Prussian war, and places new emphasis on the people at the helms of power, and the ways that their fears, anxieties and ambitions shaped the course of history.

It is, therefore, unsurprising that Wetzel begins his work with introductory sketches of the main cast. The significant political figures – diplomats, politicians, generals, kings – are introduced, Wetzel affecting a kind of arrangement of the chessboard at the outset of the war. Wetzel views this rather untraditional discussion of the *dramatis personae* as the logical opening for a diplomatic history of the war, and as such the entire first chapter ‘Politics and Personalities’ is devoted to their evocation. Whilst this might have been rendered by a less skilful writer as something of a ‘data-dump’, Wetzel manages to inject sufficient colour into his description that the coming conflict suggests itself rather compellingly. In the course of outlining the key diplomatic figures of the war, Wetzel captures the lay of the land, establishing the required social, political and historical contexts and sowing the seeds of tensions sure to
bloom in the following chapters. Having thoroughly performed the initial synoptic duties, and ‘with these personalities, destined all to play important roles in the further unfolding of our tale, in mind, we are ready to turn to the tale itself’.483

Chapter Two, ‘The Position of the Powers’ serves to provide a similar function as the first, offering context on the political stance of each of the major European powers vis-à-vis the war. Foreign intervention, Wetzel describes, was a very real possibility, and a serious threat to Bismarck’s designs. With more than a hint of admiration, Wetzel examines the various measures the future Chancellor undertook to dissuade the intervention of the individual powers. The question of intervention is no less important to the reader than to Bismarck, for they will remain largely absent from Wetzel’s account of the war (discounting brief asides), though they loom in the background. To further the narrative metaphor, much of this chapter and the next is devoted to writing the great powers out of the season, explaining their reasons for deciding against intervention, and their motivations as Bismarck (by now the protagonist in earnest), perceived them.

Chapter Three, ‘The League of Neutrals’ assesses the wider diplomatic landscape during the early phases of the war. Certainly, it would be extremely difficult for the major European powers to avoid becoming embroiled in the war to some degree – though, as Wetzel reminds us, this was precisely what Bismarck sought to achieve. Once more, Wetzel illustrates the complex matrices of negotiation and power through the individuals navigating them, the thinkers and statesmen of the various powers. What Wetzel achieves by this is a deft synecdoche: the reader, invited to imagine the events of the war from these varying perspectives in turn, is afforded a broader understanding of the driving forces behind the machinations of the powers, over the course of the war. Empathy, of course, is both the goal

483 ibid., p. 25.
and the tool of the historian, and here it is employed to great effect. A secondary effect, no less important, is to impress upon the reader the convoluted and interwoven state of international affairs toward the end of the nineteenth century. Having evinced the tensions, suspicions, expectations and aspirations swirling backstage, the fragile series of treaties and alliances upon which European peace rested appears ever more tenuous. Wetzel’s real purpose however, which serves to frame his treatment of each of the major powers, is to demonstrate the fragility and uncertainty of neutrality, and the constant danger of intervention with which Bismarck would be forced to contend throughout the war.

In ‘The End of Napoleon III’, Chapter Four, Wetzel adopts a slightly more traditional historical tack. Here, a chronological account begins. Wetzel, having carefully laid the groundwork for the coming diplomatic history, now places his reader alongside Bismarck. The chapter follows the development of Bismarck’s goals alongside the Prussian victories of August 1870. It is at this time that discussions of annexation began to gather momentum. Bismarck, assessing the situation and the requirements for German security, surmised that realistic guarantees – that is, the cession of Alsace and Lorraine - represented a necessary condition for a successful peace. Wetzel takes pains to clarify that this was not Bismarck’s objective from the beginning. Unquestionably a shrewd tactician and adherent of realpolitik, this was, however, a pragmatic improvisation rather than a premeditated goal. Wetzel also introduces the key figures of the provisional French government, cobbled together following Napoleon III’s surrender, with whom Bismarck’s calculations would now be forced to reckon.

The next section of the book, ‘Ferrières’, takes its name from the fortress where Bismarck and Jules Favre, vice-president and foreign minister to the provisional French government, undertook a series of negotiations in September 1870. For Bismarck, a new host of problems now sprung forth. As far as the provisional government was concerned, ‘the war that had been fought was a war between Napoleon III and the Prussians’, and as such the French
were hardly obligated to pay reparations or make territorial concessions.\footnote{Ibid., p. 109.} Thus, Wetzel introduces the final diplomatic puzzle piece, for Bismarck believed it was a peace ‘that no German could rationally accept’, and one wholly incompatible with his aims for the security of the southern border.\footnote{Ibid.} He now faced intensifying challenges on three fronts: the provisional government were unwilling to submit defeat and accept the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine; General Moltke, with popular support, wished to twist the knife and resume the war; and there was yet the uncertain variable of the quashed Bonapartists. In addition, the mediation of all three needed to be achieved without foreign intervention complicating the matter further. Wetzel appears to identify with Bismarck’s struggle to wrest back control, discussing at length his ‘view of the situation in Paris continuing to blacken’\footnote{Ibid., p. 113.}, ‘huge and ponderous obstacles blocking the goal to which all his efforts were directed’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 121.} The stalled negotiations with the provisional government at Ferrières, Wetzel claims, so dismayed Bismarck that he began to explore alternatives.

Emulating Bismarck, the author now turns his attention to the possibility of negotiation with the remaining imperial forces under Marshal François Bazaine. Wetzel adopts the perspectives of a central figure from each of the main parties, in a section fittingly titled ‘Bismarck, Bazaine, and Thiers’ as the diplomatic situation grows more complex. Here, the strained relationship between Bismarck and the provisional government becomes ever more troubled, their aims diametrically opposed. Thiers, the French representative, now sought to achieve international recognition for the provisional government and garner European support. Additionally, he hoped to prolong the existing stalemate so as to incite intervention by the neutral powers. Hitherto, the great powers had ‘refrained from intervention in the wars of 1859
and 1866 by the announcement of quick armistices’, which by its very principle had motivated Bismarck’s goal for a swift conclusion to hostilities. It followed then, Thiers reasoned, that the longer they dragged their diplomatic feet the better the chances of European intervention. For Bismarck, this was a bitter development. Nor did his negotiations with imperial representatives bear fruit. Despite their vulnerability, they repeatedly failed to present Bismarck with an agreeable solution. Wetzel evokes Bismarck’s perplexity at continually tone-deaf proposals. The Army at Metz seemed completely unwilling to concede the fortress, nor to make concessions of any kind as befit the defeated party and, as Bismarck viewed, wholly necessary to German security. Here, the author reinforces a certain detachment from the reality on the part of Bazaine and the imperial forces. Empress Eugenie was apparently even less pragmatic, and Bismarck soon found himself forced to reject the negotiation entirely, writing:

‘The proposals which have reached us from London are absolutely unacceptable, and I declare to my great regret that I see no further chance of us reaching a result by political negotiations’.488

All was not lost, however (the author so thoroughly adopts Bismarck’s perspective that it is difficult to discuss his framing of the events without doing the same). Thiers’ mission to secure international involvement and aid had been in vain. Within the provisional government, the view now proliferated that ‘any delay in the energetic prosecution of the war could only play into the hands of the Bonapartists’.489 Furthermore, many of the great powers viewed Prussian victory as inevitable, and Russia, Thiers’ great hope, seemed intent on remaining neutral, determined to retain favour with each of the belligerents. Wetzel thus illustrates the frustrated attempts of both Prussia and the provisional government to seek solutions beyond one another, forced, once again, to attempt a diplomatic resolution between themselves.

488 ibid., p. 133.
489 ibid., p. 137.
These negotiations take centre stage for the remainder of the book. Initially, Wetzel writes, they faced stalemate again, with France requesting replenishment of food and resources for Paris as a condition of armistice without conceding control of the surrounding fortresses to Prussia. This, again, was unpalatable to Bismarck, and to Moltke and the Prussian king, incompatible as it was with their goal of military security. As relations between the belligerents again deteriorated, so too did they weaken within them. Bismarck’s struggle with Moltke now comes to the fore. Wetzel reiterates the former’s desperate desire to end hostilities as quickly as possible so as to dissuade foreign intervention, whereas Moltke seemed dogmatically bent on the total destruction of the French force.

‘Bismarck’s Anxieties’, the penultimate chapter, charts the breakdown of relations between the statesman and general, and the former’s struggle to maintain control of the Prussian stance. Wetzel also grants significant space to discussion of Bismarck’s efforts to suppress the involvement of European powers, a perpetual cause of anxiety to the Prussian war effort. Ultimately dissatisfied with all attempts to negotiate with the remnants of the Bonapartist regime, he concluded that ‘the capitulation of Paris will present us with an opportunity of finding a shorter path to realizing [peace]’. Under renewed pressure to bring the conflict to an end and secure his vision for a united Germany, Bismarck once again found himself forced to re-open negotiations with the provisional republic.

So begins the final chapter, ‘Armistice’, which follows Bismarck’s travails in persuading the representatives of the provisional government to agree to the demands he deemed necessary for German security. To this end, Wetzel describes, Bismarck entertained the contingency of an agreement with the Bonapartists, even going so far as to play the rival parties against one another. Again, the image Wetzel presents is that of the beleaguered genius,

490 ibid., p. 179.
constantly juggling his rivals and adopting all manner of inventive tactics in pursuit of his goal. Given the exhaustive account of the numerous setbacks and obstacles he faced, both internal and external, it is difficult to disagree with this assessment. In the end, of course, he succeeded in his goal: on March 1st, 1871, the French assembly at Bordeaux overwhelmingly voted in favour of the treaty drawn up by Bismarck and Thiers. The provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were accordingly ceded to Prussia, and reparations of 5 billion francs agreed upon.

In ‘Conclusion’, Wetzel summarises the significance of the events from a geopolitical standpoint and offers an explanation for his unique approach and contribution to the historiography. The outcome of the Franco-Prussian war, he writes, set in motion a series of major historical events, not least of which was the supplanting of France as the greatest continental power. Additionally, the cession of territories Bismarck had fought so hard to achieve, Wetzel suggests, produced a French resentment and distrust of Germany that would fester until 1918. Moreover, Wetzel argues, ‘the victory over France in 1871 and the resulting terms of the Treaty of Frankfurt gave Germany more power than it needed and… raised questions as to where Germany planned to expand next’.⁴⁹¹ For Wetzel, the German empire that emerged from the Franco-Prussian war owed its creation largely to the diplomatic achievements of Bismarck and, as such, it was he who would be tasked with ‘making the system he had created work,’ nationally and internationally.⁴⁹² It is neither Wetzel’s accomplishment, nor his aim, to subvert or fundamentally challenge the existing historiography. Despite its partisan, narrative tone, what the author achieves is an accessible, compelling examination of the actions of those in power at a moment that would colour much of European history in the coming century.

⁴⁹¹ ibid., p. 217.
⁴⁹² ibid., p. 225.
Bibliography