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INTRODUCTION: A FEW WORDS ON HISTERIA! 2015.

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It is my privilege to be introducing the 2015 of Histeria! Contained within are examples of some of the best undergraduate writing in the disciplinary area of History during the 2014 academic year. Putting together such a collection serves multiple purposes. First and foremost, it showcases the talents in our discipline, of which we are extremely proud. Furthermore, it gives students their first experience of going through the academic publishing process. Finally, these essays serve as exemplars for current students, illustrating our disciplinary expectations with regard to excellent writing.

The essays in Histeria! this year represent a wide range of subjects, from German beer brewing in China to Norman conquests. Likewise, they represent a number of different approaches. Prudence Wilson, Patrick Baumgartner, and Laura Jenner have all written essays that use primary source material as their central focus. Both Baumgartner and Jenner’s essays are also based on original research based on a self-selected topic. Jenner’s work on prostitution in China in particular shows promise as the basis for further work at a postgraduate level.

Ashleigh Fremont’s essay on globalisation and the plantation system offers a nuanced look at what could otherwise be an unwieldy topic. Jack Beesley, Lydia Wilson, Jessica Wei and Thomas Aitkins also offer nuanced discussion of ‘big’ or ‘broad’ topics, which they achieve by approaching their subjects from a historiographical perspective. Historiographical prowess is an essential element of successful history writing, and these essays handle large bodies of work and different theoretical perspectives with a sense of ease. Wei in particular highlights the benefits of a historiographical approach in her review of two books about African American history.

So dig in! Enjoy, admire and learn.
In December 1395 John Rykener was arrested in London for public indecency. The city-officials assumed he was a woman. He was dressed in women’s clothing, called himself Eleanor and was having sex with a man named John Britby. However, it turned out that he was biologically male. The case is the only surviving legal record of male same-sex intercourse and transvestism in medieval England. Ruth Karras and David Boyd’s interpretation of the case challenges essentialist orthodoxy by showing that sexuality is socially and historically constructed. In medieval England Rykener would not have been labeled a prostitute despite receiving money from men for sex, nor would he have been identified as a homosexual, bi-sexual or transvestite—those categories did not exist. Karras and Boyd argue that gender transgression was the central issue in Rykener’s case. The medieval social hierarchy was reproduced by a distinct gender binary that Rykener undermined. Although Karras and Boyd were limited by the scarcity of records their article is an important contribution to the new sexual history.

Karras and Boyd use Rykener’s case to investigate the medieval English definition of a prostitute. In the modern era prostitution is considered the act of soliciting sex for money. However, Karras and Boyd use an excerpt from

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2 ibid., pp.92-99.
3 ibid., p.95.
4 ibid., p.98.
5 ibid., pp.92-93.
*Fasciculus Morum* to elucidate that in medieval England ‘any sexually active woman who [was] not attached to a particular man [was] defined as a *meretrix*’. Being a *meretrix* ‘involved being a certain type of person’ rather than just receiving financial dividends for sexual acts. The ‘terminological conflation’ of all sexually independent women and commercial prostitutes meant that in medieval England there was an inextricable link between prostitution and femininity. Rykener was not accused of prostitution despite ‘requesting money for [his] labor’ because in the medieval era a male prostitute was oxymoronic. The inconsistencies between modern and medieval ideas about prostitution reinforce the historically constructed nature of sexuality.

“*Ut Cum Muliere*” showed that medieval same-sex intercourse was not only problematic because it was considered unnatural but also because it destabilised the gender binary. Karras and Boyd cited the fourteenth century poem, *Cleanness*, to reinforce that in medieval England sodomy was detested as an ‘unclean usage of male bodies’ that scorned ‘the sweet heteronormativity sanctioned by Nature and God’. Rykener’s fornication ‘with many Priests’ was deemed problematic because members of the clergy were using their bodies in ‘unclean’ ways that defied God’s will. Rykener, however, transcended the Priests’ sexual transgressions by contravening his masculinity. Karras and Boyd argue that Rykener’s actions were not referred to as sodomy but as ‘that detestable, unmentionable and ignominious vice’ because he effeminised himself by assuming the passive role in intercourse. Indeed, ‘sodomy was only one of the manifestations of a more important issue subtending the denunciation of male homosexual contact in medieval culture: gender transgression and conflation’. In medieval culture, by having sex ‘as a woman’ Rykener not only

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7 ibid., pp.93-94.
8 ibid., p.93.
9 Karras and Boyd, p.94.
10 ibid; ‘The Questioning of John Rykener’.
11 Karras and Boyd, p.97.
12 ibid; ‘The Questioning of John Rykener’.
13 Karras and Boyd, p.97.
14 ibid., p.95.
forsook his own body but also undermined the patriarchal social order that was ‘naturalised and reproduced’ by a distinct gender binary.\(^{15}\)

According to Karras and Boyd, Rykener’s case was even more disturbing to contemporaries because he was not only having sex ‘as a woman’ but was ‘passing’ as a woman. It should be noted that in medieval England ‘transvestism would not have been seen as a sexual orientation’ and probably served a more practical purpose.\(^{16}\) Cross-dressing was problematic because it threatened the social order by exposing ‘gender roles as performative and constructed’.\(^{17}\) By dressing as a woman, referring to himself as Eleanor and working in female occupations, Rykener destabilised the masculine/feminine binary.\(^{18}\) Karras and Boyd argue that in medieval England ‘the disruption of masculine and feminine becomes an offence not only against nature but against the “natural” social order as well’.\(^{19}\) So much so that Rykener was not tried under ecclesiastical jurisdiction but in the temporal courts where issues of public order were concerned.\(^{20}\) Rykener’s simultaneous engagement in transvestism and male same-sex intercourse reflect important ideas about medieval gender and sexuality.\(^{21}\)

Gender was considered performative and there was no construction of specific sexualities. Karras and Boyd claim that Rykener reinforces Judith Butler’s theory that gender is not biological but ‘performatively constituted by the very expressions that are said to be its result’.\(^{22}\) Not only did Rykener learn his femininity from a woman named Elizabeth Brouderer but he also convinced his clients that he was a woman through self-presentation and behaviour.\(^{23}\) The Court linguistically gendered him feminine or masculine depending on the activity being discussed.\(^{24}\) For example, Rykener is said to have sex ‘as a woman’ when he is in the passive role but ‘as a man’ when he assumes the active

\(^{15}\) ibid., p.98.
\(^{16}\) ibid., p.92.
\(^{17}\) ibid., p.98.
\(^{18}\) Karras and Boyd, p.98.
\(^{19}\) ibid.
\(^{20}\) ibid., p.91; ‘The Questioning of John Rykener’.
\(^{21}\) Karras and Boyd, p.99.
\(^{22}\) ibid., p.98.
\(^{23}\) ‘The Questioning of John Rykener’.
\(^{24}\) ibid.
Rykener’s activities may have marked his gender but he was not identified as having a specific sexuality. Modern audiences might be quick to ascribe Rykener a ‘homosexual’ or ‘bisexual’ identity but this is anachronistic. Rykener’s activities must be historicised. Although medieval society would have understood that same-sex desire existed, ‘this was not seen as a fixed orientation, and did not define a particular type of individual’. Perhaps there is no evidence of Rykener’s prosecution because the Court simply ‘did not know quite what to make of him’. After all, being a woman was not illegal.

“Ut Cum Muliere” is an important contribution to the new sexual history but it is also limited. Karras and Boyd’s work challenges modern assumptions that gender and sexuality are natural by reinforcing their social and historical construction. However, a dearth of records makes drawing any definite conclusions about motivations for and reactions to pre-modern male same-sex intercourse and transvestism difficult. Although Karras and Boyd employ literary sources to contextualise their claims, their extrapolation of a single case into a broad historical argument is problematic. Moreover, while legal records offer important insights they only reflect how authorities viewed certain behaviour. Elite ideas about sexuality may have been inconsistent with wider society’s ideas. The holes in Rykener’s account also make interpretation more difficult. Aside from the fact that there is ‘no way of verifying the facticity of Rykener’s account’, the document does not indicate how Rykener felt about himself nor does it clarify what Rykener was prosecuted with, if indeed he was prosecuted at all. The article, therefore, feels very anti-climactic at times. Karras and Boyd raise a lot of important questions but can only speculate on the possible answers. Nevertheless, this document remains an important insight into medieval constructions of sexuality.

Karras and Boyd use ‘The Questioning of John Rykener’ to investigate medieval English constructions of gender and sexuality. Their article supported
social and historical constructionist theory and was an important development in the historiography of gender and sexuality. The authors explored how the category of prostitute was imbued with different meanings in medieval England compared with the modern era. They also argued that same-sex intercourse and transvestism had historically specific meanings. Rykener’s cross-dressing and participation in same-sex intercourse were not problematic because of the acts themselves but because of how the acts transgressed the gender binary by conflating masculinity and femininity. To medieval audiences this not only transgressed nature but also the ‘natural’ social order. They also explored gender’s performativity and the limited construction of specific sexualities in medieval England. Although Karras and Boyd were limited by the lack of available resources, Rykener’s case effectively illustrated the historical construction of sexuality.

Bibliography:


Medieval Sourcebook: The Questioning of John Rykener, A Male Cross-dressing Prostitute, 1395.
To what extent did plantations trigger the emergence of a modern globalised world?

The plantation institution was not new at the time of the discovery of the Americas, in fact plantation origins can be traced back to the twelfth century Mediterranean. By the sixteenth century plantations had grown into a system of international importance, a system which ‘above all others, left an indelible mark upon the huge expanses of the world’. Some of the developments which plantations impressed upon the world were not new concepts; empire building had been a dominant political force for many years, a global trade system in existence for hundreds, but plantations amplified their effect by linking together three continents in a rich, competitive network. With their rise came new social pressures. The intense migration required to support such a system meshed together cultures on a scale not seen previously. The ‘plantocracy’ would rise as a new class in the western Atlantic, bringing with it a social force and concept of race, one which would have a profound impact across continents. Plantations were global by nature, and were an important factor in the development of a modern, globalised world.

Plantations became a tool for one of the key parts of the globalisation process in the fifteen hundreds; empire building. The Portuguese were the first

34 Ibid., p.137.
to develop the Atlantic plantation system for this purpose.36 Historian Sidney M. Greenfield argues that plantations ‘served the political objectives of settling and securing new sections of the national territory’.37 The great success and wealth that they promised became the incentive for entrepreneurs to leave Portugal for these remote islands, thus setting up a settler base loyal to the crown.38 These new inhabitants would tame the land and the people around them, establishing the transportation and communication links that would tie each place together as part of an increasingly global empire.39 Portugal settled the Azores, São Tomé and Brazil this way, each a location crucial to accessing sea-routes across the Atlantic and the resources that were to be found on the eastern shores of the Americas.40 Empires by their nature were cross-continental and played a significant part in forming a modern globalised world by exporting European culture on a large scale. They drove the need for global communication and long-distance trade, and linked distant cultures and places which further developed a global attitude and awareness. Empires were not a new concept, but plantations would prove to be an effective tool in expanding this process, and thus furthering globalisation. It was their economic potential that would give them political influence.41

These colonial plantation outposts were only viable because of global long distance trade and they would quickly feed back into this network, expanding it into a new ‘Atlantic System’.42 This emerging trade system, centred on plantation goods and especially slaves, would draw Europe, Africa, North and South America into a new network transporting crops, capital and people across the Atlantic Ocean.43 Plantations produced cash-crops; commodities which were designed for market trade. Increasing demand from Europe expanded this trade in luxuries such as sugar, tobacco and cotton.44 Plantation crops constituted the

37 Ibid., p. 95.
38 Greenfield, p.116.
39 Ibid., p.110.
40 Ibid., pp.85-119.
41 Ibid., p.95.
44 Ibid., p.2.
majority of trade with the New World; slave-grown sugar and tobacco provided seventy eight percent of British America's commodity exports between 1768 and 1762. Communities within this system were affected by what occurred in distant markets. Brazilian sugar exports would send the economy in Madeira, on the other side of the Atlantic, into decline by the 1530's. Likewise the Brazilian economy was vulnerable to the political dynamics between Spain and the Netherlands in Europe. Slave populations required a sustained, large scale slave trade, so it would dominate the Atlantic trade with Africa until the 1860's, moving tens of thousands of slaves into the Americas. Like empires, global trade was already well established. What was significant about the trade that the plantations built was that it was-despite attempts at monopoly from the empire state-international. Slaves, supplies and commodities were moved around by merchants from all over Europe to equally international markets. The Atlantic trade would affect communities and economies on three separate continents, to both benefit and detriment.

This slave trade at the core of the plantation system would have a lasting impact on the African peoples involved, redefining the concept of race and forcing the formation of an African identity in a foreign land. Plantations had a new form of social organization, with one culture the master over another. Historian Ira Berlin points out that ‘plantation slavery became African slavery’ and the consequence of this was that Europeans began ‘investing pigment-both white and black-with a far greater weight in defining status than heretofore’. Initially, there was no distinction between slaves, and the trade ran from all over the world. As Europeans began to dominate West Africa and demand rose

45 Solow, p.29.
48 Emmer, p.77.
49 Solow, p.7.
50 Emmer, p.95.
51 Ibid.
52 Berlin, p.96.
53 Curtin, p.9.
however, Africa became synonymous with slavery, which was of an increasingly oppressive nature.\textsuperscript{54} It was no longer European supremacy but white supremacy, and slavery was not subordination but the basis of a new social order.\textsuperscript{55} Colour, not culture, became the limitation. Colour made no distinction for the different cultures, languages and beliefs within these populations of forced migrants. Within this diverse group slavery was a common experience and a uniting one.\textsuperscript{56} Arrival in the Americas set into process a shift of identity from state or tribe to an African identity.\textsuperscript{57} This evolving identity was also removed from that in Africa, where people were defined by where they were born, rather than how they acted.\textsuperscript{58} Plantations became a place to rebuild the lives shattered by the slave trade, insular and dominated by their own languages and belief systems.\textsuperscript{59} Plantation slaves would not attempt to integrate into European society, setting themselves apart as a new cultural group-African Americans.\textsuperscript{60} Plantations therefore, by their globalising process of the forced intercontinental migration, necessitated the formation of an identity within a global context. The definition of a new race would be a direct consequence of the awareness of a global society and the displacement of people within it.

Plantations, like many colonial outposts, had to contend with establishing the social institutions of home but plantations were not just an extension of European society into the New World.\textsuperscript{61} Although it had both capitalist and feudal elements, it was a new society with different classes and opportunities and these ideas would travel across to the European continent.\textsuperscript{62} There were three important levels to this society; the ‘plantocracy’, free people, and the slaves.\textsuperscript{63} The land-owners made up the ‘plantocracy’, a class of great wealth and power in these outposts.\textsuperscript{64} Their lavish lifestyle and total control elevated them to a position of respect and deference back home amongst the aristocracy, at

\textsuperscript{54} Berlin, pp.95-96.  
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p.99.  
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p.103.  
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p.104.  
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p.107.  
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., p.105.  
\textsuperscript{61} Solow, p.39.  
\textsuperscript{62} Curtin, p.12.  
\textsuperscript{63} Walvin, p.137.  
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
least in their opinion. This was an elevation to nobility of the common man, albeit a very wealthy one. Before long this new economic class would demand greater political power, sparking confrontation back in Europe. This example of a people rising to higher status inspired other, less wealthy Europeans. So long as there was potential to make their fortunes in the world, they came. This happened especially in the Brazilian plantations, where there are records of a second, lower planting class, the ‘lavradores’. They were cane planters with aspirations of becoming plantation owners, known as ‘senhores de engenho’. The economy in Brazil was centred on the lavradores growing and selling sugarcane to the senhores de engenho, a burden they would not accept without hope of something more. With the addition of black slaves and the racial supremacy that came from this, indentured servants suddenly found themselves distinguished from the lowest class. They too, could have hope of opportunities ahead that could change their position in society. Class was no longer static and elevation within society, however unlikely, was not impossible. This would cause ripples across the Atlantic as these new ideas regarding class gained traction back in Europe, setting in motion a change to a social order more resembling that of the modern world.

By the sixteenth century the world had entered into a new stage of globalisation following the discovery of the Americas. Although already in existence by this time, plantations became an important factor in driving this globalisation by amplifying forces that linked the cultures of the world together. International politics were driven by the building of empires, with the establishment of colonies in the search of resources and trade opportunities critical to asserting the dominance of a state. Plantations could act as another tool in the building of these empires, taming the frontier and planting supportive settlers in strategic positions. Trade had already been global in nature for many

65 Schwartz, p.183.
67 Schwartz, p.183.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Berlin, p.113.
71 Curtin, pp.1-3.
72 Greenfield, p.87.
centuries, but the introduction of the plantation’s cash crop on a large scale transformed this again, and the Atlantic was awash with wealthy merchants trading competitively as part of a rich network linking three continents together. The effects of plantations were not confined to building on existing processes. The plantation system would itself build processes of globalisation through the slave trade that it promoted, which forced the formation of an African identity in response to the mass export of culture. A developing concept of race and colour would come from an equally important aspect of plantations; the ‘plantocracy’ and the new social class and mobility that this represented. 73 These new societies, built upon plantation wealth and slavery, would become influential in the future of the emerging modern world. Although many of the factors that made the plantation system so influential already existed at the time, the plantations gave them a stage to achieve lasting international effect on a large scale. Enabled by the opportunities that the Atlantic presented, plantations developed into a driving force behind the emergence of a world that was becoming both global and modern.

73 Walvin, p.137.


The emergence of moral treatment as a means of managing the insane in the 19th century has become a contentious topic for historians. Critical analysis of this system of treatment initially came with Foucault’s understanding of institutionalisation as a ‘gigantic moral imprisonment.’ This argument envisages the physical shackles of the 18th century institutions being replaced with the shackles of social control and restraint. There has since been a proliferation of close analyses of the asylum system and moral treatment that have come to challenge and redefine Foucault’s initial criticisms. Many social historians have argued that the complexity of power structures and patient doctor relationships within the asylum evades any single definition. Ultimately it seems that while Foucault’s analysis of the oppressive nature of asylums and moral treatment is useful, and at times credible, it remains simplistic and generalised, ignoring the diversity of experiences across individual institutions and the complexity of power structures within the asylum system.

This complexity of power distribution throughout the asylum system clearly refutes the simplistic vision of the moral treatment in which, Foucault argued, ‘the physician could exercise his absolute authority in the world of the asylum.’

The County Asylums Act of 1845 required local authorities to establish asylums for their paupers and expanded moral treatment to a national scale. Legal historian Peter Bartlett argues that this resulted in the asylum becoming a Poor

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Law institution, with Poor Law authorities, rather than medical superintendents, in charge of the admission of pauper lunatics. However, Bartlett also argues that ‘the Poor Law in England never fits comfortably into the mould of a centralised, authoritarian and progressive power structure’ and that power was actually spread throughout the system. This refutes the idea that either centralised authorities or doctors had supreme power over asylums or patients. Instead power was spread across the system, with various groups able to influence the treatment and administration of the asylum. Admission and discharge generally lay outside the doctor’s sphere of influence, with the fee-paying relations of private patients wielding a considerable amount of influence over admission, discharge and treatment. Conversely, Poor Law authorities oversaw the admission of pauper lunatics, indicating a discrepancy between the experiences and agency of rich and poor patients. Yet centralised power was also often limited. Historian Joseph Melling claims that pauper admission also involved ‘a complex community process in which the resources and capacities of the individual were calculated by the relatives, neighbours, social superiors and Poor Law authorities.’ Therefore the power of Poor Law authorities over pauper admission was complicated and evades a simple definition of social control. This clearly demonstrates that the asylum was a site of shifting power relations, and thus undermines the singular, patriarchal model Foucault would portray.

This patriarchal model in relation to the power balance of patient and doctor within the asylum is also problematic for its generalisation and simplicity. Foucault portrays doctors as ‘Father and Judge, Family and Law’ and patients as either infantilised or objectified as a ‘case.’ However, this generalises the diversity of patient experiences in different asylums. While some discrepancies do emphasise the notion of social control, the agency of the patient and relatives in the doctor-patient relationship should not be overlooked nor simplified.

The complexity of agency within moral treatment can be seen in its initial manifestation at the Tuke’s York Retreat. It was at the Retreat that the move

76 Ibid., p.243.
78 Bartlett, p.244.
towards methods of non-restraint and moral treatment initially began in Britain. While not entirely eschewing the 18th century practices of restraint with their continued use of ‘straight-waistcoats’, the Retreat did pioneer a new focus on the rationality of the patient to express self-control, given adequate conditions. Historian Anne Digby, in her comprehensive study of the Retreat, claims that ‘the key to moral treatment lay in the quality of personal relationships between staff and patients.’79 This suggests a positive relationship, in which the patient retained some agency as essential to moral treatment. While the Retreat did present itself as fostering a sense of family within its walls, with the doctor as the patriarchal head, this did not mean an inherent restriction of patient agency or liberty. Digby argues the freedom of patients to mix with the public outside the asylum also ‘reduced the amount of social control the institution was able to exercise over them.’80 With its policy of patient freedom to engage with the wider society outside the asylum walls, patients were not held in the perpetual control of the doctor, as Foucault would argue. Patients were free to socialise and re-integrate themselves into society on their own terms.

The Retreat was also Quaker institution, which meant that the majority of patients and doctors were of a common religious and social identity. Digby thus posits that social indoctrination within the asylum was limited as the morality being encouraged would have been familiar to the patient.81 Ultimately Digby concludes that moral treatment at the Retreat aimed to ‘restore the self-esteem of the patients through treating them with sympathy for their affliction, and respect for their individuality, and hence to build up their powers of self-control.’82 This understanding of moral treatment clearly demonstrates the benevolent and relatively balanced doctor-patient relationship, in which the patient’s individual agency is acknowledged.

The complexity of doctor patient relationships can also be seen in Charlotte MacKenzie’s analysis of Ticehurst Private Asylum. Here, the family of the patient exercised a greater degree of influence over the treatment of the patient, again shifting the balance of power. As this was a private asylum, fee-paying relations

79 Digby, p.57.
80 Ibid., p.67.
81 Ibid., p.68.
82 Ibid., p.57.
could expect greater say in conditions and thus, as MacKenzie claims, ‘exert significant influence on where and how the patient was treated.’ This accountability resulted in doctors altering treatment to suit the needs of the family. Treatment at Ticehurst thus focused on management and care rather than curing patients, as patients were often admitted due the family’s inability to care for them. This limited the need for social rehabilitation or indoctrination. Private hospitals thus often built their reputations on ability to care for patients rather than ‘rates of recovery.’ At Ticehurst, MacKenzie claims, ‘moral management promised to moderate the extremes of mental disorder through persuasion rather than coercion.’ This indicates both the amount of agency in the hands of patients’ relatives, but also the more benevolent nature of treatment that focused on care and ‘persuasion’ rather than forced rehabilitation and social control of patients. Although, the possible indifference of relatives, coupled with the authoritative voice of the doctor perhaps would resulted in many not exercising any great effort to ensure the comfort and freedom of patients. However, ultimately, MacKenzie’s account of Ticehurst undermines Foucault’s idea of the supreme authority of the doctor and supports Bartlett’s argument for a network of power being negotiated throughout the asylum system.

However, while these institutions demonstrate the simplicity of Foucault’s argument, they remain somewhat problematic. It must be acknowledged that both the Retreat and Ticehurst were relatively exclusive, small-scale institutions that catered for upper class, private patients. The experiences within these institutions are not wholly representative of those in large county asylums. Digby also acknowledges that the move from moral treatment to moral management and the medicalisation of institutions such as the Retreat spelled a change for the nature of treatment. She argues the translation of moral treatment to larger institutions resulted in the atmosphere of a family unit giving way to a ‘more hierarchical, beaurocratically organised institution.’ It seems clear that in the context of a small, elite institution based around an atmosphere of family

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84 Ibid., p.89.
85 Ibid., p.62.
86 Digby, p.69.
and social consensus, moral treatment functioned in a positive and egalitarian way, demonstrating that Foucault’s argument is not universally applicable. However, when translated into the large-scale moral asylums of the 19th century, treatment could become management and the relationship between patient and doctor become complicated.

This spread of moral management throughout the asylum system has led many historians to side with Foucault’s idea of the patient being constructed as an infant or object. However, this remains problematic, and contradictions of this model are evident across a range of contexts. Social historian Roy Porter argues that inside the asylum ‘one was never treated as a human being, with a mind of one’s own. One was handled as anything but a man; as a child, as a deaf mute, as an animal.’ In stark contrast to Digby’s portrayal of the egalitarian relationship of doctors and patients, Porter claims the asylum infantilised the patient, with the doctor as the patriarch. He also attacks the Tukes’ perceived benevolence, citing their emphasis on treatment being ‘akin to good child care.’ Digby admits that one patient at Retreat noted that ‘to one who has always been used to a small family, this is just like being in a show’ demonstrating this patient’s feelings that she was being managed and objectified rather than being treated. At Ticehurst too, patient John Percival, wrote in his diary of the oppressive conditions he experienced, claiming ‘I was no longer a free agent … in short I was brutalized.’ Porter claims this solidifies the image of the asylum as a ‘system of oppression.’ However, it should be noted that complaints such as Percival’s, and his ability to express them in writing largely reflect his upper class background, which could have caused him to more keenly feel a loss of power within the asylum. Pauper patients would have understood the shift to the asylum differently and might have been more likely to accept or expect such relationships. They would perhaps not have distinctly felt any loss of power. It is also important to note that the mentally ill would likely have been admitted due to their inability to cope with normal life outside the asylum, and so required a

88 Ibid.
89 Digby, p.68.
90 Porter, p.182.
91 Ibid., 183.
degree of management for the safety of themselves and others. Porter relies heavily on testimony to construct this critique of asylums, thus these accounts are limited to reflect their particular context rather than the whole asylum system. However, despite such limitations, Porter’s argument does display the relative merit of Foucault’s analysis, once again indicating that moral treatment and the asylum evade any single definition.

Peter Bartlett’s argument that patients in county asylums were objectified as they began to be constructed as ‘cases’ further indicates such complexity and contradiction. Bartlett posits that as cases, patients ceased to be human beings with any agency. Foucault read the sanitised descriptions of doctors’ notes as reflecting this patient objectification and authoritarian power structures. Bartlett contradicts himself however, citing that in pauper asylums in Leicester, doctors’ notes used moralisation and emotion to explain and justify illness. This reflects a degree of empathy and an inability to completely dehumanise the patient. The contradictions of this argument become clear when Bartlett claims ‘The patient was to become a ‘case’, establishing both a hierarchical treatment relationship and the individual patient as a base of knowledge.’ As a ‘base of knowledge’ the patient clearly has some degree of influence over their own diagnosis, and their relationship with the doctors is not wholly one-sided.

Akihito Suzuki further explores this in his study of Bethlem, where he discovered that under the authority of Dr William Charles Hood, there was a shift from relying on family testimony to determine cause of insanity, to patient examination and testimony. Suzuki claims doctors ‘did not possess the power to reconstruct the individual as a case.’ This supports Bartlett’s acknowledgement of the role empathy and emotion played in doctors’ constructions of patients. Rather than having their voices stifled, patients under the new moral treatment became the ‘legitimate storyteller about their own

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92 Bartlett, p.163.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
96 Ibid., p.119
life.\textsuperscript{97} Clearly pauper patient agency was more prominent within doctors’ examinations and relations than Foucault would allow. Rather than objects, patients were often \textit{subjects} of doctors’ analyses. By including the patient’s testimony in their diagnosis, doctors humanised them and relented some agency to the patient in constructing their own diagnosis. Clearly patients became more than a case or an object, they became an integral and active source in doctors understandings of insanity. This highlights the complexity and contradictions of patient-doctor relationships also at play in pauper institutions as well as more empowering private asylums, demonstrating the simplicity of Foucault’s arguments.

Ultimately, the complexity of moral treatment and the asylum system evades any single definition. While a doctor-based patriarchy did exist to some extent, the experience was not universally oppressive, and certainly far more complex than Foucault’s analysis. A network power was at play within and outside asylum walls and patient agency must not be overlooked. Experiences also differed across individual asylums and social contexts. Discrepancies between the experiences of rich and poor patients perhaps hints at a class based social control at work, yet it seems clear that power was complexly negotiated within pauper asylums as much as in private institutions. While Foucault’s argument that the shift to moral treatment involved as much control and restraint as did 18\textsuperscript{th} century methods of physical restraint, it seems clear that this view is too simplistic and general to be applied universally and the reality was a complex and diverse range of power relations across the various contexts of the asylum system.

\textsuperscript{97}Ibid., p.131.
Bibliography


Today Tsingtao is the #1 Chinese beer in the U.S. and the #1 consumer product exported from China, and we all know China makes a lot of stuff.\textsuperscript{98}

As beer is often seen as one of Germany’s most important legacies to the world, it is not surprising that the German-founded Tsingtao brewery in the Chinese city of the same name is still well in business over a century after the amber nectar first flowed there. The history of the brewery, however, is embedded in the history of a German colony in China which emerged in a time when European powers strove to establish their (mercantile) dominance all over the world and China was forced to comply with these ambitions if it did not want military confrontations. With the Germans arriving relatively late to this struggle for colonial power, their example serves well to see how other colonial powers like the British Empire reacted to new forces in the region. Furthermore, examining this colony will provide depth to the picture of colonial life, which is in public discourse often treated with the harsh British example as epitome of the same. Indeed, the sources analysed in the following will show that life in the colonies was no unambiguous affair but that colonists were torn between influencing views held in their home countries and experiences in the colonies with, in this case, Chinese people and other colonizing nations.

First, however, it is important to briefly outline the historical context of the colonisation. Chinese history knows the 19\textsuperscript{th} century as the century of humiliation, a name which could easily be adopted for the European side, however, with a fundamentally different meaning. During the high-time of imperialism and colonialism, the European powers humiliated other peoples and

countries, and China was one of them. Before a background of pseudo-scientific concepts of race and fuelled by sinophobic sentiments that were provoked by literature like John Barrow’s “Travels in China”, the general attitude toward China shifted across Europe from earlier appreciative and sinophile sentiments. China and its people were consequently seen as inferior to Europeans and thus eligible for colonisation. As Steinmetz notes, the German discourse about China was largely based off and in line with the European (and especially British) rhetoric of sinophobia.

Based on these images of China, the British Empire tried to force its way into China and was eventually successful by winning the First and Second Opium Wars. German trading companies used the opening and “by the early 1860s [controlled] as much as two-thirds of Chinese coastal shipping”. At the same time, the Qing dynasty struggled to regain its integrity, having foreigners undermining its power as well as internal uprisings and famines taking their toll on the Empire. Germany, of course, did not even exist as such at that point, but was only founded as the German Empire in 1871. Afterwards, however, Emperor William II. rapidly built a navy and expressed intentions for Germany to increase its status as a colonial power in East Asia. Indeed, he wanted plans made explicitly for the occupation of Jiaozhou Bay as early as 1896, making it “just a matter of time before Germany found a pretext to make the first move.” This pretext was given when roughly a year later, on November 1, 1897, two German missionaries were murdered by anti-Christian groups in the province of Shandong.

The annexion of Jiaozhou — or Kiaochow in the romanized spelling — followed promptly towards the end of the month. This move was closely monitored by the North China Herald, which in its coverage shows the ambiguous relationship between the new colonial neighbours. On the one hand, the conflict and

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100 Steinmetz, 400.
101 Ibid., 404.
102 Ibid., 434.
103 Ibid.
nationalistic rivalries from the old continent carried over into the new. This is evident in the undertones of political articles but even more so in an advertisement for a fragrance which is explicitly titled “Not 'Made in Germany'!” and vows that the product is among other things “very much more Refreshing than the German Kinds.” On the other hand, though, such petty things receded to the background for a moment when it came to questions of colonial activity in China. In the November 19 issue, the Herald reports of the above mentioned murder of German missionaries and of a British effort to send a ship in order to support German ships. In another, more comprehensive article in the same issue, the author details the murder incident and its repercussions. Here, it is detailed that the German effort to seize Jiaozhou Bay was a direct repercussion of this murder — “no nonsense” would be tolerated from the Chinese. The British author seems to have no problem with this, seeing it as appropriate that Germany get “ample satisfaction” for the murder, while it does not seem to matter that this murder was not committed by the Chinese government whose lands are seized as a consequence. Beyond neutral or slightly benevolent writing such as the above, another article blatantly praises “Germany's energy in dealing with China” and wishes “Great Britain always to act in a similar way”. In this regard, it is to note that with a common point of reference in China, possible conflicts in the Old World fade into the background.

In the subsequent issue, the Herald reports that Germany will remain in Jiaozhou “whatever China’s reply may be” which, in conjunction with numerous report

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105 Ibid., 33, my italics


107 Ibid., 893.

108 Ibid., 893.

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid., 898.

111 Ibid., 890.

112 The North China Herald (26.11.1897), 1897, Nr. 1582 (URL:
on the reinforcement of the naval forces in this area, shows Germany's determination to settle in permanently. China's immediate reply certainly did nothing to discourage this behaviour, as officials of the province were instructed “to wait and see what the Germans do next.” Unsurprisingly, Germany went on to claim the area and thus created the first European colony in China that was fully located on the main land.

These examples further show a fundamental understanding between the colonial powers with regards to the methods and legitimacy of their actions. Behaving dominant towards and taking land from a perceived inferior country is seen as natural and worthy of imitation by the British and assumed as the normal course of things by the Germans who did have the chance to second guess it as late comers to the colonial game but chose to enforce its ambitions like preceding nations.

A year after the occupation, the Herald notes that the German press has become “more friendly towards Great Britain in a marked degree” and the daily order of business soon shifted from questions of conquest and rivalry to questions of administration. Exhaustive accounts have been written on how the Germans built Qingdao from a fisher's village with a garrison into a city, but it is often overlooked that supposedly small things had to be discussed, too. Such is, for example, the question of the name of the province. A British author raises the issue in the Herald and appeals to the Germans to think about a suitable romanization so that the post ships would have no trouble finding the right destinations. Such reports indicate the British having come to terms with the German colony and being willing to cooperate.


113 Ibid., 935.
114 Ibid., 937.

With these spotlights of the British perspective, the focus now shifts to the German experience of the colonisation. In the German Empire, the main discourse about China at the time of colonisation was in line with Emperor William’s rhetoric of a “yellow peril.” German officials in the new colony, like Edmund von Heyking and his wife Elizabeth, followed this thinking by thoroughly disregarding Chinese culture, not making the slightest effort to understand the same, and behaving extremely condescending towards the Chinese in both word and deed.

During the first years of the colony, views of this kind were rather common, but some accounts show different approaches in dealing with the Chinese. C.J. Voskamp’s retrospective report on “German Mission Work in Tsingtao” bears witness to an ambiguous relationship with the colonized people, being torn between an imperialist ideology, Christian missionary fervour, and interest in the foreign culture.

First, Voskamp recounts the conquest of Jiaozhou Bay by the German fleet. While the British perspective given above was already partial, Voskamp has an even stronger bias in his assessments. “As usual no resistance was offered to the German mariners”, he writes as if it was the most natural procedure in the world, and “[t]he people [...] gazed with the usual open-mouthed indifference at these new masters.” In this, one can see the casual racism which was almost all-pervasive in colonial matters. Coupled with such a condescending view of the Chinese people, Voskamp depicts the Germans as saviours and civilizers, righting the failures of the old government which had “left China in a rotten and desolate state.”

Voskamp also interprets the “political events” of the colonization in a

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118 Steinmetz, 426-427.
119 Ibid., 427-429.
120 Ibid., 458-460.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
religious way, seeing it as God’s will that the Bay fell into German hands.\textsuperscript{124}

Intriguingly, however, the actions of the missionary society stand in a bit of a contrast to their racist rhetoric. Voskamp acknowledges that the learning is bilateral, Chinese are taught German and the teachers profit by learning Mandarin. Sure enough, the motivation is to create “an atmosphere favourable for the preaching of the gospel”\textsuperscript{125} but nonetheless it means engaging with the foreign culture. Even more telling of the missionaries’ relative open-mindedness is the curriculum of the local school, in which not only Natural Sciences and German are taught, but also Chinese Classics and Chinese History, a testimony to their engagement with the local culture and their respect of the same.

Ultimately, it must be noted that all the preceding observations are but mere spotlights and cannot be seen as the complete picture of German colonial experiences in China. However, I think they have succeeded in presenting a varied illustration of the colonial situation between Germans, British, and Chinese in the area. Indeed, they have provided insight into the heterogeneity of the colonial world, in which not all Europeans were insolent imperialists but where some possessed a genuine interest in interacting with the foreign Chinese culture.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., 545.
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What were the major characteristics of the Norman regimes in southern Italy and Sicily during the eleventh and twelfth centuries? Why were they able to achieve such prominence?

Throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries, ambition and practicality were the organising principles of Norman rule in southern Italy and Sicily. The flexible and pragmatic approach Norman rulers adopted towards conquest, religion, local populations, administration, patronage and issues of identity should be understood as a coherent expression of “avidity for domination”. Although in practice this produced varied patterns of conflict and cooperation, the overriding objective remained the actualisation of political ambition. This ambition was both the defining characteristic of the Norman regimes in Italy and the explanation for their prominence.

From the moment they left Normandy, the Norman experience in Italy was shaped by pragmatism and ambition. The earliest Normans in Italy may have been pilgrims, but the broader emigration of the eleventh and twelfth centuries was a practical response to political and social conditions in the duchy. The chronological relationship between political tension in Normandy and expansion in Italy is striking. In the 1040s, for example, Duke William’s troubled minority paralleled expansion in Apulia. Given the number of political enemies exiled over this period, the correlation suggests ducal justice was a “rich source of recruitment for Norman adventurers”. The other source of recruitment, identified at the time by Amatus of Montecassino, was overpopulation, for “the people had increased so exceedingly that the fields and forests were no longer

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127 Graham A. Loud, 'How Norman was the "Norman Conquest" of Southern Italy?', Nottingham Medieval Studies 25, 1981, p.19.
sufficient to provide for them...and so these men departed, forsaking what was meagre in search of what was plentiful”.\textsuperscript{129} Customs of inheritance such as primogeniture and \textit{parage}, designed to protect the unity of the fief, and pan-European population growth meant aspirational younger sons had to search beyond the duchy to make their fortunes.\textsuperscript{130} For our future conquerors of Italy, exiles and volunteers alike, the initial decision to leave Normandy was a practical one.

If the Normans’ departure from the duchy hints at the pragmatism of their later rule, then their arrival in Southern Italy reflects its ambitious nature. As the gateway between east and west, Southern Italy was already a “mosaic” of polities, with German, Byzantine, Longobard, Latin and Muslim rulers all exercising some power.\textsuperscript{131} As mercenaries, the Normans exploited the opportunities this created, fighting first on the mainland in “the incessant and fratricidal strife which was the substitute for political endeavour in Lombard Italy” and later in the skirmishes of the Sicilian emirs.\textsuperscript{132} The feudal investiture of Rainulf Drengot as Count of Aversa shows that by the 1030s the Normans were reaping benefits more permanent than plunder. Sixty years later, through a protracted expansion that occurred in distinct geographic stages, all of Southern Italy and Sicily would be in Norman hands. Unlike the English invasion of 1066 which had mobilised the vision and resources of a duchy, this piecemeal conquest was due to the astonishing ambition of individuals. Its heroes were the Hauteville brothers Robert Guiscard, Duke of Apulia and Calabria, and his younger brother Roger, Count of Sicily. Following moderate beginnings in Normandy and successful mercenary careers in the 1040s-50s, the brothers were constantly extending their domains until they exercised an effective monopoly in the south. Their avidity for domination continued to characterise the Norman realm in Italy into the twelfth century, visible in the later attempts of Roger II and William II to attack the Leviathans to the east and south: the

\textsuperscript{129} Loud, p.18.  
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{132} Loud, p.15.
Byzantine Empire and Egypt. Ambition was the major characteristic of the Norman Mezzogiorno from its creation.

This interpretation of Norman expansion driven by ambition displaces Holy War themes and recasts religion as a means and not an ends to conquest. Traditionally historians have seen the Normans’ activities in Italy as a prequel to the First Crusade, bringing the Byzantine Orthodox Church to heel and conquering the infidels of Sicily. This view is implicit in Adele Cilento’s work in which, quoting Geoffrey Malaterra, she argues that “with the expulsion of the Muslims the Hautevilles would ‘earn both spiritual rewards and worldly goods’”. This interpretation is difficult to sustain in light of Kenneth Wolf’s finding that Geoffrey himself was extremely ambivalent about the Christian character of the Norman achievement. Geoffrey does describe a positive relationship between Norman rulers and the church, but Wolfe submits this is “at best a leitmotiv within Geoffrey’s history. The central story is the consistent actualisation of Norman avidity for domination.” Likewise there is no evidence for a Holy War interpretation in the language of contemporary papal documents, and nor would it explain the (relatively) tolerant position the rulers adopted towards their Muslim subjects, which even extended to complete military cooperation in Roger’s early endeavours in Sicily.

Religion was less of an ideological inspiration to the rapacious Norman conquerors than it was a tool. Throughout the two centuries of Norman authority in Italy, the papacy and its Norman vassals both struggled to accrue rights against the other, while co-operating for mutual advantage. The Norman sword restored Byzantine territories to Rome’s spiritual domain, while papal endorsement lent a sorely needed air of legitimacy to Norman power. This legitimising potential was first realised in 1059 when Pope Nicholas II confirmed Robert Guiscard’s title and lands as Duke of Calabria. Although Roger would continue to conquer broader territories (and face repeated excommunication),

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133 Bennett, p.98.  
135 Cilento, p.185.  
136 Wolf, p.28.  
137 Bennett, p.90.  
138 Cilento, pp.176-182.
military dominance ensured the Normans eventually gained papal recognition for all conquered lands.\textsuperscript{139} Investiture by such a great universal power trumpeted the Hautevilles’ ascendency to their subjects and rivals, also allowing them to assume the symbols of divine majesty. Count Roger of Sicily, for example, adopted the shepherd’s crook and dalmatic, emblems of a Protector of the Faith.\textsuperscript{140} Upholding their obligations to Rome, the Normans enforced the Latin Mass and celebrated the connection by building spectacular churches and monasteries, such as Cefalù’s cathedral. But these buildings are better seen as monuments to Norman ambition than expressions of religious zeal – religion remained a means to Norman prominence, not its end.

The Norman’s dealings with the local population show a similar subversion of faith to pragmatism, allowing for cooperation insofar as it did not interfere with Norman dominance. Chronicle evidence of the ravages of Norman armies makes it clear that initial contact with the local population involved conflict.\textsuperscript{141} However, based on the trajectory of Robert Guiscard’s expansion, this violence seems to have been more functional than philosophical. It declined as Norman authority grew, suggesting the magnanimity and toleration of Robert’s later reign was a luxury he felt he could not afford when his own position was less secure.\textsuperscript{142} The slow pace of conquest and small number of conquerors made a “wholesale Normanization” of local custom impossible.\textsuperscript{143} Rather, the survival of native mœurs and the employment of local administrators and clergymen suggest the conquerors adopted a policy of practical tolerance toward the conquered. At times this relationship was actively collaborative. By colluding with the invaders, some powerful Lombard families, such as the Borells of Capua, retained their estates and high honours.\textsuperscript{144} More common, however, was the phenomenon of intermarriage. It was both practical and politically expedient, for while it resolved the shortage of Norman women in Italy, family alliances also legitimised Norman power by connecting them to older traditions of nobility and

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{139} Ibid, p.182
\item \textsuperscript{140} Ibid, p. 194
\item \textsuperscript{141} Loud, p.26.
\item \textsuperscript{142} Cilento, pp.172-3.
\item \textsuperscript{143} Drell, p.189.
\item \textsuperscript{144} Loud, p.27.
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sovereignty recognised by their subjects.\textsuperscript{145} Robert Guiscard, for one, divorced his Norman wife to marry the Longobard princess Sichelgaita. William of Apulia writes that as a result “the illustrious fame of Robert began to increase, and the people, having already yielded to him by force, submitted to him now with the deference that accompanies a duty to one’s ancestors.”\textsuperscript{146} Such examples indicate that after the initial trauma of invasion, there was much to be gained in collaborative relations with locals.

This collaboration, however, should not be understood as complete acculturation. In southern Italy cultural intersection was juxtaposed with an “enduring sense of ethnic identity”.\textsuperscript{147} Intermarriage inevitably had a diluting influence on identity, however both Norman and locals employed what Joanna Drell terms “resistance in recollections” to this cultural absorption.\textsuperscript{148} Charter evidence furnishes us with two examples of this. Firstly, even up until the 1180s Lombard descendants were invoking family lineage to connect themselves with a more illustrious, pre-Norman era.\textsuperscript{149} Even women married to Normans might express their paternal Lombard lineage, such as Mabilia, daughter of \textit{dominus} Guaymar, son of Guido, son of Prince Guaymar III. Writing on twelfth-century Italian literature, T.S. Brown notes a similar Lombard nationalism in Falco of Benevento’s ”vitriolic hatred of the Normans”.\textsuperscript{150} The second pattern that emerges is people continuing to identify themselves as ‘the Norman’ or ‘the Lombard’. Like the Hautevilles, most Normans did not have a particularly distinguished lineage on which to draw, but this device allowed them to recall their “conquest heritage.”\textsuperscript{151} Both trends reveal a purposive use of cultural memory that seems to displace Loud’s claim that “race rapidly became a mark of personal identification, not the demarcation of separate governing and subject castes”.\textsuperscript{152} It shows that despite assimilation, by the end of the twelfth century there was still no shared identity which transcended Southern Italy’s ethnic

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\item \textsuperscript{145} Cilento, pp.172-3.
\item \textsuperscript{146} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{147} Drell, p.187.
\item \textsuperscript{148} Ibid, p.202.
\item \textsuperscript{149} Ibid, p.197-8
\item \textsuperscript{151} Drell, p.200.
\item \textsuperscript{152} Loud, p.24.
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diversity. Brown sees this reflected in contemporary literature, concluding the failure to forge a common identity was a major weakness.153 Because his research did not extend to the institutions of Norman government, he fails to see that autonomy of identity was in fact a crucial element of Norman prominence.154

Although the southern Normans had not “forgotten Normandy” as Orderic Vitalis imagined, nor was their pragmatic style of government wholly ‘Norman’.155 The creation of the monarchy under Roger II was characteristically western, but Roger’s title itself, ‘King of Sicily, of the Duchy of Apulia and of the Principality of Capua’, communicates that “older entities had been united by the monarchy, not submerged.”156 This challenges the traditional view of Charles Homer Haskins which credits the Normans with establishing a “feudal regime” which united the separate regions under royal control.157 Reflecting on the realm’s administrative practices, the revisionist position of Loud and others seems more credible – south Italian society remained fragmented and localised. Feudal homage was introduced in the wake of conquest, but this did not precipitate the reconstruction of social relations, which continued along the lines of personal status.158 Local law continued to have effect unless contradicted royal edicts and, while ‘the king’s peace’ rose in common parlance, in practice the administration of justice continued to fall largely on local lords.159 Nor was the realm’s bureaucracy the wunderkind previously thought. Given that administrators were often locals, the eclectic adoption of Arab and Greek terms and structures, such as the Sicilian diwan, was less of a bureaucratic revolution than a practical solution to diversity. But while Brown saw this diversity as weakness, I suggest that it was a pragmatic attempt to achieve modus vivendi with a subject population that far outnumbered the Norman rulers. In light of the relative peace of their reign, it worked.

157 Bennett, p. 90.
159 Bennett, p.101.
The Normans’ attempt to gain legitimacy through patronage of the arts reflects a similar triumph of pragmatism over strict ‘Normanness’. Where past Norman conquests had been ideologically bolstered by the writings of Dudo of Saint-Quentin and Geoffrey Malaterra, the Italian historiography of the twelfth century departed from this mythic tradition. Instead of seeking legitimacy in the past, the Norman kings celebrated their current prominence with a “parvenu takeover” of exotic symbols of status.\textsuperscript{160} This cultural pilfering brought the coinage, clothing and insignia of Byzantium, the liturgical forms of Western Europe and the art of the Muslim world together in a Norman court in Italy. Such ostentatious display was itself a sign a power, but was also informed by a more traditionally ‘Norman’ sense of domination. In appropriating the symbols of a Greek world that saw itself as the successor to the Roman Empire, Roger II was taking from the east a legacy that rightfully belonged to the west.\textsuperscript{161} Similarly, the application of eastern art forms in lavish Norman buildings was an exercise in bending foreign techniques to Norman will. Monreale Cathedral’s 7600m\textsuperscript{2} of mosaic appears Byzantine, but it decorates a western building in Latin narrative sequences. Like their administrative institutions, these visual displays of legitimacy are evidence of nothing so much as avidity for domination, realised through practical measures. Although nothing of the kind had appeared in the duchy, in this sense they were strong expressions of Normannitas.\textsuperscript{162}

The characteristics of the Norman regimes in southern Italy, from their regional development to their diverse administrative systems, their cooperative relationships with the church and locals to the royal court’s exorbitance, were all shaped by an overriding avidity for domination. This was the basis of Norman prominence because it permitted the rulers to use whatever means available, religious, marital, artistic or otherwise, to consolidate and justify their power.

The desire to dominate was distinctly Norman, even if its collateral effect in Italy was a culturally-hybrid regime that seemed anything but. Southern Italy remained regionalised and culturally divided as ever, not because the Normans had failed to create a unified ‘Norman’ state, but because it was not politically expedient for them to attempt to do so. Over the eleventh and twelfth centuries

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\textsuperscript{160} Brown, p.206.
\textsuperscript{161} Matthew, p.190.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid, p.206.
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the Norman rulers raised themselves from sell-swords to kings through both conquest and cooperation. To insist too strongly on one or the other obscures the pragmatic avidity for domination which tells the real story of the Normans in the south.

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Thomas Sugrue’s *Sweet Land of Liberty* and Clarence Lang’s *Grassroots at the Gateway* fit with the ‘new’ narrative of the Civil Rights Movement. Before the emergence of the new narrative in the historiography of African American struggles for freedom, the ‘master’ narrative dominated the literature on this topic. The master narrative of the Civil Rights Movement situates African American in the South and analyses the movement through national institutions and events. It sets the struggles for freedom as a fight of morality, usually beginning with *Brown v Board of Education*. The master narrative closes with Black Power destructively ending the fight for civil rights. Charles Payne describes the master narrative as a ‘naive, top-down’ reflection of the movement, pinpointing the ‘top-down’ perspective as the underlying weakness of the master narrative. The new narrative rectifies the shortcomings of the master narrative. Characteristic of the new narrative of African American struggles for freedom, *Sweet Land of Liberty* and *Grassroots at the Gateway* situate the narratives outside the South. Sugrue and Lang apply ‘long civil rights movement’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches to the struggles for freedom. Sugrue and Lang also illustrate the multiplicity of the struggles for freedom and re-examine the motivations of activists. They also reconsider the radicalisation of the movement and the everyday struggles for freedom. The new narrative provides a fuller depiction and analysis of the African American struggles for freedom.

Firstly, Lang and Sugrue support the new narrative by situating the African American struggles for freedom outside the South. The master narrative sets the South as the stage of African American freedom struggles. Lang and Sugrue both adopt local, rather than national, analyses. Lang examines African American working class freedom struggles in St Louis, Missouri. In his text, Lang aligns with a new group of historians examining struggles for freedom beyond the ‘North-South’ model of the master narrative. In doing so, he contests the notion that states were either Northern or Southern. After all, Missouri is a border state. According to Lang, the particularities of St Louis spawned a series of African American struggles to deal with problems of urban policy, social services and representation in public office. However, Lang is unclear as to whether location mattered or whether the interests of the working class mattered. Further, Lang does not convincingly demonstrate how Missouri’s position as a border state shaped African American freedom struggles. Lang’s text also does not indicate if the dynamics of St Louis were unique. He could have established if the situation in St Louis was ‘the exception or…the norm’ through comparisons with other cities.

Sugrue argues that the North also constituted a site of African American struggles for freedom. Here, Sugrue joins historians who challenge the notion of the North as ‘an unassailable stronghold of progressive racial conscience’. The master narrative casts the North as where the Civil Rights Movement destructively ended. In doing so, the master narrative ignores racial conflict in the north. While the North did not impose de facto segregation like the South, the North still implemented de jure segregation. Through private practices,

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166 Lang, p.252.
168 ibid.
169 ibid.
172 ibid., p.xv.
market customs and public policies, the North fashioned and buttressed racial separation and inequality.\textsuperscript{173} African Americans in the North still lived as second-class citizens. Cumulatively, the impacts of segregation, discrimination and substandard education caused African Americans to constitute the majority of the unemployed and poor.\textsuperscript{174} Notably, Sugrue examines a range of places through the North. Not only does he analyse African American freedom struggles in larger cities, but also smaller cities, towns and suburbs.\textsuperscript{175} Sugrue, however, could have further considered why the North has been ‘forgotten’ in the narrative of African American freedom struggles. After all, not only has the master narrative ignored the North, but the struggles in the North were ignored at the time too.\textsuperscript{176}

The second way that Sugrue and Lang support the new narrative is by adopting a ‘long civil rights movement’ interpretation. By considering only the ‘classic era’ of the Civil Rights Movement, the master misses earlier periods of pertinent struggles for freedom.\textsuperscript{177} The master narrative posits the 1950s as the beginning of the movement, starting usually with the decision of \textit{Brown v Board of Education}. Instead, according to Sugrue, African American struggles for freedom start further back than the master narrative proposes.\textsuperscript{178} African American and white activists, for instance, had participated in the Underground Railroad, fought to abolish slavery and strove to eliminate segregation and disenfranchisement in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{179} Sugrue also suggests that the African American Great Migration of the 1920s constituted a part of the struggle for freedom. It was a political act which asserted independence from the oppressions of the South.\textsuperscript{180} Although Lang does not go as far back as Sugrue, Lang still begins earlier than the master narrative. Lang starts by considering the struggles for freedom in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{181} During that period, African Americans in St Louis participated in local politics, organised consumer boycotts, formed trade

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\textsuperscript{173} ibid.
\textsuperscript{174} ibid.
\textsuperscript{176} ibid.
\textsuperscript{177} Payne, p.110.
\textsuperscript{178} Sugrue, pp.xx-xxi.
\textsuperscript{179} ibid.
\textsuperscript{180} ibid.
\textsuperscript{181} Lang, p.13.
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unions, supported the Congress of Industrial Organisations and beyond. During the period from the Great Depression through to World War II, African Americans reshaped their struggles for freedom, notably concerning economic issues. The 1940s, further, saw the ‘Double V’ campaign and the March on Washington Movement. As Sugrue contends, it is ‘futile’ to identify a single moment of origin of the struggles for freedom. What Sugrue and Lang demonstrate, however, is that African American struggles for freedom began earlier than the master narrative suggests.

Thirdly, Sugrue and Lang’s texts fit with the new narrative because they use a ‘bottom-up’ approach. Sugrue and Lang demonstrate that the ‘top-down’ viewpoint of the master narrative is too simplistic. As Payne argues, a ‘top-down’ framework diminishes the potency of local struggles. It fails to acknowledge the way that ‘ordinary’ people participated in and propelled the struggles for freedom. Sugrue’s analysis considers a range of historical characters, ‘some forgotten, some famous’. He acknowledges agency in activists, movements and organisations that the master narrative missed. In particular, Sugrue recognises that activists in the struggles for freedom did not act alone. Instead, activists worked collaboratively through institutions and organisations. African Americans adopted a myriad of institutions and organisations to fight for freedom, from political parties to churches to social clubs. Lang’s analysis focused on working class African Americans. By placing working class African Americans at the centre of his analysis, Lang contends that African American working class interests and efforts shaped the struggles for freedom. African American workers, however, were not simply workers or activists. Their daily lives and interests mobilised them just as much as workplace abuses and

182 ibid.  
183 Sugrue, pp.xx-xxi.  
184 Lang, pp.13-14.  
185 Sugrue, p.xx.  
186 Payne, 109.  
187 ibid.  
188 Sugrue, p.xxvii.  
189 ibid.  
190 ibid.  
191 ibid.  
192 Lang, p.3.
subordinating segregation practices.\textsuperscript{193} Workers’ interests moulded a ‘historic bloc’ of forces within the African American community.\textsuperscript{194} Further, whereas some historians have argued that working class Africans engaged in ‘infrapolitics’ as part of their struggle, Lang promulgates that the African American working class organised overtly.\textsuperscript{195} Lang’s text, however, has a small presence of ‘everyday’ people.\textsuperscript{196} African American workers are ‘more often seen than heard’ in his book.\textsuperscript{197}

Next, Sugrue and Lang develop the new narrative by highlighting the multiplicity within the struggles for freedom. The master narrative portrays the struggles for freedom as unitary force with a well-defined goal. Payne suggests that this misses the complexity of African American communities and how that contributed to different reactions to oppression.\textsuperscript{198} Sugrue argues that ‘the northern black freedom struggle cannot be reduced to a single impulse or political current’.\textsuperscript{199} Activists’ motivations, ideologies and senses of possibility varied and changed.\textsuperscript{200} Some activists believed in racial uplift and respectability, the idea that African American elites should help better their race.\textsuperscript{201} Others, however, believed in interracialism, the notion that African Americans and white Americans should collaborate to improve the situation of everybody.\textsuperscript{202} Some others, yet, thought that self-determination and self-help should be the solution instead.\textsuperscript{203} Sugrue and Lang both recognise that race and class intersected.\textsuperscript{204} Lang develops this idea of the juncture of race and class further. Lang believes that the struggles for African American freedom underlined class tensions among African Americans.\textsuperscript{205} While scholars in African American urban history have acknowledged the idea of the African American working class, the role of the

\textsuperscript{193} ibid., p.253.
\textsuperscript{194} ibid., p.3.
\textsuperscript{195} ibid., p.249.
\textsuperscript{196} Zarsadiaz, p.1095.
\textsuperscript{197} Adams, p.213.
\textsuperscript{198} Payne, p.110.
\textsuperscript{199} Sugrue, p.xxiv.
\textsuperscript{200} ibid., pp.xxiv-xxv.
\textsuperscript{201} ibid., p.xxv.
\textsuperscript{202} ibid.
\textsuperscript{203} ibid.
\textsuperscript{204} ibid.; Lang, p.3.
\textsuperscript{205} Lang, p.3.
working class in the struggles for freedom is less clear.206 Lang notes that some historians have confounded working class and middle class goals.207 While the African American working class and middle class shared overarching interests regarding racial inclusion and equality, the terms and goals of the struggle for freedom differed.208 Whereas the middle class were more concerned about ‘respectability’, the working class was more concerned with ‘self-determination’.209 Accordingly, the working class agenda encompassed issues including jobs, education and housing.210 The African American working class struggles for freedom promulgated their racial interests as well as their working class interests.211

Fifthly, Lang and Sugrue align with the new narrative by exploring the motivations and goals of the African American activists. The master narrative suggests that morality motivated the Civil Rights Movement. The image of the movement as nonviolent contributed to the belief that morality inspired the activists.212 However, Sugrue illustrates that activists did not always act peacefully. With the unfolding of the events in Birmingham in 1963, northerners began to see the limits of nonviolent resistance.213 After the Great March, Cleage proposed that for African American victories in freedom, peaceful demonstration was not enough.214 The African American struggles for freedom, instead, needed a ‘strategy of chaos.’215 Over the summer of 1963, further, African American activists purposefully became disruptive and increasingly employed strategies to draw the attention of the media.216 The African American struggles for freedom, then, were not all-peaceful, as the master narrative posits. Further, as Payne postulates, the master narrative oversimplifies the motives of activists.217 Lang illustrates how African American struggles for freedom reflected the concerns

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206 ibid., p.2.
207 ibid.
208 ibid., pp.3-4.
209 ibid.
210 ibid., p.3.
211 ibid., pp.3, 250.
212 Payne, p.116.
213 Sugrue, p.291.
214 ibid., p.301.
215 ibid.
216 ibid.
217 Payne, p.110.
and agenda of the working class. This included issues of employment, urban policy, municipal governance, housing, education and African American representation in public office. These were working class interests and, accordingly, sources of mobilisation. Similarly, as Sugrue contends, activists used the term ‘civil rights movement’ widely. At its widest, the struggle fought for the elimination of discrimination in the workplace, the opening up of segregated neighbourhoods, the arrangement of good education, the economic advancement of poorer communities and unfettered access to the consumer marketplace. The common denominator amongst these struggles was ‘rights’. In particular, Jeanne Theoharis praises Sugrue for his ‘sober examination’ of the motivations of the activists. Using the phrase ‘civil rights’ in a narrow sense makes it difficult to understand why African Americans continued to struggle and radicalise after they received their civil rights in law.

Another way that Sugrue and Lang advance the new narrative is by reconsidering the radicalisation of the African American struggles for freedom. The master narrative assumes that African American struggles for freedom were merely about obtaining legislative and policy gains. That neglects the way that the Civil Rights Movement constituted a radicalising experience for ordinary people or an evolving culture. From the viewpoint of the master narrative, then, it becomes difficult to see why the movement radicalised. In the master narrative, the ideals of a peaceful Civil Rights Movement destructed in the 1960s. The nonviolent ideals of ‘civil rights’ gave way to the radicalism of ‘Black Power’. Sugrue describes this recount as ‘terribly incomplete’.

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218 Lang, p.3.
219 ibid., pp.249-250.
220 ibid., p.249.
221 Sugrue, p.xvi.
222 ibid.
223 ibid.
225 Payne, p.129.
226 ibid., p.110.
227 ibid.
228 ibid.
229 Sugrue, p.xxi.
230 ibid., pp.xxi-xxii.
231 ibid.
and Lang recognise that Black Power had deeper roots and ‘re-emerged’ in the 1960s. Further, as Sugrue argues, Black Power did not aim to contest civil rights gains. Instead, it sought to embrace the structures of local government and ideology of grassroots self-help. Similarly, Lang argues that Black Power also had a grassroots base, visible through the rhetoric and stylisations of Black Power. In St Louis, the Action Council (Committee) to Improve Opportunities for Negroes in St Louis represented the shift from civil rights to Black Power. It reflected African American working class concerns. Although it dealt with a wide range of issues, it was primarily concerned with more and better jobs opportunities. So, as Sugrue argues, with the rise of Black Power, civil rights activism did not stop. Instead, it took new forms. Notably, through the 1970s, African Americans increasingly participated in local and national politics. However, Sugrue and Lang appear to be still be trapped by the master narrative at times. Sugrue and Lang both note the fragmentation and strains brought forth by the rise of Black Power. 

Finally, Sugrue and Lang’s analyses fit with the new narrative because they examine local movements, rather than dramatic events. The master narrative suggests that African American struggles for freedom can be understood solely through large-scale dramatic events. That neglects the social infrastructures that facilitated the struggles for freedom on a daily basis. Sugrue defines ‘politics’ in African American struggles for freedom widely. He includes demonstrations, grassroots organising, intellectual lobbying, journalism, electoral politics and litigation. He explores the institutions that activists joined, including churches and political parties. Most activists did not make laws, but they influenced policy makers at the local, state

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232 ibid.; Lang, p.15.
233 Sugrue, pp.xxi-xxii.
234 Lang, p.15.
235 ibid., p.185.
236 ibid., p.15.
237 Sugrue, pp.xxii.
238 ibid.
239 Williams, p.767.
240 Sugrue as quoted in Williams; Lang, pp.185, 216.
241 Payne, p.110.
242 ibid.
243 Sugrue, p.xxii.
244 ibid.
and national levels nonetheless.\textsuperscript{245} They vocalised issues of racial exclusion in public forums through their actions. Also, they organised ‘politically’, both within and beyond electoral politics. Similarly, Lang surveyed the way that, in the 1950s, African American workers recommenced the mass movements for equitable employment and initiated a grassroots battle for African American freedom.\textsuperscript{246} The local St Louis National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, Negro American Labour Council and Congress of Racial Equality led this movement.\textsuperscript{247} Through various local institutions, during the 1960s, St Louis’s African American working class waged ‘freedom struggles’ against economic, political and social oppressions.\textsuperscript{248} Further, in the full titles of their texts, Sugrue and Lang refer to the ‘struggle’ for freedom, rather than just the ‘movement’. In this way, Sugrue and Lang set up their texts to evaluate struggles for freedom through everyday local resistance in various forms.

The new narrative offers a more comprehensive view and analysis of the African American struggles for freedom than the master narrative. Sugrue and Lang’s texts fit with the new narrative of African American struggles for freedom. In aligning with the new narrative, Sugrue and Lang locate their analyses outside the South and outside the ‘classic era’ of the Civil Rights Movement. They employ a ‘bottom-up’ approach and delve into the multiplicity of the movement. Lang and Sugrue reconsider the motivations of the activists and the radicalisation of the movement. They demonstrate the potency of local everyday struggles for freedom, explaining the movement through everyday structures and institutions rather than national events. Of course, as Payne suggests, the complex of the master narrative versus the new narrative is not an ‘either-either’ choice.\textsuperscript{249} As Sugrue argues, the grassroots did influence policy makers at a higher level.\textsuperscript{250} The new narrative more extensively covers African American struggles for freedom. Despite the shortcomings of Sugrue and Lang’s texts, they nevertheless valuably contribute to the historiography of African American struggles for freedom.

\textsuperscript{245} ibid.  
\textsuperscript{246} Lang, p.14.  
\textsuperscript{247} ibid.  
\textsuperscript{248} ibid.  
\textsuperscript{249} Payne, p.111.  
\textsuperscript{250} Sugure, p.xxiii.
The creation of a commercial sex market due to foreign treaty ports.

“Immoral customs are prevalent in Shanghai” claims an article published in 1931. After the first Opium War was lost by the Chinese and the Nanking treaty was signed, China saw a shift from traditional values of marriage and procreation to a value of commercialisation specifically the commercialisation of sex. This was caused by the arrival of foreigners into the treaty ports of China, which saw the creation of a new middle class with expendable wealth for things like sexual pleasure. Foreigners not only became the purchasers of sex but also the sex workers. Sex became commercialised in a way that it never had been before, in dance halls, in medicine, and in books. Despite Chinese officials attempts to prevent this break from traditional customs the vast quantities of prostitution was unable to be prevented until Mao. Even after Mao, sex was no longer linked with procreation and marriage but it seemed that the arrival of foreigners had changed sex into a purchasable commodity linked with an ever increasing commercial and economic market.

The arrival of foreigners changed and destroyed traditional Chinese values of class and instead created an emphasis on money. This is evident in the change of prostitution in China. Although prostitution began began long before foreign invasion, the face Chinese prostitution was forever changed after the Treaty of Nanking. This treaty allowed the creation of five treaty ports which became centres of trading and degradation. In these treaty ports the change from courtesan to prostitute was most evident. Where once hiring a courtesan was a cultural experience for those of a high class, the creation of a middle class

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changed this scene into one of prostitution where women looked to make money from selling themselves to men for their sexual pleasure. Hershatter explains that the last quarter of the nineteenth century was seen as the “golden age” by nostalgic Republican-era authors. A time when business was good, and “beauty met with wealth to the accompaniment of music.” In the article "Detraditionalisation and attitudes of sex outside marriage in China" it is explained that traditional Chinese society placed very little priority on sexual pleasure and that marriage existed for the purpose of having children. This seems to have changed from the late nineteenth century which can be seen in the Nanjing Road area of the International Settlement which became a centre for aggressive street walkers and the North Sichuan Road became “a center for Cantonese, Japanese, Korean, and.. White Russian Brothels.” Instead of Chinese courtesans, there were now prostitutes of all races. Prostitution had become a commercial success, with variety of race being an indicator of the change.

This “detraditionalisation” after the loss of the first Opium War was due to the inability of Maritime customs to control concessions which then created areas for degradation to manifest. Concessions were created, areas governed and occupied by foreigners. Difficulties were explained of the policing of these concessions and that they then became centres of degradation where smoking, gambling and prostitution went on openly. In this same report it is said that the prostitutes were “driven into the treaty ports by economic distress.” Here it is shown that foreigners brought with them not only drugs and goods but also money. The face of sex and pleasure work had truly changed from that of a high class experience and courtesans to one of prostitution for money.

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253 Ibid.
255 Hershatter, 37.
257 Ibid.
The change from courtesan to prostitute emphasises the growth of the middle class in China. The influx of foreigners changed the dynamic of China permanently so instead of being separated into lower class and higher class, a new wealthy middle class were looking to buy sexual pleasure. Although this was created due to the arrival of foreigners, it is not to say that foreigners themselves were degenerates and they inflicted their morals onto the Chinese, in fact, foreigners saw themselves as superior to the Chinese. But there was a definite shift in the middle of the nineteenth century of Chinese society from being “a status-dominated society” and to being one replaced with “a money-dominated society.”

With an influx of a middle class of “urbanites”, courtesans who had once dominated Shanghai saw their role and status decline and were replaced with prostitutes. This shift not only exposed the declining traditional values of China but emphasised the increasing importance of money over culture.

Who the Customers and the workers of the sex industry were had been changed but the most important change in this new commercialised industry was the change of the perception of prostitutes. In the mosquito newspaper, "Social Daily News", an article written on October 1, 1935, Mo An writes of a pleasure house where "women of beautiful lands...sell their bodies." He explains that many Chinese love "to taste the pleasure" that can be found with foreign women. We are told that in the Western District of Shanghai there is a house of European prostitution and although Chinese are not generally admitted one of Mo An’s friend was allowed to enter because he looked to be of "high class." This evidence shows not only the Western aversion of the Chinese but also perhaps a continuation of a commercialised society where Mo An’s friend is only allowed in because he looks to have a lot of money. Mo An goes further to explain that his friend paid $50 for three hours with a Spanish girl and another friend of his paid only $30 so "the charges of the house are not fixed." The foreign prostitution

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259 ibid.
261 ibid.
262 ibid., 9.
263 ibid.
houses depicted in this article seem to emphasise not only the variety of foreign girls available, French, Russian, Spanish and more, but also the idea that the house is there for profit and pleasure and not for culture.

Despite the commercial success of prostitution and the changing Chinese environment, prostitution was not accepted and there were many attempts by Chinese officials to prevent it. In one police report an article explains that prostitution along with sodomy, naked dance, masturbation and sexual intercourse between women were all classed under the term “indecency” in the Criminal Code. The writer of this article explains the confusion of this blanket term of indecency. He says that in Western countries, the act of sodomy is “not punishable under heading of adultery but under special provisions” but in China it is. Sexual Intercourse between women is popular in well known hotels in Shanghai and the cost “ranges from $20 to $30.” Here he says that it affects “public morality” so the law prohibits it. Naked dancers, the writer claims, are always used by cinema theatres to promote business. The police files show the prominence that sexual acts had in the public and commercial spheres. In the Shanghai Municipal Police Files statistics are given from the Council of the United Russian Public Organisations at Shanghai to the Shanghai Municipal Council. These statistics show the crime among the local Russian community in Shanghai. From January 1st to December 31st in 1931, there were 432 convictions and 18 are for prostitution. The next year from January 1st to June 30, there are 121 convictions and 3 are for prostitution. Although the numbers of those convicted of prostitution are low, they still show the immersion of foreigners in the commercial success of Chinese prostitution. It no longer had anything to do with culture but was instead a commercial market.

Naked dancers, despite being illegal, were a flourishing commercial market that

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264 Report of Special Branch, 1.
265 Ibid, 2.
266 Ibid.
267 Ibid.
268 Ibid.
270 Ibid, 158.
allowed dance halls to profit. There are many police reports attempting to observe and shut down these halls but the share number of them shows the police’s inability to control the commercialisation of sexual pleasure. In an extract from a book called "Ling Ngoh Te Mung" (The Door of Flesh) we are told of a dancing hall but those who go there are not there for dancing but rather "extinguishing their 'fire'." A lady called Miss Mary explains to the character Burtell that she will "allow" him to do "anything [he] please." Although this is a fictional account, it shows the general acceptance that dancing hall's were not for dancing but rather an area for sex. The Western names in this extract show that the foreign impact on the sex market extends to all areas. It is unclear if Miss Mary is in fact a foreigner or a Chinese lady who Westernised her name but it is unimportant as the link between foreigners and the sex industry is still created. These naked dancers clearly show the complete separation of traditional Chinese values of sex being for procreation, to sex being a commercialised industry where pleasure can be bought.

This “commercialization of leisure activities” continued with the creation of dance halls. These dance halls are noted throughout Shanghai police reports as being areas not for dancing but for sexual pleasure and entertainment. In one instance a dancing hall referred to as the Star Cabaret was kept under observation. When the management was approached due to "the indecent performance of a naked female" they explained that she was wearing "skin tights". Other patrons questioned about her also said the same and that she "had the appearance of being of the Eurasian type." In another report we are told that "the business of all dance halls has been affected by the business depression." Tickets are being sold at "ten to twelve for one dollar." On a particular night a hall managed to secure "a young American lady to give performances of naked dancing." The business apparently did very well that

271 Report of Special Branch, 9.
272 Ibid.
275 Ibid.
276 Ibid., 4.
night and "it is not strange that other small dance halls are following the example of this dance hall." - that is to say, having naked dances.\textsuperscript{277} Once again we are shown that not only did the commercialisation of sex help the business depression of dance halls, but foreign females were often hired as entertainers. On February 9th, 1939 there was a report made by Inspector Goffe of a show that takes place twice nightly where "a Russian female... takes of all her clothes behind a silk screen, forming a living silhouette portrait in different postures." He claims that although there is nothing actually indecent about the act, it is too daring and he has instructed the management to "stop the act and not to put the show on again."\textsuperscript{278} Here it seems that the mere suggestion of a sexual act was enough for a show to be cancelled. This shows the reality of the sexual market and perhaps also how terrified Chinese officials were at the influx of sex in the public eye.

A mosquito paper called Tan Sin Hua Pao, published an article on August 26, 1939 written about Yung and his visits to the Stadium Night Garden Dance Hall. Attracted by the advertisement he arrived there at around 10pm and explains that in the show, two females clothes were stolen by a jewel dealer and they were told to turn towards the audience and "being entirely unclothed, every part of their body... became exposed to the eyes of the audience."\textsuperscript{279} Yung then returns to the Hall the next night "being not fully contented with this sight" and he witnesses a play known as "A Visit to a Girl Guide Agency by a Foreigner."\textsuperscript{280} In this play, a foreigner wishes to "play with some nice girls" for money but he first wanted to inspect the bodies of the girls to see if "she bore marks of syphilis on her body."\textsuperscript{281} This led to a girl undressing on the stage and Yung noticed "the large scab of a sore on her buttock."\textsuperscript{282} Unfortunately the tale ends here but what is obvious in Yung’s story is not only the commercialisation of sexuality but also in the second performance, the association of foreigners having money and their impact on the sexual market.

\textsuperscript{277} Ibid,  
\textsuperscript{278} ibid., p.5.  
\textsuperscript{279} ibid., p.37.  
\textsuperscript{280} ibid.  
\textsuperscript{281} ibid.  
\textsuperscript{282} ibid., p.38.
The commercialisation of sex also carried on into the world of medicine. Many advertisements attempt to sell medicine that will cure impotency and one particular advertisement claims that it will make a woman "healthy" and her "breasts will grow." These medicines will also help old men "become young again." This shows the commercialisation of sex, not just in prostitution but even for older married couples. It explains that there "are many lovers or couples in the world who have... lost the pleasures of love." Another advertisement shown claims that "a German expert on sexual disease" has found a cure for "premature discharge, impotency, weakness, under-development, etc.." and that it will "improve the happiness of a family." The price of the medicine is $6 per box, but a special price of $5 per box is offered. Once again commercialisation is apparent, and this time a German expert is used to show Western science. While these advertisements selling medicine for sexual performance and health are vital in understanding the commercialisation of sex in all aspects, they also show the issue in the splitting of ideal morals and reality. While sex and prostitution was evidently prominent, venereal diseases also became an issue. Henriot explains that it was not Chinese authorities care for the health of prostitutes that caused them to intervene but more of an issue of morality.

Sex became so commercialised that there were multiple help books on sexual intercourse. One was called "The Way to Play in A Room" which had multiple sections that began with "Evil Consequences" for example "Evil Consequences of Early Marriage", "Evil Consequences of Concubines", "Evil Consequences of Raping Widows", "Evil Consequences of Sexual Intercourse in Sing-Song Houses." This book is particularly interesting as it links commercial interests of sex with the questionable morality of sex. The book cashes in on the commercialisation of sex but then explains the "Evil Consequences" of the wrong types of sex. Through this book it seems that traditional values of sex being for procreation is an ideal that has been ignored with the money that can be created through exploiting customers wants of pleasure.

283 ibid., p.13.
284 ibid.
285 ibid., p.18.
286 Henriot, Prostitution and Sexuality, p.273.
287 Further to Attached, p.27.
The Maoist state that was created in 1949 saw a reversion back to traditional values of marriage and a ban on the commercialisation of sex. However, despite this it can be seen that sex was still something for pleasure and commercialisation when prostitution reappeared in 1980. The birth of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 saw "free choice and monogamous marriage" became widely practised. This Maoist state “eliminated prostitution” which the Chinese understood as “signs of sexual shame and national weakness.” Once again sex became seen as "a manifestation of bourgeois individualism." All that had changed in the perceptions of sex seemed to have back tracked into the previous emphasis on marriage and any sex outside of this was seen as highly immoral. However Jeffreys explains Pan Suiming’s argument that the implementation of the of the One-child Family policy actually severed the “historical link between sex and procreation in China” and placed the emphasis on sexual pleasure. Even so this Maoist state created a time where sex workers were “a rarity” and Mao closed the brothels to combat "rampant sexually-transmitted infections." So while perhaps sex was still seen as something for pleasure over procreation, the exiling of foreigners and the closing of brothels de-emphasised the commercial aspect. Hershatter believes that with the introduction of the Maoist state, the focus of modernity shifted off of the idea of sexual hygiene and well-regulated prostitution into ideas of rising production figures. But with the reintroduction of prostitution in 1980, attitudes towards sex changed even more rapidly to 'detraditionalise” China and once again saw prostitution as a focus of modernity debates. 

By looking at prostitution and 'indecency' it is possible to see the impact that foreigners had on China, and the change from a value in hierarchy to one of money. The multiple police reports and attempts to contain this change only serves to show how prevalent sex was in Chinese society. In treaty ports like Shanghai, this change was most prominent as there was an influx of foreigners

289 Hershatter, p.324.
290 Weijun Zheng et al., "Detraditionalisation", 498.
291 Ibid.
293 Hershatter, 324.
294 Ibid.
and the limited control that the Chinese government had over these ports allowed commercialisation of leisure to take hold. Mao eventually ridding China of foreigners and of prostitution may have prevented a link between commercialism and sex for sometime but the economic growth during this time just meant that after Mao, prostitution came back in full force and more prominent than ever before.

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Do these books support and/or challenge the “good sixties”/“bad sixties” interpretation of the 1960s?

Yeah that’s what we don’t wanna hear any more, alright
No bullets
At least here, huh huh
No guns, no bombs
Huh huh
No nothin’, just let’s all live and live
You know instead of killin’
—“Machine Gun”,
from Jimi Hendrix, Band of Gypsies

Jimi Hendrix, one of millions opposed to America’s involvement in Vietnam, perfectly encapsulated the anti-war sentiment prevalent throughout America during the Vietnam War. The domestic anti-war movement—if so many different campaigns and coalitions can be grouped under such a simple historical banner—proliferated throughout America with marked volatility and influence. But to what extent was this movement characteristic of the historiographical notion of declension? That is, does the development and eventual waning of this movement support the idea that the 1960s was a decade of decline—idealistic and hopeful in 1960, pessimistic and radical by 1969? Melvin Small answers this question in the negative. For him, the anti-war movement was only as radical and confrontational as the mainstream media incorrectly portrayed it to be. He argues that the media’s depiction was fundamentally biased, disproportionately
focusing upon violence while completely disregarding political strategy. A similar assertion has been made by Charles DeBenedetti. Though his work is somewhat encyclopaedic in its scope, within his broad overview are several implicit arguments which persuasively challenge the “good sixties”/“bad sixties” interpretation. By emphasising its disjointed nature, namely the tension between radicals and liberals, DeBenedetti reveals that, contrary to the idea of a decade of decline, the anti-war movement cannot at any point be accurately defined as ‘good’. The characterisation of the decade as a gradual arc from optimism to disaster is centred upon the concept of the ‘short sixties’, the idea that the movements that defined the 1960s were strictly confined to that decade. Both Small and DeBenedetti undermine this notion by expanding their discussions beyond the chronological parameters of the decade. Ultimately, Small and DeBenedetti, in spite of the outwardly contrasting natures of their respective works, equally challenge the declension model of 1960s America.

Small’s emphasis on the biased media portrayal of the anti-war movement is archetypal of the revisionist challenge to the “good sixties”/“bad sixties” interpretation which arose in the 1980s and 1990s. In his 1999 review essay exploring the development of this revisionist historiographical school—and subsequently propounding such an approach to the history of the 1960s—Alan Hunt found the ‘simplistic “death of the sixties” chronology’ to be centred upon inaccurate generalisations and a profound indifference toward key historical truths. This is essentially Small’s argument, but stated in more general terms. Through an examination of the accounts of anti-war activity given by American media outlets, including the New York Times and the Washington Post, Small asserts that the media overemphasised radical and violent activities that were actually only at the fringe of the wider anti-war movement. Rather than present a story detailing instances of grassroots or political campaigning—which constituted the majority of anti-war activity—the media accentuated

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298 Small, p.2.
“unpatriotic” slogans and flags, revolutionary rhetoric, and countercultural garb’. Through this deliberately skewed media filter, then, the quintessential demonstrator most Americans were exposed to was ‘radical and hippie’—precisely the sort of violent, disenchanted youth perceived to be a threat to the internal stability of the United States. Such an image is typical of the ‘tragic paroxysm of violence and despair’ which proponents of the declension model claim characterised the end of the 1960s. However, Small’s discussion of the unfavourable treatment of anti-war demonstrations proves this image to be a false media façade influenced by fundamentally middle-class, moderate values. By highlighting the fact that a ‘radical’ anti-war movement is akin to the unrealistic ‘media-caricatured movement’, Small successfully destabilises the foundations of the idea of the 1960s as a decade of decline.

Written in 1990, DeBenedetti’s comprehensive overview of the nature and success of the anti-war movement was one of the first major (though inadvertent) challenges to the traditional rise and fall model of the 1960s. Through his broad, detailed analysis of the movement, DeBenedetti reveals the extent to which it would be historically inaccurate to describe the 1960s as a decade that became radical as it drew to a close. He does this in two ways. Firstly, he stresses that the movement was ‘more assembled than it was organised’, that it was at best a loosely connected coalition with many disparate constituencies which only shared the abstract goal of withdrawal from Vietnam. In this sense, DeBenedetti highlights that the movement cannot realistically be characterised as ‘good’, as it began and ended as a fragmented movement which, while maintaining a relatively strong cultural influence, was never able to gain any real political traction. Without a positive start from which to fall, the anti-war movement can only been seen to exist outside of the model of declension. Secondly, DeBenedetti asserts that any militant extremists within the movement were only on its periphery and relatively small in

299 ibid., pp.2-3.
300 ibid., p.163.
301 Hunt, p.149.
302 Small, p.167.
303 ibid. p.2.
304 Hunt, p.150.
305 DeBenedetti, p.389.
306 ibid., p.4.
number.\textsuperscript{307} In a similar vein to Small, DeBenedetti asserts that while militancy attached itself to the public image of the movement, the vast majority of anti-war activity ‘remained peaceable and restrained’.\textsuperscript{308} In this way, DeBenedetti argues (albeit implicitly) that the anti-war movement was never truly ‘good’, nor did it deteriorate into something 'bad'—hence underlining the falsity of the “good sixties”/”bad sixties” interpretation.

Notwithstanding the commonality between these books in their criticism of the traditional model of the proverbial ‘arc’ of the 1960s, the two differ quite markedly in scope, as well as the methodology employed by their respective authors to reach their shared revisionist conclusions. Small’s book has a very particular focus: the disproportionate amount of attention journalists paid to revolutionary, countercultural symbols and violence relative to that given to the moderate, undramatic rhetoric typical of the majority of anti-war activity.\textsuperscript{309} Unfavourable treatment by the media, Small maintains, occurred ‘throughout the era’, manifesting most strikingly in Time's cover story describing the Siege of the Pentagon in October 1967, which had the title “Protest! Protest! Protest! A Week of Antiwar Demonstrations.”\textsuperscript{310} According to Small, negative images—such as the pairing of the famous ‘flower in the barrel of the gun’ with a Che Guevara poster—undoubtedly left the public with an unfavourable impression of the movement.\textsuperscript{311} William Hoynes argues that as a result of his exclusive focus upon a relatively small number of media outlets, Small’s work ‘lacks depth and theoretical sophistication.’\textsuperscript{312} However, this charge against Small is discredited when Small’s arguments are compared to the contentions put forward by DeBenedetti. He concludes that because the violent exceptions were emphasised in the media—for instance in Chicago in 1968 or the MayDays of 1971—a movement which by and large condemned violence was incorrectly perceived to be a radical, extremist organisation.\textsuperscript{313} While Hoynes is correct in his claim that Small provides a somewhat limited analysis of a particular aspect of the anti-war

\textsuperscript{307} ibid., p.392.
\textsuperscript{308} ibid., p.391.
\textsuperscript{309} Small, pp.2-3.
\textsuperscript{310} ibid., p.79.
\textsuperscript{311} ibid.
\textsuperscript{313} DeBenedetti, p.392.
movement, the fact the DeBenedetti's detailed and expansive investigation draws similar, in some cases identical, conclusions would suggest that the specific focus of Small’s book does not detract from the validity of his assertions.

Ironically, it is that very ‘encyclopaedic quality’ of DeBenedetti’s work that David Patterson contends is its greatest limitation.\textsuperscript{314} He asserts that the level of detail provided in terms of ‘names, dates, and events’ dampens the analytical force of the book.\textsuperscript{315} Although this aspect may be somewhat of a weakness in terms of logical coherency, it is actually a significant strength with respect to DeBenedetti’s challenge to the traditionalist interpretation of the 1960s. DeBenedetti made extensive use of a vast array of primary sources, including newspapers, manuscripts and contemporary journal articles; all supplemented by countless secondary sources.\textsuperscript{316} That this exhaustive and thorough examination yielded such a persuasive challenge to the “good sixties”/“bad sixties” interpretation proves just how inaccurate this model is. Indeed, it is not merely specific analyses with an overt agenda—such as Small’s dismantling of the idea of positive media treatment of the movement—which contest the traditional historiographical stance. Even an extensive investigation into essentially every aspect of the movement’s development throughout the 1960s provides a strong revisionist challenge. If the notion of a decade typified by decline had any historical validity whatsoever, surely it would have been DeBenedetti who uncovered it. Yet he did not, and indeed he could not, because the traditional declension model relies upon crude generalities at the expense of historical fact.

One of the most significant generalisations of the anti-war movement is the grouping of such a complex assortment of competing ideologies into a single organisation. Accordingly, the evidence of radical activity within this monolithic movement in the later 1960s would surely substantiate the assertion that the end of the decade was characterised by declension into chaos. However, DeBenedetti uncovers the realities of the structure and administration of the anti-war movement. Whereas those in support of the notion of declension would

\textsuperscript{315} ibid.
\textsuperscript{316} DeBenedetti, pp.465-476.
maintain that the end of the 1960s saw a marked spread of radicalism and general disarray, DeBenedetti convincingly argues that such ‘disillusionment and despair’ was in fact evident within the movement from its inception.\(^{317}\) He notes that ‘almost from the outset’ there was a stark tone of disenchantment towards Lyndon Johnson, and at the end of 1964, when the movement was just beginning, anti-Vietnam dissent was fragmented by ‘incipient division’ arising from a multitude of ‘personal, political, and ideological differences’.\(^{318}\) So the movement was in fact ‘bad’ from the start. Furthermore, throughout the movement’s existence, it was fundamentally divided along radical and liberal lines, an issue DeBenedetti evidences in part in the ‘Vietnam Summer’ of 1967.\(^{319}\) The liberals, on the one hand, viewed the war as a policy issue.\(^{320}\) For the radicals, on the other, the war was a means toward revolutionary social upheaval.\(^{321}\) While the former strove to bring an end to American involvement out of concern for the Vietnamese people, the latter challenged American intervention in an attempt to rid American society of corruption.\(^{322}\) Hence the prominence of radicalism in the late 1960s does not signal the deterioration of the movement into extremism so much as it highlights the temporary rise of the movement’s pre-existing radical wing.

Noting the division between radical and liberal activists that DeBenedetti so strongly underlines, Small provides a similar yet distinct reason for the apparent omnipresence of radicalism within the movement in the late 1960s. According to Small, the media’s presentation of anti-Vietnam dissent suggested a ‘monolithic anti-war movement’.\(^{323}\) He argues that the American media treated confrontational demonstrations as synonymous with the movement, while in actuality they were exceptional events in a wider scheme of political and grassroots campaigning.\(^{324}\) The Mobe Demonstrations of April 1968 provide strong evidence of this. In their coverage of these demonstrations, Small claims, the press exaggerated ‘violent confrontations and language’ despite the fact that

\(^{317}\) DeBenedetti, p.4.
\(^{318}\) DeBenedetti, p.101.; ibid., p.391.
\(^{319}\) ibid., pp.182-183.
\(^{320}\) ibid., p.402.
\(^{321}\) ibid.
\(^{322}\) ibid.
\(^{323}\) Small, p.2.
\(^{324}\) ibid., pp.2-3.
the majority of the demonstrations were peaceful.\textsuperscript{325} The entire body of media coverage from 1965 to 1967 emphasised physical clashes and arrests to such an extent that the public inevitably came to believe that ‘violent behaviour and demonstrations went hand in hand’.\textsuperscript{326} However, Small stresses that in reality disorder was either caused by unprovoked attacks from counterdemonstrators or by a handful of radicals within the movement.\textsuperscript{327} He contends (like DeBenedetti) that the movement was ‘hydra-headed’, composed of thousands of ‘formal, informal…local and national organisations and coalitions that changed over time.’\textsuperscript{328} The movement and radicalism were thus not inextricably linked as the mainstream media portrayed them to be. Radicalism was only synonymous with the movement that was presented by the media. This presentation, Small highlights, was nothing more than a ‘media caricature’ founded upon the same key flaws as the “good sixties”/”bad sixties” interpretation: generalisation and a lack of respect for historical or, in the case of the media, contemporary, reality.\textsuperscript{329}

These two books also challenge the declension model due to the simple fact that their chronologies go beyond the traditional boundaries of the 1960s. For the notion of an arc from idealism to despair within the 1960s to be substantiated, any discussion of the anti-war movement would have to be within these parameters; that is 1960 to 1969. Correspondingly, a discussion of the movement which expands beyond the decade, by referring to either antecedent or subsequent events, or both, naturally reveals the inappropriateness of the application of such a limiting model to a movement that spanned across two decades. DeBenedetti begins his discussion of the movement by examining its origins in the pacifist and anti-nuclear organisations of the late 1950s, such as the Committee for Non-Violent Actions (CNVA) or the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE).\textsuperscript{330} He ends his investigation with the reinvigoration of the movement that occurred in the early 1970s, culminating in such demonstrations as the Kent State Protest of May 1970.\textsuperscript{331} Repeatedly throughout his book,
DeBenedetti characterises the movement as ‘two decades of peace activism’ spanning from 1955 to 1975.\textsuperscript{332}

Although Small’s book provides many examples of his concurrence with DeBenedetti regarding the lifespan of the movement, one need only look at the title of Chapter Eight—‘The Movement Rebounds, April 1970-May 1971’—for evidence of his disagreement with the traditionalist notion of the ‘short sixties’.\textsuperscript{333} He posits that, contrary to that which proponents of the declension model would assert, the movement did not in fact end in 1969. Like DeBenedetti, Small notes the significance of the Kent State Protest.\textsuperscript{334} This demonstration, despite its lack of advance planning, boasted more than one hundred thousand participants.\textsuperscript{335} Small attributes the significant turnout to the ‘widespread anger and frustration’ among Americans with the perceived escalation of violence.\textsuperscript{336} Thus, he reveals that the spirit of encouraging (or forcing) American withdrawal from Vietnam which characterised the advent of the anti-war movement still existed in the early 1970s. Hunt argues that the 1990s saw a distinct broadening of sixties research to become much more inclusive of hitherto ignored organisations or events.\textsuperscript{337} The revisionist histories which began to circulate in the 1990s, such as those presented by Small and DeBenedetti, have looked into historical developments neglected by traditional histories—such as the Kent State Protest—to reveal the extent to which the traditionalist account of the 1960s ignores the numerous historically significant movements and events of the late 1950s and early 1970s. Those like Small and DeBenedetti have forced us to ask how a model which so blatantly neglects key historical realities can be justifiably regarded as an accurate representation of the 1960s.

The works of Small and DeBenedetti are typical of the revisionist histories which arose in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Both present well-substantiated arguments which contest the traditionalist “good sixties”/“bad sixties” interpretation. Small on the one hand provides a rigorous analysis of a particular aspect of the anti-war movement; that is how the media paid disproportionate

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{332} ibid., p.1.
\item \textsuperscript{333} Small, p.127.
\item \textsuperscript{334} ibid., p.130.
\item \textsuperscript{335} ibid., p.131.
\item \textsuperscript{336} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{337} Hunt, p.154.
\end{itemize}
attention to radical confrontation. Consequently, he maintains, it was only natural for the American public to wrongly associate the movement with radicalism and violence.\(^{338}\) DeBenedetti, on the other hand, gives a much broader overview of the historical development of the movement and the extent to which it may be considered a success. He concludes that, as a result of the dichotomy of liberal and radical ideals, the movement’s political efficacy was doomed from the start.\(^{339}\) The two historians thus provide a stark challenge to the notion of declension. They highlight that any radicalism toward the end of the 1960s was not typical of the larger movement. It was merely the result of an increase in the activity of movement’s pre-existing radical offshoot and, more importantly, due to a profoundly biased overrepresentation of such activity in the media.

Ultimately, Small and DeBenedetti present the anti-war movement as existing entirely outside of the artificial model of declension, as not only did it not deteriorate into something ‘bad’, it was never actually ‘good’ to begin with.

**Bibliography**


Hunt, Andrew, “‘When Did the Sixties Happen?’ Searching for New Directions’, *Journal of Social History*, 33, 1, 1999, pp.147-161.


\(^{338}\) Small, p.163.
\(^{339}\) DeBenedetti, p.4