HISTERIA!

2017
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**Cover image:** Bayeux Tapestry (c.1070), Musée de la Tapisserie de Bayeux. Halley’s Comet appears in the heavens; news of the portent is brought to Harold at Westminster. Photograph by Myrabella in the Public Domain and available online: [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Bayeux_Tapestry#/media/File:Bayeux_Tapestry_32-33_comet_Halley_Harold.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Bayeux_Tapestry#/media/File:Bayeux_Tapestry_32-33_comet_Halley_Harold.jpg). Accessed 6 December 2016.
This 2017 edition of Histeria! marks the fifteenth anniversary of the publication under its present title, as well as the fiftieth anniversary of its predecessor, the Historical Society Annual. The first collection of short pieces of academic writing by students of History at the University of Auckland was compiled in 1967 under the editorship of Associate Professor (now Emeritus Professor) Nicholas Tarling. Subsidised by funds from the University Council, the Historical Society Annual originally appeared in neat octavo-sized paperback booklets which sold for thirty cents apiece. Many of the young students who wrote for the Annual subsequently went on to great things in History and related fields: the first issue included essays by Graham Dunstall (now of Canterbury University), Michael Pugh (Emeritus Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Bradford), and the late Susan Moller (famous as a political philosopher under her married name Susan Moller Okin). Subsequent editions featured names as illustrious as Michael Stenson, Kerry Howe, Claudia Orange, Deborah Montgomerie and Lisa Bailey, among many others. From the beginning, the purpose of the journal was to publish outstanding essays produced during the course of the year, and although the first few issues heavily favoured the work of graduate students, the Annual rapidly became a showpiece of the best work from undergraduate courses as chosen by lecturers or tutors. As Professor Tarling put it on the occasion of the Annual’s thirtieth anniversary in 1997, the publication was intended to be “a kind of reward to those who did very good work, and an example to others, not, of course, to copy, but to emulate.”\(^1\) Although the name and format of the publication has changed over time, this dual purpose of recognising high achievement and providing examples for future students to follow remains very much part of the ethos of Histeria! In 2002, under the editorship of Lindsay Diggelmann, the Annual was rechristened with a more arresting title, and Histeria! has appeared without fail every year since in very much the same format. There has been only one major change in the intervening years: since 2015 Histeria! has been published online in pdf format rather than in hardcopy. This reduces both the costs of production and the

\(^1\) Nicholas Tarling, Lisa Bailey and Ewan Johnston, ‘Editors’ Foreword,’ Historical Society Annual, 1997, p.i.
constraints of space, allowing for the inclusion of a larger number and greater range of essays than were permissible in the days of printed copies. It also potentially allows *Histeria!* to be brought to a much wider audience, and so adds a new dimension to the collection of essays published here: *Histeria!* serves as a flagship for the discipline and an advertisement for the history courses taught at the University of Auckland.

Back-issues of *Histeria!* and the *Historical Society Annual* can also provide a rather intriguing insight into the kinds of issues that have preoccupied students of history over the last half-century. The first edition of the *Annual* in 1967 contained seven essays, most of them concerned in various ways with themes of war, colonialism and revolution. Ten years later, attention had shifted decisively to questions of postcolonialism, civil rights and popular resistance. During the 1980s and 1990s there was a marked diversification of the topics addressed by students: essays were dedicated to histories of culture, economics, mentalities, social welfare, immigration, racial theories and sport. Perhaps most significantly, the 1985 issue of the *Annual* was subtitled ‘About Women… About Time,’ and contained eight essays on themes relating to women’s history, from ‘Matriarchy in Minoan Crete’ to ‘Women in Nazi Germany,’ as well as an unsigned editorial making ‘A Case for Women’s History.’ This diversification has only increased in recent years, though perhaps the most noticeable trend has been a swing towards much greater emphasis on historiography, and especially on its practical applications. Whereas the early editions of the *Annual* often devoted one or – at most – two essays to rather abstract questions of historiographical theory (in 1967 W.F. Holt asked ‘Are there any laws of history?’), more than half of the submissions in this year’s issue engage on some level with the problems of secondary literature and with the challenges of historiographical method.

The thirteen essays chosen for this year’s issue also reveal certain connecting themes. Readers must, of course, navigate their own pathways through these very different pieces of work, but I would like to suggest three major themes that seem perceptible to me. The first of these is the idea of ‘rupture’: moments of crisis or violence that both create and reveal deep divisions within societies. This theme is introduced by Tashi Emmens in the first essay in this collection, which considers the divisive effects that the two world wars had on New Zealand society. Emmens shows that the society of the home front was split not only over
reactions to the conflict itself, but also by a hardening of attitudes towards differences of gender and ethnicity. She suggests that, although the shared experience of the war did create bonds of solidarity within New Zealand society and did provide new opportunities for women outside the domestic sphere, it also tended to stimulate discrimination against minorities and to harden conservative attitudes towards appropriate gender roles. Moreover, she suggests that the wars caused a deep rift to form between those who had endured the experience of the front and those who had remained behind: a divide of long-lasting significance for New Zealand families and communities. **Christopher Moses** takes up the theme of ‘rupture’, looking at perhaps the single most famous moment of violent discontinuity in English history – the Norman Conquest of 1066 – and its legacy. Moses concludes that the imposition of Norman power over England in fact represented a much less dramatic rupture than is often assumed. Far from introducing revolutionary change to England, Moses suggests that the Conqueror made use of the existing administrative and legal structures of the Anglo-Saxon state – as well as Norman military strength – to consolidate his authority over a recalcitrant kingdom. The result was a realm in which Norman influence was relatively superficial, despite the symbolic markers of Norman power: the castles, the cathedrals and the Domesday Book. **Briar Hollings** contributes a piece of creative writing: an editorial article from a Chinese newspaper of 1919. Hollings’ composition gives some sense of the intellectual ferment of China in this moment, and suggests the political and cultural divisions that opened up in Chinese society as nationalist and anti-Western ideologies came into contact with Marxist internationalism. A scarcely less dramatic moment of cultural and social rupture is examined in **Aaron Kirkpatrick**’s discussion of the 1960s in the United States of America. Borrowing Rebecca Klatch’s description of the decade as “a generation divided,” Kirkpatrick stresses the ways in which the radicalism and rebellion of this period’s youth culture – and the conservative reaction that it provoked – created ideological divisions both between generations and within the youth culture movement itself. Indeed, Kirkpatrick suggests that contrasting responses to the key issues of that era – such as the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement – have left long-lasting scars that can still be detected on America’s political landscape, though he concludes with a rather upbeat assessment of the health of American democracy.

The second broad theme that I think runs across many of these essays is the idea of identities and encounters. Cultural historians are increasingly interested in the ways that groups
negotiate their own identities and the kinds of encounters that take place when groups with very different self-understandings are brought into contact with each other. This year we have two essays that ponder the problems pre-modern ethnic identities pose for historians. First, William H. Oosterman explores the formidable problems that beset any historian trying to write a history of the ‘barbarian’ peoples of Europe in the first millennium CE. These are primarily problems of the written sources and their interpretation, though Oosterman does also briefly consider the issues raised by the archaeological record. Because written accounts of ‘barbarians’ were composed mainly by outsiders and often according to formulaic literary or religious tropes, their interpretation is highly contentious. Moreover, even sources that do apparently convey ‘barbarian’ self-conceptions – such as the Anglo-Saxon epic Beowulf or the sagas of the Icelanders – raise difficulties of dating and of historicity. If it is difficult to know what ‘barbarian’ identities looked like, Alex Johnston demonstrates that it is almost as hard to know what Norman ethnic identities meant in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Medieval notions of ‘ethnicity’ or ‘nationhood’ did not necessarily resemble ours, and it can be difficult to understand quite what the Normans thought they shared in common. Johnston draws particular attention to strong sense of Norman distinctiveness which developed in Normandy – an idea of shared origin, common descent, characteristic values – and which seems to have dissipated quite rapidly once Normans settled as minorities in England or Sicily. For all its apparent strength, he suggests, Norman cultural and ethnic identity quickly broke down once carried outside of Normandy.

Closely related to this theme are a series of essays on the topic of cross-cultural encounters in the modern world. Daniel Barclay examines the way that Chinese emigrants settled throughout the Pacific in the second half of the nineteenth century, impelled by the growing networks of global trade and the concomitant demand for labour in industries as far-flung as the goldmines of California, the guano fields of Peru and the plantations of the Pacific Islands. He explores the differing ways in which Chinese migrants related to the cultures in which they found themselves and either adapted to or changed their cultural matrix. The cultural responses of the Chinese diaspora to these new environments included such distinctive manifestations of identity as the ‘Chinatowns’ scattered around the Pacific Rim from Sydney to Vancouver. While Barclay situates the migration patterns of the late nineteenth-century in the much longer history of Chinese engagement with the Pacific world, he nevertheless stresses the unique characteristics of this historical moment, and the ways in
which communities all around the Pacific increasingly found themselves drawn into and shaped by an emerging global economy. Eloise Sims also looks at a cultural encounter, this time in China itself. Sims considers the changing status of Christian missionaries in China during the first two decades of the twentieth century. She shows that, following the anti-Western and anti-Christian violence of the Boxer Rebellion, Christians in China in fact enjoyed a period of relative favour, both on the part of officials and the broader populace. This period of widespread approval saw the breakdown of the traditional Confucian education system and a growing role for missionaries as educators and teachers of ‘Western’ knowledge. Lingering hostility to foreigners, however, combined with growing nationalistic and anti-imperialistic sentiment in the years immediately following the First World War. The result, as Sims shows, was a renewal of anti-Christian sentiment that had significant implications for the later history of China. Much closer to home, David Simcock reviews a recently-published monograph on the subject of Māori urbanisation in the post-war decades. Panguru and the City, by former Auckland history lecturer Melissa Matutina Williams, makes extensive use of interviews and oral histories to reconstruct the recent history of Māori migration between Panguru, in the Hokianga region, and the growing industrial centre of Auckland. Simcock sets this book in the wider context of historiographical discourse about Māori urbanisation, contrasting Williams’ rather positive and even ‘beautiful’ account with the more familiar narrative of urban Māori rootlessness and indigence. Simcock draws particular attention to the distinctive way in which Williams conceives of urbanised Māori communities as imaginatively occupying a space between two kāinga – the ‘city home’ and the ‘back-home’ – rather than experiencing total dislocation and loss of identity as previous scholars have often assumed. If Williams’ account of this cultural encounter ultimately emphasises agency and negotiation, Sam Jaffe argues for an approach to late nineteenth-century American foreign policy that recognises the agency of a wider range of non-state actors than have been acknowledged in traditional historiography. Jaffe advocates a ‘cultural’ approach to American imperialism, which considers the imperial project in terms of a network of ideas and practices linking the metropolitan centre with the emerging ‘colonies.’ By looking at the popular assumptions, beliefs and ideologies that underlay America’s relationships with the rest of the world, Jaffe suggests that American diplomatic history can be re-imagined as a series of cultural encounters – or, perhaps better, misencounters – mediated over long distances by a ‘web of meanings’ as much as by raw political and economic power.
The third and final theme that I detect in many of these essays is a wide-ranging interest in questions of gender, sexuality and the body. Louise Pilsbury links this theme with issues of identity in an essay looking at the way historians approach the question of female same-sex desire in medieval and early modern Europe. Pre-modern ‘lesbianisms’ are problematic for historians of sexuality not only because female same-sex desire is seldom openly discussed in texts prior to the sixteenth century, but also because medieval conceptions of sexuality differ so vastly from modern assumptions that the very appropriateness of imposing modern categories like ‘lesbianism’ on the remote past is open to question. As Pilsbury observes, the controversy over the best way to describe same-sex desire in the pre-modern world runs not simply along ‘constructivist’ vs ‘essentialist’ lines, but it also divides those historians who privilege understanding past cultural systems on their own terms from those who want a history that speaks meaningfully and directly to marginalised communities in the present. 

The history of gender has also often had an explicit political object, yet – as Emma Wordsworth demonstrates in her essay on gender roles in early modern Europe – it also poses difficulties of its own. Few historians would challenge the claim that women occupied a subordinate position in early modern societies, but the extent of this subordination and the nature of female agency within patriarchal institutions remains a matter of contention. Wordsworth suggests that early modern women had limited spaces of negotiation to exploit and even transgress male-dominated expectations of gendered behaviour, and she emphasises that both men and women actively upheld these expectations rather than passively acquiescing to them. Finally, Nathan McLeay examines the emergence of the modern hospital in France and England during the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He shows how the medieval and early-modern infirmary was transformed from a place of Christian compassion to a site of scientific knowledge and education in the decade following the French Revolution, as a new culture of Enlightenment empiricism filtered into the medical profession at the same moment that the revolutionary state undertook to reform its medical institutions. In these new institutions, bodies became known and experienced in new ways through new ‘webs of meaning.’ In England during the nineteenth century, the new hospitals were assumed into networks of social prestige, civic pride and private philanthropy, reconfiguring the medicalised body once again as an object of charity or a source of authority and respectability.
All the essays included in this volume have been gently edited for grammar, spelling, consistency and (in a few places) clarity, but no effort has been made to alter either the content or the style of the writers’ work. Although this year’s issue contains a record number of essays, it has been necessary to omit a number of very accomplished pieces submitted for publication. In the interests of variety only one essay has been selected from each course, though – following the precedent of recent years – courses taught as second and third year options have been permitted one for each year group so long as the topics are relatively disparate. For all their diversity, these thirteen compositions share the characteristics of strong historical writing, including evidence of research, thoughtful engagement with the question, logical structure, cogency of argument and fluency of expression. I can do no better here than to invoke the words of Dr Diggelmann himself, who described the traits of a good history essay in the preface to the first issue of Histeria!:

> These are all fine pieces of writing. Each contains the basic elements of a successful essay: an argument that responds clearly and concisely to the relevant question or topic; a lucid introduction and conclusion that leave the reader in no doubt of the author’s point of view; and a marshalling of appropriate, correctly acknowledged evidence to support the opinion advanced. […] Readers are encouraged to use these selections as model essays, to ask themselves why it is that these pieces are considered worthy of the highest marks, and to strive to produce work of similar quality.²

Readers should, however, be aware that not all the submissions published here adhere to the referencing style required by most History courses at Auckland. Students should refer to course guides and the History discipline’s website for clear instructions on how best to format coursework.

*Ryan Brown-Haysom*

*December 2016*

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During the first half of the twentieth century, New Zealand men and women ventured overseas to serve and fight for Britain in two world wars. The country’s contribution to the war affected not just our soldiers but New Zealand society as a whole. The sharp mood of wartime saw the solidification of gender roles and racial discrimination. War brought out religious and political opinion: everyone had their own idea of how best to cope with the conflict. But where there is conflict there is also coming together, and to cope there is a need for cooperation. Undoubtedly the violence and sacrifice of wartime caused rupture in New Zealand society, but in some cases it only widened cracks already present.

During both World War One (WWI) and World War Two (WWII) the treatment of those who refused to fight was brutal.\(^1\) The majority of New Zealanders did not openly oppose the war, or they openly supported it through volunteer work or enlisting.\(^2\) Māori participation in WWI was greatly influenced by hapū allegiances; those tribes that had lost large amounts of land to Crown confiscation opposed joining the army to fight a war against Germany, which posed no threat to the physical nation of New Zealand.\(^3\) Although Māori were not allowed to serve in the beginning of WWI, when conscription of the Māori population began later in the war those who refused military service were targeted and could be fined or imprisoned with

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hard labour.⁴ Pākehā antimilitarists faced the same punishment. WWII brought even harsher treatment of pacifists, but it also saw the creation of a Māori Battalion as well as wider spread enlistment from the Māori population.⁵ The split between those supporting and those who opposed to the war did not necessarily create complete rupture, as the majority of citizens did support the war, either because of their strong pride in their British nationality or because they had husbands, fathers, sons or brothers in the army. The true number of pacifists is hard to find because of suppression, especially during the Second World War when the government became extremely strict on anything considered anti-empire. Men at home who had not enlisted during WWI could face a barrage of abuse from women, who were openly disgusted by those seeming not to support the war effort.⁶

The xenophobia experienced by Germans and Austro-Hungarians in New Zealand was not new during the wars, but a pre-existing element of British-New Zealanders attitude toward foreigners.⁷ New Zealand’s physical location being so isolated and the majority of migrants being from the United Kingdom, the Pākehā population had a strong sense of imperialism, being unchallenged by any other European nationalities. As Michael King puts it, “New Zealand, as an island nation, had no borders with other countries or cultures to mitigate a sense of racial solipsism – and to describe this feeling as ‘racial’ is no exaggeration.”⁸ My own family just recently discovered that a German relative who suppressed his heritage to move to New Zealand before the First World War, not even his children knew of his origins. When two wars were fought against Germany, the Germans in New Zealand were targeted as enemy aliens and the gap that was already present between them and British New Zealanders was widened. “Patriotism could be displayed positively, publicly and directly via such media as festivals, flag-waving and fund-raising. However, it was also possible to be patriotic in a negative sense by vilifying the enemy.”⁹

⁸ Ibid., 367.
Although wartime introduced the employment of women in occupations not ordinarily considered suited to them, it also solidified the place of women in society. When employing women in ‘unfeminine’ spheres, jobs were modified to suit a woman’s perceived capability. The Occupational Re-establishment Emergency Regulations of 1940 meant employers were required to re-hire employees who returned from service, which meant that replacing employees with men could become problematic if the replacement were to be conscripted and employing women meant that they could be fired once the men came home and could take their jobs back.\(^{10}\) The work given to women was considered a temporary measure; like rationing food, women were considered a backup but not a solution.\(^{11}\) Some employers refused to hire women at all: “The Christchurch District Transport Manager rejected the possibility of employing women at several stations, because too great a burden would be thrown on to the station-master.”\(^{12}\) In factories where repetitive tasks needed to be performed, it was thought women were more capable than the men, who got bored with repetitive actions.\(^{13}\) Women were considered perfect for these jobs because they resembled the types of task performed in the kitchen.\(^{14}\) When it came to the shift in women’s workplaces, even though they did enter new spheres not previously open to them they were still incapable of climbing to the same rung of the ladder as men. Instead of providing an opportunity for breaking gender boundaries, wartime created a panic around preserving traditional perceptions of femininity, while still relieving the pressures of war.

New Zealand soil was untouched by battle throughout WWI and WWII. The experience of citizens at home was vastly different from those fighting on the shores of Gallipoli or the desert in North Africa. The unscarred citizens of New Zealand could not relate to the returned servicemen. Having not experienced or witnessed the trauma first hand, they had no insight into the reality of battle or of the experience of shell shock (now known as PTSD).\(^ {15}\) During WWII, when Prime Minister Peter Fraser called a number of soldiers back home for leave,


\(^{11}\) Ibid.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 76-77.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., 70.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., 79.

many soldiers understandably refused to return to the war. On one hand, they were angry that fit men avoided conscription because their occupations were considered vital to upholding production; on the other hand the lack of any real symptoms of war carnage in New Zealand provided a comfort for those soldiers who had lived in the wreckage of war overseas. It is a commonly heard saying from children of soldiers: “my father never talked about the war.” My own great-great-grandfather, George Maidens, fought in the WWI and – despite having fought in Gallipoli and France, and having sustained two horrific injuries – not one of his postcards sent from England and Egypt mentions anything about the this or his experience of battle. Whether this was because of censorship I cannot know, but what is evident is the tendency to avoid traumatic subjects. Denial was a coping mechanism for these men, and the unscathed environment of New Zealand inadvertently created a world where denial could thrive: likely unhelpful for the recovery of PTSD.

The First and Second World Wars caused nothing but rupture to New Zealand society, but it was mainly by inflaming old wounds. The greatest scar inflicted by the wars was the rupture between soldiers and the rest of society. A trauma that could never really be resolved existed for both the servicemen themselves and the families who felt the silent impact of war on their men, as well as the devastating loss of family members. The greatest wound for people was the inability to acknowledge the true nature of war experience, instead of facing the fear, the terror, the mutilation and the death, it felt necessary to envelope it in patriotism, nationalism and rationalisation.

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16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
Bibliography


“We should employ cross-cultural and historical evidence not only to chart changing attitudes, but to challenge the very concept of a single trans-historical notion of homosexuality... The physical acts might be similar, but the social constructions of meanings around them are profoundly different” (Weeks, 1991). Discuss with reference to the history of female same-sex desire for the pre-modern period.

Within the study of queer histories, there are two major positions: the essentialist and the social constructionist. The essentialist position holds that sexual orientations are natural, biologically innate, and transhistorical. Social constructionists argue that the social constructions surrounding same-sex desire were profoundly different across time and space, challenging the concept of a transhistorical notion of sexual orientations. This debate becomes even more problematic when looking at pre-modern female same-sex desire in the Western world: the distance in time from the present and the lack of representation of both female and queer perspectives means there is a dearth of source material to draw conclusions from. Most scholars fall closer to the social constructionist end of the spectrum; however, without a trans-historical notion of sexuality what is ‘queer’ or ‘lesbian’ history? While some scholars take an intermediate approach, looking at the ways sexuality was constructed differently in Western pre-modern times while simultaneously creating links to modern identity, others maintain hardline social constructionist positions.

To explore female same-sex desire in premodern times, researchers draw from sources such as theological writings, medieval penitentials, medical and scientific texts, law codes, court records, poetry, literature, letters and art. However, the information that can be gleaned from these sources is limited and problematic for several reasons. In comparison to male same-sex
desire, female same-sex desire was rarely mentioned and often considered less serious. These sources were mostly written by men whose understanding of women was quite limited. Female same-sex desire only appears in medical or scientific discourses when it’s considered a medical abnormality, or related to one in some way. It was rarely prosecuted or even mentioned in the law, and only thirteen cases of female sodomy conviction have been found from the premodern period.\(^1\) It is hard to determine what was really going on with the women involved in court records, as their voices were often silenced or spoken with the goal of defending themselves against the accusations. Poetry, literature, art, and letters can flesh out the picture, but their subjectivity means they can be interpreted in various ways. It is with these limited resources that scholars must analyse and draw conclusions about female same-sex desire in the premodern world, and they interpret them according to their own perspectives along the essentialist-social constructionist spectrum.

In her article ‘Twice Marginal and Twice Invisible: Lesbians in the Middle Ages,’ Jacqueline Murray rejects both the essentialist and social constructionist positions as not fully satisfactory.\(^2\) She acknowledges the importance of social context, but uses the anachronistic word ‘lesbian,’ which she defends by stating that it “does not imply consistency over time but is a convenient term to distinguish those women whose primary relationships, emotional or sexual, appear to be woman-identified.”\(^3\) Using Adrienne Rich’s concept of the ‘lesbian continuum,’ she concludes that the marginalization and invisibility of lesbians in medieval society is because of the phallocentricity of medieval male writers who did not take female sexuality seriously unless they saw it as a threat to male dominance.\(^4\) Historian Judith Bennett also takes an intermediate position, arguing that using the concept of ‘lesbian-like’ rather than ‘lesbian continuum’ opens up new possibilities in the study of female same-sex desire in the Middle Ages. She is interested in the ordinary lives of average people, criticizing Murray and other scholars for construing a small group of elite writers as representing a broad medieval reality.\(^5\) She explores pre-modern female same-sex desire by looking at ‘lesbian-like’ women who “regardless of their sexual pleasures, lived in ways that offer certain affinities with modern lesbians,” showing how cross-dressing, pious autonomy from male control,

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3 Ibid., p. 193
4 Ibid., p. 199
singleness, monastic same-sex communities, prostitution and widowhood illuminate the possibilities that may have existed for female same-sex desire in medieval society. Although she acknowledges that premodern people were not categorised based on the sex of their partners, Bennett insists that the social constructionist abandonment of the word ‘lesbian’ is “unnecessary and counterproductive,” and furthermore, defers to homophobia. Despite their different analytical frameworks, both Murray and Bennett and use the word ‘lesbian’ transhistorically while at the same time exploring ways in which female same-sex desire was differently constructed in premodern times.

Another intermediate position can be seen in Patricia Crawford and Sara Mendelson’s article ‘Sexual Identities in Early Modern England: The Marriage of Two Women in 1680,’ which discusses an ecclesiastical case involving the marriage of two women and speculates on some of the ambiguities involved. On the one hand, Crawford and Mendelson discuss social constructions around same-sex desire that are different from those of today, such as the blurring between hermaphroditism and ‘lesbian’ sexuality in contemporary understanding, the context of cross-dressing for amusement or social rebellion, and narratives of female marriage in popular texts of the time. However, they speak of the ‘heterosexual culture’ of the time and speculate on whether the women were having a ‘lesbian love affair’, which social constructionists would argue is anachronistic and limits understanding of the premodern context.

In her essay ‘The Renaissance of Lesbianism in Early Modern England,’ Valerie Traub takes a more social constructionist approach. Traub argues that there was a dramatic increase in the representation of female homoerotic desire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, exploring the literary themes of the impossibility of female-female love and the magical sex change, the monstrous figure of the tribade and eroticized intimate female friendships. Despite using the word ‘lesbian’ at times in her essay, she stresses that “representations of female homoeroticism do not provide clear antecedents or stable historical ground for contemporary lesbian identities.” Her balanced viewpoint is summed up at the end, as she states: “I have tried to keep open the question of the relationship of present identities to past

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6 Ibid., p. 14
7 Ibid., p.11-12
cultural formations – assuming neither that we will find in the past a mirror image of ourselves nor that the past is so utterly alien that we will find nothing usable in its fragmentary traces.\textsuperscript{10}

A more extreme social constructionist position can be seen in Barry Reay and Kim Phillips’ discussion of premodern female same-sex desire in ‘Between Women.’ In opposition to both Murray and Bennett, they argue that whatever the authorial intent, using terms like ‘lesbian’ or even ‘lesbian-like’ and ‘lesbianisms’ risks restricting interpretation and confining the spectrum of female same-sex desire in limiting rhetoric.\textsuperscript{11} Following this social constructionist model, Katharine Park’s ‘The Rediscovery of the Clitoris’ details the impact of the ‘rediscovery’ of the clitoris in the sixteenth century and its growing association with sex between women. In discussing female same-sex desire, she does not use the term ‘lesbian’ at all, and focuses on the ways in which it was constructed differently from modern times, such as the association with hermaphroditism and the view that tribadism and female-female sex were bodily conditions that any woman could potentially succumb to.

In sum, there is a range of perspectives within scholars of queer histories on the essentialist vs. social constructionist continuum. Those with intermediate positions like Murray, Bennett, and Crawford and Mendelson explore the ways that female same-sex desire was constructed differently in the past while also creating links with present identities by using lesbian-related terms and concepts, whereas social constructionists like Traub, Reay and Phillips, and Park would argue that by doing so they are imposing modern ideas on the past. As for my own judgment on this issue, I find both approaches lacking in one key aspect. Although all of the sources discuss desire between women, only one of them uses the word ‘bisexual,’ even though they use other modern identity terms like lesbian and heterosexual and discuss people who had relationships with and/or desires for multiple genders where it seems the word ‘bisexual’ would be relevant (even if only to discuss the differences between these people and modern bisexuals). The social constructionists advocate for the renunciation of the categories and words ‘lesbian,’ ‘gay,’ ‘homosexual,’ and ‘heterosexual’ in the study of premodern history, but they don’t mention the ‘bisexual’ category. Do the authors not see it as an important or valid category in the history of sexuality, do they not think that it is a category that should be renounced like all the others, or is there some other reason? We cannot know.

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p. 262
\textsuperscript{11} Phillips and Reay, p. 88, 98
because they do not discuss it at all. When we replace “lesbian history” with the “history of same-sex desire,” this adds women who desire men and women and perhaps other genders as well (in modern terms, bisexuals) into the equation. If we split sexual histories into the ‘history of same sex desire’ and the ‘history of opposite sex desire’ in order to reflect reality, those with both same-sex and opposite-sex desire will form a part of both categories. But their existence compromises the separation of these categories, as they clearly overlap, and complicates matters for historians. Ignoring bisexuality might make the historian’s job easier, but it is at the expense of a complete and nuanced view of sexuality. In order to truly move beyond imposing modern notions of sexuality onto the past, any future study of same-sex desire must take into account the fact that same-sex and opposite-sex desire are not mutually exclusive, and that the history of one overlaps with the history of the other, in order to avoid marginalizing or erasing those people throughout history who loved, had relationships with, and desired people of multiple sexes and genders.
Bibliography


What new kinds of Pacific societies emerged from the plantations, trade, and migration in the second half of the nineteenth century? How different were these societies from previous ones in the Pacific?

Historian David A. Chang argues that “the emergence of the modern world saw the construction of spaces where global history became local.”¹ The plantations, trade, and migration of the second half of the nineteenth century created new societies that were more connected with global trends than ever before. One group of people that feature prominently in this development are the Chinese, especially those from the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong in the South East of that country.² Studying their interactions and experiences illuminates our understanding of the Pacific societies before and during the second half of the nineteenth century.

There was a tradition of Chinese migration and trade throughout the Pacific Ocean, primarily around Southeast Asia, from at least the fourth century CE.³ Chinese continued to play a large role in the economies of Southeast Asia during the arrival of Westerners, and small societies of artisans and traders developed as the middlemen between the people of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines, and the Europeans who traded out of fortified enclaves.⁴ The Chinese history of regional trade is consistent with the experiences of others in the Pacific: for example, there is evidence of intraregional trade between societies in

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³ Ibid., p.37.
⁴ Ibid.
Eastern Polynesia, and in Micronesia. The Polynesian and Chinese examples are just two of many that show the trading connections between sub-Pacific regions.

This began to change with the Spanish establishment of transpacific trade between Manila in the Philippines and Acapulco in Mexico. Pacific trade started to shift from regional to global relationships. Europeans continued to establishing maritime trading relationships but these were often highly regulated by their Asian trading partners. As Western naval technology improved, Europeans were able to overpower the previously superior Asian coastal forces in attempts to gain access to the lucrative markets that were previously inaccessible. After the Opium Wars of 1839-42, the British forced open ports on the Chinese coast and established the colony of Hong Kong, and in 1853 Commodore Perry secured American access to Japan. These deregulations incentivised trade and thus were crucial in the development of the migratory patterns and plantations of the second half of the nineteenth century.

What sets the second half of the nineteenth century apart is the increase in labour migration throughout the Pacific. Again the Chinese experience is emblematic of this wider trend. Chinese labour can be found in Peruvian guano fields, Hawaiian plantations, and Californian mines during this time. Chinese labour was a mixture of free and indentured. In North America most of the labour was self-organised and self-financed, while in Peru 100,000 Chinese were brought in as labourers between 1847 and 1874, often as nominally indentured labourers but in reality as slaves. This was similar to experiences of Melanesians brought to work on the sugar plantations in Queensland. There were often young men willing to work for Europeans as labourers, but if there was an insufficient supply of labour

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8 Ibid.
11 Look Lai, p.44.
12 Ibid., p.43.
13 Melillo, p.1029.
14 Ibid., p.1039.
contractors would coerce or kidnap people in a process called ‘blackbirding’.

Both of these labour movements primarily consisted of men, and earnings from labour were typically sent home. This contributed to some social change, especially in Melanesia where new goods and ideas were brought back to communities. This represents another connection of the local with the global, as the Melanesian labourers entered into a global economic trend.

While social change may not have been as marked in China as in Melanesia, there were significant social impacts on the lands Chinese found themselves in. Perhaps the most uniquely Chinese Pacific society is the ‘Chinatown’. Numerous such communities developed around the Pacific Rim during the second half of the nineteenth century in Vancouver, Lima, San Francisco and Sydney. Lima’s Chinatown provides the most interesting example of how trade and migration created new societies. Initially the town developed as migrants brought in to labour on guano fields or as domestic cooks and servants settled around the market of La Concepción. Their children began to work as street traders around this area as it became a centre for fresh produce. A second wave of immigration occurred as Chinese traders moved to Lima from California. These traders developed networks that imported goods from China and North America, changing the appearance of the quarter. However, the most significant social development in the Chinese quarter was its development as a centre for the working class. This saw the Chinese of Lima living alongside Afro-Peruvian and indigenous populations.

Here we can see Chang’s idea of the global becoming local as people from across the globe were brought together in a local environment as a result of migration, trade and plantations.

In conclusion, the Chinese experience in the Pacific allows us to see how Pacific societies were affected by the trade, migration and plantations of the second half of the nineteenth century. These movements connected the Pacific with the global economy, shifting the economies of these places away from a regional system. While Chinese experiences of the

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16 Ibid., pp.112-113; Melillo., p.1039.
17 Connell, p.113.
20 Ibid., p.121.
21 Ibid.
Pacific shared many similarities with others both before and after the second half of the nineteenth century, it is important to understand that there were differences, with establishment of Chinatowns around the Pacific Rim a notable one. Nevertheless, the broad nature of Chinese involvement in the Pacific both as labourers and traders shows how Pacific communities became global during the second half of the nineteenth century.
Bibliography


Based on your reading, how did ideas about gender influence the experience of European people during the early modern period? Why, in your view, do these scholars offer different explanations?

Ideas about gender simultaneously influenced and were influenced by the experiences of early modern Europeans of both sexes, as popular culture was generated, reinforced, and negotiated by people’s interactions with dominant discourses. The assertion of historians such as Susan Dwyer Amussen and Diane Purkiss that “popular culture is created at the crossroads between theory and life” reaffirms that European men and women were not passive recipients of gendered dogma, but were complicit in its dissemination and enforcement.\(^1\) Martin Ingram and Silvia Evangelisti also debate the extent of a ‘cultural consensus’ of patriarchal beliefs that influenced both laypeople and elites, and the extent to which these varied.\(^2\) Furthermore, Julie Hardwick and Mary Fissell contest the degree to which ideas about gender influenced the lives of men, as well as women. The differing explanations of these scholars can be explained by their diverse areas of investigation, and the context of their particular focus groups, which reflect the varying degrees of agency possessed by Europeans in negotiating gender ideas and expectations.

Susan Dwyer Amussen and Diane Purkiss argue that men and women in early modern Europe were not the passive recipients of gender discourses, but were complicit in the perpetuation of gender expectations. Amussen dismisses the idea that women were completely oppressed, and offers the explanation of ‘limited subordination,’ in which the

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extent of women’s involvement in the household economy influenced their status and power within the private sphere. She explains that female labour and occupational skills were essential components of plebeian household economies, and thus put wives in a position to negotiate the extent of their subordination. However, Amussen reinforces the point that women still had to complicitly subscribe to and participate in Europe’s patriarchal framework, which denied them political and social rights. Therefore, although limited subordination provided the ability to reconceptualise gender ideas, female authority was inherently linked to social disability. Amussen demonstrates this in relation to chastity, which became the fundamental ideal for prescribing gender expectations; it was reinforced by both sexes as a necessary virtue, as it combined the ideology of religious purity, and the experience of the reluctant communal care of bastard children, thus making it easily identifiable and enforceable. Subsequently, by subordinating the problem of gender discrimination to community welfare, women both accepted and perpetuated such gender expectations, in spite of their limited ability to contest the extent of their repression in the household.

Purkiss also asserts that in order to understand the extent of women’s role in shaping ideas about gender, it is necessary to examine how they conceptualised and reinforced normative social practices. She uses the testimonies of women in witch trials to establish that stigmas about witches derived from both religious patriarchal ideals, and the everyday experiences of women themselves. Purkiss asserts that witches were conceptualised as an antithesis to the ideal wife, as a method of social orientation to encourage normative behaviour amongst women. Ironically, these beliefs derived from the experiences and anxieties of women, as well as men. This is shown in an example from 1582, in which Bennet Lane accused Agnes Heard of witchcraft and maleficium as a result of a domestic exchange of goods. This reveals some of the basic anxieties of women in early modern Europe; economic concerns such as famine and crop failure were exacerbated by the General Crisis, whilst the transgression of the physical boundaries of the household became analogous with female bodily transgressions represented by chastity. However, Purkiss’ idea that gender ideas are

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4 Ibid., pp. 51-5.
5 Ibid., p. 53.
6 Ibid., p. 59.
8 Ibid., p. 423.
reconstituted at the meeting of the public and private spheres is refuted by Amussen, who asserts that the revision of gender ideas was restricted to female involvement in the household. This can be attributed to Purkiss’ focus on witchcraft, as she emphasises ‘liminal spaces’ – such as lying-in periods after birth – as fertile grounds for transgression due to the vulnerability of existing outside of normative action.\(^9\) By contrast, Amussen’s focus is on the negotiation of these ideas within patriarchal structures rather than without, and she thus asserts a strict division between the public and private spheres.

Silvia Evangelisti and Martin Ingram have argued that gender ideas influenced and were influenced by both laypeople and elites to different extents, due to the shared social and religious ideology of the patriarchal hierarchy. Evangelisti examines the politically-motivated institutions of marriage and convents in terms of only elite members of society, as both were designed to extend and consolidate familial power by continuing the bloodline through property or reproduction.\(^{10}\) Evangelisti demonstrates the enhanced repression of elite women in relation to the ‘limited subordination’ of laypeople, as upper class women’s lack of involvement in the household economy reduced their ability to negotiate conceptions of gender. However, she maintains that minimal agency was still possible for elite women under the patriarchal institutions of marriage and the convent by “manipulating these norms and acting with a degree of autonomy,” particularly through monastic art and education.\(^{11}\) Therefore, Evangelisti asserts that elites were more heavily influenced by gender ideas than plebeians, due to the political value of property and chastity in the continuation of the family.

Martin Ingram, by contrast, asserts that the division between elite and popular culture is overemphasised in the perpetuation of gender ideas by using the example of charivaris. He suggests that these mocking demonstrations were occasioned by the sexual transgressions of women, most notably the physical or verbal assault of her husband, and exemplified fundamental beliefs which were shared by all groups in society.\(^{12}\) Although elites did not actively participate in charivaris, they did encourage plebeian enforcement of normative practice at a communal level to ensure uniformity with their own beliefs, particularly the

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\(^9\) Ibid., p. 422.
\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 245; p. 238.
\(^{12}\) Martin Ingram, ‘Ridings, Rough Music and the “Reform of Popular Culture” in Early Modern England’, p. 86; p. 90; p. 94.
husband’s right of correction and the chastity of the wife. However, Ingram notes that charivaris were most prevalent during festive periods, suggesting that, whilst they were intended to shame transgressors back into normative practice, they also provided a source of parody; an awareness of the tensions of elite ideals of sexuality which could be revised in terms of the economic role of women in popular society. Ingram’s focus on charivaris demonstrates a manifestation of popular culture which existed outside of judicial and religious institutions, and thus demonstrates the negotiation of gender roles at a communal, rather than individual level. Conversely, Evangelisti only analyses female agency in terms of individuals, which was facilitated by patriarchal institutions, and subsequently framed gender ideas more in terms of ideology than experience.

Julie Hardwick and Mary Fissell have debated the extent to which gender ideas shaped and were shaped by both sexes, and contest the dichotomous model of the patriarchal hierarchy. Hardwick examines how separation of property and the person could be petitioned by French women in extreme circumstances when their husbands had failed to fulfil the expected duty as the sustainer and head of the household. This ability of women to obtain limited power through legal remedy reflects Amussen’s notion of ‘limited subordination’, but also corroborates Evangelisti’s idea that the use of patriarchal mediums to achieve agency serves to reinforce dominant gender discourses. Thus the idea of the separation was ultimately to chasten the husband and coerce him to reassert authority in adherence to normative practice, rather than to provide remedy for his wife. Furthermore, women were refused the right to divorce, and granted separations only in extreme circumstances in which battery was a prerequisite. The entitlement of the husband to use ‘corrective violence’ to discipline his wife was accepted, and only became an issue when it inhibited the wife’s performance of her accepted duties, such as running the household or giving birth. The examination of non-ecclesiastical courts in France therefore provides a more complex insight into the dynamic

13 Ibid., p. 111.
14 Ibid., pp. 96-97.
15 Ibid., p. 111.
19 Ibid., p. 165; p.176.
interplay between the gender roles of men and women, and refutes the traditional notion of a binary patriarchal model.

Alternatively, Fissell suggests that gender discourses were oriented and conceptualised in relation to the experience of males alone, and relied upon male domination over ideas of female sexuality. Fissell investigates the use of prescriptive literature to demonstrate how gender ideas were disseminated by literate men, based on their ideas about reproduction. The conceptualisation of women as property to be controlled and appropriated is reflected in the analogy of land ownership, in which “men planted, constructed, and enclosed her in ways congruent with cultural expectations of women’s behaviour.” This contests Hardwick’s argument that gender roles were mutually reinforced by both sexes, and instead asserts that gender ideas rely on male definitions of the female and her social role. However, Jane Sharp was a woman who used prescriptive literature to reappropriate popular gender discourses to reflect the female perspective. She subverts the notion of females as passive figures to be transformed by male reproductive power, and instead renders the woman the active creator of life.

The variance in Hardwick and Fissell’s arguments can be attributed to their examinations of different contexts and sources. Hardwick’s examination of France is significant, as separations of property were not available to women living in Fissell’s England. Ingram agrees that communal enforcement of gender ideas was aimed at reinforcing the normative behaviour of both husbands and wives, as a punishment for both female transgression and male passivity. However, it is also significant that Fissell’s examination of prescriptive literature is inherently biased towards male domination, as there was a far higher rate of literate men than women.

Over time, various scholars have had differing interpretations on the extent to which ideas about gender both influenced and were influenced by the experiences of early modern Europeans. The complexities of limited subordination, social status and the complicity of both sexes reveal how ideas about gender were constantly reconceptualised and renegotiated in early modern Europe, and therefore reflect that women could not be absolutely subordinate

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21 Ibid., p.446.
22 Julie Hardwick, ‘Seeking Separations: Gender, Marriages, and Household Economies in Early Modern France’, p.175.
all the time. Despite the varying interpretations by historians, gender ideas did not exist in a vacuum, and early modern Europeans helped to shape and perpetuate dominant discourses, just as they were in turn influenced by them.
Bibliography


What factors influenced the changing status of hospitals in the nineteenth century?

The convergence of practical political concern with a nascent medical epistemology ensured the reconstitution of the French hospital as an important educational institution by the early nineteenth century. The French Revolution facilitated this change in thinking about hospitals, shifting from the internment of suffering to educational institutions based on observation and practice. The assumption of educative functionality by hospital institutions spread throughout Europe during the early nineteenth century, and hospitals therefore became critical in the development of medical professionalism in Great Britain. Furthermore, hospitals as humanitarian institutions benefitted significantly from nineteenth century private charity.

Administrated by ecclesiastical orders or quasi-monastic lay organisations, pre-revolutionary French hospitals were humanitarian spaces of “charity, care, and convalescence” housing the destitute and diseased. The revolutionary assemblies, however, associated hospitals with ancien régime Catholicism, penury and corruption, and demanded their abolition. Convention nationale member Joseph Lebon, for example, condemned the internment of “suffering humanity” within hospitals and declared: “Let notices be placed over the gates of these asylums announcing their coming disappearance. For if when the Revolution is complete we still have such unfortunates amongst us, our revolutionary work will have been in vain.” Similarly, the radical revolutionary Bertrand Barère famously proclaimed, “no

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4 Quoted in Foucault, p.43.
more alms, no more hospitals.” The rhetoric of Lebon and Barère was realised on 23 Messidor, Year II (11 July, 1794), the date when the Convention nationale ordered the confiscation of hospital property and nationalisation of hospital finances. 

Meanwhile, envisaging the liberation of French medicine from ‘artificial’ bureaucratic controls, the revolutionary assemblies dissolved any organisational remnants of the ancien régime medical establishment; the “sanctuary of medicine, like the temple of Janus, was flung wide open to admit the onrushing crowd.” The zeal with which the revolutionary assemblies dissolved existing institutional regulation did not produce associated medical benefits. Rather, the free enterprise of French medicine ensured only the proliferation of charlatanism and “murderous quackery.” By collapsing the “Gothic universities and aristocratic academies” of ancien régime medicine, the revolutionary assemblies exposed the French public to the malpractices of unskilled, unqualified practitioners. The problems that came from medicinal deregulation were such that it was not long before politicians and bureaucrats were demanding proper supervision and control increased: “With how many ignorant murderers will you inundate France if you authorize second-and third-class physicians, surgeons, and chemists… to practice their respective professions without a new examination[?]”

At the same time as the revolutionary government was grappling with an unregulated medical environment, French physicians were embracing the rigour and accuracy of Enlightenment empiricism, and advocating an epistemology of medicine organised around observation and experience. This new approach considered theoretical speculation concerning the primary causes of disease academic indulgence, producing only “empty ghosts.” Medical knowledge needed to be substantiated by experiential mechanisms: clinical examination, anatomical pathology, autopsy and statistical-numerical analysis. For the empiricists, the

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5 Quoted in Foucault, p.43.
6 Risse, p.305
7 Foucault, p.74.
8 Foucault, p.69.
9 Foucault, 68.
10 Foucault, p.66.
12 Ibid., p.6.
“true instruction” of medical students was “not received from books, but at the sickbed.”\textsuperscript{14} This nascent system of medical epistemology therefore challenged the bookish esotericism of classificatory, humoral medicine and “effaced dogmatic language as an essential stage in the transmission of truth.”\textsuperscript{15} No longer channeled through books and words, decisive medical knowledge was immediate and empirical.\textsuperscript{16}

Hospitals, the wards and mortuaries of which facilitated observation and experience, were therefore considered the “universal solution” to problems of medical pedagogy.\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, Félix Vicq d’Azyr, an adherent of Cabanis’ experiential epistemology and influential former secretary of the Société royale de médecine, observed à propos:

Diseases and death offer great lessons in hospitals. Are we benefiting from them? Are we writing the history of the illnesses that strike so many victims in our hospitals? Do we teach in our hospitals the art of observing and treating diseases? Have we set up any chairs of clinical medicine in our hospitals?\textsuperscript{18}

In September 1790, Vicq d’Azyr presented to the revolutionary government a programme that had the potential to resolve tension between an unregulated medical administration and an emerging scientific medicinal agenda.\textsuperscript{19} Vicq d’Azyr emphasised the experiential virtue of Enlightenment empiricism, and recommended the employment of hospitals in medical education.\textsuperscript{20} Although the reformatory scheme advocated by Vicq d’Azyr was initially disregarded, Antoine-François, Comte de Fourcroy successfully tendered a similar project during the Frimaire of Year III (December, 1794).\textsuperscript{21}

Fourcroy’s submission to the revolutionary government recommended the immediate establishment of écoles de santé, teaching hospitals wherein students would benefit from clinical and practical experience.\textsuperscript{22} In these clinics, pupils were to be “practiced in chemical experiments, anatomical dissections, surgical operations and the use of machinery.”\textsuperscript{23} “Read little, see little, and do much” formed the basis of the new curriculum.\textsuperscript{24} The Convention

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{14} Ackerknecht, p.3.
\bibitem{15} Foucault, p.68.
\bibitem{16} Ackerknecht, p.3.
\bibitem{17} Risse, p.330; Foucault, p.64.
\bibitem{18} Quoted in Foucault, p.64.
\bibitem{19} Risse, pp.302-303.
\bibitem{20} Ibid.
\bibitem{21} Risse, p. 303.
\bibitem{22} Ackerknecht, p. 32.
\bibitem{23} Foucault, p. 70.
\bibitem{24} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
nationale responded positively to the suggestions of Fourcroy and, on 14 Frimaire, Year III (4 December, 1794), écoles de santé were established in Paris, Montpellier and Strasbourg.25

The Year III reformatory programme simultaneously confirmed the practical character of the new medical curriculum and revived the hospital as an educational establishment.26 The opportunity for experiential learning within hospitals, an element hitherto absent from medical education, henceforth constituted its essential element.27 The republican suppression of traditional hospital beneficence, and the abolition of the historical institutions of medical education, enabled the communication of medical knowledge within the “concrete field of experience.”28 Furthermore, the hospital was reconstituted as the productive locus of medical knowledge – a “domain in which the truth teaches itself.”29 Thus, American medical historian Erwin Ackerknecht concludes that by the early nineteenth century the French hospital “was in its conception and organisation, no longer a medieval receptacle of all miseries. It had become a medical institution and thus served as the cradle of a new medicine.”30

French notions of an observational-experiential epistemology and the related employment of hospitals for educative purposes enjoyed increasing prominence within European medicine throughout the nineteenth century.31 In England, for instance, medical licensure was tied to hospital education by the Apothecaries Act of 1815.32 Consequently, nineteenth century medical practitioners considered hospitals important to the development of their professional careers.33 Indeed, an 1860 instalment of the British Medical Journal observed hospitals’ enablement of the acquirement of “fame and fortune by the means of bricks and mortar.”34 As British historian Lindsay Granshaw demonstrates, nineteenth century medical specialists successfully utilised the hospital as an instrument for professional legitimation; a means to

25 Ackerknecht, p. 32.
27 Foucault, p.69.
28 Ibid., p.68.
29 Ibid., p.68-69.
30 Ackerknecht, p. 22.
33 Granshaw, ‘The rise of the Modern Hospital in Britain’, p.204-205; Waddington, p.157.
obtain competitive advantage in an increasingly combative medical economy.\(^{35}\) The importance of hospitals is exemplified by the actions of specialist practitioners. Recognising the necessity of hospital experience in establishing professional authority, specialist practitioners stopped seeking to attract patients by direct advertising to the public and began petitioning philanthropists for financial support.\(^{36}\) The practitioners realised that, if they could secure sponsorship for a specialist dispensary or hospital, they would be able to affirm their professional reputation and medical authority and thereby attract wealthy clientele.\(^{37}\) Specialist practitioners therefore harnessed the charitable imperative of Victorian England for entrepreneurial purposes.

In addition to the funding specialist hospitals received via philanthropic sponsorship, hospitals also benefited more broadly from charitable activity. Indeed, British historian Keir Waddington notes the significant contribution of Victorian philanthropy toward the establishment of hospitals throughout nineteenth century Great Britain.\(^{38}\) Significantly, the increasing popularity of English evangelicalism within mid-nineteenth century London invigorated religious charitable concern and the related proliferation of London hospitals.\(^{39}\) By 1850, an estimated three quarters of British charities – including several hospitals – were sponsored by evangelical philanthropists.\(^{40}\) Evangelical Christianity attributed earthly success to heavenly providence, and therefore associated philanthropic employment with divine virtue.\(^{41}\) Thus for evangelical Christians, charity provided an intrinsic spiritual recompense.\(^{42}\) As Waddington observes, hospital administrators appealed frequently and successfully to evangelical sentiments in attempting to secure patronage.\(^{43}\) Philanthropic sponsorship of British hospitals however, was not an exclusively evangelical phenomenon.\(^{44}\) Indeed, sensitivity toward “sympathy and commiseration” was widely considered an essential and ubiquitous English quality.\(^{45}\) Hospital administrators evoked these notions of secular

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38 Waddington, Charity and the London Hospitals.
40 Ibid., p.27.
41 Ibid., p.26.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., p.27.
44 Ibid., p.28.
45 Ibid..
humanitarianism in emotive appeals to public sympathy: the ‘tear-jerking’ requests for
sponsorship launched by children’s’ hospitals proving particularly compelling.\(^46\) Indeed, the
*London Journal* remarked in 1858 that “there was no one with so many claims upon the
sympathies of the benevolent” as the London Hospital for Sick Children.\(^47\) Furthermore,
novelists and social commentators encouraged the assumption of greater social responsibility
amongst wealthy industrialists and the privileged urban bourgeois.\(^48\) Thus for George
Finlayson wealth produced its own recourse to philanthropy:

*Noblesse oblige*… could merge into a way of quieting a conscience troubled by the possession of
riches, or of justifying those riches by devoting a proportion of them to the cause of the sick poor.\(^49\)

For historian of Manchester John V. Pickstone, the “tremendous sense of social duty and
responsibility” generated by the possession of wealth strongly influenced bourgeois
sponsorship of hospitals within heavily-industrialised northern England.\(^50\) Motivated by a
‘paternalistic’ concern for proletarian welfare, entrepreneurial industrialists spearheaded the
foundation of hospitals throughout northern England during the late-nineteenth century.\(^51\)
Hospitals as institutions therefore came to represent civic responsibility and social
coherence.\(^52\) Furthermore, hospitals could signify the financial and social power of the
wealthy benefactors involved in their foundation.\(^53\) Hence, hospitals “became part of civic
pride: any self-respecting town—and its leading figures— came to need a museum, a library,
and, of course, a hospital.”\(^54\)

As this paper has demonstrated, French pedagogy and British philanthropy were instrumental
in the changing role of hospitals throughout the nineteenth century. The French embracement
of the hospital as a teaching establishment during the revolutionary period prompted similar
reforms in Great Britain. Hospitals, as the sites of empirically viable medical knowledge,
were crucial in the development of medical professionalism during the nineteenth century.
Finally, nineteenth-century British hospitals benefited significantly from a cultural climate
that encouraged philanthropic endeavour.

\(^{46}\) Ibid.
\(^{47}\) Ibid.
\(^{48}\) Ibid., p.29.
\(^{49}\) Ibid.
\(^{51}\) Ibid.
\(^{52}\) Ibid., pp.98-134.
\(^{53}\) Granshaw, ‘The Rise of the Modern Hospital in Britain’, p. 204.
\(^{54}\) Ibid.
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Western Protestant missionaries in China have long been a topic of controversy in Chinese history, with radically shifting perceptions of their actions: sparking anti-foreign riots, or encouraging en masse conversions to Christianity. A particularly interesting period in the history of missionary activity in China is the post-Boxer Rebellion period after 1901 to the anti-Christian movement of the 1920s. This era is of note for the dramatic shift in both the public role and perception of said missionaries by the Chinese public. This essay will aim to show that the post-Boxer era began with a dramatic “golden era” for missionaries, with the rapid growth of missionary schools and Chinese Christians highlighting a positive overall public perception of Western missionaries as educators and guardians. It will then highlight the decline of this positive image and role, aggravated by themes such as the post-WWI perception of Western hypocrisy and the rise of Chinese nationalism, to explain why the 1920s riots occurred as they did. In exploring this, I aim to conclude that this period is certainly one of the most noteworthy episodes in the history of Christian activities in China.

The Boxer Rebellion of 1899-1901 was a brutal anti-foreign and anti-Christian uprising, fuelled by opposition to Christian missionary activities and perceived imperialism.1 During the rebellion, 134 Protestant missionaries and 52 missionary children were murdered in horrific ways, as well as around 32,000 Chinese Christians. 2 Hospitals, schools and churches

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2 Ibid.
were demolished, particularly in Northern China. 3 Such an uprising undoubtedly had an enormous impact on the way missionaries were perceived in China, and – fascinatingly – post-Rebellion, this impact would be the growth of a positive public image of missionaries. In October 1901, for instance, the Governor of Shanxi Province, Chen Chunxuan, issued a province-wide declaration that publicly shamed those in his region with pro-Boxer leanings.4 “Ignorant people followed the Boxers,” he declared. “We have treated Christian missionaries with injustice and contempt, for which we ought to feel ashamed.”5 Such comments were carefully aimed to promote pro-missionary sentiments among the Chinese populace, and this quickly took hold.

In the immediate post-Rebellion context, missionaries were shocked to find that their public image among Chinese changed from one of virulent anti-foreign hatred to a general acknowledgement – and, in some cases, open interest. In letters to the North China Missionary Herald in 1903, the Reverend F. Jones at the Tai An Fu Mission notes his bemusement at the increasing number of his clergy.6 “I find large numbers of Chinese now coming forward as ‘enquirers,’ and willing to have their names enrolled as candidates for baptism… these numbers are considerably over 100,”7 he writes, claiming such an event is a “phenomenon” considering the violence the mission was subjected to in 1901.8 Additionally he notes a “willingness to learn the foreign doctrine” previously unheard-of among the new members of the clergy.9 Such an event may seem unique, but not when correlated with the account of clergyman Arthur Judson Brown. Brown writes in 1904 of indications of “a new Christian movement among the Chinese.”10 He gives the example of We-Hsien Station in Shantung, having previously had every foreign missionary driven out and property torched, baptizing 437 Chinese in 1903.11 Such baptism and clergy statistics reflect a clear change of perception of foreign missionaries, with a recorded sudden embrace of Christianity among some Chinese.

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5 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
This “new Christian movement” noted by Brown was occurring for a reason. The Qing dynasty in the post-Rebellion era abolished the previous Confucian imperial examination system, replacing it with a nationalistic system that emphasized Western-style learning of the sciences and physical fitness. Such Western-style teachings, as well as Western schools, were immediately and eagerly sought by the Chinese elite. Mission presses could not keep up with the new demand for Western books and learning, a demand that would spiral into one hundred million pages being printed by the Presbyterian Mission Press in Shanghai in 1907. Not only that, but mission schools doubled in enrolment numbers every six years until 1920, reaching 170,000 in 1915. In 1904, the Reverend Timothy Richard was even appointed the chancellor of Taiyuan University in Shanxi by the Qing government, with approved Christian missionary professors designing the curriculum. Taiyuan University, as well as the many new missionary schools established, would go on to change the perceptions of missionaries amongst Chinese, as well as expanding the horizons and opportunities of many Chinese. A golden age of missionary educational activity certainly occurred in China from 1901 until about 1919, with missionaries being largely perceived positively as educators. “China is awake, thirsting for knowledge,” Richard concluded after his appointment in 1904, “and it is our worthy task to supply.”

However, this time of general Chinese public approval and expanded missionary role in the mainstream of everyday life would not last forever. Cracks existed under the surface that reminded missionaries of the days of the Boxer Rebellion, and warnings were still emitted to prevent the provoking of any further anti-foreign attacks. Arthur Judson Brown noted in 1904 that efforts were still made in some areas to exclude Christian teachers and textbooks from Chinese government schools. “The almost invincible prejudice against the foreigner still remains,” he concludes. This sentiment would be one echoed by Robert E. Speer in summarizing the principles and values of the China Inland Mission in the 1902 Chinese

12 Brown, ‘Through Fire and Sword.’
14 Brown, ‘Through Fire and Sword.’
15 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Judson Brown, ‘Hopeful Signs.’
20 Ibid.
“Too great caution cannot be exercised,” he argued, emphasizing that “preaching to large crowds should be avoided” for fear of personal attack. Such quotes show that the Chinese public perception of foreign missionaries was more varied than merely bland approval, and that anti-foreign feelings still remained distinctly below the surface. This is important to keep in mind to contextualize the beginning of the anti-Christian riots in the 1920s.

Such anti-foreign tensions would slowly present themselves again with time, precipitated by both Chinese domestic politics and international relations issues. From 1914 to 1918 WWI raged to a bloody close, an issue that, according to historian Daniel Bays, was costly to both the image and the credibility of missionary teachings in China. After the brutal nature of WWI, the West was clearly an unsuitable role model to epitomise both progressive beliefs and the idea of Chinese becoming ‘civilised’. Not only was the apparent hypocrisy of Western missionaries noted due to this conflict (with thinkers such as Ch’en Tu-hsiu claiming that the church preached militarism more than universal love and sacrifice), but also publications began emerging that questioned the control that missionaries exercised over the Chinese educational system. This control was labeled imperialist, encouraging public resentment of missionary power according to the writings of the American missionary Lewis Hodous. In 1919 Chu Chih-Hsin, a prominent Chinese revolutionary in the May Fourth movement, issued an essay called *What Is Jesus?* In it, according to Hodous, he claims: “Jesus is an idol which is fair-spoken, ill natured, irascible… the child of an illicit union, intolerant, nothing but an idol with no importance in history.” Such an essay was a damning condemnation of what missionaries were teaching Chinese children, as well as of Christianity as a whole – particularly vicious, considering Chu was the colleague of the Christian Nationalist leader Sun Yat-Sen. The piece, which grew increasingly popular and disseminated throughout China (particularly in universities), is invaluable in reflecting the

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22 Ibid.
23 Bays, ‘The “Golden Age” of Missions and the “Sino-Foreign Protestant Establishment”, 1902-1927’.
26 Ibid.
gradual curdling of public perception of missionaries. This growing resentment of perceived imperialism and of religion as a whole would lead directly into the anti-Christian riots of the 1920s.

As China’s nationalistic fervor grew in the early 1920s, encouraged by the new system of nationalistic education, so too did simmering anti-religion and anti-missionary resentment. Historians Tatsuro and Sumiko Yamamoto identify the influence of the New Thought movement as a key reason for this. The New Thought movement was a lobbying association that swept Chinese universities with the idea that science and rationality should be valued above all else. Chu Chih-Hsin was a prominent advocate of this movement, seeing science and religion as completely irreconcilable – hence, religion was irreconcilable to the progress of China as a nation. In the words of another advocate of Chu’s movement, Bertrand Russell (who spoke frequently at Chinese universities at the time), “religion conserves the old, opposes the new, and hinders progress.” C.S. Chang made a similar point in the 1923 *Chinese Recorder*, claiming that “Christian teaching is too unscientific, contrary to logic, and contrary to social theories.” With statements like these being circulated around university campuses, as well as through the increasing number of magazines and newspapers in China, such ideas took strong hold. From this the public perception of missionaries can be argued to have curdled into the role of “progress hinderers” and teachers of beliefs that were “contrary to logic.”

Combined with the nationalistic beliefs generated in the May Fourth Movement, Yamamoto concludes that missionaries also began to be increasingly seen as cultural imperialists. This was for their unimpeded control over Chinese mission schools and some tertiary institutions, such as the aforementioned Taiyuan University. Anti-Christian societies sprung up in universities to protest missionary control over institutions, severely criticizing this control and even organizing protests against religious holidays such as Christmas. Other claims were made by a growing Communist element – Yamamoto’s third reason for the strong anti-

29 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
missionary sentiment growing – that Christianity had always traditionally supported the evils of capitalism, and therefore should have no influence over the schooling of Chinese. These beliefs grew to the extent that in 1925 the Educational Association of China adopted the policy of preventing the church establishing mission schools and banning public preaching.

In this decade the anti-Christian movement came into full force in encouraging virulently anti-missionary beliefs amongst the Chinese public. In the same year as the Educational Association’s decision, societies such as the Anti-Religious Federation stated in their journals that they saw Christianity as “an instrument of international imperialism to invade weak nations.” Throughout this decade until the baptism of Chiang Kai-Shek, public protests against Christianity and missionaries were common. To illustrate the everyday nature of this anti-missionary feeling, a British Foreign Office report from 1927 shows propaganda fixed to the wall of a mission station at Tsinanfu. A missionary stands on a heap of broken treaties, holding bags of money in his hands, being stabbed by handsome young Chinese nationalists. This propaganda and this period shows a dramatic change from the post-Boxer Rebellion era of positive public perception of missionaries to a virulent anti-missionary sentiment throughout China. Missionaries were at this time being denounced by many different societal elements as cultural imperialists, capitalists and adherents to an outdated belief.

To conclude, it is clear how much the public perception and role of missionaries changed from 1901 to the anti-Christian riots of the 1920s. In a post-Boxer Rebellion context, positive images of missionaries as teachers were encouraged by the abolition of the Confucian imperial examination system and the need for Western learning. However, as time went on this image soured due to missionaries’ control over Chinese schools, to explode into accusations that missionaries were imperialists and capitalists. While this change may seem dramatic, anti-foreign sentiments constantly lurked under the surface in Chinese society (as Arthur Judson Brown neatly illustrates), and exploded into the anti-Christian riots of the

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38 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
1920s as a matter of societal and political pressures. The decline of the positive image of the missionary would encourage a nationwide embrace of atheism and scientific rationality, an ideology that Maoist Communism would imbue for decades to come.

43 Judson Brown, ‘Hopeful Signs.’
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By what methods, and how effectively, was Norman power imposed on England during the latter part of the eleventh century? How can Domesday Book provide evidence for this process?

William the Conqueror’s invasion of England in 1066 was arguably the single greatest ‘Norman’ achievement in history; yet the extent to which he was able to effectively impose his power on the English is a different matter entirely. For several turbulent decades, the Conqueror employed a range of military, administrative, social and legal methods to solidify his grasp on the kingdom. Whilst these all played an important role, it was the dual relationship between military force and administrative organization that proved to be the most effective. It is also important to note the significance of Domesday Book in providing us with much of the key evidence for this period; although there are limitations on how much we can rely on the book for accurate and reliable information, it nevertheless provides us with a comprehensive account of the economic and social state of England in the latter part of the eleventh century. This information, combined with other sources, suggests that there was no dramatic change of institutional structures from those that had characterized England before 1066. Ultimately, although the Normans were highly effective in imposing their power in the short term, there was to be nothing distinctly ‘Norman’ about the English society that would emerge and develop in the following century.

The most obvious and effective method by which the Normans imposed their power on England was their use of military force, both in the initial conquest and in the repression of subsequent rebellions and foreign invasions. Although William claimed to have a right of succession to the throne from Edward the Confessor, it was not until he defeated Harold at the battle of Hastings in 1066 that he succeeded in his goal. In the years following the conquest it was far from comfortable ruling for the newly crowned king; most historians
agree that although he initially expressed an interest in forging strong Anglo-Norman relations by reinstating several powerful English earls with their land, a series of rebellions forced a more brutal approach.¹ Rebellions in Exeter in 1068 prompted William to build several imposing castles in an attempt to discourage any potential uprisings, and he proved fairly lenient in his dealings with the rebelling Englishmen.² However, the following year in the Northern regions of England, where there was a strong Scandinavian influence, William was less mild in his reproach. Edgar the Atheling, the ‘Saxon pretender’ to the throne, managed to incite a rebellion in Northumbria with the help of several key English supporters and Danish forces.³ In response William, who had previously tried to quell this attempt on the throne by diplomatic means, marched north and stamped out the rebellion with brute force.⁴ In what is perhaps one of his most notorious and horrific achievements, William went on to utterly devastate a broad swathe of land and the people who lived on it, in what has come to be known as the ‘Harrying of the North.’⁵ There are conflicting reports as to the extent of the casualties, but by all accounts there were many thousands of victims who perished, many of whom would have had nothing to do with the initial rebellion.⁶ In carrying out this prolonged attack, William ensured not only that the land would provide no relief to any future Danish invaders, but also that other regions would take note of this harsh punishment. Thus, as William’s reign as king in England went on and his attempts at reconciling the English to his rule failed, he increasingly employed the use of military force to stamp out key rebellions that posed a threat to his rule. However, the reason William was able to effectively combat these rebellions was at least in part due to the fact he had a tight-knit core of trusted supporters in key institutional roles, so we cannot overlook the importance of administration in effecting control over England.⁷

Thus another way in which William imposed Norman power on England was through his government administration. He brought in a loyal and effective Norman aristocratic elite and gradually instated them in existing institutional positions of power. As has already been mentioned, the king initially appeared willing to used both native English aristocrats and

² Ibid., pp. 138-41.
³ Huscroft, p. 144.
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ Huscroft, p. 144.
Normans in these official positions. However, twenty years after the initial conquest only a handful of the 250 major landholders in England were of Anglo-Saxon descent. By placing the existing institutional powers in the hands of a Norman aristocracy, William ensured that the previously economically efficient government of England was able to continue under the oversight of his close supporters. Judith Green makes an argument that the role of local sheriffs was key to the success of Norman rule, as they held ‘an office at the height of its influence, for the effects of the Conquest had added to its responsibilities.’ Indeed, given that England was an agricultural economy, William would have needed and relied on local knowledge for land management. The Normans also appeared more than willing to employ a ‘mixed bag’ of landholders in these positions, showing practical pragmatism, but there was still a key nucleus of interconnected men that provided stability and continuity in the office. The sheriffs were not the only relevant or powerful administrative office, and they were definitely subordinates to local earls who often played a role in their appointment, but they were nevertheless part of an administrative machine that maintained strong links with the central government. All in all, whilst there may have been slight variations between Norman and Anglo-Saxon feudalism, there were no major institutional changes that took place in the immediate aftermath of the Norman Conquest. Rather, the system was a “model of efficiency, but of efficiency imposed after… the unprecedented disorganization caused by the conquest.” A key group of the Norman aristocracy took on existing roles after a chaotic period, and enabled William to effectively impose his rule on England.

Closely connected to the administrative methods employed by the Normans are the legal reforms they used to solidify and legitimize the effects of the chaotic settlement process following 1066. After the initial battle of Hastings, many native landholders were deprived, justly or otherwise, of their possessions. Thus there was a need either to redress unjust acquisitions or to confirm and consolidate them in law. The first challenge posed to William was the fact that there was no consistent law across the country; local courts and variations of

8 Huscroft, p. 138.
9 Clanchy, pp. 44-5.
12 Ibid, p. 132.
15 Clanchy, pp. 32-4.
16 Ibid., p. 44.
the legal process made for a difficult resolution of the chaos.\textsuperscript{18} The role of sheriffs previously mentioned cannot be overstated, as they mixed knowledge of local traditions and the authority of the King to resolve disputes.\textsuperscript{19} Indeed, they appear to have been remarkably effective in doing so, as the landholders recorded in the 1086 Domesday Book were mostly Norman.\textsuperscript{20} I will discuss the substantive content and possible motivations for the extensive survey later in this essay, but it is important here to mention the legal significance of that text. Given the chaos that had ensued following the initial conquest, there was much uncertainty as to who owned what across the country.\textsuperscript{21} Aristocrats had to make their case for their holdings in local courts, presided over by the sheriffs, and the result of these proceedings was a final, legitimate claim approved by the Crown’s representative.\textsuperscript{22} In addition to certifying landholdings, William used the legal system to impose severe taxes on local regions and to add several laws of his own to undermine local rebellions. Due to political instability caused by English bandits such as Hereward the Wake, William put in place a law that effectively fined local villages whenever a Norman was killed.\textsuperscript{23} The ‘forest laws,’ which granted the king unprecedented dominion over English forestry, gave the king “revenue and recreation as well as jurisdiction over dangerous terrain.”\textsuperscript{24} Since these legal reforms in most cases resulted in Norman aristocrats emerging as rightful landholders and an effective taxation system, it is fair to say that the legal process, combined with administrative efficiency, was an effective tool with which power could be imposed.

Although the Normans had a limited lasting social impact on England, one could argue that – because they were by no means intending to fuel dramatic social reform – any changes worth noting were side effects of the invasion rather than methods used by the Normans to impose power. There is perhaps one exception to this in the way William used the Church to add legitimacy at the local level for his conquest. Before even setting out for England, the then-Duke of Normandy sought, and purportedly received, papal approval for his quest for the English throne.\textsuperscript{25} His appeal to the Church for legitimacy did not stop there, as he followed in his Norman ancestors’ footsteps in using monastic developments to further the reach of his

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 25.
\textsuperscript{19} Green, p. 129.
\textsuperscript{21} Wood, pp. 21-5.
\textsuperscript{23} Clanchy, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{25} Clanchy, p. 32.
power. Churches received large grants of land – and thus great wealth – from the king, presumably in return for loyalty to the crown; by 1086 most of the dominant landholders in the country were major Church officials.\(^{26}\) Whilst it is worth noting that we cannot fully discount genuine religious belief as a motivating factor for William, it cannot be denied that his use of the Church was an effective method of extending his reach into the local communities of England. Yet it is important to note that this method was aided by the fact that the English and Normans shared a religion.\(^{27}\) The social impact of this method was not, therefore, particularly significant. That is not to say that the invasion had no social impact at all; changes to the language and social classes were considerable, if not particularly long-lasting.\(^{28}\) Less a method for imposing power and more a side effect it, the social impact of the Normans was considerably small.\(^{29}\) Rather, the similar social conditions in England allowed the Normans to transition comparatively seamlessly into their rule.

One of the main sources of information for this era, the ‘Domesday Book’, reveals several key aspects of eleventh-century Norman England; namely the political, social and economic structures in place, the spread of power in society and the political intentions of King William. As far as the political structures are concerned, the fact that the book was produced at all points towards an extremely efficient and well-organized government; in the words of Michael Clanchy, this was William’s “single greatest achievement.”\(^{30}\) With respect to the king’s motivations for conducting this survey, Michael Wood argues that it was “borne out of military necessity,” to establish how the king might tax his subjects to fund military ventures.\(^{31}\) This does not appear to coincide with Clanchy’s argument that to conduct the survey at all the King must surely have needed a state in relative stability.\(^{32}\) Indeed, this argument seems more convincing, given that many of the survey’s original questions were unrelated to military issues.\(^{33}\) Whilst the needs of the military machine would likely have been in one eye, the other was surely looking at the more general administrative demands of economic government.\(^{34}\) As to the specific details of the survey, they reveal a society in which the use of land, specifically agricultural production, is the fundamental part of

\(^{26}\) Domesday Book, pp. 394-95.
\(^{27}\) Thomas, p. 109.
\(^{28}\) ibid, pp. 111-12.
\(^{29}\) Ibid.
\(^{30}\) Clanchy, p. 42.
\(^{31}\) Wood, p. 18.
\(^{32}\) M. Clanchy, p. 44.
\(^{33}\) Darby, p. 4.
\(^{34}\) Morillo, pp. 16-18.
economic life; that is, the information relates the production potential of the land, the livestock on it, the number of workers and the comparative efficiency with respect to life under King Edward.\textsuperscript{35} The information on taxes suggests William was attempting to centralise power whilst still rewarding loyal local earls.\textsuperscript{36} However, as Darby points out, Domesday Book has several likely sources of error: it lacks consistency between the different inquisitors who undertook the survey, contains different terms for the same measurements, and perhaps most significantly, it was a compilation of abbreviated versions of smaller, more localized texts.\textsuperscript{37} Why and how these were abbreviated are questions key to fully interpreting the book as a whole. Nevertheless, we can draw more general conclusions above about the state of affairs in England at the time, both from the fact the survey was conducted at all and the substantive content of the survey itself.

In conclusion, the Normans used four distinct key methods in imposing their power on England, and Domesday Book provides us with much of the historical evidence to prove this. The single most important method was the use of military force in achieving political ambitions, but that this method cannot stand on its own two feet; the system of taxation, combined with the administrative organization, much of which was owed to the pre-existing Anglo-Saxon institutions, allowed the military to operate as effectively as it did. Given the extent to which the institutions were being run by a tight-knit Norman aristocracy in 1086, the Normans were hugely successful in imposing power over the English. However, this ‘power’ had nothing distinctly Norman about it; although the Normans did have a significant short-term impact on English society, culture, and economy, not much of this endured in the long run. At the very least, it was later reclaimed as ‘English’. Nevertheless, by the end of the eleventh century the Normans had successfully and effectively imposed their power on England.

\textsuperscript{35} Domesday Book, pp. 394-5, 1008.
\textsuperscript{36} ibid, p. 716.
\textsuperscript{37} Darby, pp. 1-13.
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How can we save China? Now, when the capitalist deluge has so completely brought down unending strife upon the eastern continent, we hear from every mouth the same question: how can China be saved?¹ Do not seek the answer in others. Look for it in our very nation. Seek it, as Chen Duxiu says, “in the cursed system whose victims we all are; in the State capitalistic civilisation which is based on organised violence, on the shameful exploitation of all the nations!”²

I see before us the road to China’s deliverance, and it is painted red. I say this, comrades, because the path to Communism may require us to pay a toll of blood. I have been born in an age of disorder, and I know the sufferings of China well. It is for this reason that I spent my time in Germany seeking the means of our salvation. Before me I see a nation that has not been petted by history. On the contrary, it is us who have been exploited! But we are not alone. For the past two years I have seen Germany’s suffering at the hands of avaricious foreign powers. These powers have extracted more than is fair and broken the back of a once mighty empire, all for the sake of capital gain. With this common ground between us, I believe that Germany can help us see the way forward.

¹ This repetitive, rhetorical style of writing was common in New Youth periodicals, as evidenced by Chen Duxiu’s article ‘Blood and Iron,’ which can be found in Duxiu Chen, Xin Qing Nian (Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 1970), 401-406.
² Ibid., 402.
Before we can go forward, however, we must realise what went wrong by looking back. Kang Youwei once said that “a survey of all states in the world will show that those states that undertook reforms became strong while those states that clung to the past perished.” He was not wrong. However, no desire for reform will ever be translated into action if the national policy is not fixed, and public opinion is not united. Therefore, before we can seek to reform institutions, we must seek to reform people’s minds. Nine years ago Chen Huan-Chang asked “why should the whole school of Confucius not be able to modernise China?”

We now know, comrades, that it cannot. For today the pulse of modern life pushes us to strike at the heart of traditional culture, and reject the Confucian ethics of a bygone, feudal age.

And so it falls to us, comrades, to transform our nation by synthesising Western civilisation with our own. Last year, word reached me in Germany that on May the fourth revolutionaries began to rattle the shackles of capitalist imperialism in China. These actions are undeniably admirable, comrades, but we cannot rest: many more steps must be taken before our work will be done. Last Autumn, while I was at the Universität unter den Linden, Ernst Thälmann frequently came to discuss with us members of the Zirkel für chinesische Sprache proposals to propagate Marxist thought throughout the Chinese populace. Keep in mind, comrades, that in recent times Germany has tasted the suffering we have known for the past eighty years. I have seen firsthand how she chafes under unfair reparations, how her progress is constrained by the insatiable greed of imperial might, and how the militarism bred by capitalism suffocates any chance of harmony and reconciliation. Indeed, it appears that the

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5 The Universität unter den Linden is now known as the Humboldt-Universität (Humboldt University) of Berlin, having changed its name in 1949, and was a major intellectual centre in Europe. By the 1920s, ‘Red Berlin’ had become the centre of Chinese radicalism, and the Comintern was particularly successful at recruiting Chinese students to their anticolonial campaigns. For more information see Gregor Benton, Chinese Migrants and Internationalism: Forgotten Histories, 1917-1945 (New York: Routledge, 2007). Incidentally, the founders of Marxist theory, Marx and Engels also attended this university, see: “Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin,” last modified January 19, 2016, https://www.hu-berlin.de/en/about/history/huben_html/huben_html.
6 The Zirkel für chinesische Sprache (Circle for Chinese language in the KDP) was established in Berlin by Chinese members of the KDP, and whose disciplinary procedures were supervised by the KDP. Ernst Thälmann, leader of the KDP, was said to have taken a personal interest in the Chinese cell in Berlin. While Circle members were primarily motivated by Chinese issues, they were also active in KDP campaigns. See Benton, Chinese Migrants and Internationalism, p. 33.
7 This is a reference to the shared bitterness following the First World War, after which both China and Germany emerged considerably worse off. While Germany was considered to be the ‘mad dog’ of Europe, and was consequently suppressed and controlled by European powers to prevent further outbreaks of aggression,
thirst of capitalism and its twin brother, the state, are not sated unless once-mighty empires are drowning in blood. Yet the greatest misfortune of all is that the majority of people fail to see this destructive connection. Many continue to gauge a nation’s strength on its military and technological innovation. This, my friends, is a monumental mistake. For China’s needs cannot be met by war, but by the peace that only socialism can bring.

It is for these reasons that I have been fascinated by new teachings on the triumphs of social progress and inspired by their noble ideas. Equality for all people! Elimination of the distinction between rich and poor! As for the work of revolutionary reconstruction, I base my ideas on the disadvantages, advantages, accomplishments, and failures found throughout human history. My studies have enabled me to grasp the core tenet of Marxism: that capital is the key to economy and society. The oppressor’s imperialism has stemmed from the surplus of capital. This surplus, in turn, has drawn their greedy eyes to unindustrialised markets such as ours. Such foreign capital falls into three categories. First, the loans to our government. Second, the loans to public and private organisations. Finally, the foreign investment of local government or organisations. In China, foreign capital belongs in the latter of these categories, and has had a deleterious effect on China’s economy. In my opinion, of these the loans, it is those to railways, mines, and other large industrial enterprises that have been the most harmful. Why you ask? Because in financing these operations the imperialist powers have merely exploited our misery and, in turn, kept China weak and impoverished. 8 Our dependence on foreign capital will, I fear, carry with it all of the undesirable effects that plague the West. For in the West, “the wealth of the wealthy springs from the poverty of the poor.” 9 If the vast tide of foreign capital that has swept into China continues unchecked, the wealth of foreign capitalists will spring from the poverty of China. This, my friends, must not be allowed. Capital is not, of course, inherently bad — in the words of Liang Qichao, “where

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8 Around 1920, several intellectuals maintained that China’s economy had been harmed by the financing and operation of railroads and industrial enterprises by imperialist powers. For example, this argument can be seen in Liang Qichao’s views on socialism (see Li Yu-ning, The Introduction of Socialism into China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 11-12, and was also disseminated by members of the Peking Communist Group (see Jane L. Price, Cadres, Commanders, and Commissars: The Training of the Chinese Communist Leadership, 1920-45, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1976), 17.)

there is capital, there is happiness."\textsuperscript{10} This capital, however, must not be held in foreign hands. For our happiness is contingent on its public ownership and, hence, this must be our primary objective. I propose therefore a new government that, when established, will use foreign capital for industrial development, in line with the principles of state socialism in Germany.

It is my hope that, through these measures, China will avoid the social discontent that plagues the West. We will instead rise above such follies to become the social model that all nations will aspire to become. It is true, of course, that none can know what the future holds, but this much is clear: capitalism is our destruction, Marxism is our salvation. We must draw on our knowledge and, if necessary, risk our lives to ensure a new social order. We must dare to think, dare to act, for we have nothing to lose but our chains.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10} Yu-ning, \textit{The Introduction of Socialism into China}, 4.
\textsuperscript{11} ‘Dare to think, dare to act’ later became a crucial slogan during the Great Leap Forward, which Mao used to encourage peasants to follow his lead, see “Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding: party Slogans,” accessed October 11, 2016, http://www.sacu.org/slogans.html.
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When one thinks of the sixties the stereotypes of hippies, protests and political radicalism come to mind. And yet the majority of Americans were conservative, as they supported the Vietnam War for most of the decade and opposed many of the objectives of the Civil Rights and other movements.¹ Our association of the sixties with social and political radicalism shows that the divisions in American society went so deep that a vocal minority could command such attention. The best historical characterisation which captures the sixties is ‘A Generation Divided,’ because it is a politically neutral narrative. It highlights the conflict created by the division between older and younger generations, the conflict within the sixties generation which was divided into competing movements and parties, and the conflict resulting from divisions within the movements themselves. President Kennedy dramatically heightened the American public’s expectations of their system by his declaring a “struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself.”² But these inflated goals were unachievable, and the diversity of people’s responses to Kennedy's appeal – whether by joining the Peace Corps or the Civil Rights Movement or the anti-war movement – and the divisions these created is the focus of this essay.³ How, for example,

could we explain the landslide Democratic victory of Johnson in 1964 and then a mere eight years later the landslide Republican victory of Nixon in 1972? Clearly there were deep social and economic divisions within American society able to be tapped by various political movements. This essay will by no means be a comprehensive answer to these questions, but it will give a good framework for better understanding the sixties. But first, let us turn to why the ‘Generation Divided’ phrase is better than the alternatives.

Historians need to take special care when dealing with the sixties, as with history in general, because its legacies are still hotly contested. ‘A Generation Divided’ is the best way to characterise the sixties as it does not have a particular political ideology or agenda to promote, and thus is able to look at the sixties as a whole and not be blind to counter-narratives. According to leftist memories of the sixties, social movements represented cultural resistance to oppression and the heroic mobilisation of citizens against racism and an unjust war. But this is perhaps too optimistic about a very morally-grey and complicated era. Historical characterisations like the ‘Age of Great Dreams’ capture the hopes but not necessarily the true struggles of the sixties. Likewise, conservative accounts of the sixties often assert that protest movements and hippies destroyed the traditional family structure, caused violence and stirred up divisive debates about foreign policy at a time when unity was required. But again, this characterisation would be too pessimistic. Apocalyptic historical labels like ‘Decade of Nightmares’ or the ‘Unravelling of America’ do not capture the accomplishments and positive developments of the decade. Historian John D'Emilio similarly argues that by “keeping gay out of the sixties,” some historians – in subscribing to the declentionist narrative – implicitly associate the establishment of the gay rights movement in 1969 with negative connotations, thus oversimplifying the era. This is why I think historian Rebecca Klatch's phrase ‘A Generation Divided’ is best suited to characterise the sixties: it gives an accurate snapshot of the sixties while still being politically neutral and does not prejudge history regardless of contrary trends.

As the younger generation came of age in the sixties, many increasingly doubted the wisdom of their elders. ‘A Generation Divided’ is the best way to characterise the sixties

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4 Farber, The Sixties, p.229.
5 Ibid.
because of the gap in years and in outlook between the World War II generation and the sixties generation, particularly over the Vietnam issue. While the older generation was preoccupied with concerns of economic security and settling-down borne out of the Depression and Second World War, the younger baby-boomer generation revolted against this out of restlessness, seeking to use the fifties’ prosperity for the purposes of experimentation.\(^8\) A younger generation of up-and-coming feminists rejected the traditional family roles which had been tied to fighting the Cold War, denouncing them as a ‘culture of constraints.’\(^9\) A chasm of disconnect grew between an older generation’s administration, which could only see the Vietnam War for its geopolitical implications of containing Communism internationally, and a younger generation, who began to think in terms of Vietnam’s national independence and colonial liberation.\(^10\) President Johnson’s breaking of his 1964 election promise of peace by escalating the conflict disillusioned many Americans and spurred the growth of the anti-war movement amongst youth.\(^11\) Some of the older generation, in turn, militarised against these developments, as is well illustrated by Johnson’s intervention at the 1968 Democratic Convention. He manipulated the convention to adopt his policy positions (for example, a hard-line stance on Vietnam) as the platform in order to try to safeguard his legacy.\(^12\) When faced with such an unresponsive system, many youth turned towards alternative political expressions such as the anti-war movement, or towards a broader movement of counterculture and rock and roll, which indirectly undermined the legitimacy of political leaders.\(^13\) Thus different values and historical contexts between different generations, when combined with controversial societal issues, set up the sixties for greater divisions.

The sixties generation was not only divided against their elders, but also against each other. ‘A Generation Divided’ is the best way to characterise the sixties because that generation itself was divided into competing social and political movements, such as Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), as well as youth who were apolitical.\(^14\) The 1962 Port Huron Statement of the New Left SDS revealed their

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\(^9\) Ibid., p.57-58.
\(^13\) McMahon, \textit{Major Problems}, p.451; Farber, \textit{The Sixties}, p.221.
\(^14\) Klatch, \textit{A Generation Divided}, p.2.
frustration at the contradiction between American ideals of equality and actual practice, their solidarity with the Third World and their willingness to take action to achieve justice. But this didn’t just place leftist movements like SDS in opposition to the older generations, as it also brought them into conflict with many of their fellow youth who were of a more traditional political bent. The 1960 Sharon Statement of the New Right YAF expressed firm support for individual liberty, small government, capitalism and strong anti-Communism abroad. The people who made up YAF were probably like Allard Lowenstein to an extent. He, like many of his generation, refused to make the jump that others did from criticising liberalism for its shortcomings to actually repudiating Great Society liberalism itself. Indeed, you could be a liberal (either on the left or right) if you believed the Vietnam War was a mistake able to be corrected peacefully by policy reform that would allow America to get back to its historic mission. But if you saw Vietnam as a war of American imperialist aggression which afforded an opportunity to resist and press for revolutionary changes in American society, then you were a radical. Whether for reasons of disinterest, complexity or risk, most students did not protest or get politically involved, and movements like SDS and YAF only represented specific portions of their generation, not American sixties youth as a whole. But those who did get involved left a real impact, for they reflected the divisions of American society over the views of elders and of fellow students.

Competing social movements like SDS and YAF were not the only markers of division within the sixties generation. The societal battles were also played out across the Democrat-Republican divide. Mainstream politics in the sixties was not just about liberal reforms and policies, but also reflected the strong conservative wave of the New Right, which contested and expressed opposition to them. Just as the anti-war movement stood ready to challenge Johnson’s control over the political centre, so too was the Republican Party ready to criticise the Democratic administration and benefit from its failings. For example, during the 1968 Presidential campaign Republican Richard Nixon was able to appeal very effectively to what he dubbed the ‘silent majority’ of Americans, who were very concerned about the left’s reforms, the Vietnam quagmire, the poor state of the economy and the increased radicalism of

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16 Ibid., pp.21-22.
19 Ibid.
protest movements disrupting ‘law and order.’ Arguably Nixon was swept into power in 1968 because he had promised he would begin to seek an honourable peace from the Vietnam conflict. Between 1968 and 1971, however, anti-war protests became more violent as they realised Nixon’s betrayal. Nixon seized upon and exaggerated this for his own political gain, even using government agents to infiltrate movements and provoke them to violence to discredit and possibly repress them as terrorists. Nixon – and later Ronald Reagan – opposed big government spending on Democratic Great Society programs, pushed for tax cuts, called protesters un-American, lamented the decline of traditional family values and made use of Christian rhetoric to empower a new kind of right-wing movement. Christian conservative movements, which opposed developments like the establishment of the gay rights movement in 1969 as representing the onset of moral decay, would have supported such Republicans.

Despite their best efforts, some sixties movements could not weather the divisions within their own ranks. ‘A Generation Divided’ is the best way to characterise the sixties because even within some of the movements there were deep divisions along lines of race, class, and gender, some of which split up the movements to form new ones. One such example was the growth of an independent Chicano movement out of the Civil Rights Movement. Although Martin Luther King Jr.’s Poor People’s Campaign was aimed at imposing an arguably paternalistic racial unity on the American oppressed poor, it ironically highlighted the major differences in culture, analysis and solutions between African Americans, Chicanos and Native Americans such that they needed to split off and form separate movements. The Civil Rights Movement itself was split after King’s assassination in 1968 between those who sought to continue his doctrine of non-violent action, even in the face of police brutality like that during the 1963 Birmingham Riots, and Black Power groups such as the Black Panther Party who advocated for the use of violence because the pace of reform was too slow. In addition, some women in SDS felt that not enough reforms for them were being advocated by their movement. In their 1967 statement from the SDS Women’s Workshop, they advocated

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23 McMahon, Major Problems, p. 452.
24 Ibid., pp.451-455.
26 Bloom, Long Time Gone, p.225.
28 Matusow, The Unravelling of America, pp.87, 375; Freedman, ‘Coming of Age’, p.212.
that men in the movement must confront their own male chauvinism, claimed that campus regulations and certain SDS programs discriminate against women, and that women were currently in a relationship of colonial-like subservience to men in society and in the movement.\textsuperscript{29} Many women who spoke out against sexism within the movement overlapped with those who split away from SDS and formed radical new feminist movements which would be highly influential in the seventies.\textsuperscript{30} The prospects for SDS and YAF would continue to worsen, as in 1969 each of the movements split into warring factions at their annual general meetings, thus destroying their respective ideological and organisational unities.\textsuperscript{31} Movements, like generations in general, are not monolithic or unitary, and tend to speak with contradictory voices which can sometimes tear them apart.\textsuperscript{32}

In conclusion, the best characterisation of the sixties is ‘A Generation Divided’ because it is a politically neutral narrative, and because it highlights the division between older and younger generations, the division within the sixties generation between competing movements and parties, and the divisions within the movements themselves. The sixties was never about pure, uncontested liberal reform. On the contrary, while movements like the New Left exposed the deep flaws in sixties Great Society liberalism, this also ironically stirred up a right-wing counterculture.\textsuperscript{33} In addition, the personalities and legacies of the sixties have continued right up to the present day. Youth political movements like YAF shaped the future leaders of the eighties and nineties and the political establishment of today.\textsuperscript{34} People who had been in the vanguard of movements like SDS, such as Tom Hayden, later helped Barack Obama become President in 2008, fulfilling many of the dreams of the Civil Rights Movement.\textsuperscript{35} Even though the post-sixties era has seen a conservative ascendency in American politics and government, the cultural shifts which occurred through the activism of the New Left acted as a constraint on what the right could accomplish.\textsuperscript{36} Indeed, it is thanks to the feminist movements of the sixties and seventies that we have a woman running for President in 2016. In many ways, the divisions of the sixties are evident in the current Presidential election. Hillary Clinton came of age in the sixties, and committed herself to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[31] Ibid., pp.9, 207, 231-232.
\item[32] Ibid., p.5.
\item[33] Fraser and Gerstle, \textit{The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order}, p.237.
\item[34] Klatch, \textit{A Generation Divided}, p.2.
\item[36] Ibid., p.19; Fraser and Gerstle, \textit{The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order}, pp.228-229.
\end{footnotes}
changing the system from within instead of resisting the system. Now she is part of the political establishment and has contributed towards positive liberal change in American society. Donald Trump also came of age in the sixties, and his campaign focusing on ‘law and order’ is arguably strikingly similar to Republican nominee Richard Nixon's in 1968. But this election, like the sixties in general, is not a revolution or an apocalypse but rather part of an ongoing debate between different political factions essential to the longevity and healthy functioning of any democratic society.

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Guy Halsall once imagined the historical reputation of the Vikings being decided by a courtroom.\(^1\) Surely, in such a metaphor literary sources would serve as witnesses. If so, it is easy to see they are subject to three problems, which in turn impose limitations on literary evidence. Firstly, there is the author: matters of perspective and agenda. Secondly, the content: genre, relevance and independence. Thirdly, the matter of validation: limited verifiability and questionable representativeness. These are not wholly independent from each other, and validation is further compounded by the historian approximating the lawyer more than the judge or the jury. Yet no-one would argue that witnesses are completely useless, and even given their limitations they can help uncover the truth. Thus it is apparent that literary sources can be highly complementary, that they can provide unique insights and that they need not all be approached by a single methodology. In effect, historians seek to filter sources and make connections with others, and so present a realistic idea of the past.

By their very nature, literary sources require authors. However, not all texts are as ‘authored’ as others. In many instances, scholars do not know who wrote a text: this is particularly true in the cases of the Icelandic Sagas and Beowulf. Both are examples of oral traditions that were later written down, probably by clergymen. This uncertainty complicates interpretation because scholars do not know to what extent the scribes altered the traditions, especially regarding religion. It is reasonable to suggest that clerical scribes would have been more inclined to remove or downplay pagan elements, and if scholars knew specifics about the authors then further contextualisation of the sources would be possible. However, this is not akin to exposing the historical truth as it merely allows the use of probable rather than

\(^1\) Guy Halsall, ‘Playing by Whose Rules? A Further Look at Viking Atrocity in the Ninth Century,’ in Medieval History (Bangor, 1992), pg. 3.
possible. This is true of other limitations imposed on literary sources by the authorial problem.

A given author has a given perspective from which their text was created. In the case of monks such as Bede this is often religious, hence the suppositions noted above. Yet all authors are individual people, and the extent to which their occupational perspectives influenced their texts varied. In *The Annals of Xanten* (an abbey), Viking raids are clearly expressed in religious terms of ‘the heathen’ and ‘the Christians.’\(^2\) In contrast, the *Annals of St Bertin*, are much more regional: ‘Northmen,’ ‘Saxons’ and ‘Aquitanians’ all being terms of reference.\(^3\) For the chroniclers of the abbey of St Bertin, an inferred religious perspective was manifested more in terms of specified victimisations like ‘killed the bishop’ or ‘pillaged many cities and monasteries’ rather than the entire framework of interpretation, as in Xanten.\(^4\) This regionalisation actually raises an important further point about perspective: did the chroniclers of St Bertin, or perhaps their sources, know enough about the Vikings that scholars can trust the specification of Danes? This problem is particularly acute in dealing with the histories of most barbarian groups prior to the fall of the Western Empire. As most barbarian societies appear to have been oral rather than literary, the literary source evidence invariably comes from Romans or Greeks, and they interpreted what they saw or heard in terms of the Greco-Roman world, as well as their own personal interests. Naturally, this makes identification of various groups – including the term barbarian – highly suspect, and leaves little evidence of what the barbarian groups themselves thought. Caesar noted that the Gauls tortured widows when their husbands died suspiciously.\(^5\) Caesar neglected to explain why this happened. In other places in the *Gallic Wars*, Caesar expressed cynicism toward the explanations he heard for Gallic practices: whether the cynicism was warranted cannot be told from Caesar.\(^6\) At best, scholars can look at a text with a known author and then metaphorically apply filters to remove the author’s personal and cultural biases and preconceptions to develop a highly probabilistic image of the barbarian. This image, in the case of Caesar’s Gauls, involves human sacrifice.

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4. Ibid., years 843 and 859.
It seems natural to suppose that a Roman like Caesar would dislike human sacrifice. It follows from this perspective that such a Roman might care to note that the Gauls engaged in human sacrifice. However, this line of reasoning does not account for why Tacitus would claim the Germans do too, when Caesar’s earlier digression on the Germans lacked any mention of human sacrifice. The perspective paradigm above is simply not sufficient to filter out the author. Perspective can explain why certain observations or comments were made. Bede’s interest in the Church means the treatment of royal women is unlikely to be as detailed as Gregory of Tours, a cleric involved in court life. However, generally it is agenda which accounts for the systematic selection of material; Bede also wrote specifically to celebrate the Church. For Caesar, noting Germanic human sacrifice meant there were similarities with a people he was strongly arguing were completely dissimilar: the Gauls.

Discerning agenda is more complex than perspective, as it requires information about the authors and their audience. For political figures like Caesar this is relatively simple, but a lot of authors are like Victor of Vita: what we know about them is largely based on inference from texts over which they exercised control. Jordanes is a particularly clear example of the challenge represented by the author. His work is derived from that of Cassiodorus, whose lost work is imagined to be a propagandistic history of the Goths. Jordanes claimed several things about himself and his text, including Gothic descent, and it is belief in those claims that largely determines whether or not the Getica is viewed as anti-Gothic. There is little more known, except that his work was commissioned. The audience of the Getica may well have just been its commissioner or it could have been broader. This essay supposes that most authors had an audience in mind and assumed the audience knew that status, and consequently authors were generally not troubled to elaborate further. This discussion of agenda and perspective makes it clear that the authors of literary evidence had a critical

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7 Ibid., VI.16.
10 Andrew M. Riggsby, ‘The “Other” and the Other “Other”’, in *Caesar in Gaul and Rome: War in Words*, (Austin, 2006), pg. 64.
12 Ibid., pp. 61, 69.
13 Ibid., pg. 70.
relationship with content: no author can be treated as having written merely what was. It is also true that audience expectation would have influenced content.\textsuperscript{15}

Evidence content represents the hardest limitation imposed by the problems discussed here. After all, if there is no information then it is not possible to weigh likelihoods, and informed guesswork becomes assumption rather than inference. Sometimes alternative sources of information can be found. The Vandals are commonly located in Northern Poland prior to their invasive migration through Gaul and Spain into North Africa.\textsuperscript{16} As there is no known Vandalic history of the Vandals, this origin point was reconstructed from non-Vandal texts, including the \textit{Getica}, or from archaeology.\textsuperscript{17} Both methods rely on such critical assumptions as an association between certain archaeological patterns and the Vandals, or on the validity of the other texts, often in ways incompatible with the arguments used to justify the authorial filters used to develop the Goths.\textsuperscript{18} Arguing that the Goths believed themselves to be from Scandinavia is one thing; claiming that their oral traditions accurately located an enemy group in time and space is quite another.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, even in sources which historians treat as historical or descriptive, what the evidence actually contains necessarily directs the historical questions, not just the answers.

Analysis of literary sources is further complicated by a lack of independence in the sources. This extends beyond Bede’s reliance on Gildas, a known text, or even Jordanes and Cassiodorus, where the ancestral text is unknown, to the very structures used in the sources. The former issue is serious as it means there is less information than at first glance, and in the \textit{Getica}’s case there is a need to filter for two different authors but not enough information to develop a widely satisfying approach. The classicising of late antique and early medieval writers presents a more subtle challenge to the historian. One adaptation to the absent content problem is simply to try and use the sources themselves to discover more about the worldviews of their societies. This means using the texts themselves to generate an understanding of the perspectives of the authors and their cultures. Thus classical models are more troublesome than surface-level complications like continuity of the Vandals and Vandili: the former could have been named for the latter. At a deeper level, the particular

\textsuperscript{15} Goffart, pg. 63; Herwig Wolfram, ‘Origo Et Religo: Ethnic Traditions and Literature in Early Medieval Texts’, in \textit{From Roman Provinces to Medieval Kingdoms}, (Florence, 2006), pg. 84.
\textsuperscript{16} A. H. Merrills and R. Miles, ‘The Vandals in History’, in \textit{The Vandals} (Chichester, 2010), pg. 24.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., pg. 25.
\textsuperscript{19} Wolfram, pp. 75, 84.
response evoked by classicised text cannot be taken as authentic to the time and place of the text. Supposing that classicising explains everything is a neat solution, but it is entirely reasonable that Hunnic and Viking victims felt similarly, although possibly for different reasons.

The classical model is almost a subtle genre for, as with hagiography or epic poetry, there are conventions which the scholar must seek to isolate. The difficulty is that why these conventions manifest in the way they do is unknowable, and thus the scholar lacks both complete insight into the mentality of the text and accessible content. Certain genres are more limiting than others. *Beowulf*, as an epic poem, deals with clearly fictional events, but the fiction is set in a world of halls and warriors: features of real and ancestral society. To draw historical interpretations, scholars have to engage with the genre and its features. If deciding that *Beowulf* retold history requires utter credulity, scholars must exercise care to avoid reading the same in the authors and audiences of hagiography, where miracles are necessarily real. Between them, *Beowulf* and hagiography represent degrees of fiction, but hagiographies were, as authored texts, factual, regardless of modern assessment.

Thus far, addressing the limitations imposed by authorship and source content has resulted in a probabilistic, uncertain picture of the past, which has assumed the validity of both the information and the methods used to engage with the source limitations. Information validity follows from some of the above discussion. For example, to use the sentiments of a monastic chronicler to infer the motivations of the described Viking raider is to assume that they shared the same perspective or that the information the chronicler inherited did so. Viking scholarship often proposes that Christian barbarians and Vikings had quite different cultural norms, implying a necessary invalidity. Bede, as a monk of humble origin, cannot be supposed to share the same worldview as the warrior aristocracy: theirs is a mentality Bede cannot express, but *Beowulf* might. Quite simply, some conclusions cannot be made from some evidence, even if the angle of mentalities is taken.

With the Icelandic Sagas this becomes a more complex question. As ‘communal’ texts, sagas would have been perceived to capture some truth, but they relate to an era several hundred

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20 Halsall pg. 6.
years before their written composition. Furthermore, sagas and texts in general are difficult to date, which particularly complicates source comparison. The central question of the saga remains: to what extent did sagas represent the mentalities of their characters and are those characters more properly called subjects? Answering this question would require understanding the audience of both the sagas and their described societies. However, the best evidence – or even the only evidence – for either is the sagas themselves. Whether a text is authored in a traditional sense or the result of traditions, the audience the text was written for is the only audience that scholars can understand as sharing the assumptions of the text. Is the Saga of Ref the Sly darkly humorous? Was Ref moral? Was he those things to the audience that developed the saga, the audience at transcription or just modern readers? Validation is impossible: there is no alternative evidence, nor are these questions conjecturable in the way The Ecclesiastical History can be known to not represent an aristocratic mentality. Scholars are left essentially to recursively construct the framework to approach these texts, and although there is more evidence for some barbarian groups than others, the validity of attempting this ought to be questioned.

Furthermore, whether lacking alternative evidence or presented with a relative wealth of it, scholars, like lawyers, do not take a passive role in seeking the truth. For many scholars this extends to translation, an activity which exacerbates the gulf between scholarly knowledge of the author’s assumptions and the audience’s. Translation requires consideration of meaning, and thus context. Words or phrases can be translated differently, meaning differing interpretations are entirely possible. For instance, Andrew Gillett criticised Herwig Wolfram for privileging ‘Germanic philology,’ therefore translating ‘spoon’ as ‘troll’ and concluding that the Vandals feared the Goths rather than mocked them. These two quite different interpretations arise purely because of the scholars’ active involvement and their different conceptions of the quoted passage’s audience and author. Differences in translation can also arise from different views regarding the wider history. These issues allude to the question of anachronism: are scholars able to ask questions that would have made sense to the peoples they are studying? This has proved particularly controversial in terms of barbarian identity, with some scholars believing that barbarians did not conceive of ethnic identities in the way

22 Ibid.; Goffart, pp. 68-69.
24 Ibid., pp. 14, 16.
that approximates how modern scholars might consider themselves German, French or
English. This limitation also extends the above discussion: scholars lack knowledge about the
ways in which barbarian societies tried to think about their worlds, not just their social
assumptions.\textsuperscript{26}

Validation is not always impossible. \textit{Beowulf} may be a fictional text but it is a text of halls
and of burials that match archaeological finds. The \textit{Annals of Xanten} and the \textit{Annals of St
Bertin} both mention a deal between Vikings and Charles the Bald, although it is entirely
possible that such non-first-hand accounts worked from the same sources.\textsuperscript{27} Whether through
comparison with other literary sources, suitably filtered, or with archaeological evidence,
literary sources do not need to be treated in isolation. This can be challenging due to the lack
of independence, but it is possible. This applies within limited settings too: part of the value
of the sagas is in their sharing of elements.\textsuperscript{28} Likewise, filtering represents a self-contained
partial validation of sources.

Filtering is also a means of systematically contextualising evidence, which is much easier
with literary sources than archaeology. The grave of a horse near a chieftain’s burial is
suggestive of a link. The chieftain’s grave itself can say that the burial’s patrons once
possessed any discovered grave goods. That they could afford to bury the goods is reasonable
conjecture, but still conjecture. The exact purpose of the goods is not knowable from a grave
either. Even a single annals entry can say much more than a single artefact because it can be
approached like archaeological evidence or as literary evidence. Arguments for a Vandal
Renaissance under Thrasamund use literary sources from a more archaeological perspective:
these are works which existed in the middle of the Vandal era, therefore they are a sign of
North Africa’s literary flourishing in Vandal Africa.\textsuperscript{29} Interpretation of the works themselves
might suggest either Vandal concern for extant Roman loyalties or evidence of dynastic
violence.\textsuperscript{30} Literary sources have an internal context generated by their content, and two
external contexts: those of their authors, and of the situation they were produced in. In
contrast, artefacts can only be contextualised via argument, which limits their uses.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[26] Tucker, pg.21.
\item[27] Xanten, entry for 845; St. Bertin, entry for 845.
\item[28] Tucker, pg. 22.
\item[29] Yitzhak Hen, ‘Out of Africa: The Vandal Court of Thrasamund’, in \textit{Roman Barbarians: The Royal Court and
Culture in the Early Medieval West} (New York, 2007), pg.74.
\item[30] Ibid., pg. 84-86.
\end{footnotes}
Proper use of literary sources is naturally cautious and emphasises the lack of certainty in the interpretations, but even if this must be borne in mind, there are interpretations to be made. Literary sources cover a huge scope of human society, and the barbarian evidence is much the same. Literary treatment of law codes can yield information about social hierarchies, organisation and values, although the extent to which the codes were experienced is left unanswered. The surviving works of Cassiodorus represent fascinating insights into political events and policies which otherwise may not have left any record, such as Theodoric’s attempts influence other barbarian successor states. The wars which his failures did not prevent left other traces, but without sources like Cassiodorus’ letters an important part of Ostrogothic Italy would be entirely unknown. The explicit works of history, the sagas and poems mentioned above may not provide entirely trustworthy accounts of human life, but possible or even probable lives can be reconstructed. These can then be used to inform archaeological evidence: an Anglo-Saxon hall is a building, but Beowulf creates a place, breathes life into impressions in mud. The Icelandic sagas are a classic example of versatility of literary sources: saga telling is mentioned in them. Literary sources are at once both cultural artefacts and culturally expressive.

Flawed though they may be, no history of barbarian society could ever hope to present a fleshed-out people, society or state without careful filtering and mapping of literary sources. By thinking about and acknowledging the limitations imposed by the author, content and validation problems, scholars can filter the literary evidence. While these analyses by nature lack certainty, the systematic contextualisation allows readers, especially fellow scholars, to assess the reasonableness of conclusions. This contextualisation also involves incorporating other literary sources and archaeological evidence, which may provide external sources of validation and increase the resemblance of interpretations of the past to the actual past. Scholars are also not bound by literary sources to the words on the page: they can look to the external contexts of a given text. Through such treatment historians are able to consider literary sources ranging from histories to laws to stories, and thus develop images of barbarian history which look like human life, images more than “hairy men beating each other up.”

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31 Tucker, pp. 15-16.
32 Peter Baker, ‘Introduction’, in Honour, Exchange and Violence in Beowulf (Suffolk 2013), pg. 3
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Primary Sources


Secondary Sources


What do historians mean when they refer to ‘identity’ when discussing both the Normans and their neighbours? Why has it proven so challenging to agree on the definition and significance of this term?

When discussing ‘identity’ in the history of the Normans and their neighbours, historians refer to an imagined common descent, tied to a place, with characteristics attached to that descent. The identity is emphasized by comparison and ‘othering’, as well as through institutions and buildings. The Normans developed a strong self-identity through their origin myth and a powerful ducal government with successful military exploits. However, it has proven challenging to agree on a comprehensive definition and significance of the term for three reasons. First, identity labels are flexible and change over time so arriving at a fixed ‘definition’ of how the Normans saw themselves is a difficult exercise. Second, Norman identity was taken beyond Normandy and so assessing its significance and staying power in a cultural cocktail in England and Italy is complex. Lastly, the evidence available of Norman identity is largely filtered through the eyes of particular medieval writers whose treatment is different depending on the narrative they are shaping. This essay will interrogate some of the constructions made by both the Normans, their writers, and the historians who have studied them since. I will seek to construct my own version of Norman self-identity; that is, an imagined understanding of common descent fused to the Norman region and polity, and strengthened through success in war and conquest. However, when the Norman natio was removed from the equation, the identity of the Norman gens was vulnerable in the long term.

When talking of identity in the context of the Normans, historians have largely focused on the Norman conception of self; the extent to which they saw themselves as a ‘people’, or the gens Normannorum, across different places and time periods. This analysis has at its starting point
the Norman duchy in Northern France as a political entity and geographic point of identity.\(^1\) Dudo of St Quentin gave literary shape to this by providing an origin myth that made the Normans a people with common ancestry, descended from Rollo and the Vikings who migrated there.\(^2\) Despite the account containing an acknowledgement of Rollo ruling over a diverse peoples, this myth could still act as a common identity marker for people living within Normandy to look back to. Other inherited identity markers such as language and religion, though common to Normans, were also common to other parts of France during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and so could not act as strong points of delineation. Despite the ethnic make-up of Normans probably not being too different from its neighbors, an origin myth provided this delineation, and allowed for the Norman *gens* to be more than just a political entity.

It is to this point of origin that many of the writers of the period attached certain characteristics to the Normans: Geoffrey Malaterra described the “inborn trait” of the Normans as being avid for domination.\(^3\) This warlike trait is also alluded to by Orderic Vitalis who appeals to imagery of “mother Normandy” to call for unity and an outward channeling of Norman aggression.\(^4\) The Norman *gens* was therefore an idea of common descent attached to certain characteristics, especially warlike ones, and not simply an ethnic identity.\(^5\) According to Graham Loud, these characteristics contained within the sources are proof that the “Normans considered themselves to be a race in their own right.”\(^6\)

It is important to take the use of Norman ‘race’ beyond late modern conceptions of the term. For historians’ analysis of identity, problems with categorizing people into groups based on descent emerged after Hitler’s racial project in World War Two, and since then a more nuanced understanding of identity formation has developed. All markers of identity, including descent, are formed within a social context, and are therefore impossible to place rigid definitions on. The idea of a Norman ‘race’ is therefore a social construction rather than a biological fact. Medieval writers themselves didn’t think of the *gens* as solely a biological

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6. Ibid., p. 111.
entity, often placing emphasis on “ideas of environmental influence and… the cultural and social component of ethnic identity.” But the language used to describe identity is still bound up in racial terminology, since translations of ‘gens’ often rely on the “translator’s choices of ethnic and racial terms from modern English.” Historians must therefore be aware of the loaded language of identity when discussing both the Normans and their neighbours. Imagined genealogical origin was one part of identity formation, but must be viewed in conjunction with other social aspects of identity.

Historians have also analysed the way in which identity was reflected in the built form and in institutions. In England, the Normans embarked on an extensive building program on a scale not seen before. William of Malmesbury reflected that “you may see everywhere churches in villages, towns, and cities, monasteries rising in a new style of architecture.” The Norman identity was imposed on the British landscape through castles and churches that showed the power of the state and that the occupation of England was permanent. Likewise, the institutions of Church and government themselves acted as bastions of Norman identity in England at a time of growth in their respective influence in society. In this sense, buildings and institutions physically imposed both the Norman presence and their identity. Conversely, in Sicily King Roger used a distinctly different form of rule by maintaining local laws and customs as well as religious practices, preserving “an autonomy” of local identity. The Norman style of architecture fused with Arab and Byzantine craftsmanship to reflect a more assimilated identity, rather than a ‘Normanisation’ of the region. This shows the power of institutions and architecture in reflecting culture and identity. They are more tangible markers of identity than origin myths or descent, and can both project a new identity or reflect and maintain the status quo.

A third important aspect of identity formation is in comparison with other groups of people. This is particularly evident in the historical writing when the Normans are compared to their

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8 Ibid., p. 44.
12 Ibid., p. 189.
neighbours or those they rule over. Malaterra compares the military might of the Normans with the weakness of the Greeks, who were “given by custom to the delights and pleasures more than to the study of war.”

William of Malmesbury assesses the conquest of England through a moral lens. He portrays the English as a people fallen from grace, whose nobles were “abandoned to gluttony and lechery” and whose “hot blood [had] no staying power,” compared to the Normans who raised the “standard of religion” upon their arrival. This categorization of the ‘other’ defined who the Normans were, and served to legitimise Norman rule by creating cultural superiority over those they fought. The definition of ‘other’ could also be extended to physical characteristics to emphasise and delineate Norman identity. In the Bayeux tapestry, the different hairstyles between Normans and English are clearly evident. By the late twelfth century, once an Anglo-Norman identity had established itself, neighbouring Irish were described by Gerald of Wales as “abandoned to nature,” a people whose features of beard and dress are “so barbarous that they cannot be said to have any culture.”

It is evident that an ‘other’ forms a contrast in order to affirm particular aspects of Norman identity or rule, whether it be the English in the 1070s or the Irish in the 1180s. This shows that identity operates in a social context; it is “a system in which meanings are always derived from context and from comparison.”

One difficulty that arises in light of the social aspect of identity is understanding how firmly identities were held. Ralph Davis challenged the extent to which the concept of Norman selfhood was actually present beyond the accounts of particular writers such as Dudo’s origin myth and the writing of Orderic, and argues that most Normans until the end of the eleventh century “were indifferent to whether they called themselves Norman or French.” He argues that the ‘myth’ of Norman identity emerged in the twelfth century as greater assimilation into surrounding cultures occurred; it was an attempt to define themselves as their practices and culture became less distinctive. The fluidity of labels was also present in the description of their neighbors: the label of barbarism was transferred from the English to the Welsh, and could be lost by adopting the cultural practices of the Normans, as David I did according to

18 Ralph Davis, The Normans and Their Myth, p. 54.
Malmesbury. Indeed, Malmesbury’s entire history was framed as a progression from barbarism to civility that tied together identity, culture and religious practice. Identity’s fluidity therefore makes it hard to place fixed definitions on the Normans’ conception of ‘self’ and of ‘other.’

Despite this, Graham Loud argues that the description of a Norman gens in the written sources, that attached certain characteristics to people of common descent, was a norm of medieval writing dating back to Isodore of Seville. Its consistency with other writing of the period strengthens the claim that such descriptions actually reflected society’s views to some extent. He therefore claims there was a Norman identity before and immediately after the conquest of England, and that the idea of common descent was “fundamental” in the Normans’ conception of themselves. Likewise Hugh Thomas challenges the significance of the use of ‘French’ by English scribes to describe the Normans, arguing that it may say more about English perceptions rather than the self-identity of the Normans. The earliest French chroniclers of the conquest of England, William of Poitiers and William of Jumièges, described the invaders as ‘Normans’. Therefore, while there may be challenges in ‘fixing’ Norman identity entirely, the power of the origin myth and pride in their history alongside ‘Norman’ characteristics to frame an ethnic identity cannot be underestimated.

The next challenge is in assessing the staying power of such identity when the Normans moved to different places and assimilated into local cultures. While the Normans initially imposed their own identity on the landscape and on the people in England, by the late twelfth century a distinct English identity was emerging. Bartlett argues that the Anglo-Norman state had all the ingredients for a strong new self-identity through a political dynasty, an (eventually) common language and the territorial integrity of an island state to create a “match between people and polity”. In Southern Italy and Sicily, a smaller Norman elite blended with the local aristocracy to create local identities. The conquest is described in the sources as a Norman enterprise, with links made between the Hauteville characteristics and

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20 Ibid., p. 61.
their Norman heritage, but the survival of the Norman project in Italy depended on assimilation. They mixed with the local population, and the distinctiveness of the descendants of the Norman invaders quickly waned. Thomas argues that the Norman identity was solidified by war and conquest. It follows that they were therefore undone by their own success in England and Sicily, since they no longer had ideological reasons for maintaining their identity.

While this is to some extent true, I would contend that the emergence of an identity of a conquering people operates within a wider framing of identity in relation to place. The accounts of Norman military exploits solidified Norman identity when it was the Duchy fighting for its existence or exercising its power over others. When conquest was not linked to the Norman duchy, as in Italy and Antioch, there was no longer a place on which to fix Norman identity. In England, this took some time as the connections to the mainland were in place for some time, until the civil wars of Stephen’s reign resulted in many nobles having to cut their ties to Normandy. In Italy, the heroism of individuals could not act as a long-term replacement for a uniting political identity tied to a homeland. Both William of Apulia and Geoffreya Malaterra focus their Norman identity on family dynasties rather than cultural origin as a whole, with Normandy no longer being a decisive factor in determining political loyalty as early as the 1090s. When coupled with assimilation and intermarriage with local populations, a Norman identity was doomed. While they still talk of ‘Normans,’ the sources show that geographic origin couldn’t – or didn’t need to – serve as a powerful uniting force once new political entities separate from the Norman duchy were established.

The last challenge historians face in assessing identity is the way that the primary source writers construct their own interpretations of identity to fit a wider narrative. Already identified was William of Malmesbury’s framing of a development of English history from barbarism to civilization. Ewan Johnson argues that William of Apulia places greater emphasis on the geographic boundaries between groups than on ethnic ones, in order to put

26 Ibid., p. 44.
27 Ibid.
forward a model of Italian rulership.\textsuperscript{30} While he does assign behavioral traits to ethnic groups, these are not applicable in all situations. Instead, he focuses on a “common political identity” forged in Southern Italy.\textsuperscript{31} These are just two examples of the way that the writers’ treatment of identity is never consistent or neutral. Historians are therefore trying to interpret Norman identity through the lens of these writers. This adds to the challenge of creating a consistent definition of Norman identity. One way to navigate around this is to use other forms of evidence. For instance, Joanna Drell looks at the naming practices in charters of Southern Italy to show the way that ethnic memory operated after Norman conquest.\textsuperscript{32} She concludes that, despite new, multicultural polities being formed, Lombards and Normans referenced their lineage “to justify or emphasise their links to power: both their ancestral status and the status to which they aspired.”\textsuperscript{33} A combination of evidence types can therefore perhaps offer a better insight into the conception of self in this period. However, in many cases – such as in the early Norman period – there is limited evidence available.

A history of identity is therefore somewhat problematic as there is always an element of conjecture in arguing how a group of people understood themselves and their neighbours. Identity is constructed, not fixed and comes with loaded terms dependent on a subjective understanding of the world. Historians have debated what markers of identity were important at particular points, and to what extent Norman identity went beyond a ‘myth’ of cultural origin. Once identity was defined, it is difficult to point to exactly when it fell away. I have argued there was a Norman identity present before the Norman conquest of England, but that was linked to a place and to a polity, meaning it fell away once those two unifying factors no longer had tangible significance. Emphasising cultural difference through comparison to their neighbours, and imposing identity through institutions and on the landscape, could only go so far to preserve Norman identity once assimilation occurred and ties to Normandy weakened. In other words, the Norman \textit{gens} as a collective identity ultimately relied on the Norman \textit{natio} for its survival.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p. 91.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p. 89.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 201.
Bibliography


*Bayeux Tapestry tituli.* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayeux_Tapestry_tituli


Melissa Williams’ *Panguru*, published in 2014, is the most recently published history focusing specifically on Māori urban migration. In dealing with migration to Auckland from the Northland area of Panguru from the 1930s to the 1970s, life in Auckland for both the migrants and their children and with return migration from the mid-1980s, *Panguru* deals with a longer period of Māori migration in the twentieth century than other accounts but also provides the most complete analysis of what Williams calls the “life-course” of migration, encompassing an “inter-generational journey,” return migration and death, compared to other work published to date.\(^1\) Despite Māori urbanisation being seen by some, as Aroha Harris notes in her work on the Department of Māori Affairs, as “that great post-war evil,” Williams’ oral history records quite a different story of “robust[ness],” where the resilience of whānau (extended family) relationships helped successfully negotiate life in a new city.\(^2\) It is the importance of both whānau and of ‘home,’ in their many guises, which are the central features of *Panguru*. In the same way that Williams weaves the kōrero (oral interviews) into her analysis of the historiography of Māori migration, the peculiarities of oral histories, the role of the state and the way in which whānau relationships were maintained in the Panguru ‘back-home’ and in the new home in Auckland, this present analysis will look at how those and other features of *Panguru* are relevant to that work.


Although published only six years prior to Panguru, Angela Wanahalla’s chapter in The New Oxford History recognised the need for further study on the “impact of urbanisation… especially for Māori” and “an analysis of Māori family structures.”³ This is perhaps not surprising given that the only other substantive analysis of Māori urbanisation in The New Oxford History is Richard Hill’s Māori and State Policy.⁴ His focus is entirely on the interaction of Māori organisations and the Crown in what he describes as “urbanisation’s unfriendly environment for rangatiratanga,” a term defined as ‘authority, independence, dominion and control’, rather than Williams’ definition as ‘chieftainship.’⁵ The alternative meanings may derive from the difference in focus in Panguru, which admirably meets Wanahalla’s exhortation by dealing principally with whānau relations with each other, their ‘back-home’, their employers, and with community organisations, rather than contestations with the state or with a pan-Māori drive for greater authority or control.

The call for further study on the impact of Māori urbanisation was despite, or perhaps because of limitations in, earlier studies, including those by anthropologists Joan Metge and Ranginui Walker. Metge’s A New Māori Migration, published in 1964, begins its analysis with the heading ‘Māori Urbanisation: The Problem and its Background’ and covers up to 1955, the middle period of Williams’ book.⁶ However, despite the ‘problem’ for social anthropologists of how to deal with the urbanisation of people with “obvious cultural differences,” Metge was able to conclude that “urbanisation [for Māori]… need [have been] neither traumatic nor disintegrative, though still a difficult process…”⁷ Interestingly for a study based on interviewing large numbers of ‘informants,’ Metge elects to leave out “many personal illustrations” and to “protect the anonymity of… informants by changing all names…”⁸ In order to consider an additional fifty years of migrants’ experiences, starting from a position which did not involve an academic ‘problem’ and having a methodological desire to quote freely from named interviewees, there was clearly a need for the updated and historical – as opposed to anthropological – approach found in Panguru. Even the revised edition of

⁶ Joan Metge, A New Māori Migration: Rural and Urban Relations in Northern New Zealand, London, 1964, pp.1. 5.
⁷ Ibid., pp.264–5.
⁸ Ibid., p.5.
Walker’s *Ka Whawhai Tonu Mātou*, published in 2004, did little to bring forward the discussion of Māori migration much beyond the 1970s and had a different emphasis, as some of his section headings – such as ‘The Struggle against Hegemony’, the conflict between ‘The Māori Council’ and the government and ‘Modern Māori Activists’ – make clear. While he does recognise the maintenance of ‘kinship bonds’ among Māori in their new urban environment, the discussion, as Williams notes, does not extend much beyond the apparently binary choices of either dwelling “in the dual world of biculturalism or surrender[ing] to the Pākehā imperative of assimilation.”

Historians of general histories have also generally commented less than favourably on Māori urbanisation. Michael King’s assessment in *The Penguin History of New Zealand* is of a “brown proletariat in New Zealand cities,” many of whom had lost their connection with their tribal homelands and practices and who became “resent[ful] and resist[ant]” to policies of assimilation. James Belich, in *Paradise Reforged*, his general history of New Zealand from the 1880s, suggests that despite “a substantial upturn on Māori economic fortunes, supercharged by urbanisation,” there was still significant “detrivalisation”, or loss of connection with kin which has added to a loss of constraint over social behavior and an increase in criminality. Overall, these are significantly negative views of the consequences of Māori urbanisation. Williams’ general dislike of the position taken in these “grand narratives” and of Walker’s approach is clear from her allegation of their failure to focus on “the cultural and local contexts in which Māori urban migration occurred” (emphasis added).

It is against this background that Williams researches and writes her book. At a seminar given to a class of undergraduate history students in September 2015, she explained that her preconceptions about a period of overall difficulty for Māori in New Zealand’s history changed, somewhat to her surprise. Following – as historians must do – the evidence of her research (the kōrero) enabled her to conclude that the Panguru migrants’ experience was a “beautiful” one, focused on “families, whānau and home-places.” The establishment of

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10 Williams, p.35.
13 Williams, p.36.
14 Williams, presentation to a History 300 class on 25 September 2015; Williams, *Panguru*, pp.247-8.
home-places in both Panguru and Auckland began with conscious efforts to maintain the values of hard work and cultural values “such as whakapapa” (genealogy) and “notions of whānau,” values which Williams notes were “brought to the city, not values… acquired there.”\(^\text{15}\) The concept of whānau became extended to include Māori experiences beyond tribal ones when shared spaces such as hostels meant living outside purely family arrangements.\(^\text{16}\) This was also the case with ‘workplace-whānau’ when businesses such as the Auckland Electric Power Board, hospitals and factories became places with substantial Māori workforces.\(^\text{17}\) The Board and one particular West Auckland factory became the local focuses for Williams’ study. However Williams does not understate the issues faced by the migrants. While historian Geoff Bertram’s description of “successful Māori urbanisation during New Zealand’s extraordinary three decades of full employment from the late 1940s to the mid-1970s” might provide some explanation for the ‘beautiful’ experience, Williams’ analysis recognises throughout the difficulties arising from such things as poor housing, the interaction with “state Māori policy in Auckland” and, later, industrial reform.\(^\text{18}\) The “beautiful ending” which she describes has not been achieved without constant “negotiation” and “determination” by the Panguru migrants.\(^\text{19}\)

Williams’ approach to oral history is similar to that suggested by Michael King, writing forty years earlier about his learnings about this type of history from his work on Princess Te Puea. His proposition that a written narrative from oral interviews should be “according to the conventions of Western history … (expository prose, clearly labelled sources, footnotes, and some discussion of methodology)” has not always been followed in other academic disciplines, but accurately describes Panguru.\(^\text{20}\) While not adopting “any specific theory,” Williams acknowledges “the power of story as a historical tool” in presenting the experiences of the Panguru people and their “home-places in Panguru and Auckland.”\(^\text{21}\) Some of the limitations of oral histories noted by King are also recognised. For example, it is accepted

\(^{15}\) Williams, *Panguru*, p.104.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., pp.104-8.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., pp.183, 199.


\(^{19}\) Williams, p.247.


\(^{21}\) Williams, p.36, including footnote 74.
that kaikōrero (interviewees) might choose to remember things in a way which they feel might fit an acceptable or majority point of view, or decide to be unwilling to elaborate on some issues. Nevertheless, interviews with forty-two individuals, representing migrants to Auckland between the 1930s and 1970 and their children, is a large enough group for Williams to assert that she avoids “representing [the] collective past as something homogeneous or one-dimensional.” She also notes, as Harris does, the inability to capture completely the “performance” involved in oral delivery although Williams believes that some sense of it has “informed the meanings” of kōrero discussed in her book.

Williams is not alone in finding positive outcomes in migration stories from strong relationships with whānau and home-places. Aroha Harris identifies “creative energies” in the way in which migrants developed their new community, drawing on what she calls a “whakapapa of experience.” In Letty Brown, Wahine Toa, she also celebrates the achievements of Letty Brown, an immigrant to Auckland from the East Coast “at the peak of Māori urbanisation.” Harris describes “a great story, an empowering story” of a woman who was able to help create such a spirit in the community activities she led in Auckland that people felt “it was ‘just like how we were down home, the same sort of spirit.’” A 2012 Families Commission study of Tūhoe migration to South Auckland summarises its findings about successful migration in the Māori title of the report, Te Pūmautanga o Te Whānau, which it says describes “whānau resilience and strength.” It too records the importance of whānau support for each other through sports clubs, churches and interaction with government agencies.

A number of major differences separate Williams’ approach from that of non-historians writing on Māori migration. Perhaps the most important is her consistent reference to the idea of ‘kāinga tahi, kāinga rua’ (‘co-existent home-places’) contained in the title of her

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22 Ibid., p.24.
23 Ibid., p.23.
26 Harris, ‘Letty Brown’, p.102.
27 Ibid., pp.104,116.
29 Ibid., p.15.
book. For her, the return migration to Panguru dealt with in chapter eight is the return from
the “co-existent” city home to the “back home” rather than the “coming home” suggested by
geographers Scott and Kearns in their ethnographic study of return migration to the
Mangakahia Valley in Northland. Their work suggests that the traditional tribal home in the
North was the only “home” the migrants to Auckland had had despite being there for as many
as two generations. Williams also records her preference for a diachronic approach to
history over the synchronic approach adopted by anthropologist John Booth in his work on
Panguru in the early 1950s. Another major difference is the use of photographs and the
comparative lack of the statistical analysis, tables of census details and appendices used by
geographers and government agency reports on Māori migration and population studies.
Both Metge and Walker included photographs, but sometimes just generic pictures of Māori
working or performing, while Williams makes use of more personalised, and much more
extensive (116 by her reckoning), photographic records in order to “illustrate how our [noting
her own Panguru heritage] stories are dynamic, diverse, moving and strong.” As King
observes, seeing old photos may “loosen a flood of forgotten recollections” for the
kaikōrero.

Panguru has been reviewed very favourably twice since its publication. The first, by
sociologist Cluny Macpherson, calls it “a gem” which focuses on the “very active agency” of
the Panguru migrants. In doing so, Macpherson rightly claims that Panguru “presents a far
more nuanced… picture” of Māori engagement with the government and the city than
previous accounts of this relationship, a picture made more possible because it is “a long
text” which avoids focus on just a few “central trends.” One aspect of the review which
Williams may have some resistance to is the description of her work as being of the “social
sciences,” given her own description of it as a micro history, a sub-set of social history, and
the fact that the view that history is a social science, first made popular by historian E.H. Carr
in the 1960s, “had in many respects run into the sands” by the 1980s according to Richard Evans in *What is History Now?*38 The other review, by Canadian historian Coll Thrush, concludes that *Panguru* “should take its place among the best scholarship on urban Indigeneities” after he examines the way in which Williams “challenges the ways in which outsiders have typically portrayed Māori urbanization” with her emphasis on resilience, adaptation, “an ‘ongoing life-process’” and the maintenance of “connections to ‘back-home.’”39 Thrush accurately reflects the positivity evident in *Panguru* and notes the importance of the interplay of kōrero with a broader discussion of policy and history in producing what he describes as “a rich, human scale, and accessible account of home places and migrations.”40 Both reviewers would no doubt applaud *Panguru’s* 2016 award as the E.H. McCormick Best First Book for General Non-Fiction.41

*Panguru* is a history about resilience and adaptability for which the title of Judith Binney’s edited work on Māori oral history, *Stories Without End*, is more fitting than the English title to Walker’s book: *Struggle Without End*.42 As Williams notes, her work provides a voice to parents and grandparents, for the benefit of themselves and their offspring, about their cultural connections between their several home-places, voices which will no doubt enable their stories to be retold to future generations.43 *Panguru* also goes beyond a history of one tribe, and in terms of total Māori migration to the cities, a relatively small number of migrants. Williams fairly asserts that is it is “not just about Panguru whānau or Māori people; it is about an important aspect of Aotearoa New Zealand’s history.”44

40 Ibid., p.166.  
43 Williams, p.13.  
44 Ibid.
Untangling the Webs: Culture and the Historiography of US Foreign Relations

Man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs.¹

Clifford Geertz

Opening the first edition of *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations* in 1991, Michel Hogan and Thomas Paterson defensively asserted the need to “demonstrate the field’s vitality” against charges that it was ethnocentric, “mired in detail…and desperately in need of new directions.”² A decade later, however, the same authors proudly announced in the book’s second edition that the field had “enjoyed something of a renaissance” thanks to greater interdisciplinary collaboration.³ By the publication of the third edition in 2016, the editors were positively jubilant, declaring that U.S. foreign relations historiography had transcended its narrow, nationalistic roots and “surged to the forefront of methodological innovation.”⁴ In many respects, the analysis of culture—that amorphous mixture of people’s ideas and social practices—was central to this revitalisation, leading some historians to describe a “cultural turn” in the historiography of American foreign relations.⁵ This essay explores the impact of culture on the historiography of U.S. foreign relations between 1890-1912, a formative period

in which America experimented with empire and developed its international influence.\(^6\) Culturally-oriented analyses of this era reconsider who and what speaks for U.S. foreign relations, focusing on non-state actors and sites of cultural production to illuminate new perspectives on the process of imperial expansion. Besides moving away from traditional subjects, culturalists also refocus historiographical attention upon the ideological content of historical evidence, charting how American discourses of race, gender and consumerism shaped and were shaped by imperial practice. Moreover, by mapping the transmission of ideas throughout imperial networks of exchange, cultural historians illuminate the benefits of interpreting late-nineteenth century U.S. foreign relations in a transnational frame. Taken together, cultural approaches to U.S. foreign relations underline the field’s increasingly broad, interdisciplinary character. Yet this new vision of foreign relations raises an essential question: in a field traditionally concerned with power and the state, does culture distract from historians’ efforts to explain the past? To attempt an answer, we must first consider how culture gained sway amongst historians of foreign relations.

In 1949, Arthur M. Schlesinger, noted that “history should be an indispensable ally of statecraft” that illuminates “how similar problems were handled in other times.”\(^7\) Schlesinger’s conception of history’s relationship to policymaking reflected the period’s prevailing historiographical school, ‘realism’, which criticised the “excessive idealism of U.S. policy,” blaming irrational moralism for America’s flirtations with empire during the 1890s.\(^8\) Instead, realist analyses reflected the needs of Cold War diplomacy, centring upon rational state interests in an international frame at the expense of domestic factors. In contrast to realists, ‘revisionist’ scholars of the 1960s and 1970s viewed economically-influenced expansionism as the chief driver of U.S. foreign relations, suggesting that successive generations of diplomats – including those of the 1890s – had purposefully pursued wealth and power.\(^9\) Echoing progressive historians of the 1930s, revisionists reoriented

\(^6\) NB: This periodisation is broadly consistent with the secondary sources examined throughout this essay.


historiographical attention towards the actions of domestic, corporate actors, adopting a much more critical view of America’s role in the world during the twentieth century than their realist counterparts. Yet throughout this “politically charged debate… the matter of national culture” was notably absent. Following the ‘linguistic turn’ in the 1980s, however, historians increasingly disavowed state-oriented positivist historiographical methods, shifting instead to cultural analyses that focused upon ideas, discourses and the historical contingency of U.S. foreign relations.

Culture is arguably one of the most nebulous concepts in the English language: few modern historians, however, can do without it. Clifford Geertz defines culture as a “historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols… by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.” Building upon this notion of culture as a system of meanings, William Sewell argues that culture “stands for a concrete and bounded world of beliefs and practices” attributable to a clear social group such as ‘Americans’ or ‘Filipinos’. Thus culture “should be understood as a dialectic of system and practice” that is constantly contested and transformed by individuals. Cultural histories of foreign relations fall into two broad categories: multilateral studies that examine “cultural exchanges between America and other countries” and “domestic cultural studies” that consider how cultural ideas about subjects such as race, gender and consumerism shaped American policymaking. In both instances, the cultural approach is necessarily interdisciplinary, drawing especially upon postmodern literary theory to deconstruct the discursive components of U.S. foreign relations. Thus, where realists and revisionists once sought to describe foreign policy in order to prescribe it, culturalists primarily aim to untangle the webs of ideas, symbols and practices that frame foreign relations.

In eschewing a state-oriented, ‘Schlesinger-esque’ role as the diplomat’s historical guide, cultural historians expand the range of subjects and evidence considered in the study of

10 NB: For a progressive interpretation, see: Charles Beard, America in Midpassage, New York, 1941, pp.1-21, 383-433.
11 Rotter, p.427.
12 Geertz, p.89.
14 ibid., pp.52-4.
American foreign relations. One distinguishing feature of the cultural approach when compared with traditional interpretations is that it decentres state sources and places them alongside non-state subjects. Indeed, cultural historians view non-state actors as critical subjects in the study of U.S. foreign relations. Emily Rosenberg, for example, argues that “the private sector spearheaded American expansion” during the 1890s, and that examining “traders, investors, missionaries” is crucial to understanding how ‘the American Dream’ spread. While Rosenberg’s choice of subjects builds upon Thomas McCormick’s notion of a financially-driven ‘informal empire’, her approach rests upon a broader, culturally-inflected notion of ‘empire’ than her economically-minded predecessor. Rejecting prominent economic actors altogether, Greg Bankoff chooses Gifford Pinchot – a former chief of the U.S. Forestry Service – to illustrate how experiences of forestry in a colonial context encouraged leading American environmentalists to develop ‘utilitarian’ and ‘scientific’ forms of conservation. Similarly, Kristin Hoganson takes domestic, middle-class women as the central subjects of Consumers’ Imperium, anatomising how their consumption of “household objects, food and fashion… constituted a form of interaction with the wider world.” For both Bankoff and Hoganson, then, the state is a secondary aspect of their analyses of foreign relations, while non-state actors play a much more prominent role.

Cultural historians also nuance the state’s relationship to non-state agents of U.S. foreign relations. In Paul Kramer’s study of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ racial ideology, for example, prominent diplomatic figures such as Theodore Roosevelt and Albert Beveridge are placed alongside ordinary soldiers and travelers, giving readers a multi-positional view of a single body of diplomatic events. Likewise, in considering the Spanish-American War of 1898, Hoganson illustrates the connection between the gendered rhetoric of state officials – especially prominent U.S. politicians – and ordinary ‘jingoist’ annexationists, thereby refining our

understanding of both groups’ attitudes during the prelude to war. In many ways, cultural historians’ emphasis on associations of historical actors builds upon the ‘corporatist’ interpretation of foreign relations popularised during the 1980s, which argues that public and private sector elites informally share power and collaborate “to guarantee order, stability and progress.” Like the corporatist model, cultural historians illustrate that power in the context of foreign relations is more complicated than exclusively political or economic interpretations might suggest, indicating a need to carefully consider the relationship between the state and non-state actors. Ultimately this broader cast of historical subjects leads cultural historians to treat ‘cultural diplomacy’ as a more flexible alternative to ‘foreign policy’ that employs the views of non-traditional sources to enrich our understandings of America’s role in the world.

Rather than simply adding new characters to an overwhelmingly state-oriented story, however, cultural historians of foreign relations place cultural forms of evidence at the centre of their analyses. Amy Kaplan, for example, argues that historical romance novels “of the 1890s created fanciful realms” onto which Americans could “project contemporary desires for unlimited global expansion,” mirroring the nostalgic rhetoric of imperialists like Theodore Roosevelt. Similarly, Kramer uses popular magazines of the 1890s such as The Atlantic Monthly and North American Review to show how publishing “helped create an ‘imagined community’ of literate, English-speaking Americans and Britons with common affiliations and reference points” who supported racially-driven imperialism. Moreover, Vincente Rafael shows how nationalistic Filipino plays performed in Manila during the Philippine-American War “served as screens for projecting… social experiences of revolution, colonial occupation, war, and the intense longing for freedom.” In each instance, sites of cultural production are integral to the authors’ explanations of U.S. foreign relations during the late-nineteenth century, indicating a historiographical departure from previous studies that revolved around political and economic sources.

24 Gienow-Hecht, p.234.
Moving from popular culture to private homes, Kristin Hoganson searches for “international connections” in “middle-class American households,” focusing especially on foreign ornaments such as rugs, drapes and cushions that adorned decorative “cozy corners.”

Echoing Leora Auslander’s contention that material culture is often imbued with aesthetic and personal value, Hoganson argues that these exotic objects “offered an imaginative escape” from middle-class life, promising “an unbounded world of romantic self-fulfilment.”

Daniel Doeppers examines objects of another kind in his study of urban development in American-occupied Manilla during the early twentieth century, suggesting that “city spaces can be thought of as symbolic forms” in which U.S. officials could visibly demonstrate American power to Filipinos.

In focusing upon the relationship between physical objects and imperialism, Hoganson and Doeppers outline the power of material culture as evidence, uncovering a heretofore unappreciated emotional component of foreign relations. Indeed, when examined together, these studies illustrate how cultural approaches to foreign relations explore a much wider variety of non-written texts than conventional diplomatic histories do. By decentring traditional diplomatic evidence, however, culturalists necessarily broaden the range of actors who can speak for late-nineteenth century U.S. foreign relations. In doing so, they force historians to consider whether non-state sources and cultural evidence truly address issues of power in an international context. Yet to exclusively study political or economic sources is “to skim the surface of the past” and erroneously assume that a cultural intersubjectivity exists between the historian and their subjects. Thus, by analyzing cultural evidence, historians of U.S. foreign relations ensure that their analyses will not anachronistically project contemporary cultural norms upon historical actors.

Beyond reconsidering the cast of historical subjects, culturalists also search their sources for the ideas and beliefs that informed the practice of U.S. foreign relations. While ideas have always been present in the historiography of American foreign relations, culturalists treat them as more serious objects of historical analysis than their traditionalist predecessors. As Akira Iriye notes, realist and revisionist scholarship prized rational, “balance-of-power

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calculations and considerations of national interests” at the expense of “soft or ‘irrational’ factors like ideas, visions or prejudices.  

Where realists viewed ideas in foreign relations as moralistic and dangerous, revisionists conceived of them in exceedingly economic terms, creating a rigid interpretive framework that failed to account for confusion and conflict amongst policymakers.  

By dissecting evidence for its ideological content, cultural historians have uncovered networks of imperial discourse that challenge whether fundamental aspects of U.S. foreign relations historiography such as “interests, security, and threats are as much constructed concepts as terms that connote something fixed, tangible, and real.”

Indeed, as early as 1982, Emily Rosenberg explained U.S. imperialism during the 1890s in the context of “liberal developmentalism,” an ideological framework that rested upon “unrestricted trade and investment, free enterprise, and the free flow of cultural exchange.”

Rosenberg’s argument is significant because she considers not only how people physically spread the ‘American Dream’, but how they spread ideas about the ‘American Dream.’ Taking their cue from Rosenberg’s approach, cultural historians writing over the last three decades have trained their analytical sights upon discourses of race, gender and consumerism in an imperial context. Vincente Rafael, for example, examines the American-led census of the Philippines between 1903-5 not for demographic data, but for what it reveals about contemporary racial attitudes and “the annexation of local populations into the space of colonial knowledge.”

The census, he argues, “not only mapped the structure of racial difference” but also formalised the white race’s right “to determine the borders of those differences.” Similarly, Paul Kramer’s study of the U.S.-Philippine War begins from the supposition that imperialism “meant inventing ideologies to calibrate inclusion” in colonial spaces and that “race was an epistemology suited to constructing the political exceptions that would qualify and delimit these state’s universalistic claims.”

In connecting ideas about race to imperialism, Kramer and Rafael demonstrate that the practice of foreign relations fundamentally begins with the individual’s apprehension of the world. Their analyses thus

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33 Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, pp.2, 11.
35 Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream, p.37.
36 Rafael, p.190.
37 ibid., p.199.
craft a compelling case for attitudes and prejudices as important factors in shaping the practice of foreign relations.

Beyond perceptions of race, cultural historians also show how late-nineteenth century ideas about gender profoundly shaped the decisions of U.S. soldiers, politicians and businessmen involved in imperialism. Considering the case for the Spanish-American War, Kristin Hoganson argues that gender suffused the rhetoric of imperialism, as pro-imperial ‘jingoists’ treated war as an opportunity to ‘redeem’ and ‘bolster’ American manhood.\(^{39}\) By framing the practice of empire in masculine terms, these jingoists transformed gender into “motivating ideology and a political posture” that turned “disparate arguments for war into a simple, more visceral rationale with broader appeal.”\(^{40}\) Hoganson’s exposition of a complex web of ideas about gender complicates our understandings of decision-making in foreign relations, suggesting that simple studies of national or economic interests cannot account for the totality of factors that weighed upon American imperialists during the late-nineteenth century. Her approach also suggests that historians of foreign relations must not treat decision-makers’ experiences as unquestionable evidence and should instead examine how their views and visions were discursively constructed.\(^{41}\) Shifting from politicians to homemakers, Hoganson’s later study of American consumerism in the context of empire illustrates how domestic middle-class women constructed “an imagined realm of fantasy fulfilment” when purchasing exotic goods from colonial spaces to place in their homes.\(^{42}\) In spinning webs of meaning around these household objects, American women crafted a relationship to empire based on consumerism, novelty and pleasure, demonstrating that empire had a home in the U.S. “thanks to consumerist desires and fantasies.”\(^{43}\) Thus, like Kramer’s exposition of an imagined Anglo-American racial community, Consumers’ Imperium illustrates that consumer imagination shaped the practice of empire as much as the act of consumption itself.

Yet critics of cultural approaches to foreign relations argue that ideologies can oversimplify complex ideas, adding a deterministic tinge to events that were, in fact, eminently murky.\(^{44}\) Cultural historians often respond to this critique by acknowledging the fluid nature of ideas.

\(^{39}\) Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood, p.8.
\(^{40}\) ibid., pp.8-9.
\(^{42}\) Hoganson, Consumers’ Imperium, p.11.
\(^{43}\) ibid., p.12.
Echoing Sewell’s definition of culture as inherently malleable, Paul Kramer examines how Anglo-Saxon ‘racial-exceptionalist’ arguments for imperialism evolved to accommodate traditional republican notions of limited government and anti-imperialism. Moreover, as Michael Hunt recognises, the ways in which ideas informed U.S. foreign relations were essentially contingent: images of Oriental peoples, for example, varied widely: “a positive one… when paternalism and benevolence were in season, and a negative one, suited to those tense periods when abuse or aggrandizement became the order of the day.”

Recognising that ideas are contingent does not, however, assuage the more potent critique that, while ideologically-focused cultural histories may explain how people thought and acted, they do not address why these thoughts and actions mattered to the practice of foreign relations. Kaplan’s study of 1890s historical romance novels, for example, may illuminate contemporary gender constructions, but does it truly help to explain why the Spanish-American War occurred? Indeed, cultural historians’ emphasis on non-state actors and ideologies arguably decentres traditional approaches to the extent that material drivers of foreign relations such land and wealth are sidelined in favour of relatively abstract ideas. Yet this criticism seems to ignore that “how people see other people, how they construct and imagine them, affects how they treat them.”

Kaplan’s romance novels alone may not account for America’s invasion of Cuba and cultural histories may not fully explain foreign relations, but they do illustrate how “at certain times in certain circumstances ideas and assumptions do become crucial.” Adding attitudes, ideas and perceptions to existing political and economic explanations of U.S. foreign relations ultimately reminds us that diplomacy takes place between people as well as states.

By uncovering the relationship between ideas and practice in U.S. foreign relations, culturalists also illustrate that the networks of exchange underpinning American imperialism were as ideological as they were material. Writing in 1991, Alan Henrikson argued that the latent ‘mental maps’ historical actors used to geographically order and understand their world are objects worthy of study, calling for historians of foreign relations to “think through space as well as time.”

Responding to this challenge, culturalists have rethought the range of

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46 Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, p.69.
47 Rotter, p.433.
spatial perspectives through which one can examine U.S. foreign relations. Opening *Consumers’ Imperium*, Hoganson notes that historians often conceive of the American imperialism during the late-nineteenth century as an expansionist ‘outward thrust,’ interpreting it as the ‘Americanisation of the world.’\(^{50}\) In contrast to Rosenberg and Hunt, who argue that American imperialists remade colonial ‘others’ in their own image, Hoganson adopts a “domestic perspective” on U.S. foreign relations that emphasises the “globalisation of the United States.”\(^{51}\) In doing so, she illustrates how “spreading the American Dream” shaped America itself, reversing the conventional directionality of foreign relations histories. By reorienting historians’ perspectives of foreign relations from ‘America and’ the world to ‘America in’ the world, culturalists uncover previously unexplored perspectives on U.S. imperialism during the late-nineteenth century, thereby ensuring that historians do not simply recreate “the world according to Washington.”\(^{52}\) Indeed, by adopting a multidirectional, cultural approach to foreign relations, historians can “ask how international relations reciprocally shape a dominant imperial culture at home.”\(^{53}\) Rosenberg herself recognised the value of this approach a decade after *Spreading the American Dream*, calling for historians to recognise “the parochial perspective of power centres,” remain aware of their positions “as insiders or as outsiders” and “walk the borders” of foreign relations.\(^{54}\)

In reconceptualising the directionality of U.S. foreign relations, cultural historians often question the usefulness of ‘the nation’ as an analytical framework because it compartmentalises individuals and ideas into restrictive national units. As outlined above, traditional historians of foreign relations were frequently criticised for limiting their studies to political and economic interactions between states, thereby conceptualising historical processes almost exclusively in relation to ‘the nation’. By contrast, a number of cultural historians champion a ‘transnational’ methodology which recognises that historical processes are not inherently related to ‘the nation’ and “are constructed in the movement between

\(^{50}\) Hoganson, *Consumers’ Imperium*, p.2.


places, sites, and regions.” Paul Kramer’s study of the Philippine-American War illustrates this approach well, suggesting that metropolitan and colonial spaces must be analysed “in a single, densely interactive field in which colonial dynamics are not strictly derivative of, dependent upon or respondent to metropolitan forces.” Thus by eschewing the metropole-colony opposition and freeing foreign relations historiography from the straitjacket of national boundaries, cultural historians offer a novel means of uncovering the multidirectional intellectual currents that flowed through the veins of America’s early-twentieth century empire.

By charting late-nineteenth century U.S. foreign relations in a transnational frame, culturalists also illustrate how foreign territories acted as spaces for social and political experimentation that informed domestic policymaking. Indeed, America’s experience of empire profoundly transformed the federal government from “a small bureaucracy with weak domestic capacities…into an expanded, empowered apparatus launched on a path to global power.” Considering this shift, Alfred McCoy notes that the Philippines was a “site of a protracted social experiment in the use of police as an instrument of state power” to suppress anti-government resistance. The techniques generated “in the tropical hothouse of colonial governance” did not, however, remain isolated in the Philippines, travelling homeward “through the invisible capillaries of empire” to form “a new internal security apparatus” that was deployed during the First World War to contain social unrest. By connecting the “colonial crucible” to domestic policy developments, McCoy shows how cultural approaches to U.S. foreign relations can uncover previously unappreciated consequences of late-nineteenth century American imperialism. In stark contrast to McCoy’s proto-surveillance state, John McNeill notes how “distant colonies also provided free rein for forms of environmental science… that in some cases proved too intrusive to be undertaken at home.” Bankoff, for example, illustrates how American environmentalists developed ‘scientific’ conservation policies in colonial spaces, arguing that “the Philippines was not just a prologue to later U.S. forestry policy” but a prism through which historians can glimpse the origins of

58 Alfred McCoy, Policing America’s Empire the United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State, Madison, WI, 2009, p.16.
59 ibid., p.17.
domestic conservation movements “undistorted by metropolitan political restraints.”

Like McCoy, Bankoff’s transnational approach allows him to demonstrate that the consequences of U.S. foreign relations often transcended national boundaries.

Moreover, when placed in a transnational framework, cultural histories also demonstrate that the character of ideas about U.S. foreign relations during the late-nineteenth century was as much a product of their transmission as their original ideological intent. Considering the debate over whether America should colonise the Philippines, Paul Kramer illustrates how ideas about Anglo-Saxon racial superiority flowed throughout Britain, America and colonial spaces to produce “a novel racial formation whose specific contours and texture emerged from a particular local convergence of transnational forces.”

Rather than charting a simple case of Americans exporting and replicating a domestically-generated racial discourse in the Philippines, Kramer’s study illustrates how ideas about race were forged outside and between the boundaries of any one nation. Although Kramer, McCoy and Bankoff each demonstrate the benefits of decentring ‘the nation’, none of them pause to consider the potential costs of transnationality. Like the shift towards non-state actors and ideological evidence, transnational cultural histories risk de-emphasising the distinctly ‘national’ aspects of foreign relations such as formal diplomacy and military interventions. For Thomas Zeiler, ‘maintaining the state in American history is essential to good research’ and, while examining it in an international context may be fruitful, eschewing it altogether risks shifting the study of U.S. foreign relations too far away from the America itself.

Thus it seems that, for traditionally-minded historians of U.S. foreign relations, decentring ‘the nation’ constitutes the ultimate act of heresy in a field traditionally concerned with state power and diplomacy.

Despite the protestations of state-oriented orthodox historians, however, the cultural approaches to U.S. foreign relations examined throughout this essay clearly demonstrate that culture can speak to issues of power. Culturalists illustrate that U.S. foreign relations involves a wider cast of non-state historical subjects than realist or revisionist interpretations might otherwise suggest. By drawing upon the experiences of non-traditional subjects and exploring new forms of evidence, culturalists challenge the notion that state sources ought to have a privileged role in speaking for American foreign relations. Cultural historians also illustrate

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61 Bankoff, p.486.
how the ideas, attitudes and discourses of U.S. foreign relations profoundly shaped imperial practice itself. In doing so, they challenge the deterministic notion that national or economic interests alone can explain the behaviour of American foreign relations during the late-nineteenth century. By focusing upon the ideological content of evidence, culturalists also illustrate how the discursive networks that framed U.S. foreign relations were both international and transnational, suggesting that historians ought to reconsider the directionality of their studies, as well as the validity of ‘the nation’ as an analytical construct. Ultimately, culturalists illustrate that foreign relations – whether formal or otherwise – is an essentially human act about the relationships between different individuals and groups. The webs of significance that people suspend themselves in frame how they engage with members of other societies. By ignoring culture, historians of U.S. foreign relations consign themselves “to a narrow, and increasingly irrelevant, understanding of the world.” In approaching the history of U.S. foreign relations from new vantage points, culturalists reanimate the past’s complexities, fulfilling Eric Foner’s belief that historians must demonstrate how seemingly fixed ideas are, in fact, fluid. Thus culture does not distract from historians’ efforts to explain the history of U.S. foreign relations; rather, it is essential to them.

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