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Editorial Preface

Among the ingredients of a work of history, imagination—one might argue—has just as important a role as evidence, construction, and research. From a song, script, or newspaper, an historian envisions a world. They then ask what might be needed in the reconstruction of past lives, and how their own assumptions can be reconsidered. Through investigation, the assembling of a body of sources, and conversation with other scholars, they explore and revise. Each step urges the historian to attempt to transport themselves into a time and place that would otherwise no longer be accessible, and that cannot be done without an openness to imaginative possibility.

Thus history offers an antidote to insularity and resignation. If we must look back to move forward—titiro whakamuri, kōkiri whakamua—we then historical texts do more than answer a specific essay question; they leave their readers with changed approaches to the future.

The essays selected for this year’s issue of *Histeria!* are examples of such texts. Nominated as some of the best from our undergraduate and honours courses, these students demonstrate first technical skill in articulation, argument, and analysis. Covering a broad range of topics and moving across time and space, they also explore the different ideas, perspectives, and understandings that shape both History, the field, and history, the past. Some focus on mechanisms of change and continuity, using specific historical events and movements to explore how the past has been written. Others challenge a certain historical narrative by comparing and contrasting different historical perspectives, revealing the varied ways in which stories can be told and interpreted. Each, imagining the past in light of their present, is a contribution to an ongoing and expanding historical conversation—to what historian Pieter Geyl described as ‘an argument without end’.1

Although this journal sets essays out in order of course number, we will introduce the collection here across three themes: understanding history, challenging history, and historical methods.

In the first, essays by Daniel O’Brien, Nancy Guo, Eamon Campbell, Blair McIntosh, and Sue Mercer suggest ways of understanding the past by focusing on scope, definition, or the way that events happen. Description, in a field where there are so many sources and interpretations, is neither easy nor neutral, and these authors bring those difficulties and implications to light.

Fifty years after Nga Tamatoa presented the Māori Language Petition to Parliament in 1972, O’Brien reflects on the evolution of Māori activism. O’Brien reveals how Nga Tamatoa took Māori activism to the forefront of the political landscape by challenging and changing public perceptions of the Treaty of Waitangi. His essay expertly traces the rise of the modern Māori protest movement within an international context whilst also emphasising its homegrown roots and the central role the Treaty has played in Māori activism since 1840.

Guo takes us back to America in the year 1968, a pivotal time of crisis and opportunity. The surge of radical protest movements in 1960s America sowed the seeds of liberation that would sprout in New Zealand less than a decade later. Guo’s essay traces the turbulence and transformation that occurred in 1968 as the liberal consensus broke down and an increase in political polarisation saw authority challenged and society disrupted.

Campbell also focuses on America in the 1960s, moving beyond the period itself to seek historical justification for how it has been narrated. His essay exposes the difficulties that arise when historians attempt to summarise a period of history into a single phrase or idea. Although the title of Allen J. Matusow’s book, The Unraveling of America, is both clever and catchy, does it come at the cost of historical accuracy?

McIntosh delves even deeper into the past in an essay examining how Christian attitudes towards Indigenous peoples of the New World were shaped by the Spanish Reconquista. McIntosh argues that although the Reconquista provided an initial framework for Christian attitudes towards Indigenous people, over time, this attitude of evangelising optimism gave way to one of growing disillusionment and the hardening of attitudes towards Indigenous
peoples along an increasingly racialised divide. His essay emphasises the importance of the Reconquista on the Spanish psyche whilst also showing how these ideas were transformed by Spanish conquest in the Americas.

In a study of Guy Fawkes commemorations in New Zealand from 1850 to 1950, Mercer explores how English traditions adapted in a colonial context. British settlers transported the Guy Fawkes celebration across the seas, preserving the festivities but losing the day’s religious and political relevance. By examining how Guy Fawkes commemorations have been transformed and adapted into New Zealand culture, Mercer reveals different manifestations of settler nostalgia and the evolving relationship between the colonial metropole and its peripheries.

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Samantha Opticon, Angela Black, Mia Rutledge, Luca Basso, and Henry Chignell then build on this discussion by challenging history, taking concepts and examining the very frames with which we use to think.

Opticon demonstrates an astute understanding of how the boundaries of freedom in the United States have been as contested as the word itself. By arguing that progressive principles placed a greater emphasis on positive notions of freedom, increased government intervention, and prioritised collective welfare over individual rights, she reveals how concepts of liberty and freedom were fundamentally redefined in the twentieth century.

Black also explores the influence of gender on historical practice, but in the vastly different context of Nazi Germany. Her essay debates whether historians agree that Nazi Germany was a ‘masculine pursuit’ that largely excluded women. By exploring the advantages and disadvantages to traditional analysis of gender in Nazi Germany, Black reveals an important distinction between masculinity as an ideology and the ‘masculine pursuit’ in practice.

In her essay on David Arnold’s Colonizing the Body, Rutledge explores Western medicine and its perceived position as a critical battleground where the coloniser goes to war with the colonised. She argues that the binaries of coloniser and colonised obscure the true
complexity of the colonial relationship and that Indigenous agency and adaptation to Western medicine meant that it was dictated by on-the-ground actors, rather than the imperial agenda. Although Western medicine was a politicised and racialised force, Rutledge concludes that the notion of a critical battleground oversimplifies the colonial dynamic.

Basso applies the costs of historical accuracy to commemorative history in his study of post-rebellion Ireland. The events of 1798 have been remembered in a multitude of ways due to the competing influence of nationalist politics, folk memory, and loyalist commemoration. By recognising the constructed nature of historical narratives, Basso navigates, with care, the gulf between history and memory to argue for the importance of a diverse historiographical approach.

Chignell also examines the role of memory and remembrance in historical narratives through a case study of the Chinese Labour Corps in World War One. The Chinese Labour Corps faced a complex combination of danger and reward, resulting in a broad variety of motivations and intentions. Chignell argues that this diversity of experience ensures that the labours of each individual must be seen in their own context, and that the historiography of WWI has obscured the contribution of individual imperial labourers, rendering it not only incomplete, but inaccurate.

Essays under our last theme explicitly address the historical method — or rather, historical methods, and historiography. Dissecting the ways in which history has been done, Te Rina West, Molly McLennan, and Hanna Lu expose how history is shaped, in sometimes unacknowledged ways, by everything from source identification to an historian’s own context to ideas about the purpose of the historical endeavour.

West opens the collection with a formidable analysis of the dominance of colonial methods in Pacific histories. By demonstrating the dangers of whitewashed history, West’s essay argues for the importance of decolonising these narratives through a substantiation of oral history and Indigenous agency. In order to truly decolonise, Pacific history must be by and for the Pacific.
McLennan continues to examine this shaping of history in her essay on how historical analysis of gender in Aotearoa has transformed since 1977. McLennan traces the changes in feminist approaches to history from the second wave’s focus on female subjugation to a poststructuralist balancing act that recognises multiplicity in discourse. Her essay reveals how advances in gender and feminist history have required historians to broaden their scope in terms of evidence and experiences.

In the final contribution Lu ties the collection together with a discussion of a specific historical method — authorial intention as articulated by contemporary historian Quentin Skinner — and how it can be applied to a work written in the fourth century BC. Through an analysis of the method, the text, and associated historiography, Lu interrogates the uses of history, and reflects on the ability of the discipline to make clear the otherness of the past. Human experience is vast, and our understanding imperfect; from that comes humility and potential.

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We give heartfelt thanks to students and staff who submitted essays for consideration, and to all who make the History discipline what it is. This year has been especially hard-won because of the circumstances, but it has been a pleasure for us to serve as co-editors and we wish you all the best for 2022.

Hanna Lu and Caitlin Moffat-Young | Co-editors, 2021
Note on editing and referencing

The essays in this issue have been very lightly edited for grammar, spelling, and clarity. References have also been made consistent across the issue, but for the specific requirements for your course, please check with your course convenor.
HISTORY 104 – PACIFIC HISTORY: AN INTRODUCTION

How have colonial narratives of history in the Pacific dominated the stories of Pacific peoples and why should we push to decolonise these narratives?

Te Rina West

A quick google search of the phrase “history of the Pacific” will show an array of narratives published predominantly by Pākehā or non-Indigenous writers and historians. In order to find Indigenous portrayals, one either has to do substantial scrolling or know the names of specific Indigenous authors. This in itself is one example of how colonial narratives of history have monopolised discourse in the Pacific and continue to influence narratives in the current day. This essay will explore how colonial narratives of history in the Pacific have dominated the stories of Pacific peoples by analysing the tools Western and Pacific historians have used to convey these narratives. Consideration will be made when exploring the attitudes, motivations, and cultural nuances of these times to the wider implications these had on the Pacific, and on growing perceptions of the Pacific. This essay will also delve into the roles key Pākehā figureheads such as Captain Cook, Louis Antoine de Bougainville, and Margaret Mead have played in perpetuating colonial narratives about the Pacific. Lastly, this essay will explore why we should push to decolonise these narratives and place emphasis on just how to embark on this journey that is decolonisation.

In order to analyse the Pacific we must first determine the parameters; the Pacific is hugely diverse, spanning across 25,000 islands throughout Micronesia, Polynesia and Melanesia, with over 30 different ethnicities and countless languages, dialects, stories,
traditions, and inherent pedagogies.¹ Most of the academic sources pertaining to the Pacific are post-colonial accounts dating back to the Age of Discovery. Whilst this essay uses the term “discovery” loosely and ironically, it is in reference to the era of exploration which began in the fifteenth century.² This era brought about new encounters between Indigenous and explorers, the latter of whom often declared they had “discovered” these islands and peoples in the Pacific, and documented their impressions and opinions for publication. Henceforth, Westerners explorers held the power to portray how Pacific peoples were talked about, and determined how the rest of the world perceived them — based largely on the interactions of a few Indigenous peoples with the few colonial explorers.³ For the most part, whilst these Western portrayals may have been born out of curiosity, they were also written with the intended agenda of glorification of the colonials themselves. A classic example of this is Captain Cook himself whose very own words apotheosised him as a hero for bringing civilisation to the “primitive” people of the Pacific.⁴ Cook himself perpetuated this self-serving narrative which has been spurred on largely by other white male historians. The historiography of Cook remains largely positive due to the glorification of his acts over hundreds of years, resulting in dozens of landmarks being named after him, and numerous celebrations of his works which continue to depict a one-sided, tunnel-vision narrative of Pacific history.⁵ Whilst colonial narratives from this period were based on opinions and impressions, they deprive their audience of Indigenous insights and portray an obvious lack of understanding not only of language, but of the ethos and values that underpin key cultural customs. On the contrary, Indigenous portrayals were much more poetic, and although perhaps less obvious to outsiders, were indubitably entrenched in rich cultural history through the likes of carvings, tapa, dance, music, karakia, tā moko, tikanga, and kawa. Nonetheless, popular belief stretching from this period and even into the twentieth century continued to diminish the real historical value of oral traditions and instead relegated them to the area of myth and legend.⁶ Thus, the colonial narratives perpetuated were deliberately misconstrued on the premise of blatant disregard for


³ David Routledge, ‘Pacific History as Seen from the Pacific Islands’, *Pacific Studies*, 8, 2, 1985, pp.81-100.


the cultures they were interacting with, misunderstanding, and a lack of desire to delve deeper into the cultures they so readily misrepresented in their versions of history. Indigenous peoples have been actively working in direct response to this notion in order to change the discourse around these narratives. However, a greater collective effort is needed in order for these Indigenous voices to become the dominant narratives. Indeed, an excellent starting point is the recognition of the aforementioned oral traditions that have a home in many Pacific cultures. Nēpia Mahuika argues that ‘if you pay attention in these spaces, oral history is all around you, evident in the people, art, traditions, environments, and genealogies that speak to inherited experiences. For many indigenous communities, oral history is inextricably connected to identity’. This point is supported by many historians today who recognise that the lack of recognition of oral traditions as credible sources perpetuates the ubiquity of whitewashed histories. Substantiating oral history is the first step to relinquishing colonial control over Pacific narratives. The notion of privilege that was (and to some extent, still is) at play when Pākehā historians portrayed Pacific peoples without true cultural understanding and without feeling any obligation to learn more is obscene, but unfortunately, not yet obsolete. One cannot place enough emphasis on the importance of a collective agreement to return autonomy of Pacific narratives to the Pacific.

The principal holds colonial narratives have over history in the Pacific has been spurred on by key European figureheads in the past. Louis Antoine de Bougainville is one such individual whose work outlines Western attitudes toward Pacific peoples and their motivations for exploration of the Pacific. Bougainville’s journal details his “discovery” of French Polynesia and the commune of Hitiaa which he renamed New Cythera — an illustration in itself of his lack of acknowledgement towards the Indigenous, whom he actively refers to as ‘savages’. Bougainville constantly iterates a sexualised narrative of not only Indigenous women, but the men too, who are often depicted as being reverent of these explorers for their whiteness. His motivations for interacting in the Pacific were made clear when he journaled of the plentifulness of the land and remarks, ‘this country is finer and could be wealthier than any of our colonies’. Interestingly, Bougainville also showed acknowledgement of the social class systems and forms of government. However, although there is recognition that these

10 Bougainville, p.66.
people operate as a fully-fledged, harmonious society (albeit entirely different from French society) with hierarchy and rules, his actions and words are performative as he still saw himself as the adjudicator despite being privy to the power dynamics at play. These themes of sexualisation and recognition, but with a lack of adherence to social structures, are not uncommon when reviewing primary sources from this period. It is evident there was recognition of Indigenous systems but there remained a distinct lack of recognition of Indigenous humanity. This is increasingly evident via this lasting theme of objectivity and expendability, and is heightened by Bougainville’s writing which stated they may, ‘be forced to kill a few as examples to others’.¹¹ This further serves as a reminder of the white saviour mindset Westerners held when bringing “civilisation” to the “primitive savages” of the Pacific. This, combined with the disinterest in delving deeper into these cultures and peoples who Bougainville crudely refers to as ‘Indians’, are indications of the attitudes explorers across this era held towards the Indigenous — constantly stereotyping Indigenous peoples across the globe into a single categorisation. However, these whitewashed versions of history are not distant tales. Many accounts are far more recent. One such illustration of this is through Margaret Mead’s *Coming of Age in Samoa*, whereby, lacking comprehension of the nuances of Samoan culture and humour, Mead falsely portrayed Samoan women as promiscuous and loose.¹² Such depictions only fuelled the sexualised view of Pacific women and the misconception of the dusky maiden narrative. Although Mead’s portrayal has since been widely discredited, this version of history is still readily available and continues to dominate the stories of Pacific peoples.

It is becoming increasingly more pertinent to decolonise the narratives of the Pacific. The harm these ill-conceived portrayals have had on public perception of the Pacific, and in turn, the energy Indigenous peoples have had to pour into debunking these narratives is becoming glaringly more evident. Unpicking colonial narratives is necessary to understand motivations and attitudes in order to interpret the actions of the likes of Cook, Bougainville, and Mead, within the Pacific.¹³ This, alongside the act of substantiating oral history, are great initial steps towards decolonising narratives. Autonomy over Pacific narratives belongs with the Pacific peoples, and in particular, with the specific islands and cultures to which these narratives pertain. Decolonising these spaces is necessary in order to paint a more accurate depiction of Pacific histories and move to expunge inaccurate, whitewashed versions of history.

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¹¹ Bougainville, p.66.
¹² Margaret Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa: A Psychological Study Of Primitive Youth For Western Civilisation*, New York, 1928.
upon which the intentions were aimed toward glorification of colonial ideals. Decolonisation in any form is no easy feat; decolonisation of hundreds of years of Pākehā-dominated history even less so. However, it is a necessary task that must be undertaken by all — Indigenous and Pākehā alike — in order for true change to occur. The first step is decolonisation, the natural consequential phase is re-indigenising Pacific history.

This essay has explored examples of how colonial narratives have dominated stories of the Pacific peoples and has argued throughout that pushing to decolonise these narratives is vital. The whitewashed versions of history perpetuated by colonial voices such as Captain Cook, Louis Antoine de Bougainville, and Margaret Mead, proved incredibly problematic for Pacific peoples. These colonial narratives spread inaccurate depictions which contributed to the sexualised and stigmatised ways in which Pacific peoples were and are perceived. Although a long journey remains ahead, concrete steps have already been made to start decolonising narratives of the Pacific. An indication of decolonial progression will be when a quick google search of the phrase “history of the Pacific” results in narratives written by Indigenous authors. This must be a matter of not if, but when.
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HISTORY 108 – RISE AND FALL OF THE USA

Assess the following in light of United States history from the 1880s through the 1980s: ‘Liberty has knit us together as Americans.’ However, ‘…the boundaries of freedom have been as contested as the word’s definition itself.’

Samantha Opticon

In the twentieth century, American concepts of liberty — that had previously both united and divided the nation — were substantially redefined by progressive principles. These principles placed a greater emphasis on positive notions of freedom, invited increased government intervention, and prioritised collective welfare over individual rights. Such reformed ideals of freedom not only produced a new definition of American liberalism; they also expanded freedom’s boundaries for various disparate and disenfranchised groups. However, freedom’s boundaries extended only so far and often failed to translate into lived reality for such groups. Throughout the century, a harsh individualist, conservative counteraction continually contested notions of collective freedom, culminating in the “New Conservatism” of the 1970s-1980s.

The Progressive Era (c.1900-1920) significantly redefined American concepts of freedom and its boundaries, offering an increased focus on collective welfare. This was largely a response to the era’s various socio-economic issues, which originated in the immediately-preceding Gilded Age (1870s-1890s). Glenda Gilmore argues that, in this period, ‘industrialization, technological advances, migration, and urbanisation [resulted in]… people crowd[ing] into cities, monopolists corner[ing] industries… [and] children toil[ing] ten hours
The Gilded Age heralded a period of enormous wealth acquisition, but only among a privileged minority of businessmen. They pitched their gains as the outcome of individual economic freedoms exercised in a free market unbridled by government interference. However, this was typically at the expense of both labourers and consumers, who were exceedingly exploited. As Gilmore elaborates, corporate industrialists appropriated individualist notions of freedom to challenge workday limits as an infringement on an individual’s ‘right to choose [their] working hours’. Similarly, they invoked the free market principle of *caveat emptor* to justify consumer exploitation: a ‘dairy-man could set his own standards of purity for milk, but a mother had no guarantee that the milk she bought from him would be fit to drink.’ In an attempt to restrain such abuses, Progressives sought to ‘challenge the tradition’ of individualist meanings of American freedom and opposition to government intervention. In 1906 they passed the Pure Food and Drug Act to promote ‘greater public confidence in the quality and safety of… products’. Similarly, several states enacted workmen’s compensation laws to cover workplace injuries. Such legislation reworked definitions of American freedom to include collective welfare rights as a bulwark against the excesses of individual liberties.

The 1930s-1940s saw a continuation of these collectivist notions of American freedom through the policies of Franklin Roosevelt’s administration. The reforms of the first and second New Deal aimed to address the socio-economic crises of the Great Depression through government intervention. Such policies included the 1935 creations of the Works Progress Administration, which employed three million Americans, and the Social Security Act, which produced ‘a system of unemployment insurance, old age pensions, and aid to the disabled, the elderly poor, and families with dependent children’. Roosevelt justified these sweeping reforms as serving the interests of freedom, remarking that ‘the liberty of a democracy’ could not stand if its citizens could not ‘sustain an acceptable standard of living’. As Eric Foner notes, ‘Roosevelt juxtaposed his own definition of liberty as “greater security for the average man”’ to the older notion of liberty of contract, which served the interests of ‘the privileged

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2 ibid., p.11.
3 ibid.
4 ibid.
6 ibid., p.569.
7 ibid., p.658.
8 ibid., p.659.
few’. The New Deal order gave rise to modern understandings of American liberalism as economic security, in contrast to the free market principles of its nineteenth century meaning. Predictably, there was considerable backlash from conservatives, who contested these expanded boundaries in the belief that they interfered too much with individual liberties, including rights to property. Such opponents included Congressional Republicans, conservative businessmen, and as revealed by historian Matthew Avery Sutton, ‘fundamentalist ministers… [who] believed that as more Americans turned to the federal government for help, the fewer rights they would retain’. The Roosevelt era was thus one of national tension between the ideals of freedom from economic want and freedom from economic interference.

The emergence of the mass African American Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s breathed new meaning into the concepts of liberty Roosevelt had expressed. In 1941, Roosevelt outlined “Four Freedoms”, including ‘freedom from want and freedom from fear’, which Americans were to fight for in World War Two. Yet, for many disenfranchised groups, these freedoms were not a reality. Foner argues that ‘the gap between those ideals and reality’ was clear to many African American soldiers who had fought for these notions abroad only to come home to see them unfulfilled. The emerging mass Civil Rights Movement recognised that African Americans collectively could not live ‘free from want’ if they were deprived of equal educational opportunities, nor could they live ‘free from fear’ in the face of systemic segregation. To that end, the movement directly challenged ‘racially segregated schools… [as] inherently unconstitutional’. Their subsequent success in the 1954 Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board of Education sparked considerable backlash by white Southerners who appropriated the language of individual freedom to justify segregation. In 1956, ‘nearly one hundred senators and congressmen introduced a “Southern Manifesto”’, denouncing the decision. In their view, the decision amounted to government intervention into parents’

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9 ibid.
10 ibid.
13 ibid., p.702.
individual rights ‘to direct the lives and education of their own children’. The 1957 conflict in Little Rock, Arkansas summed up the decade’s tensions over freedom, as a clash erupted between violent ‘white mobs’, asserting their supposed individual freedoms, and federal military intervention enforcing the collective freedoms of African Americans.

Whilst the 1960s witnessed an even greater extension of civil rights and freedoms to other marginalised groups, the following two decades saw the emergence of a highly popular conservative counteraction. The 1960s ‘produced new rights and new understandings of freedom’ which extended to ‘numerous members of racial minorities’, and resulted in a ‘transformation in the status of women’. A vast number of social and political movements emerged, including an extended African American Civil Rights Movement, Women’s Liberation, Gay Liberation, and Latino activism. These groups advocated for the collective welfare of the marginalised and a ‘more open, more tolerant’ America. Despite this, the 1970s-1980s also saw a dramatic individualist, conservative counterattack with the rise of the “New Right” and the “Reagan Revolution”. President Ronald Reagan was able to unite a ‘broad coalition of old and new conservatives’ in the hopes of restoring ‘what they considered traditional moral values to American life’. Under Reagan, the meaning of freedom regressed to nineteenth century notions of liberalism, with a focus on individual rights and free market principles. Foner concludes that, under Reagan, ‘the “free market” took its place alongside the free world as the essence of freedom’. Reagan himself articulated these individualist and anti-interventionist ideals of freedom in 1985 when he stated his administration had ‘begun to… reduce the increase in cost and size of the government and its interference in people’s lives’. This included ‘dismantling economic regulations’ and attacking the bargaining power created by unions. Despite the increasingly collectivist notions of freedom that had expanded throughout the previous decades, the 1970s-1980s produced a broad and widely successful conservative backlash and regression back to individualist ideals of liberty.

19 Foner, Give Me Liberty!, p.807.
20 ibid.
21 Foner, Give Me Liberty!, p.834.
Tensions over freedom’s boundaries and meanings, in existence since the nation’s origins, continued to express themselves in ways both familiar and new throughout the twentieth century. Often, such tensions pitted individualist, negative notions of freedom asserted by the white, male, privileged few against the positive, collectivist ideals of the marginalised: the working class, women, and ethnic and social minorities. This played out in a cycle of collective rights’ expansion and reactive regression. The tensions raised a fundamental — and perhaps irresolvable — question about the nature of American liberty: to what extent are claims of individual freedom valid in the face of inequal opportunity and bargaining power, or, indeed, the unfreedom of others?
Bibliography


HISTORY 227 – WAITANGI: TREATY TO TRIBUNAL

In what ways has the Treaty of Waitangi been portrayed and debated in the context of Māori activism?

Daniel O’Brien

In his 1984 paper, *The Genesis of Māori Activism*, Ranginui Walker declared that Māori activism is not an aberration of modern times, but instead originated at the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840.¹ In August of 1970, Walker organised the Young Maori Leaders Conference. It was held at the University of Auckland and from it emerged Nga Tamatoa — a radical organisation that characterised the emergent political consciousness of young urban Māori in the late twentieth century.² Nga Tamatoa kept the Treaty of Waitangi at the ngākau of their kaupapa, and the group proved to be a persuasive force in the Māori protest movement.³ The purpose of this paper is to discuss the ways in which the Treaty of Waitangi has been portrayed and debated in the context of Māori activism, with particular emphasis on the activism of Nga Tamatoa.

In the late twentieth century, modern Māori activism emerged as the political sister movement of a broader cultural renaissance of Maoritanga. In the 1970s, the unapologetic discourse and radical practice of Nga Tamatoa dovetailed the rhetoric of overseas movements for civil rights, introducing a Black Panther-inspired approach to modern Māori activism.⁴ Nga Tamatoa spoke of cultural murder, institutional racism, and ‘Uncle Toms,’ echoing the

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³ Walker, p.276.
language of the Black Panthers.\(^5\) In doing so, the young activists portrayed the Treaty as an abused and disrespected document, and as a set of promises that took second fiddle if Pākehā interests might be threatened.\(^6\) In the past, Māori rangatira had negotiated behind closed doors. In contrast, Nga Tamatoa brought their concerns to the fore, and made their grievances public. In this sense, Nga Tamatoa inspired a fundamental step-change in the nature of debating the Treaty; that is, their radical methodologies trended towards a more open discussion of historic breaches and potential remedies. For example, Nga Tamatoa protested the loss of te reo Māori, and argued that its demise was a direct consequence of continuing breaches of the Treaty.\(^7\) In response, the group both generated a national conversation about the state of te reo Māori and ignited public debate about both the destructive and restorative potential of the Treaty.\(^8\) Nga Tamatoa, therefore, both challenged public portrayals of the Treaty and inspired a step-change in the approach, locale, and rhetoric of debating it.

In 1971, Nga Tamatoa organised their inaugural protest at Waitangi in an effort to challenge existing beliefs about race relations in New Zealand. At the time, New Zealand had a reputation abroad for being a leader in upholding constructive and equitable race relations. In truth, New Zealand had a troubled past, and the government had a disturbing record of breaching their obligations to Māori. Nga Tamatoa intended to disrupt the usual proceedings at Waitangi to reveal a more telling account of the nation’s race relations.\(^9\) In addition, members of Nga Tamatoa sported black armbands to mourn the loss of Māori land.\(^10\) At the protests, Nga Tamatoa brought attention to the prejudiced legislation that the Parliament continued to pass. In particular, the group highlighted the Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967 as a contemporary example of such legislation.\(^11\) At the time, Māori activists referred to the Act as ‘the last land grab,’ and it provided the impetus for both the emergence of radical activism and a redefining of the Treaty.\(^12\) The Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967 required that all Māori freehold land that had four or less landholders be converted into general land; this conversion subjected Māori land to the same constraints and obligations of non-Māori land. In doing so, the Act made many of the remaining small tracts of Māori land vulnerable to

\(^5\) ibid., p.199.
\(^6\) ibid., p.72.
\(^8\) Johnson, p.196.
\(^9\) McDowell, p.29.
\(^10\) Harris, p.27.
\(^11\) McDowell, pp.34-36.
\(^12\) ibid., p.18.
alienation. Nga Tamatoa described this legislation as yet another claim on a long list of unsettled grievances, and, in effect, pushed a continued change in the public portrayal of the Treaty.

Just one year later, Nga Tamatoa organised a boycott of Waitangi commemorations and protested the Kirk administration’s decision to change the name of the occasion from ‘Waitangi Day’ to ‘New Zealand Day’.¹³ Nga Tamatoa did not believe that Māori should participate in Waitangi celebrations, arguing that the Treaty represented the genesis of their current issues and declared it a fraudulent document. This depiction antagonised the public consciousness and, once again, provided for a step-change in debating contemporary Māori issues.¹⁴ Nga Tamatoa endured considerable backlash from both the Pākehā public and even some of their kaumātua, albeit for different reasons. For the Pākehā public, Nga Tamatoa challenged the popular understandings of the Treaty that many of them harboured. For their kaumātua, the group’s tactics proved to be distasteful.¹⁵ As mentioned, Māori activism in the past had often dealt with such issues in private, and Nga Tamatoa instead made a conscious decision to bring these issues to the fore. In boycotting the Waitangi commemorations and protesting the Kirk administration’s decision to rename the occasion, Nga Tamatoa confronted the historical underpinnings of the nation and portrayed the Treaty as the origins of both historic and contemporary Māori issues. Moreover, the agenda of Nga Tamatoa continued to broaden, and the group set their sights on language reform.

In te ao Māori, language is the key to the house of culture. It is the bedrock of Maoritanga, and its rapid decline in use since the signing of the Treaty destabilised the foundations of Maoridom. On the 14th of September 1972, Nga Tamatoa and their partners presented the Maori Language Petition to Parliament in an organised effort to promote te reo Māori. Nga Tamatoa and their partners had mobilised the support of more than 40,000 signatories, and then leveraged this mandate to call for te reo Māori to be taught in schools. In taking their petition to Wellington, Nga Tamatoa brought the government back to the table and stressed a fundamental belief that redressing Māori grievances is essential to restoring both the honour of the Crown and the mana of Maori. As a result, their combined efforts contributed to the introduction of te reo as an optional subject in schools, and the establishment of both the first bilingual school in 1978 and the first kōhanga reo in 1982.¹⁶ Nga Tamatoa used the

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¹³ ibid., p.16.
¹⁴ ibid., p.124.
¹⁵ Harris, p.26.
¹⁶ ibid., p.17.
abysmal state of te reo Māori as a prism through which the public could view the dramatic effects that historic breaches of the Treaty have had on Māoritanga. In 1973, Nga Tamatoa informed the United Nations delegation to New Zealand that this loss of language is a direct consequence of a Pākehā-led cultural genocide that had been sustained through continued breaches of the Treaty.\(^{17}\) In their 1986 report on te reo Māori, the Waitangi Tribunal illustrated the shortcomings of the Crown as a partner to Māori, reaffirming the declarations of Nga Tamatoa; that is, that the loss of te reo is a breach of the Treaty.\(^{18}\) As such, Nga Tamatoa stressed the destructive record of the government, thus reframing the debate and, once again, placing the onus on the government to provide for the effective resolution of these issues. After all of this, Nga Tamatoa still had more to accomplish, and, in 1975, the group turned their attention to an issue that had been the core of many historic and contemporary Māori grievances against the Crown — land.

In 1975, Nga Tamatoa supported the Maori Land March in an effort to stress the overarching themes of stolen land and loss of culture, and the group reiterated that these issues originated at the signing of the Treaty.\(^{19}\) Nga Tamatoa proved to be instrumental in helping define and organise the movement that became the Maori Land March.\(^{20}\) The group helped to establish Te Roopu Ote Matakite in 1975, a pan-tribal organisation that became a focal point for Māori land grievances.\(^{21}\) In practice, the Maori Land March unified the different strands of Māori activism to achieve a common goal; that is, to dramatise Māori activism in an effort to bring attention to the full set of unsettled Māori grievances, and to unite the broader Māori protest movement in doing so. In 1978, Nga Tamatoa mobilised a coalition of land protest organisations to help reignite protests at Waitangi, delivering for a second thrust of Waitangi activism and a figurative reunion of the land issues and Treaty issues, thus sparking debates about differing cultural interpretations of the Treaty and subsequent opposing approaches to land. Nga Tamatoa portrayed the Treaty as an active symbol of Māori landlessness, and their engagement in these protests helped to broadcast the debate to a national audience.\(^{22}\)

The activism of Nga Tamatoa presented an emergent portrayal of the Treaty of Waitangi, and the group used their depictions of it to generate debate about Maoritanga, land, language, and tino rangatiratanga. Nga Tamatoa’s use of language and symbolism to portray the Treaty

\(^{17}\) Johnson, p.359.
\(^{18}\) Waitangi Tribunal, Report of The Waitangi Tribunal on the Te Reo Māori claim, Wellington, 1986, p.50
\(^{19}\) Walker, p.280.
\(^{20}\) McDowell, p.18.
\(^{21}\) ibid., p.18.
\(^{22}\) ibid., p.18.
of Waitangi as the genesis of Māori issues pushed their message to the fore of the nation’s collective consciousness. In doing so, Nga Tamatoa articulated the broader Māori experience in an effort to reject hegemonic Pākehā understandings of the Treaty of Waitangi, and to knit a more acute social consciousness into the fabric of New Zealand. In addition, their activism delivered a step-change in both the approaches to and the nature of debating the Treaty of Waitangi. Nga Tamatoa brought these debates out from behind closed doors and to the forefront of the national conversation, and, in the process, even disregarded the backlash from some of their kaumātua that told them that their approach didn’t adhere to traditional methods of Māori activism.23 Nga Tamatoa held the Treaty of Waitangi very centre of their doctrine and their readiness to move against the grain has had a lasting impact on both the portrayals and debates of the Treaty of Waitangi.

23 Harris, p.26.
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1968: A Pivotal Year of Crisis and Opportunity

Nancy Guo

On January 1 1968, America greeted the new year with ‘revelry and prayer, with hope and apprehension’.¹ This New York Times’ juxtaposition of peoples’ expectations for 1968 eerily captures the double-edged spirit of this pivotal year, a time of both crisis and opportunity. It also foreshadows the tumultuous and traumatic events that soon followed, unleashing forces that shaped 1968 into a turning point of the 1960s. One should remember, however, what came before — that in the words of historian Estelle Freedman, ‘no one year turns a corner without a build-up of underlying pressures’.² Rising public disapproval of the Vietnam war and the growing discontent of oppressed communities during the mid-1960s are all pressures that culminated in 1968, sparking crises with the radicalisation of movements and its critique of authority, the breakdown of the liberal consensus, and increasing political polarisation. But with crisis came opportunity — allowing movements like women’s and gay liberation to gain significant momentum and influence. Both these struggles assert that while 1968 deepened the divisions of American society, it also united marginalised communities, and radically critiqued and dismantled the status quo.

Historian Terry Anderson described the 1960s as synonymous with ‘the movement’, a loose coalition of protest groups that attacked ‘almost every institution, from the armed forces to religion, from business to government’.³ However, in 1968 the ‘movement’ became increasingly radical and confrontational in its critique of authority, as exhibited by the

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Columbia student protests. Quickly becoming the centre of national media attention, Columbia students demanded the end of the college’s military research in April 1968, and by extension, its support of the Vietnam war. Others following the lead of the Student Afro-American Society opposed the administration’s plans of building a racially segregated gymnasium. To effectively demonstrate their discontent, students adopted protest tactics that were more militant and confrontational than before. Overnight occupation of buildings transitioned into permanent occupation, while barricaded resistance replaced traditional forms of symbolic civil disobedience — tactics pioneered during the civil rights movement. For the student activists, opposition to the war and racial injustice were hardly confined to Columbia; instead the college’s failure to address students’ demands represented the ‘American problem in miniature — the inability to provide answers to widespread social needs’. The Columbia student uprisings of 1968 were just one demonstration in the growing radicalisation of the ‘movement’ that both challenged institutional complicity and opposed the ‘middle-class world of manipulation, channelling and careerism’. Taking shape in the mid-1960s, the counterculture represented a collective of mainly white and middle-class young people who sought independence from mainstream American society. Counterculture members, or “hippies”, challenged American values of individualism and materialism by setting up rural communes and demonstrations like the Golden Gate Park free-food giveaway in 1968. However, Freedman argues that ‘each attempt to overthrow older values created new vulnerabilities’. In an opinion poll conducted in the late 1960s, ‘communists, prostitutes and hippies’ were listed as the most harmful groups in the country. This reflected the resentment the increasingly radical ‘movement’ elicited from many Americans, who grew to associate leftist politics with their horror of the privileged, white, sexually promiscuous, and drug-using youth.

Critique and opposition of authority were not only propelled by the student movement, but also by marginalised communities, particularly African Americans who increasingly protested against their alienation during the mid-1960s. John F. Kennedy’s 1961 inaugural speech famously declared that America was ‘unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing

4 Freedman, p.214.
5 ibid.
7 ibid., p.386.
8 ibid.
10 Freedman, p.219.
12 Farber and Bailey, ‘Sixties Culture’, p.60.
of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world’, capturing post-war liberalism’s idealistic values of social change and equality.\textsuperscript{13} His successor Lyndon B. Johnson carried on the liberal vision with welfare initiatives like War on Poverty and the Great Society, as well as civil rights legislation like the Voting Rights Act of 1965.\textsuperscript{14} However, with demonstrations like the “Watts Uprisings” of 1965, it became clear that post-war liberalism’s shiny welfare programmes and legislation had little impact in solving structural issues like extreme Black poverty and institutional racism. For many African Americans, their sense of disillusionment peaked in 1968 with the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. on April 4th.\textsuperscript{15} Civil rights historian Sharlene Sinegal-DeCuir states that King’s death unleashed this feeling that we were suppressed… this is our pain, and we have been telling you this for years and years’.\textsuperscript{16} In the days following, violent racial uprisings erupted in over 130 cities and towns across the nation, resulting in 20,000 arrests, 3,000 people injured, and 46 people dead.\textsuperscript{17} By the end of 1968, it was clear the civil rights movement’s integrationist and non-violent approach had transitioned into politics of rage. This propelled the Black Power movement, which advocated for self-sufficiency, anti-white rhetoric, and militant tactics to attain racial justice.\textsuperscript{18} However, Black Power was not the only organisation that intimidated mainstream America. Embittered by the failed promises of post-war liberalism, radical New Left groups like the Weathermen also gained influence, with their opposition to American imperialism and their advocacy of a classless world.\textsuperscript{19} The Weathermen and Black Power’s radical critique of the nation’s social inequities reflect the alienation and disillusionment many experienced under Johnson’s administration. This revealed the breakdown in America’s liberal consensus as its failures to meet the needs of minority and marginalised communities were becoming increasingly apparent.

1968 not only saw the deterioration of the liberal consensus due to the nation’s growing discontent with its domestic policies, but also with its foreign policy — creating a credibility gap, or a lack of trust of American citizens in the Johnson administration. On January 27th

\textsuperscript{17} Farber and Bailey, ‘Polarisation’, pp.50-53.
\textsuperscript{18} ibid.
1968, General Westmoreland announced to the nation that the enemy had ‘experienced only failure’, connoting an optimistic sense of success for the year. However, three days later enemy troops launched their most intense attack of the war yet — the Tet offensive, resulting in more than 16,000 American deaths, a higher annual death toll than any before. The psychological defeat of Tet shattered the illusion of progress in Vietnam, propelling many citizens to question both the price of the war and the reliability of the Johnson administration. This sentiment was reflected in opinion polls that followed soon after, in which approval of Johnson’s war policies had plummeted to a new record low of 26 percent. The breakdown of the liberal consensus fragmented the Democratic Party and its supporters. After Johnson’s announcement of his decision not to pursue re-election, the race to elect a new presidential nominee divided Democrats. This resulted in Gene McCarthy, whose campaign had attracted thousands of anti-war student volunteers, losing to Vice President Hubert Humphrey in August’s Democratic National Convention of Chicago. Liberals were left divided, with many anti-war activists and McCarthy supporters refusing to back Humphrey and his endorsement of Johnson’s pro-war policies.

The Democratic National Convention of Chicago also saw increasing political polarisation between the nation’s liberals and conservatives, allowing conservative politicians to gain favour as crisis and unrest heightened. Ten thousand anti-war protestors gathered at Chicago to rally against the Johnson administration’s war policies, despite being refused permits to march on the convention site. However, the activists were met with a ‘city mobilised for combat’, with its mayor Richard Daley publicly vowing that ‘no one is going to take over the streets’. In preparation for full-scale insurrection, nearly 12,000 policemen were put on 12-hour shifts, stationed at every corner and in the middle of every block in downtown Chicago. As the protestors marched, police deployed tear gas and violently attacked the demonstrators. For many citizens who watched on from their television screens, Daley’s use of brutal force was a justified means of controlling the disorderly anti-war activists. By 1968, most had grown weary of the intense unrest and uprising the nation had faced continuously.

21 Fortin and Astor, p.4.
22 ibid.
24 ibid., p.46.
27 ibid.
28 Farber and Bailey, ‘Polarisation’, pp.46-49.
throughout the mid-1960s. Increasingly, more Americans aligned themselves with the conservative ideologies of Daley and the Republican nominee Richard Nixon. Appealing to the ‘silent majority’ or ‘the forgotten Americans — the non-shouters; the non-demonstrators’, Nixon appeased the frustration of the nation’s ‘respectable’ and ‘decent’ working class by promising to restore law and order.³⁹ Many felt that their domestic tranquillity had been disturbed by the privileged student protestors like those from Columbia, militant African American activists in Black Power, and the disorderly long-haired anti-war demonstrators of Chicago.³⁰ Fortunately for Nixon, his utilisation of populist resentment later paid off with his 1968 presidential victory, marking the demise of post-war liberalism and the ascendancy of conservatism, deepening the divisions in American politics.

As the turbulent and traumatic year of 1968 wrapped up, it seemed like with Nixon’s victory the early 1960s’ hopeful idealism had fizzled out. However, this conclusion oversimplifies the complexities of 1968 as a year, uncritically packaging the 1960s as an era that started “good” and ended “badly”. The early 1960s’ spirit for social justice did not simply disappear with the rise of conservatism; instead 1968 was a springboard for the growth of movements like women’s liberation and gay liberation, opening up new opportunities to dismantle the status quo. During the mid-1960s, as New Left groups campaigned for equality and liberation, it became increasingly clear that the oppression of women also deserved adequate recognition. In 1967, Students for a Democratic Society published the Ann Arbor statement, declaring that the ‘liberation of women must be part of the larger fight for human freedom’.³¹ This sentiment echoed the new wave of feminists in the late 1960s who worked not only to end economic discrimination on the basis of gender but also to ‘raise womens’ consciousness’, empowering more women to be involved in activism and politics.³² 1968 saw the movement’s first nationally visible demonstration which took place at the Miss America pageant in Atlantic City. Activists gathered to protest the sexual objectification of women by nominating a sheep for the pageant title.³³ After 1968, the movement made significant gains in raising awareness about the oppression of women with the introduction of new words like “sexism” and “male supremacy” into the American vernacular. Furthermore, after the intense

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³³ ibid.
lobbying of women’s organisations across the nation like the National Organisation for Women and the League of Women’s Voters, in 1972 Congress approved the Equal Rights Amendment which granted equal legal rights for all citizens regardless of sex.\textsuperscript{34} These achievements of the women’s liberation movement challenged the status quo’s patriarchal ideals, pushing women and issues of gender into the political sphere to promote a more intersectional approach to examining social inequities.

Similarly, by the end of the 1960s, the gay liberation movement also gained significant influence by building upon the momentum of activist forces like women’s liberation, anti-war activism, and the Black Power movement. Facing overt legal and social discrimination, homosexual people remained largely invisible in politics before the late 1960s. Cold War America extensively separated and marginalised queer individuals, utilising a multitude of institutional powers such as the church and the medical profession to enforce the idea that being gay was ‘sick, sinful, criminal, depraved, menacing’.\textsuperscript{35} This started to change with the Stonewall Inn riots in 1969, with many gay activists marking the event as the beginning of the gay liberation movement. The demonstration occurred in response to a police raid of Stonewall, a gay bar, drawing in hundreds of protestors from New York’s gay community.\textsuperscript{36} Historian John D’Emilio argues that the event should be seen as ‘symbolic of a shift that had been in the making for a number of years’.\textsuperscript{37} Throughout the 1960s with the rise of the ‘movement’ and its critique of the status quo, they argue that ‘everything was being questioned, for a moment anything could be imagined - even a world in which homosexuals would finally win a measure of equality’.\textsuperscript{38} In 1968, a non-sectarian Christian foundation was established that allowed gay men and lesbian women to worship without censure. Furthermore, in 1973 the movement saw the creation of over 800 gay organisations and the American Psychiatric Association’s official elimination of homosexuality as a classified disease. These significant achievements of the movement helped to dismantle decades of stigma surrounding queer relationships, as well as the involuntary institutionalisation and alienation of homosexual people.\textsuperscript{39} The examination of women’s liberation and gay liberation exposes the declension narrative as an oversimplified interpretation of the 1960s that fails to take into account the notable achievements of both

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\textsuperscript{34} ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Farber and Beth, pp.72-73.
\textsuperscript{37} D’Emilio, p.216.
\textsuperscript{38} ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} ibid., p.224.
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movements. Instead, both struggles affirm 1968 as a pivotal year of opportunity, propelling the increased political activism and emancipation of marginalised communities as well as the radical deconstruction of traditional norms.

Like the New York Times’ heralding description of a year filled with ‘hope and apprehension’, 1968 juxtaposed crisis with opportunity. The pivotal year unleashed forces that both deepened the political divisions between Americans and united many of its minority and oppressed communities. With the radicalisation of the ‘movement’ and its critique of authority, the breakdown of the liberal consensus, and increasing political polarisation between the nation’s liberals and conservatives, 1968 served as the culmination of the underlying discontent that built up throughout the 1960s. Not only was the year a turbulent and transformative period of the era, but with the rise of women’s and gay liberation movements, 1968 also served as a springboard for radical change, keeping the dynamic and progressive spirit of the 1960s alive for decades to come.

40 Scrunach, p.1.
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Historians have contested the relevance of gender to historical analysis since the onset of first-wave feminism in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Within academia, recognition of the importance of this ongoing debate grew following the women’s liberation movement of the late 1960s and 1970s, the advancement of gender studies in the 1990s, and the integration of gender, sexuality, and other components of identity into historical analysis in the 2000s. Social memories of Aotearoa are often viewed through a ‘gendered’ lens, whether it is the nation’s contribution to the suffrage movement, construction of masculine identity rooted in colonialism, or the mainstream ‘acceptance’ of queer identities. Although post-structuralist historical approaches attempt to analyse subjects via an understanding that human experience is shaped by multi-dimensional human identities (such as class, race, and ability), historians’ continued focus on gender has led to a lack of consideration of experiences outside of te ao Pākehā.

The path to integration of women into academia, either as scholars or subjects, runs parallel to the three waves of feminism. As the suffrage movement flourished in Aotearoa, the influence of sex on social experience was examined and negotiated. History was decidedly a ‘man’s realm,’ which focused primarily on the pursuits of historical ‘heroes’; whether that be on the battlefield or in politics. However, by the 1960s, fundamental differences in social experience based on sex had become apparent to the burgeoning field of feminist history. Inspired by the historical narrative technique of ‘history from below’, which centres ‘common’ people, feminist historians argued that women ‘made,
and also make, history’. Historical analysis was useful in describing and naming the subjugation of women across cultures and societies. Raewyn Dalziel’s 1977 investigation into ‘helpmeets’ of nineteenth-century New Zealand utilises a transformative historical approach, the subsequent development within women’s history following the compensatory method. Rather than aiming to recount the lives of notable women ‘worth’ remembering, transformative history incorporates class awareness by focusing on spheres of everyday existence. Dalziel’s use of a transformative historical approach scrutinises women’s experiences in ‘the special circumstances of colonial New Zealand’ and how ‘women’s role within the home and family’ came to be heavily emphasised in the nineteenth century. Dalziel argues that female enfranchisement ‘did not lead New Zealand women rapidly into new spheres of activity but consolidated [...] their role as homemakers and guardians of moral [...]welfare’.

Through the 1970s, feminist approaches to history explicitly focused on describing the nature of female subjugation. The influence of other academic fields such as sociology helped to intensify scrutinisation of the concept of a historian as a ‘disinterested interpreter of the past’ - a position which encouraged male historians’ ‘stake in downplaying the gendering of cultural and political authority’. Two decades later, post-structuralist theory revisited ‘conventional history’ — a history which included men. Post-structuralism emphasised balancing multiple discourses; investigating the ‘nexus of knowledge and power’ and the ‘open-ended construction of the social identities’. Post-structuralist theory describes gendered experience as relational and identities as being constructed simultaneously — the female experience was a witness and subjected to the male experience and vice versa. Written in 1987, Jock Phillips’ study of the construction of Pākehā masculinity attempts to ‘correlate the history of men with changes in female experience’. Caroline Daley and Deborah Montgomerie’s study of gendered experiences in World War Two aligns with Phillip’s examination of masculinity within multiple spheres: public and private; home and recreation; and ‘on the playing field’. Such an approach aims to address the inequities of implicit gendering of men, and centring women’s experiences solely on gender. Barbara Brookes’ text follows this same approach by framing gender

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1 Toby L. Ditz, 'The New Men’s History and the Peculiar Absence of Gendered Power: Some Remedies from Early American Gender History', *Gender and History*, 16, 1, April 2004, p.1.
4 Dalziel, p.113.
5 Ditz, p.2.
6 ibid., p.2.
7 ibid., p.2.
10 Daley and Montgomerie, p.298.
relations as an interrelationship between men and women. In doing so, Brookes focuses on the performative aspect of gender, in a decade where men increasingly found themselves collaborating with women both in private and public life.11

The turn of the millennium saw considerations of the interplay of class and race become more prominent in historical analyses of gender. Bronwyn Dalley’s article on white slavery in New Zealand examined how the term became a ‘powerful rhetorical device and narrative framework... through which feminists articulated...demands for...equality in New Zealand’,12 Dalley’s chosen subject would have posed difficulties for earlier feminist historians, dealing with a realm of the imaginary, and scrutinising the actions of the historical heroines, such as those in the suffrage and temperance movements.13 But by choosing to examine this cultural moment, Dalley uncovered that the anti-white slavery campaign catalysed ‘wider social change’, ‘demanding that men should accept responsibility for their actions... [with] women upholding their own sexual integrity...and the freedom to walk the streets...in safety’.14 Historical constructionists approach studies of current experiences by examining their roots in past practices and understandings. Chris Brickell’s study of gay historical experience in New Zealand inspects the relationship of the ‘erotic past’ to the ‘ways we understand...our lives today’.15 Building on Phillips’ theories of masculinity in Aotearoa, this approach requires comfort in the realm of ambiguity. Brickell is interested in interpretations of what remains unsaid, moments when identity is articulated, and why certain distinctions are ‘understood, underlined, or undermined’.16

Change in approaches to analysing the influence of gender on historical experiences has required historians to broaden the types of primary evidence used to inform historical arguments. Throughout Phillips’ book, quantitative data is used alongside personal anecdotes to detail the origins and impacts of the construction of Pākehā male identity. This approach is especially effective when applied to historical events and concepts that are also part of social memory as ‘nation-forming’ moments, such as the Springbok tour of 1981, and male drinking culture.17 This approach acts to both support the argument that aspects of individual experiences were shared and to provide nuance to otherwise impersonal statistics.18 Dalziel’s use of newspapers, books, and comparisons between the diaries of married women in New Zealand and England is less compelling. By arguing that life in the

12 Dalley, p.586.
13 ibid., p.601.
14 ibid., p.600.
16 ibid., p.8.
17 Phillips, pp.266-268.
18 ibid.
colonies provided more satisfaction for women, consideration for the experiences of women who were not literate is missing. Contrasted against Dalziel’s focus on personal sources, Dalley considers a wider breadth of experiences. By analysing pamphlets, such as those from the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, and newspaper publications, like the Paul Mall Gazette, Dalley sought to uncover societal conceptions of white slavery in order to construct the argument that it was a ‘symbolically supercharged topic’. Dalley’s consideration of the relationship between “common” people, feminist organisations, and institutions of power is striking, drawing particularly on the Contagious Diseases Act and suffragist reactions to the legislation.

Brickell’s study of homosexuality in Aotearoa is distinct in that it relies heavily on photographic evidence, but also court records, diaries, newspaper archives, and interviews with the contemporary gay community. Combining a myriad of primary sources was necessary in uncovering male affection and eroticism, which were often intentionally hidden from history by both gay men and historians. Excerpts from diaries are particularly useful in drawing out the ways in which repression of homosexuality impacted queer people on a deeply personal level, such as those from Erick McCormick: ‘It is one of the most powerful forces in my nature, and I pray devoutly that it may not merely be a perversion of the sexual instinct’. Although the types of primary evidence increased in diversity through the last quarter of the twentieth century, they were still incredibly focused on Pākehā experiences, yet were instrumental in bringing awareness to the need for incorporation of history relating to gender and sexual orientation into Aotearoa’s historical canon.

Interest in intersection of class, race and gender indicate a historian's willingness to understand the experiences of the oppressed, but also the means of their oppression. Beyond this, historical reconstruction of past lives should aim to humanise historical subjects in a way that honours the ‘radically different social experiences’ that occur at the intersection of at least three axes of identity. More recent approaches to gender history consider indigeneity and cisnormativity and their influence on constructing gender in Aotearoa. Two examples are Elizabeth Kerekere’s study of Takatāpui and Will Hansen’s thesis on trans resistance between 1967 and 1989. Historical approaches which centred on a binary view of the public and private sphere, and considered that the spheres’ inhabitants,

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19 Dalziel, p.115.
20 Dalley, pp. 585-586.
21 ibid., p.587.
22 Brickell, p 8.
23 Brickell, p.97.
25 Scott, p.30.
26 ibid., p.30.
men in the former, women in the latter, as leading separate lives, tend to be reductionist.\textsuperscript{28} When analysing a text such as Dalziel’s some forty years after publication, the lack of consideration of Māori and tauiwi experiences indicate the ongoing need to re-evaluate historical methods to prevent misrepresenting past experiences. The emergence of an open LGBTQ* and MVPFAFF culture in Aotearoa has strongly shaped contemporary views of gender and collective social memory.\textsuperscript{29} Phillips acknowledges that this emergence made it ‘more problematic to me in the mid-1980s the whole question of when, and why, the New Zealand male stereotype became so strongly heterosexual’.\textsuperscript{30} Perhaps historians such as Kerekere and Hansen are following the challenge Montgomerie described in 1999: ‘writing the private and psychological dimensions of experience into our social histories of gender is not easy, but it is necessary if we are to understand the elasticity and persistence of gender asymmetry’.\textsuperscript{31}

Brickell’s conceptualisation of history as a ‘long, idiosyncratic rope, a hank of twisting strands that pick up and drop off, split and recombine along the way’ encapsulates the ways in which modern inhabitants of Aotearoa must construct understandings of ourselves through the reconstruction of past ‘threads that stretch back in time’.\textsuperscript{32} To some degree, historiographical exercises require the same level of empathy as historical analysis, a balancing of critical analysis against an understanding that historians in the present benefit from precedent discourse in ways that those in the past did not. Yet, writing those ‘private and psychological dimensions of experience’ into the historical narrative, and representing the full spectrum of gender experience calls for more nuanced studies, like those of Kerekere and Hansen’s, that recall and honour the lives of New Zealanders beyond the gender binary.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{28} Scott, p.31.
\textsuperscript{29} MVPFAFF is an acronym to describe Pasifika identities; Mahu (Hawai'i and Tahiti), Vaka sa. lewa lewa (Fiji), Palopa (Papua New Guinea) Fa'aafafine (Samoa) Akava'i'ne. (Rarotonga), Fakaleiti (Tonga), Fakafifine (Niue).
\textsuperscript{30} Phillips, p.ix.
\textsuperscript{31} Daley and Montgomerie, p.298.
\textsuperscript{32} Brickell, p.384.
\textsuperscript{33} Daley and Montgomerie, p.298.
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Do historians generally agree that Nazi Germany was a ‘masculine pursuit’ that largely excluded women?

Angela Black

Historians have been debating the relative roles of men and women in Nazi Germany since the 1970s, when the “women’s history” movement started to gain popular traction. Since then, a plethora of scholarly works focusing on the experiences and voices of women in Nazi Germany has revealed that it is no longer possible to suggest that women were merely passive victims of the Nazi dictatorship, exempt from any responsibility for Nazi pursuits. However, this scholarship also suggests that historians continue to grapple with the question of whether Nazi Germany was a “masculine pursuit” that largely excluded women. This essay will argue that although historians generally agree that ideologically Nazi Germany was an exclusively masculine pursuit, they continue to debate whether this was the case in practice. Historians who focus on Aryan women’s roles as stabilisers and prosecutors in Nazi society generally rebut the idea that Nazi Germany was a masculine pursuit. On the other hand, those who focus on the actual power dynamics between men and women in Nazi society will support the proposition. Ultimately, intersectional histories which recognise the complexities of society by engaging with individuals as more than just female or male are the most effective. These studies suggest that it is too simplistic to view Nazi Germany as purely either a masculine pursuit or not. My conclusion, therefore, will be that historians have not been able to agree on whether Nazi Germany was a masculine pursuit, but are instead increasingly accepting that the complexities of Nazi society mean that no clear-cut categorisation is possible.

Historians generally agree that, on an ideological level, Nazi Germany presented itself as a masculine pursuit that largely excluded women. Nazi propaganda advocated the establishment of a

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hierarchical gender order; women were depoliticised and largely confined to their roles as mothers and homemakers in the domestic sphere, whilst men dominated the public sphere in accordance with masculine standards such as strength, courage, and honour. Indeed, historians have deployed a wide range of evidence in support of this proposition. Elizabeth Harvey and Adelheid von Saldern both note Nazi attempts to remove women from the public sphere. During the Nazi rise to power in 1933, for example, Nazi pressure resulted in the dissolution of most feminist organisations advocating women’s professional development, political, and civic rights. Further, women’s radio advertised the importance of the woman’s role in the domestic sphere to the creation of a racially-superior, harmonious ‘people’s community’ (Volksgemeinschaft). Meanwhile, other historians have noted Nazi rhetoric around ‘remasculinising’ the public sphere through ridding the workplace of ‘feminised’ ideas of egalitarianism and individualism, and instead creating a community of men who honoured German hard work and enterprise in pursuit of a thousand-year Reich. Ultimately, the propagation of such ideals during the Nazi rise to power has led many historians to agree that, ideologically, Nazi Germany was a masculine pursuit which aimed to largely exclude women from the public sphere of society.

Despite such Nazi ideology, some historians have called into question the extent to which Nazi Germany was in practice a masculine pursuit. These historians criticise histories which merely focus on ‘top-down models of social control’. Instead, they utilise a bottom-up approach to investigate the agencies of women within their own conservative ‘sub-milieus’ and suggest that women played an important role in the Nazi pursuit for a harmonious and racially pure Volksgemeinschaft. Adelheid von Saldern argues that conservative women continued to play an important role in female-dominated welfare organisations which worked to benefit other Aryans. Given these organizations were now subsidiaries of the Nazi Women’s League or the Nazi-run German Women’s Organization, female members were actively working towards the Nazi pursuit. Conservative women also played active roles in Nazi society as guards at female concentration camps, nurses who diagnosed and reported social ‘misfits’, teachers who actively indoctrinated their students with Nazi ideology, and secretaries who performed administrative tasks with the knowledge that they were contributing to the racially-
exclusive policies of the Third Reich. Therefore, historians who take the term “masculine pursuit” to denote a society in which women were exempt from active involvement in the Nazi pursuit will generally conclude that Nazi Germany was not a masculine pursuit which largely excluded women.

However, we should continue to be sceptical about whether female involvement in such activities actually rebuts the idea that Nazi Germany was a masculine pursuit. Indeed, it is important to note that the above studies on female involvement in the Third Reich focus almost solely on the women and fail to investigate the power dynamics present. Historians who have instead focused on the relationships between women in their own milieus and men in superior positions of power posit a rather different picture. Two such studies are Vandana Joshi’s investigation of wives who denounced their husbands, and Claudia Koonz’s study of female employees in church-funded health and education institutions. To be sure, Joshi’s study suggests that, through denouncing their husbands, women had significant political power and assisted in the Nazi persecution of political enemies. However, Joshi’s study does not conclusively rebut the idea that Nazi Germany was a masculine pursuit. Her findings suggest that many female denouncers were not denouncing in the name of Nazi ideology, but rather as a last-resort measure to rid themselves of abusive partners or seek revenge on ex-husbands. The fact that the Gestapo often let abusive men off with only a warning and eventually decided that the maintenance of a marriage was more important to the community than the prosecution of guilty husbands suggests that the Nazi pursuit was very much controlled by men in accordance with masculine standards.

Meanwhile, Koonz’s study demonstrates how Catholic nurses and educators were torn between their own moral and religious reservations and their obligation to report any ‘genetically-deficient’ individuals in their care. Koonz suggests that these women’s opposition to such policies often resulted in a struggle along gendered lines as they fought with their male superiors to gain clarity and guidance on the conflict between their own morals and obligations to the Nazi state. Historians who have focused on the power dynamics present in socio-political circles of Nazi Germany have therefore suggested that some women were not asserting their own agency, but rather they were being mobilised by male-dominated structures and processes.

With some historians concluding that Nazi Germany was not a masculine pursuit based on the nature of women’s involvement in society, and others concluding that it may have been a masculine

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11 Ibid., p.423.

12 Ibid., p.431.


14 Ibid., p.80.

15 Ibid., p.67.
pursuit given prevailing power imbalances, it may appear that there will never be consensus on the issue. Increasingly, however, historians who have engaged in intersectional histories are beginning to agree that Nazi society was too complex to simply be categorised as a masculine pursuit or not. Indeed, intersectional histories recognise that individual experiences are shaped not only by an individual’s gender, but also by their relationship to other social categories such as race, sexuality, and class. The rest of this essay will demonstrate how, through engaging with individuals as more than just “male” or “female”, intersectional histories ultimately agree that the extent to which an individual living in Nazi Germany experienced it as a masculine pursuit was contingent on the individual’s race.

One way in which intersectional histories have complicated the picture of Nazi Germany as a masculine pursuit is by recognising that Aryan women’s experiences were not only shaped by the fact that they were women, but also by their inclusion in the “superior” race. Indeed, Michael Stibbe notes how Nazi Germany was more concerned with the maintenance of Nazi-imposed racial hierarchies than the maintenance of the gender order. The result was that gendered roles in society were continually being modified in order to further the racial goals of the regime. For example, whilst Nazi ideals did not envision women in the industrial workforce, the pressures of rearmament meant that Aryan women were increasingly required to assist in industrial war preparation. This involvement blurred the gender order, as women’s roles expanded into the masculinised world of the workplace. In 1942, however, as forced labour deportees began arriving in Germany from the occupied Soviet territories, Nazi planners were able to postpone the labour conscription of Aryan women in order to better support the ideal Nazi gender order. Therefore, as Kuhne correctly notes, the construction of gendered identities and the discordant interactions between them in Nazi Germany were never static. It follows that trying to come to a definitive conclusion about whether the Nazi regime was a masculine pursuit fundamentally ignores the fluidity of gendered order in Nazi Germany.

Another way in which historians have utilised the concept of the intersectionality between gender and race to demonstrate the complexities of categorising Nazi society as a masculine pursuit has been by studying the lived experiences of racial minorities in Nazi Germany. Elizabeth Harvey’s observations about the denial and disavowal of gender identities within Nazi punishment regimes and Marion Kaplan’s study of German-Jewish responses to Nazism complement one another in presenting this case. Harvey notes how Jewish men were ‘demasculinized’ through both humiliation by SS

17 Stibbe, p.177.
18 ibid.
19 ibid., p.166.
20 Harvey, p.325.
21 Kuhne, p.359.
guards in concentration camps and by Nazi propaganda, which portrayed Jewish men as racial inbreeds who were ‘weak and hunched’. Meanwhile, Kaplan reveals that German-Jewish women significantly expanded their traditional roles, taking on new responsibilities as breadwinners and defenders while their husbands were increasingly persecuted and forced out of jobs. The result was what Kaplan called a ‘gender-role reversal’. Two important observations can be made from these studies. Firstly, it is clear that the gendered experiences of individuals in Nazi Germany were largely dependent on race; the specific circumstances of those facing persecution presented a gender order unique to that group of people. Secondly, Harvey and Kaplan’s studies reveal that hierarchies in Nazi Germany were dependent upon the interrelationships between gender and race. Indeed, the ‘demasculinisation’ of Jewish men saw them subjugated to a position below Aryan women in Nazi society. The general hierarchical structure of Nazi Germany as a whole was therefore more complicated than men dominating women. There were instances of men dominating women, but also of Aryan and Jewish women dominating Jewish men. To claim that we can conclusively call Nazi Germany a masculine pursuit therefore overly simplifies a complex society.

To conclude, historians do generally agree that Nazi Germany was ideologically a masculine pursuit that largely excluded women. The Nazi goal of a harmonious and racially-pure Volksgemeinschaft posited a society based on a hierarchical gender order; women were to be confined to their roles in the domestic sphere and men were to be in charge of the ‘masculinised’ public sphere. However, historians continue to debate whether Nazi Germany was a masculine pursuit in practice. The point of difference comes down to the individual historian’s line of inquiry. Those who focus on women’s roles in propagating the Volksgemeinschaft generally dispute the idea that Nazi Germany was a masculine pursuit. Meanwhile, those who focus on the relationships and power dynamics between women and men suggest that Nazi Germany was both practically and ideologically a masculine pursuit. Whilst these points of difference appear hard to reconcile, historians engaged in intersectional histories are increasingly coming to the consensus that the issue is too complex to reduce to a simple categorisation. By studying the effect which race had on gender roles and constructions, and the relationships between men and women, historians have revealed that the extent to which individuals experienced Nazi Germany as a masculine pursuit differed according to the space they occupied in society. Therefore, whilst historians do not agree whether Nazi Germany was in practice a masculine pursuit that largely excluded women, they are beginning to agree that there is no simple answer.

22 Harvey, p.318.
24 ibid., p.95.
25 Lewis, p.41.
Bibliography


When titling works on epochal time periods, historians often attempt to condense their overall thesis down to a single pithy and memorable phrase. The motivation for doing this is not difficult to discern; short and dramatic titles draw more attention than banal or wordy ones, and this helps to distinguish individual works among a sea of material covering the same topic. A cynic might therefore suggest that this preference for such hyperbolic phrases is self-serving, and offers little in the way of scholarly value. However, history is often understood in terms of sweeping narratives rather than granular accounts, especially among the general public, and the language one uses in describing these narratives can be used to initiate a more substantive historical debate. This essay will examine the provocative title of Allen J. Matusow’s book *The Unraveling of America* as an example in this regard, and argue that the concept of ‘unraveling’ captures much of the essence of 1960s America if not all of the era’s minutiae. ‘Unraveling’ describes a process not of linear decline, but of accelerating deconstruction, and I will attempt to demonstrate why this is a fitting shorthand for many of the events for which the ‘60s are best remembered.

Considering this essay’s focus on Matusow’s title, it seems appropriate to focus first on the topic to which his book is dedicated: liberalism. Descriptions of the trajectory of American liberalism over the course of the ‘60s often use words like ‘collapse’, ‘capitulation’, and ‘failure’, characterising the decade as one that began with transformative hope for liberals and ended in bitter despair. Such portrayals generally associate the idealism of early ‘60s liberalism with the John F. Kennedy administration, and when one examines the rhetoric that Kennedy used to articulate his vision for the future, it is not difficult to see why. In his 1961 inauguration speech, Kennedy spoke of peace, justice, and unity, both domestically and internationally, and he did so in language so romantic that it almost
defies the belief of a twenty-first century audience.¹ In order to understand the ultimate fate of ‘60s liberalism, then, we must set aside the cynicism that is afforded to us by hindsight and recognise that many people at the time truly believed in Kennedy’s utopian vision and the ‘long twilight struggle’ by which it might have been realised.² By setting such lofty goals, Kennedy ensured that liberalism was, if not doomed to fail outright, at the very least unlikely to yield the political and emotional catharsis that it promised. Where Kennedy’s soaring rhetoric and image of perfect statesmanship sought to tie a neat little bow around America and its future, later events would reveal loose threads that had yet to be properly accounted for. Despite the best efforts of liberals, the ‘60s liberalism that Kennedy espoused was plagued by shortcomings and contradictions, and this only became clearer as the decade continued.

Perhaps the most visible proof of Kennedy’s miscalculation is presented by America’s involvement in Vietnam, which was escalated by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1965 and became a source of considerable embarrassment for the United States on the world stage. In the meetings that led up to the decision to escalate, Johnson grappled with and ultimately succumbed to the pressure of living up to Kennedy’s vision of American global leadership, expressing concern about ‘Uncle Sam’ being exposed as a ‘paper tiger’ and ‘breaking the word of three presidents’.³ The liberal vision articulated by Kennedy and others demanded that America assert itself internationally, but when this worldview was put to the test in the jungles of Vietnam, it only served to highlight the limits of America’s soft and military power. Beyond this damage to the United States’ global prestige, Vietnam also shook the faith of Americans in the liberal internationalist project to which they had committed themselves. Televised images and harrowing first-hand accounts highlighted the futility and mutually-inflicted trauma of the war, and the continuation of American involvement in the face of mounting protest demonstrated the unresponsiveness of the existing political apparatus to popular outcry. In light of this, many turned away from traditional avenues of activism and towards more radical ideologies and forms of dissent. Where liberalism sought to unite Americans in pursuit of a common cause, the adversity of actually carrying out this mission exposed the gaping chasm between rhetoric and reality. Vietnam represented a loss of innocence for many liberals, and when pretty words were brought into contrast with horrifying pictures, Kennedy’s idyllic tapestry was destined to unravel.

Although it was a major driving force behind the unraveling of ‘60s liberalism, Vietnam was not the only contributing factor in this regard. A further challenge to the existing consensus came

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² ibid., p.224.
from a growing desire, especially among young people and minority groups, to express particularised racial, sexual, economic, and generational critiques, rather than falling in line behind a singular liberal vision. This desire manifested itself both in the growing number of communities that sought liberation, and the unwillingness of these communities to compromise with liberals in pursuing what they perceived to be vital and immediate interests. In this fractured leftist landscape, preserving the liberal consensus became a Sisyphean task that was as intractable as it was personally taxing. An illuminating tale in this regard is that of Allard Lowenstein, whose commitment to realising change through mainstream politics saw him become disillusioned and ostracised from his increasingly radical leftist peers. Lowenstein believed that ‘the system’ was fundamentally good and necessary, and he viewed the confrontational and decentralised politics of movements like Black Power as detrimental to the pursuit of substantive change by increments. As a result of this difference in ideology, even issues upon which mainstream liberals like Lowenstein and radical ‘outsiders’ nominally agreed became fraught with tension over methods and end goals. Kennedy’s rhetorical focus on emotion rather than policy specifics only worsened this divide, as it created a climate under which political affiliation was imbued with great moral significance and strategic compromise was therefore unappealing. As Lowenstein so soberingly discovered, liberalism was not equally appealing to everyone, and once it began to come apart at the seams there was little that could be done to salvage the illusory consensus that it once enjoyed.

Interestingly, the difficulty liberals encountered in accommodating the increasingly pluralistic and radical left-wing politics of the late ‘60s was also present in the New Left and countercultural movements. In each case, the desire for fundamental reform professed by young activists was tempered somewhat by the social conditioning to which they had been exposed, and the narrow view that this cultivated in relation to issues of race and gender. A striking example of this phenomenon can be found in the ridicule to which feminist reformers within Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) were subjected; organisers of a 1965 workshop on ‘Women in the Movement’ were mocked by their male peers, and dismissed as ‘castrating females’ who were ‘in need of a good screw’. This treatment of women was paralleled in the counterculture’s understanding of sexual liberation, which often ‘pressured women to be available sexually for men without a larger vision of an intersubjective, egalitarian, or emancipatory definition of sexual pleasure itself’. Racial awareness was another area in which the counterculture left much to be desired, as the incorporation of Black music and aesthetic styles by the mostly white youth movement was rarely accompanied by an adoption of the culture

5 ibid.
6 Miriam Schneir, Feminism in Our Time: The Essential Writings, World War II to the Present, New York, 1994, p.103.
and politics that gave rise to them. The challenge of uniting diverse racial groups in pursuit of a shared political goal proved to be too much even for Martin Luther King, whose Poor People’s Campaign of 1967 failed to achieve its aims with regard to poverty and fell short of establishing a lasting or influential rainbow coalition. All of this demonstrates that although large-scale movements did emerge and gather momentum over the course of the ‘60s, none were able to fully reconcile the competing elements within them to achieve an enduring consensus. Internecine conflict and fragmentation plagued the culture and politics of both the mainstream and its alternatives, and the ubiquitous chaos of this situation is captured well by the term ‘unraveling’.

Another advantage of ‘unraveling’ as a descriptor for the ‘60s is that it is equally applicable to social changes that might generally be regarded as positive as it is to processes of decline. Although unity and stability are often held up as ideals towards which societies should strive, this pursuit of a single dominant order can lead to the oppression of those whose interests diverge from those of the majority. For these groups, times of social deconstruction or ‘unraveling’ represent not a cause for alarm, but a rare opportunity for self-determination. One dimension of American life that was a site of major upheaval in the ‘60s was that of gender and sexuality, as the decade saw a radical re-examination of the norms around these concepts and birthed movements that would come to fundamentally reshape them in the years that followed. Unsatisfied with the conservative gender roles assigned to them by traditionalists and embittered by the chauvinism of their male peers, women breaking away from the liberal mainstream and the New Left alike lit the spark of Second Wave feminism, which would have enormous consequences for women’s rights and social standing in the following decades. The status quo may have offered women a clear and unified model of how to live their lives, but the unraveling of this orthodoxy offered the opportunity to embrace a messier ambiguity and take control of their own affairs. Ultimately, the trailblazing feminists of the late ‘60s and beyond were all too willing to take advantage of their unique historical moment, and the legacy of this societal transformation is still keenly felt and appreciated today. In a similar vein, the reconsideration of gender and family that took place over the ‘60s provided a much-needed platform for gay men and lesbian women. While the courage of individual protestors ought not to be discounted, it is clear that gay liberation drew inspiration from the efforts and successes of earlier movements.

We can thus characterise the progress towards gay rights that occurred through the end of the decade and beyond as, at least in part, a continuation of the ‘unraveling’ that had already taken place across the broader sociopolitical landscape of ‘60s America.

8 ibid., p.167.
A similar paradigm shift occurred in the realm of race and ethnicity, where the momentum attained by the civil rights movement allowed for the development of a new brand of racial politics that was bold and unapologetic. Black activists increasingly turned away from the non-violent and rights-focused protest represented in popular consciousness by Martin Luther King and towards the proud expression of Black identity and solidarity, often through militarism.\footnote{ibid., pp.46-52.} The placement of racial categories at the intersection of politics and culture has persisted to the present day, and movements like Black Lives Matter demonstrate the continuing sway that these categories hold over the national psyche and discourse. On a related note, the social chaos of the ‘60s saw the emergence of a number of non-Black ethnic movements that have played a vital role in diversifying American politics in subsequent years. Some of these include the Chicano, Native American, and Asian American movements, which each drew emotional and strategic inspiration from Black liberation and the civil rights movement.\footnote{ibid., pp.132-134.} These movements not only demanded greater recognition from predominantly white America, but also fundamentally altered the way that their participants viewed themselves. The very experiences that led diverse peoples of colour to feel excluded from mainstream society also helped them to form powerful collective identities, and to coalesce into motivated political bodies with the power to enact real change in spite of their minority status. While many of the most celebrated achievements of these groups would come later on, the ‘unraveling’ period of the ‘60s and early ‘70s was essential for allowing them to separate and redefine themselves, and the significance of this should not be understated. Only through a deconstruction of the old order could a new America be born, and the diversification of American politics that began in the 1960s proves this beyond the shadow of a doubt.

History should not, ultimately, be written in slogans. A truly meaningful understanding of the past requires an allowance for nuance, and focusing on snappy catchphrases can lead instead to the kind of black-and-white thinking that scholars of history would do well to avoid. What this essay has tried to convey, however, is that while no book title is perfect or comprehensive, some titles are better than others. *The Unraveling of America* as a title may not provide a detailed analysis of the social dynamics of the 1960s, but it does identify a common theme that emerges when one examines the decade’s major events with a critical eye. Moreover, it serves to counter simplistic narratives of decline by centring the mechanics of change rather than its mere occurrence, as well as illuminating some of the long-term benefits that have arisen from shifts that might generally be regarded as negative. An effective title draws the reader’s attention and establishes expectations for the material within the book’s pages, but it also helps to justify the work’s existence and its intended contribution to the discourse. In these respects, I believe that *The Unraveling of America* is an excellent title for a
work on 1960s America, as well as a surprisingly apt distillation of the most essential qualities of the decade.
Bibliography


In what ways were Christian attitudes towards Indigenous peoples of the New World shaped by the interaction between religious groups within Spain both before and after 1492? Was Spanish conquest in the Americas simply a continuation of the Reconquista?

Prefacing his account of the colonial enterprises of early modern Spain, Luis Riviera contends there are few years so historically fateful as 1492.¹ For in it, three major events occurred: the defeat of the last Muslim Kingdom in continental Europe, the expulsion of the Jews from the Iberian Peninsula, and the discovery of the “New World”, known today as the Americas.² Crucially, it is the potent interplay and legacies of what these three events represent that should be subject to critical inquiry. As this essay will argue, Christian attitudes towards Indigenous peoples of the New World were initially shaped through the prism of the Spanish Reconquista, which narrated the Americas as a divinely-endowed reaffirmation of Catholic predestination over religious “others”. However, over time this attitude of evangelising optimism succumbed to one of increasing disillusionment as the quasi-mythic prophecies which flowed from the Spanish Reconquista failed to materialise in the converted “Christians” of Old and New Spain. Consequently, it saw the hardening of attitudes towards Indigenous peoples along increasingly racialised lines. Viewed collectively, this demonstrates that Spanish conquest in the Americas was not simply a ‘continuation’ of the

² ibid.
Reconquista. Rather, it was a powerful *transformer* of it, one that precipitated a fundamental re-evaluation of its meaning and purpose.

In order to understand the attitudes Spanish-Christians held towards the Indigenous peoples of the New World, it is first necessary to recognise that the military Reconquista or “reconquest” of the Iberian Peninsula by Catholic forces lay at the heart of formative expectations Spanish-Christians had of the Americas. As historians like Joseph F. O’Callaghan have argued, although this centuries-long Reconquista of Spain was initially catalysed by territorial concerns, over time it became increasingly permeated with the rhetoric of Christian intransigency. Spurred by Papal Bulls offering soldiers who partook in the Reconquista the same spiritual indulgences as those who went on crusades to Jerusalem, the war against the Muslim *Taifas* (principalities) of the Iberian peninsula gradually morphed into a holy war waged in the name of Christendom itself. When this is critically considered, the Reconquista can thus be perceived as constituting an important turning point for the shaping of later Christian attitudes for two key reasons. First, it necessitated an all-encompassing union between Catholic faith and the soon-to-be Spanish nation. From here on, “Spain” could only be, and *was only*, Christian. Following a decisive victory against the last Muslim kingdom of Granada in January 1492, this ambition was capable of being realised with the royally-decreed expulsion of all Jews and Muslims from Spain in 1492 and 1501 respectively. However secondly, and arguably more importantly, the ostensive *success* of the Reconquista where similar crusading efforts launched by other Christian nations had previously failed inculcated Spaniards with a conviction that they had been pre-eminently chosen by God to be His principal agents for spreading Catholicism on Earth. Moreover, West notes that due to other prevailing Christian ontologies like Providentialism and Apocalypticism circulating in Early-Modern Europe at the time, this vanguard position was viewed as being time-sensitive: the Last Days were seemingly neigh, and there was much work to be done before Christ’s Second Coming could be fulfilled. Consequently, when the New World was “discovered” by Christopher Columbus in 1492, its initial reaffirmation of all these ideological undercurrents in Spanish society kicked them into overdrive. As a result, the early attitudes Christians held towards Indigenous peoples of the New World became increasingly mobilised in advancing this overarching narrative of Spanish ascendancy and Christian hegemony that first gained traction in the military Reconquista of the Iberian Peninsula.

Further evidence for the Reconquista’s ideological spillage into discourses on the New World is especially forthcoming when analysing early accounts of European-Amerindian contact. Tellingly,

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4 ibid., p.22.
7 West, pp.535-541.
in most of these accounts the attitude articulated towards Indigenous peoples is implicitly predicated on two core assumptions rooted in the crusading mentality of the Spanish Reconquista. Namely, Spain had a *divine right* to conquer non-Christian territories, and once these territories were conquered they would be *made Christian*. These mentalities are exemplified by the Requerimiento of 1513 that was read out to newly-discovered Amerindian communities, which ‘informed’ them that their territory was now under Spanish control and missionary activity was not to be obstructed under threat of death or enslavement. Indeed, their success imposing these conjectures on Iberian Muslim and Jewish populations following the Catholic reconquest of Spain reaffirmed their indubitability. Consequently, the central debate which early attitudes towards Indigenous peoples coalesced around was not *if* they should be made Christian, but *when* they would be. On this matter, most early sources were positively sanguine. For example, following his arrival in Mexico the Spanish Bishop Vasco de Quironga remarked:

> Anything may be done with these people, they are most docile, and, proceeding with due diligence, may easily be taught Christian doctrine. They possess innately the instincts of humility and obedience…with very tractable minds void of error and ready for impression.

Similarly to many of his spiritually-devoted contemporaries like Bartolomé de las Casas and Francisco de Vitoria, Quironga’s initial attitude towards the Indigenous peoples he encounters is principally framed by his assessment of their extreme *suitability* for Christian faith. Unlike pejorative accusations of carnal vice and societal corruption traditionally aimed at Jewish and Muslim communities on the Iberian Peninsula, the Amerindians were perceived as ‘docile’, ‘obedient’ and ‘tractable’ people who would ‘easily’ accept the Gospels. In other words, they were non-Christians out of ignorance and not by choice. Indeed, some Spaniards like Christopher Columbus went so far as to argue that the conversion of the New World would be so complete that it would become the base from which the victorious campaign to recapture Jerusalem would be launched, a ‘crusade to end all crusades’ that would usher in the eschatological End Time. As scholars like Delno West have argued, viewed collectively this preemptive *Christianisation* of the Amerindians functioned to

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8 Rivera, p.262.
9 ibid., pp.32-35.
10 O’Callaghan, pp.18-22.
15 West, pp.533-541.
implicate these communities at the heated centre of Christian ‘theo-politics’ at the time, one still turbid and raw from the Spanish Reconquista. In this way, Spanish conquest in the Americas acted as an epistemological accelerant on the smouldering embers of the Reconquista, reigniting a conviction in its veracity and opening up new arenas in which its fantasies could be played out.

In the early years of Spanish contact with the New World, its “newness” and unfamiliarity allowed master narratives of Spanish predestination and Christian hegemony to continue unchecked. Indeed, this ‘spiritual conquest’ was even compounded by accounts of near-universal conversion to Christianity amongst the Indigenous population, a feat which paralleled the significant number of Jews and Muslims in the Old World who when faced with expulsion chose to convert en masse. In both cases, this was taken as yet another sign that the nation’s ‘universal Reconquista’ was divinely ordained. However, as time went on, the momentum of proselytising change ground to an ignominious halt. Crucially, despite the Spanish Empire being ostensibly Christian, concerns over the authenticity of this faith in its convert populations — Conversos (former Jews), Morsicos (former Muslims), and Amerindians — emerged. In response to this challenge new attitudes towards the Indigenous peoples of the New World materialised, many shaped by their fertile cross-pollination with analogous interactions between religious groups on the Iberian Peninsula. By doing so, it radically transformed the very notion of ‘Reconquista’ within the Spanish-Christian imagination itself.

One such shift in Christian attitudes towards the Indigenous peoples of the New World can be seen in the evolution of missionary practices by the Spanish clergy. In the initial period of Spanish-Amerindian contact, proselytising efforts were conducted with a genuine belief that true conversion must, to quote Bartolomé de las Casas, ‘persuade the understanding with reason and gently attract the will’. Consequently, early missionaries sought to learn the local language, establish Sunday Schools, and build churches which benefited the Indigenous community they ministered to, acts which facilitated local acceptance and thereby conversion. However, as the Spanish clergy became entrenched within New World society, growing concerns over Amerindian ‘Christians’ still performing ‘pagan’ ancestral and spiritual rites emerged. As one Jesuit priest exasperatedly explained, the Indigenous people of the New World appeared no better than: ‘The Moors of Granada, in that they all, or most of them have on the name of Christians and practise only the outward

16 ibid., pp.541.  
18 Riviera, pp.32-35.  
19 Helen Rawlings, Church, Religion and Society in Early Modern Spain, Basingstoke, 2002, pp.110-112.  
20 Keen, pp.106-108.  
21 Trouboday, p.171.  
22 Keen, p.104-106.  
23 Rawlings, pp.110-112.
ceremonies. This reference to the Amerindians being like ‘Moors’ is not inconsequential, because it demonstrates how issues over conversion in the New World were increasingly perceived as echoing the interactions between religious groups within Spain. As scholars like Brian A. Catlos, L.P. Harvey and David Nirenberg have noted, the late fifteenth and early-sixteenth centuries were characterised by profound Catholic unease in Spanish society, as reports of widespread ‘moral backsliding’ amongst the converted morsico and converso populations surfaced. For devout Spanish Christians, this rumoured ‘relapse to idolatry’ was not simply insulting but *radically subversive*, as these non-Christian elements in Spanish society brought with them a fear of metastasising corruption and contagion. Indeed, it even called into question the mythic claim of a *Christian Reconquista* itself. Consequently, it is little surprise that accusations of religious infidelity in the New World prompted a reactionary attitude from many Spanish missionaries. As a result, evangelising practises devolved into a focus on *conversion through coercion*, often by employing the same repressive mechanisms such as bans on cultural practises, ‘idol campaigns’, and religious inquisitions first mobilised against marginalised religious groups in Spain. Viewed collectively, these changes represent a significant hardening of Christian attitudes towards the Indigenous peoples of the New World, one that put existing mentalities of Spanish predestiny and Catholic hegemony under significant strain. Clearly, a more fundamental recalibration of the ‘New World’ was required within the Spanish-Christian imagination.

These ballooning conjectures of disillusionment, paternalism, and crisis Spanish-Christians felt in the New World eventually dovetailed into a growing racialisation of Christian attitudes towards Indigenous peoples. As Rebecca Overmyer-Velazquez’s meticulous analysis of the *Florentine Codex* expertly notes, the central paradox of how Amerindians had failed to properly convert to the ‘true faith’ of Spanish Catholicism despite exhaustive missionary efforts was reconciled by emerging arguments that the Indigenous people of the New World were physically incapable of complete religious adherence. As one leading group of Dominican Friars penned:

> They [Amerindians] have not the ability to understand surely and correctly the things of the faith nor their reasons, nor is the language abundant enough to explain the faith without great improprieties that can easily lead to errors.

24 ibid., p.112.
26 Nirenberg, p.1070.
27 Rawlings, pp.109-112.
28 Overmyer-Velazquez, pp.71-75.
29 Riviera, p.150.
This fixation on attributing ‘inferior’ intellectual and thereby racial qualities to the Amerindians has numerous parallels in rhetoric mobilised against religious groups in the Old World. Catlos in particular emphasises that similarly-degrading attitudes were expressed towards moriscos, who became popularly perceived as too inherently perfidious, obstinate, and depraved to ever become ‘true’ Christians. In a complete repudiation of the Spanish Reconquista’s fervent belief in the liberatory and universalising nature of Spanish Catholicism, Christian faith became perceived racially as something that was only ‘fully understood’ by some and paternalistically ministered to others. As a result of this attitude change, the mid sixteenth century saw the adoption of numerous ‘blood purity’ measures in society that entrenched the position of conversos, moriscos and Amerindians as segregated second-class citizens ‘unfit’ for even-footed interactions with their ‘Spanish’ counterparts. Taken together, the consequences these attitude shifts had towards religious ‘others’ in the Spanish-Christian imaginary are profound. To borrow the Orwellian aphorism, from now on although everyone would be ‘Christian’, some were perceived as more Christian than others.

In conclusion, can it be confidently argued that Spanish conquest in the Americas was simply a continuation of the Reconquista? As this essay has sought to demonstrate, this is not a straightforward question to answer. On one hand, it is imperative to recognise the importance of this event in shaping the psyche of Spanish-Christians and their narratives of the New World. In a society where concepts like providence, predestination, and righteousness were viewed as truths, not beliefs, the experience of successfully subjugating different religious groups under Christian control was a powerful one. It made Catholicism synonymous with Spanish nationhood, and set into motion prophetic visions of a future Spain that already prefaced ‘spiritual victory’ even before the New World was discovered. In the early period of Spanish contact with the Amerindians, it was these visions and narratives which flowed from the Reconquista that shaped Christian attitudes towards the Indigenous peoples they encountered. However, despite this it is also necessary to recognise that Spanish conquest in the Americas did not leave these formative visions and narratives unchanged. Rather, the New World in many ways marked the gradual unravelling of the Reconquista myth as the promises of Spanish predestination and Catholic hegemony rubbed up against a reality of piecemeal conversion, slow progress, and religious liminality. Compounded by similar experiences with Morisco and Converso populations within Spain, it triggered a fundamental re-evaluation of the narratives driving this ascendant ‘spiritual conquest’ alongside a redirection of their militant energies. Consequently, the later period of Spanish contact saw a hardening of attitudes towards Amerindian communities along increasingly racialised lines, often by mobilising rhetoric and methods of missionary coercion.

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30 Catlos, p.297.
31 Traboulay, p.96.
32 Rawlings, pp.4-5; 113-115.
first deployed against marginalised religious groups within Spain. Viewed collectively, perhaps then instead of a ‘continuation’ of the Reconquista, Spanish conquest in the Americas can be more accurately described as a profound *transformation* of it, one which continues to reverberate through our world today.
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Discuss David Arnold’s claim in his book *Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India* (1993) that Western medicine became a critical battleground between the colonised and colonisers.

*Mia Rutledge*

In *Colonizing the Body*, David Arnold claims that Western medicine became a critical battleground between the colonised and colonisers. However, with attention to a broader and more ambiguous historical picture, the battle lines of colonial medicine were frequently blurred. This essay will argue that Western medicine was at times a battleground, however, local agency reveals that medicine was more than just contestation and superficial dichotomies of colonised and coloniser should be resisted. Arnold’s colonial battleground of Western medicine is riddled with nuances. Western medicine was undoubtedly embroiled in a struggle for political control. However, recent scholarship has posited that, in certain circumstances, Western medicine was not interventionist or effective enough to constitute the oppressive “coloniser”. Furthermore, Western medicine generated a battleground along racial lines due to segregationist policies. Yet, Arnold’s dynamic of the colonised and the coloniser denies the complexity of colonial interactions. The “coloniser” frequently adapted Western medicine to suit local circumstances, whilst the “colonised” exhibited extensive agency over medical agendas. Local participation meant that Indigenous medicine did not simply keel over and die, but survived and transformed.

As a tool of imperial enterprise, Western medicine was a critical battleground in the fight for political control. Historians Roy MacLeod and Milton Lewis argue that medical knowledge was a
‘set of social messages’ about colonial dominance.¹ Initially, Western medicine was confined to the white and military enclaves of society.² However, the medical agenda extended to encompass Indigenous populations, as commercial imperialism was dependent on healthy labour forces.³ Preventing disease became the business of government.⁴ Alison Bashford argues that sanitary reform was colonisation by the laws of cleanliness, rather than military conquest.⁵ David Arnold argues that the hegemony permitted by medicine was greater than that which could ever be derived from conquest, as it disguised the coercion inherent in Western rule.⁶ It was through medicine that Western officials gained unprecedented rights over colonial subjects.⁷ Yet this argument denies the agency of local populations and overemphasises the dichotomy of colonised and coloniser. Arnold claims that physical contact between doctor and patient was one of the most ‘direct and traumatic experiences of the colonial encounter’.⁸ Medicine undoubtedly comprised a critical colonial battleground, but it was more than a mere tool of empire for both colonised and coloniser. Indeed, its efficacy and numerical superiority in the colonies has been doubted by historians.

In certain contexts, colonial medicine was too ineffective to constitute a decisive battleground between the colonised and coloniser. Arnold positions Western medicine as a threat to the long-established social and religious practises of Indigenous populations.⁹ However, historian Meghan Vaughan argues that colonial medics in Africa could not be either oppressors or liberators of the colonised, as Western medicine was too ineffective and thinly distributed throughout the continent.¹⁰ Even Arnold has admitted that Western medicine in India was ‘left out in the cold’.¹¹ Colonial medicine remained in a struggle for dominance amongst Indian locals after 150 years of British rule.¹² Vaughan argues that the visibility of colonial medicine was ‘patchy and periodic’ and therefore far less important in controlling both disease and populations than is frequently depicted by historians.¹³ MacLeod and Lewis depict colonial medicine as a calculated control agenda.¹⁴ Yet, Shula Marks

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⁵ ibid., p.1.
⁶ ibid., p.19.
⁷ ibid.
⁸ ibid., p.20.
⁹ ibid., p.20.
¹¹ David Arnold, Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India, Berkeley, 1993, p.3.
¹² ibid.
¹³ Vaughan, ‘Healing and Curing,’ p.287.
¹⁴ MacLeod and Lewis, p.1.
disputes Western medicine’s supposed efficacy.\textsuperscript{15} Similarly, Vaughan argues that African mortality was influenced by social and economic upheavals, rather than medical intervention.\textsuperscript{16} Additionally, historians argue that Western medicine was too closely intertwined with the colonial state and therefore removed from local needs.\textsuperscript{17} Hence, in India until at least 1914, colonial medicine failed to supplant Indigenous kavirajas, vaidyas, and hakims.\textsuperscript{18} Colonial medicine had distinctive limitations that frequently prevented it from being harnessed as an all-powerful imperial tool of domination. Arnold’s perceived ‘battlegrounds’ of Africa and India are often falsely made out to be a form of mediciocracy.\textsuperscript{19} Yet, potential exists to dispute historical portrayals of colonial medicine as highly interventionist and effective.

Although the intensity of the colonial battleground has been doubted, Western medicine undoubtedly paved the way for racial battle lines to be drawn from medical segregation and racial determinants of health. Waltrund Ernst argues that medicine aided the development of racial hierarchies by generating scientific justifications of racism.\textsuperscript{20} Some medical professionals viewed epidemics as a ‘colonial malevolence’ unleashed against a ‘troublesome race’.\textsuperscript{21} Medical practitioners like John Atkins in the eighteenth century argued that the dark complexion of Africans marked out a ‘constitutional immaturity’ prone to disease.\textsuperscript{22} Similarly, medical professionals declared the Māori constitution ‘fundamentally rotten’.\textsuperscript{23} In Bengal, colonial authorities perceived malaria amongst Indians to be a sign of racial decay.\textsuperscript{24} Race became a source of disease in itself, leading to the expression of social Darwinism and segregationist theory.\textsuperscript{25} Bashford posits that quarantine zones in Australian epidemics symbolised more than temporary borders between the diseased and the healthy.\textsuperscript{26} Cordon sanitaires simultaneously represented the population’s racial identity.\textsuperscript{27} In the 1940s, Aboriginal people were prohibited from travelling below the ‘leper line’.\textsuperscript{28} Therefore,
Western medicine was part of a system of colonial race management and hierarchy. Western medicine’s critical racialised battleground in the colonies is undoubted, yet there is more complexity to this historical narrative.

Western medicine facilitated the emergence of a racial battleground, however historical realities are often more nuanced than the simplistic binary of colonised versus coloniser would allow. The colonial construction of race as a medical determinant was denied by some colonisers. Physicians like Ronald Ross, among other medical practitioners and colonial elite, did not believe that Bengali susceptibility to malaria was inherently racial. They highlighted the necessity of using medicine to combat environmental factors such as sanitation and poverty, to reveal that malaria was not racially determined. Furthermore, racial segregation was also promoted by the colonised. Bengalese epidemics heightened the fears of local Indians about Hinduism’s decline and the increasing population of Bengali Muslims. Hindu majorities in the Western and central districts of Bengal were afflicted by malaria, whilst Muslims in the eastern districts were largely unaffected. Bengali Hindus feared they were an imperilled race, a dynamic exacerbated by the partition of Bengal in 1905. In 1909 U. N Mukherji published A Dying Race detailing his fears of Hindu extinction and the consolidation of a ‘United Mohammedan world’. Hence, the racial battleground engendered by medicine was more intricate than a struggle between colonised and colonisers. Local populations also used medicine to heighten internal rifts. Indeed, Bengali Hindus saw Western practice not as something foisted upon them by colonial authorities, but desired medical intervention to assert their racial supremacy against Bengali Muslims. Colonised populations were not racially neutral. Although there is a historiographical tendency to depict the colonised as unwitting victims of medical tools of empire, such an approach denies local complexities.

Colonial medical practitioners and local populations were not monoliths that can be tidily placed into a false dichotomy of colonisers and colonised. Historian Michael Worboys claims that Western medicine was ‘monopolistic’ and colonial practitioners readily dismissed Indigenous medicine as ‘primitive’. However, this denies the complex nature of interactions between locals and Europeans. Medicine is too vast an enterprise to fit into a homogenous historical narrative. As historian Donald Denoon argues, to lump everyone together ‘might produce an average which no

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30 ibid.
31 ibid., p.137.
32 ibid.
33 ibid.
34 ibid.
35 ibid.
36 Worboys, p.256.
single community experienced’. Some colonials used non-Western medicine as they were aware that Indigenous physicians were more familiar with local diseases. In the Americas, the Spanish used cinchona, Peruvian bark, to reduce fevers. Likewise, the Portuguese in Western India frequently attended ‘pandito’ physicians who practised Ayurvedic medicine. Conversely, not all Indigenous people rejected Western medicine and its practitioners. Indeed, Vaughan argues that colonial medicine was not practised only on Africans, but also by Africans. Africans were significantly engaged in and articulated colonial medicine themselves so that in a sense, Vaughan claims, it became as African as any Shambaa healing system. Cultures should not be divided into two monolithic rivals, as colonial dynamics are often more interactive than historical narratives centred around a critical battleground allow.

Negating Arnold’s theory of a critical battleground between the colonised and coloniser, is the reality that colonial practitioners routinely adapted Western medicine to suit local complexities. Vaughan points out that whilst the practises of African healers are attributed with nuance and embedded in social circumstances, colonial medicine is assumed to align with theory. Hence, colonial medicine is merely ‘reduced to a theory of itself’. Yet, colonial medical theory often did not correspond with practice. Indeed, Surgeon-Colonel Harvey in nineteenth-century western India noted that an ‘alien government cannot offend the root-ideas of its subjects’. In New Zealand, Native Health nurses were highly cognisant of the respect that needed to be shown towards Māori customs and spiritual well-being. In a 1928 lecture, Nurse Jarrett stressed the need of understanding tapu and karakia when attending the sick. The Native Health Nurses scheme did not fit neatly into a model of subjugated Indigenous population and Western medical oppressors and was not always an attempt to impose uncompromising Western values on Māori at the expense of their own traditional cultural values. In the nursing journal Kai Tiaki, one nurse described the flowers and rock-melon she received from Māori and her welcome as ‘an old friend’. Native Health nurses were not one

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37 Denoon, p.2.
39 ibid.
40 ibid.
42 ibid.
44 ibid.
45 Arnold, Colonizing the Body, p.245.
47 ibid.
48 ibid., p.84.
49 ibid., p.91.
dimensional agents of the colonial state. Similarly, in India, not all colonial medics articulated the imperial ambition to eradicate caste and superstition. Rather, they established caste hospitals and often made room for traditional Vaidya and hakim healers. Western medicine could not be blindly enforced on Indigenous populations without adaptation to local circumstances. Colonial authorities were aware of the necessity of cultural sensitivity and accommodation of resistance. To acquire footholds in the colonies, Western medicine frequently had to display cultural sensitivity, blunting the force of Arnold’s accusations of a critical battleground.

Western medicine was a not top-down process solely determined by the colonial agenda, as local agency meant medicine often transcended its colonial roots. MacLeod and Lewis, in advancing their theory of Western medicine as a ‘tool of empire’ overlook the complex process of negotiation at the local level. Absorbed in Foucauldian theories of social control, they portray an abstract top-down system-based account of Western medicine that fails to grasp the complexity of colonial realities. In contrast, historians Ryan Johnson and Amna Khalid point out the agency of intermediary and subordinate workers who were influential in the implementation of medical policy. In New Zealand, traditional Māori healers were outlawed by the 1907 Tohunga Suppression Act. However, Native health nurses frequently worked alongside tohunga. Their accounts depict that tohunga remained commonplace in Māori communities. Indigenous agency constantly forced Western medicine to negotiate with locals to make its way through colonial societies. In India, the Bengali bhadralok sought to eradicate malaria themselves through the implementation of village sanitation and distribution of quinine. The bhadralok asserted a class agenda to acquire control over poor villagers and educate them away from ‘prejudice, ignorance and apathy’. The provision of hygiene and disease education strengthened bhadralok claims to leadership over Bengal. Hence, local populations often possessed their own agenda and used Western medicine for their own advantage. Indeed, Indian urban elites ‘hijacked’ Western medicine through Indigenous networks of patronage, to aid the development of hospitals and enhance their social standing. Colonial medicine was not

50 ibid., p.99.
51 Arnold, Colonizing the Body, p.294.
52 ibid.
55 Bryder, p.96.
56 ibid.
57 ibid.
59 ibid.
60 ibid.
61 Arnold, Colonizing the Body, p.268.
confined to colonial hands, but subject to the agency of local populations. Local responses demonstrate that Western medicine was much more than mere subjugation.

The active participation of local inhabitants on Western medicine shows that Indigenous medicine did not fall in the colonial battlefield and lived to fight another day. Colonisation undermined traditional healing systems, but did not break them. In Tanzania’s Shambaa kingdom, traditional healers were legitimated by royals at the highest level of political authority. African healing systems did not cease to exist due to colonial medicine’s arrival as they were deeply incorporated into societal structures. Diseases were treated diversely in a feat of ‘medical pluralism’. Locals changed approaches between ritual purification, herbal medicines, hospital visits, and penicillin injections. Indigenous medicine was involved in a constant process of re-invention. Africans retained a vast degree of control over their health. Western medicine, Vaughan concludes, offered little ‘conceptual challenge’ to African healing. African healing systems served to indigenise effective elements of Western medical practise, rather than be destroyed by it. As Amna Khalid argues, there is more to medicine than the discourse of colonial hegemony. The battleground of colonial medicine posited by Arnold perhaps neglects important continuities apparent in Indigenous medicine, which was not always supplanted by its Western rival.

Arnold’s claim that Western medicine became a critical battleground between colonised and coloniser oversimplifies colonial dynamics. Western medicine was an instrument of imperial policy, which permitted racialized conceptions of diseases. However, colonial interactions were more elaborate than a simple battleground of contestation in the furtherance of Western authority. Western medicine could be ineffective and outnumbered. Furthermore, the colonised and coloniser are not monolithic rivals. Both were capable of interaction and adaptation to suit local complexities. This local agency meant that Western medicine was dictated by on-the-ground actors, rather than the imperial agenda. Superficial dichotomies of colonised and coloniser fail to appreciate the complexity of historical realities and human interaction. Western medicine was certainly politicised and racialised, but beyond Arnold’s battleground contestation was negotiation.

63 ibid., p.290.
64 ibid., p.284.
65 ibid.
66 Vaughan, Curing their Ills, p.19.
67 ibid.
68 ibid., p.18.
69 Khalid and Johnson, p.5.
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‘...the trouble with commemorative history is that, if those distant people were saying unwelcome things, it is all too tempting to put words in their mouths’. (Roy Foster). Discuss Foster’s observation in relation to remembrances of 1798.

Luca Basso

To assess Roy Foster’s observation about the manipulation of commemorative history is to delve into the convoluted array of competing agendas and motivations that is post-rebellion Ireland, which brings a host of historiographical difficulties. The most effective approach is to look at how certain attitudes were adopted in the remembrances of 1798 by different groups and individuals. This affords greater insight into the ideological and societal tensions that existed at the time of the rebellion, and how these tensions manifested into commemorative agendas. Ultimately, it appears that Foster’s observation is a mostly accurate characterisation of how remembrances of 1798 were moulded to fit certain perspectives. While there may not be many instances in which words were ‘put into mouths’, the sentiment is certainly demonstrated via the repackaging of historical events whether through deliberate selectiveness or pure omission. The nationalist movement provides a fitting starting point; the politicisation and repackaging observed in the 1898 commemorative discourse demonstrates what Virginia Crossman describes as the ‘propagandist traditions’ of the United Irishmen.¹ Nationalist commemoration can be further understood by applying a historiographical framework suggested by Guy Beiner: that of the ‘social memory’.² By looking at how the commemorative landscape of oral tradition, vernacular history, and folk memory compares to the discourse of the centenary, we are

provided a more populist angle on the distortion of commemorations described by Foster. A similar methodology can be applied to Loyalist commemoration, which can be analysed via the mechanics of ‘social forgetting’ described by Beiner. More generally, the suppression of certain ‘unwelcome things’ in the commemorative discourse can be seen in the case of the Catholic Church, which further illustrates Foster’s observation. Finally, the emergence of martyrs and revolutionary heroes like Wolfe Tone and Father Murphy demonstrates the wielding of historical memory to both celebrate and diminish individuals. The use of this type of ‘heroic’ commemoration in order to envision a role for nationalist women demonstrates that Foster’s observation not only includes the retroactive manipulation of the mainstream Nationalists and Loyalists, but a form of forward-looking discourse as well.

Despite being the originators of the 1798 uprising, the United Irishmen and the nationalist tradition that followed on from them were no exception to Foster’s observation about manipulated commemoration. The movement began to gain momentum in 1795 with a partnership between Presbyterian radicals and aggrieved members of the working class. After British pushback that suspended the Insurrection and Habeas Corpus Acts in 1796, tensions were set to boil over in East Ulster and Wexford. The combination of apparently-sectarian animosity in Wexford and the force with which the British quelled the rebellion resulted in a stiff orthodoxy within nineteenth century historiography of the conflict, made no less complicated by the relative sparsity of rebel historical records. Foster notes a general tendency of traditional nationalist historiography to ‘play down’ the role of the French and the nature of pre-existing agrarian conflict in order to assert 1798 as an unequivocal struggle for freedom. The contentiousness of this interpretation has been argued by pointing to specific historiographical tendencies; post-revisionist historians like Louis Cullen were critical of attempts to exaggerate the role of intercommunal and agrarian strife in order to bring sectarian impulses to the forefront. With this contentiousness in mind it becomes apparent that the 1898 commemorations for the nationalists provided an opportunity to metaphorically ‘put words in mouths’, and co-opt remembrances in order to rekindle the relevance of United Irish tenets of ‘liberty, equality, and fraternity’. What began in literary societies eventually became highly politicised, and figures like W.B. Yeats involved with Fenian cultural societies like the Young Ireland League were eventually overtaken by the more extreme political force of the constitutionalist wing.

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4 ibid., p.70.
5 ibid.
6 ibid., p.74.
9 Foster, p.75.
Timothy O’Keefe describes how Nationalist Ireland was gifted a platform for rhetoric due to consistent newspaper coverage, which was undoubtedly capitalised upon to advance specific historical interpretations. The ‘standard’ nationalist interpretation put words (and motives) in mouths by attributing the 1798 rising to the Loyalist persecution of the Catholic peasantry, thus placing responsibility upon the British government. The IRB wing of the nationalists provided a variation on this perspective, which prioritised the memory of revolutionary men like Wolfe Tone. This entailed a ‘ritualistic’ reiteration of motifs regarding their republicanism, efforts in pitting foreign forces against the British, and self-sacrifice for the cause. The endurance of mainstream nationalist commemoration beyond the centenary, in a form stripped of revolutionary sentiment, once again demonstrates how history can be commandeered in order to produce favourable interpretations. Foster describes how Wexford sectarianism was generally ‘skimmed over’, and even atrocities like the Scullabogue barn massacre were repainted by historians like Ruan O’Donnell, who suggested that ‘great discipline and discrimination’ was used to separate the loyalists from the citizenry before proceeding. Ultimately, the repackaging of history in order to remove ‘unwelcome’ attributes is primarily used to further an agenda, and so we can see why current attempts to negotiate an inclusive political structure with Britain may require a carefully revised approach to Nationalist commemoration.

For a deeper understanding of the mechanics by which nationalist commemorative history allows a reinterpretation of the past, Beiner’s approach to ‘collective memory’ posits that identifying the trends, rituals, and popular literature surrounding commemoration allows for an examination of social memory and its manipulation. This requires movement away from the earlier discussion of the centennial at the level of the nationalist elite, towards what Ian McBride describes as a hidden ‘vernacular historiography’ of 1798 that draws from sources rooted in local tradition. The dichotomy between the two forms of memory appears to present social memory as an ‘antidote’ of sorts to the manipulation of public commemorative history. One such example can be found in the folklore around the ‘Year of the French’, which created oral traditions such as laments — expressions of remembrance tied to grief in specific regions. This kind of folk memory is described by Beiner as a form of private memory that conflicts with elite attempts to ‘reshape public

11 ibid., p.85.
12 ibid.
13 Foster, p.89.
16 Beiner, ‘Negotiations of Memory’, p.66.
memory into legitimising myths promoting hegemonic values of uniformity and stability’. Another aspect of social memory that provides a potential form of remembrance ‘untainted’ by the imposition of the nationalist elite is the cultural geography described by John Brinckerhoff Jackson as the ‘vernacular landscape’, involving the commemorative ties towards locales and their communities. Examples include noted sites of agitation, the taxonomy of place-names corresponding to historical events, and even spontaneous acts of commemoration like the erection of makeshift memorials to mark rebel graves. While these forms of folklore memory often resulted in the rejection of external versions of history that did not correspond with the community’s popular remembrance, it appears that it must still be seen as a component of commemorative discourse, rather than a rebuttal of it. Beiner himself concedes that it is more beneficial to envision a dialogue between official commemoration and folklore, in light of the fact that memorialisation in general is subject to modification by individuals, who ‘must be able to recognise their own pasts in the group’s shared memory’. Another example of social memory and discourse being susceptible to the same mechanics of manipulation seen at the level of the nationalist elite is the manner in which popular literature ‘repackaged’ certain themes through commemorative discourse. Eileen Reilly describes how Nationalist novels and poetry in the late nineteenth century often contained geographic references to Wexford, in line with Jackson’s theory of the vernacular landscape, and promulgated themes of martyrdom and physical resistance to British rule. Despite this, historian Drucilla Mims Wall points out that Enniscorthy folk memory appeared to show a dichotomy between ‘purist’ representations of history, and those focussed on making them ‘visitor-friendly’. It appears that while social memory provides a unique vantage point from which to view the broader picture of commemorative historiography, it is not exempt from the forms of historical repackaging described by Foster as ‘putting words in mouths’.

The natural counterpoint to an analysis of Nationalist commemoration is one that explores how Loyalist historiography has developed over time; an evaluation that ultimately appears to suggest a similar level of ‘repackaging’ as described by Foster. McBride suggests that it would be remiss to paint loyalism as ‘knee-jerk patriotism’ manipulated by political elites, and so general loyalist hostility towards nationalist commemoration should be addressed alongside more specific Unionist

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17 ibid.
18 ibid.
19 ibid., p.64.
20 ibid.
21 ibid., p.67.
rhetoric arising around the first centenary. In 1898, Loyalism appeared to be bolstered by a Conservative-Unionist majority in the House of Commons, contributing to the notion of ‘Two Irelands’. This divide was observed throughout politics and culture, particularly in light of the perceived hand of Fenianism behind increasingly popular ‘Irish-Ireland’ endeavours like the Gaelic League. Unionist publications were influential in popularising the general Loyalist narrative that Nationalists maintained a dangerous revolutionary sentiment, despite having achieved the religious equality and tenant rights that their United Irish forebears were fighting for. McBride describes how the *Belfast Evening Telegraph* lambasted Nationalist commemorative speeches as exposing their true nature; ‘patriots stood forth as openly-avowed rebels’. Similarly, O’Keefe describes how Unionist attempts to play up the ‘incurable romanticism’ of nationalist commemoration involved overlooking the ideological grounding behind IRB pursuits, and instead pointing to the earliest aspirations of the United Irishmen as the primary motivation for current Nationalist MPs involved in commemorative activity. This is perhaps the most literal example of Foster’s observation in action, in which the act of ‘putting words in mouths’ allowed a connection to be drawn between 1798 discourse and the supposed motives of Irish Parliamentary Party members, in order to brand the centennial as a ‘cunning nationalist subversion’. Unionist endeavours to attribute rhetoric to the Nationalists not only encompassed the 1898 centenary remembrances, but also sectarian tensions at the time. The Orange Order saw figures like John Fowler claim that popery was the root of the disloyalty shown by the commemorations, which celebrated the ‘savagery of fiendish priests’ and ‘Romish Rabble’. In analysing the extent of this partisanship, historians like Peter Collins have suggested that Protestant attitudes towards the United Irishmen ‘thawed’ throughout the years. Nevertheless, Loyalist hostility towards Nationalist commemoration plainly exemplifies Foster’s observation about manipulated historical interpretations, particularly in the case of Unionist rhetoric.

Beiner’s discussion of social memory brings with it a corollary; the notion of ‘social forgetting’ by which remembrances are suppressed either from within the community itself, or via an external influence. While the Nationalists of 1898 were engaging in commemorative activity, the Orange Order’s treatment of 1798 can be construed as a means of forgetting. Dr Richard Rutledge

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24 McBride, p.400.
26 ibid.
27 McBride, p.409.
28 O’Keefe, p.71.
29 ibid.
30 ibid.
Kane describes how for some, the ‘terrible year’ would be best ‘forgotten and forgiven’. Just as a commemorative landscape exists which intimately ties commemoration to certain locales, Beiner discusses how a ‘collective amnesia’ about republican heritage was observed in Ulster; an act of ‘expurgation from social memory’. While this is the exact opposite of ‘putting words in mouths’, the act of suppressing historical remembrance is similarly intended to advance a given interpretation. In this case, Unionist historiography in Ulster focussed upon seventeenth-century events like the settler massacres that pitted Catholics against Protestants, purposefully neglecting the events of 1798. A more direct example of active forgetting within social memory is that of Loyalist Sir Richard Musgrave. He adapted the social memory of the rebellion by forgoing testimonies of ‘suffering loyalists that did not fully comply with his predetermined conclusions’, in favour of the familiar themes present in texts within Loyalist collective memory. Even in more modern recollections, like Lord Ernest Hamilton’s 1917 book *The Soul of Ulster*, the confining of the narrative to atavistic anti-Protestant violence has been described as ‘schematic and selective’. Despite these partisan efforts, it appears that social memory may contain some form of inbuilt countermeasure. Given the interplay between folklore memory and official commemoration discussed earlier, grand narratives imposed from above can be deflected via ‘bottom-up’ historical memory. Beiner discusses the ‘stubborn refusal’ to relinquish the bitterness felt around the French desertion at the time of surrender, despite attempts to inject an appreciation for their military efforts into Nationalist remembrances. This intrinsic fortitude of social memory is strengthened by individuals who actively attempt to ‘safeguard’ remembrances of 1798. Mary Ann McCracken is one such person whose attempts to employ ‘counter-forgetting’ in the papers has been argued as an act of guardianship over the memory of the United Irishmen. Ultimately, although it may be ‘tempting’ to repackage history as per Foster’s observation, this does not necessarily preclude an opposing interpretation from arising that may act as a counter-balance within the discourse.

The Catholic Church also adopted similar methods of ‘forgetting’, but perhaps for more practical reasons than advancing political standing. Given the Church hierarchy’s fear that they would experience a downfall along the lines of revolutionary France, figures like the Archbishop Troy of Dublin aimed to distance Catholics from the uprising in fear of arousing the kind of Loyalist hostility.

32 ibid., p.45.  
33 ibid.  
34 ibid., p.12.  
that led to the Wexford church burnings. In order to legitimise Catholic involvement, we can see a form of ‘putting words in mouths’ by way of retroactively justifying the Wexford rising as a defensive act from a ‘morally pure Catholic peasantry led by heroic priests’. This ‘faith and fatherland’ narrative countered the secular republican perspective, allowing a Catholic-friendly commemorative history to be conveniently disseminated around the centenary, where there was an unprecedented level of popular interest in the Church. In terms of the Church’s influence upon social memory, writers like Father Kavanagh exhibited a cunning selectivity in their remembrances by denouncing the sedition of ‘secret societies’ like the Fenians, while singling out the excellent character of a select few figures who joined them. For example, Kavanagh wrote on the universal heroism of priests persuasively enough that figures like Father John Murphy became cemented in the commemorative history of the Wexford rising. This is despite later historiography revealing that 74 of the 85 priests in the county either kept a very low profile, or were active loyalists. The distancing of the Church from revolutionary sectarianism while simultaneously establishing ‘heroic’ figures in commemorative history demonstrates precisely the form of selectivity towards 1798 remembrances that Foster describes.

At the same time, the Church’s decision to diminish Nationalist figures like Wolfe Tone in remembrances is understandable, given his opposition to popery and his sectarian tenets. This had a tangible result upon his legacy within Nationalist commemoration; the Tone Fund ended up losing membership and resources around the time of the centenary. In light of Foster’s observation, we can view this as an example of a historiographical attempt to undermine the significance of Nationalist martyrs. Another prominent example is that of the Loyalist author Mary Arthur, who manifestly condemned the reverence towards Robert Emmet because of his ‘silly, pretending, grandiloquent youth’. The attention paid towards revolutionary figures also allows another form of commemorative historiography to arise, in which principles of action are extracted in order to create a forward-looking agenda. The Shan von Vocht journal, while not explicitly feminist, saw authors Alice Milligan and Anna Johnston promoting a literary and cultural revival for republican women in a manner that was ‘hardly subsidiary’, all within the established

37 Collins, p.46.
38 ibid.
39 ibid.
41 ibid., p.140.
42 O'Keefe, p.81.
44 Reilly, p.121.
Nationalist literary framework. They envisioned a role for women in the years to come by employing a critical historical attitude towards the republicans of 1798, lambasting the partisanship of male activists who were ‘mainly concerned with fighting the interests of a faction’. The legacy of Wolfe Tone was also leveraged; the Shan von Vocht journal compared his commemorations to those of ‘Northern girls honouring the memory of Mary McCracken’. Rather than manipulating remembrances in order to improve political standing, this form of commemorative history employs historical criticism in order to create a plan for the future, based upon lessons of the past. Although the temptation to put ‘words in mouths’ is undoubtedly present, it appears that unwelcome things in history may provide a means to reflect upon the present, and look to the future.

Foster’s observation about commemorative history can be understood via a breadth of historiographical approaches. While words have not always been literally ‘put in mouths’, the selectivity of certain historical accounts can be seen as a metaphorical ‘taping shut’ of the mouth to prevent unwelcome realities from coming to light. A diverse historiographical approach, as per Beiner’s discussion of social memory, lifts up perspectives that can neutralise the historical manipulation of the elite, which continually threatens to force a narrative from above.

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45 Crossman, p.131.
46 Ibid., p.132.
47 Ibid.
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‘A Tame Affair’ – Celebrating Guy Fawkes at the Edge of Empire: Aotearoa/New Zealand 1860-1945

Sue Mercer

On November 5 1858, young English settler John Leighton was on board the sailing ship, *Kinnaird*, several months away from his Wellington destination, and in sight of ‘an immense’ and rather alarming coral reef off the coast of Africa. As darkness fell, and they lost sight of the ‘ugly lee shore’, the crew kept up ‘the old charter’ by dressing up ‘a real live’ Guy Fawkes and parading him around the ship with a lantern and a ‘stocking leg stuffed full of rags’. 1 After a month at sea, this was a welcome ‘evening’s amusement’, one served with songs and ‘preserved potatoes’. 2 Four years later, two more young Englishmen recorded their November 5 celebrations on board the *William Miles*, one of them noting the imperial reach of the day, ‘this being Guy Fox day on board ship as well as on land all around the world’. 3 On this voyage the celebration was led not just by the crew, but ‘the whole of the male passengers’. 4 They planned to stick their ‘first rater’ guy into a barrel of tar, set it on fire and then throw it overboard. 5 They were anticipating ‘a grant sight’, until their scheme was thwarted by the ‘crusty hilltempered old captain’ who objected to the Guy being an obvious parody of the unpopular ship’s doctor. 6

In this way, crew and British settlers transported the Guy Fawkes traditions of rowdy parades, effigies, fire, and charivari across the ocean to New Zealand, where the day is still part of the festive

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1 *Opunake Times*, 17 October 1947, p.3.
2 ibid.
3 James Morris, *Diary ‘William Miles’*, Accession # 2012.37.1., Albertland Heritage Museum, p.18; *New Zealander (NZer)*, 6 December 1862, p.5.
calendar. However, New Zealand cultural historians to date have generally preferred to focus instead on local commemorative holidays such as Anzac and Waitangi Day and their relationship to matters of national identity. \(^7\) Alison Clarke has also explored the importance of the seasonal Christian calendar in the lives of New Zealand colonists and others have looked at the role of annual events like Burns Night in maintaining ethnic settler identities. \(^8\) Guy Fawkes Day however, remains a largely unexplored oddity, a remnant of British Protestant identity, which regularly prompts questions in the press about its continued observance. \(^9\) Using newspaper reports of Guy Fawkes celebrations between 1850 and 1950, this essay attempts to understand why the tradition persisted in settler New Zealand. It explores how New Zealand’s settler community celebrated the foiled Gunpowder Plot, the cultural purposes of the day, and its changing meanings. Describing first the low-key nature of early celebrations, it argues that November 5 continued to be remembered initially because of settler nostalgia, and then as an opportunity for local excitement among the small boys of the colony. Then by applying Eric Hobsbawm’s insights about the ‘invention of tradition’, it argues that the persistent debate about the celebration’s relevance to the new colony reflected the absence of any shared sense of meaning for the tradition. \(^10\) It suggests that, as the middle class took ownership of the event at the beginning of the twentieth century, the tradition’s ‘symbolic ambivalence’ allowed it to become one of the cultural practices of recolonisation, reintegrating the colonial periphery more tightly to the metropole via a shared sense of Britishness. \(^11\) This essay concludes that this ‘Britishness’ resuscitated the tradition and that by the end of the Second World War its celebration represented a return to the shared ‘normal life’ of the British Empire and its seasonal calendar.

From the outset, New Zealand celebrations were a ‘tame affair’ in comparison to those which many of the early settlers from southern England would have seen. \(^12\) One writing in 1878 recalled ‘bands of rough men and ill taught boys’ and ‘the dread of injury … if their rude demands (were) not complied with’. \(^13\) In the 1850s, in England, Guy Fawkes Day was a rowdy working-class occasion, in contrast to the bonfire celebrations of the late eighteenth century, where ‘elites and plebeians’ had

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12 Wellington Independent (WI), 6 November 1869, p.4.

13 Colonist (C), 5 November 1878, p.3.
gathered around a fire for food, drink, and fireworks, after official processions. By the mid-nineteenth century however, November 5 had become a vehicle for expressing the revived anti-Catholic feelings surging after an unpopular papal edict reintroducing a Roman Catholic hierarchy to England. New Zealand newspapers of the time carried reports of these Guy Fawkes demonstrations in which effigies of Cardinal Wiseman, and the Pope were burnt and the Protestant identity of Britain was celebrated by street parades, fireworks, and the national anthem.

However, aside from news of English riots, and the occasional use of Guy Fawkes as a trope to criticise local politicians, any local celebration of the day went largely unremarked upon in the New Zealand press during the 1850s and 1860s. The form they took can therefore only be guessed at. Fireworks were available in the colony from the 1840s and already used to celebrate a variety of settler anniversaries and days with imperial connections. For example, in February 1856, two thousand people attended a ‘brilliant display’ in Nelson to celebrate the fall of Sebastopol; a year later the Queen’s Birthday was celebrated with a fireworks display and a cricketers’ ball; and the Prince of Wales’s birthday on 9 November was a regular occasion for fireworks in the 1860s. There were also press reports in this period of youths charged with letting off fireworks and of the injuries they sustained. Fireworks may therefore have been used on a small scale along with other traditional elements of the day such as bonfires and effigies. Both these cultural forms had been transported to the colony and, although not reported in relation to November 5, they were clearly part of the settlers’ ‘vocabulary of celebration’. For example, as early as 1845 there were reports of ‘illuminations in Wellington’ honouring ‘the joyful news of Captain Fitzroy’s recall’ and descriptions of the Governor’s effigy being tossed on a bonfire to express settler jubilation at his departure.

The fact that few early November 5 celebrations were reported is explainable. Settler numbers were still small and the 1860s was a period of war, depression, and high settler mobility. This does not mean however, that the date was not remembered in the new colony. November 5 had been a popular date in the English calendar for nearly 250 years, and its early celebration in New Zealand among a largely Protestant settler community may therefore have been unremarkable. For example in 1865, the *Otago Daily Times* noted briefly that ‘we have had two holidays this week… Guy Fawkes

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15 Sharpe, p.149.
16 WI, 23 April 1851, p.4.
17 For example: ‘Governor Browne will immortalize himself as the antipodean Guy Fawkes’, *Lyttelton Times* (LT), 14 November 1860, p.5.
21 NE, 25 October, 1845, p.135.
Day and...the birthday of the Prince of Wales. The banks and government offices were closed’.  

That celebrations did continue to take place is clear from more newsworthy moments such as one altercation in 1868 when a woman was charged with using threatening language to another after her little boy complained that she ‘had spoiled his Guy Fawkes’. It is likely though that ‘the tame’ nature of what reporters saw here in contrast to their memories of England is what inspired an emerging and persistent theme in the press that this tradition would die out in the colony. In 1869, one noted that it was ‘not likely to become a colonial institution’ because it ‘loses its zest and fervour by being transplanted’. In Wellington in 1870, the sight of ‘a few miserable’ Guys led another to suggest that ‘ere long Guy Fawkes Day will probably be remembered as an institution of the past’. Despite these predictions, guys continued to be paraded ‘as usual’, probably because the tradition was a site for settler nostalgia. In 1851, a letter to the editor remembered ‘the felicity’ of observing the day and of maintaining ‘the youthful reminiscences of the fathers abroad’. By the late 1860s it was being observed by ‘patriotic sparks’, ‘residents who cherish old associations’, and those cheered by the blaze of bonfires on Wellington’s hills because of its association with ‘the customs of the old country’. Alongside these sporadic celebrations, elements of British print and theatre culture featuring Guy Fawkes as the central character in this festival were also starting to appear in the colony. Ainsworth’s popular novel The Gunpowder Treason. An Historical Romance was on sale in Dunedin from 1865 and in 1867 Dunedin’s Princess Theatre staged a burlesque production of Guy Fawkes, albeit to rather thin crowds and mixed reviews.  

What failed to take root in the colonial celebrations however was the ‘anti popery’ of the English event. The reason for this lies in the local context, and the absence of factors behind the flare up of anti-Catholicism in mid-nineteenth century Britain and the role of Guy Fawkes celebrations in that flare up. The foiling of the Gunpowder Plot in 1605, along with William of Orange’s arrival to overthrow the Catholic monarch James II on the same date in 1688, had cemented November 5 in Britain’s popular imagination as a moment of Protestant victory. Guy Fawkes celebrations of the ‘glorious fifth’ affirmed both this victory and Protestant identity, and from the eighteenth century this ‘intolerant Protestantism’ became the cultural glue uniting all classes of English, Scots, and Welsh as British, and ‘Britishness’ firmly associated with liberty from the putative corruption and anti-
democratic character of the papal hierarchy.\textsuperscript{30} This rhetoric of ‘no popery’ was synonymous with popular freedoms and provided a powerful trope for those seeking to mobilise popular action against both political and religious targets, painting them as un-British, and supporters as patriotic. In this way, as Robert Storch demonstrates, ‘arcane upper class quarrels could easily be transmitted to crowds’ and become a trigger or excuse for popular action.\textsuperscript{31}

This appears to be the explanation for much of the violence in the Guy Fawkes celebrations of the time, few of which actually targeted Catholics or Catholic churches.\textsuperscript{32} A number of factors drove Protestant agitators in the mid-nineteenth century. These included a backlash to the 1829 Catholic Emancipation Act, dissenter anger at increasing ritualism in the High Anglican church, and local social tensions arising from increased Irish immigration.\textsuperscript{33} The ensuing riotous behaviour of the 1850s Guy Fawkes celebrations has also been attributed to a social context of increased urbanisation, and widespread popular protest.\textsuperscript{34} In Denis Paz’s view however, for the working-class participants, these events were largely ‘void of ideological content’.\textsuperscript{35} The entertainment value of the street riot was an equally important factor. This sport of anti-Catholicism was initially under middle class or gentry patronage, with parishes, municipal bodies, and elites financing the performative rage and theatre of protest in the streets by providing food, drink, and fuel. However, as concerns grew over the damage and destruction associated with these celebrations, they withdrew support and local gangs of ‘bonfire boys’ took over the organisation.\textsuperscript{36}

The same patronage did not exist in New Zealand, and nor did any widespread Protestant agitation develop. This is largely because the surge of British immigration in the 1870s occurred as anti-Catholic sentiment was weakening in Britain.\textsuperscript{37} Most settlers had arrived after the 1859 removal of the Guy Fawkes commemorative prayer from the Anglican prayer book and the statute requiring parish commemoration of the day. This is not to say that sectarianism did not exist. There is evidence of some lingering animosities. In one early tragic Auckland episode, an eight-year-old girl was attacked by a group of young ‘Garibaldians’ protesting the burning of a papal effigy outside a Devonport butcher’s shop.\textsuperscript{38} When asked if she was ‘for the pope or Garibaldi’, she responded she was ‘for neither’, and then died after receiving several blows to her head.\textsuperscript{39}

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\textsuperscript{31} Storch, 1982, p.4.
\textsuperscript{32} Paz, p.228.
\textsuperscript{33} ibid., p.226.
\textsuperscript{34} ibid., p.225.
\textsuperscript{35} ibid., p.247.
\textsuperscript{36} Paz, p.243.
\textsuperscript{38} DSC, 28 March 1870, p.4.
\textsuperscript{39} ibid.
\end{flushright}
The general consensus among New Zealand historians is that sectarianism was mild, sporadic, and limited, particularly in the nineteenth century.\(^{40}\) The press of the time praised the removal of ‘those blots from the prayer book’ and on the three-hundredth anniversary of Guy Fawkes, the Protestant church hierarchy directed churches not to make ‘anti-Rome’ a theme in any sermons.\(^{41}\) The Orange Order, a Protestant organisation which traditionally commemorated November 5 as a sacred date, also generally conducted their services in private. As Gerard Horn has demonstrated, the Order’s main focus was sociability and support for its members, rather than political agitation.\(^{42}\) Any overt attempts at sectarianism made them the brunt of press derision and one paper called them ‘arrant two legged donkeys’ for celebrating the day.\(^{43}\) On the few occasions where Catholics and Orangemen confronted each other, the situations were quickly defused.\(^{44}\) Anti-Catholicism in New Zealand was not therefore hitched to any widespread populist movement or used to advance the interests of either gentry or middle-class political elites. It had no powerful sponsors. The one exception to this was the ‘strange spasm of sectarian antagonism’ that arose between 1917 and 1922 when the Protestant Political Association (PPA) did rally support for its anti-Catholic platform, and assisted in the election of William Massey.\(^{45}\) Although closely connected to the Orange Order, the PPA never mobilised these sentiments via public Guy Fawkes celebrations. Instead, denominational antipathies tended to play out in pulpits, in attitudes towards secular education, and behind closed doors in the private prejudices of families.

As a result an anti-Catholic version of Britishness was not reproduced here via Guy Fawkes celebrations. There was a sense that ‘gunpowder treason should be forgot’ and that a ‘harmonious union’ between religious denominations should take its place.\(^{46}\) Unmoored from sectarian tensions, November 5 became a ‘small boys’ day’, remembered in the colony by the ‘rising generation’, who would carry the meanings of the day forward.\(^{47}\) What, however, were these meanings? Hobsbawm has argued that the nineteenth century saw the invention of a number of traditions which served the purpose of connecting communities to an imagined past.\(^{48}\) These in turn enabled the formation of shared social identities. This suggests that to be effective, the ritualised practices of any tradition requires some consensus around these shared values and identities.\(^{49}\) Without this, the discourse

\(^{40}\) Belich, 2001, p.222.; King, p.177.
\(^{41}\) Hawkes Bay Herald, 4 December 1858, p.3.; LT, 30 October 1905, p.4.
\(^{43}\) Tuapeka Times (TT), 8 November 1873, p.2.
\(^{44}\) Westport Times, 18 November 1871, p.2.
\(^{45}\) Belich, 2001, p.113.
\(^{46}\) WI, 6 November 1869, p.4.
\(^{47}\) TT, 6 November 1869, p.3.
\(^{48}\) Hobsbawm, p.1.
\(^{49}\) ibid.
around them becomes uneasy. For example, as Christian holidays such as Christmas and Easter have become increasingly severed from their religious roots, concern about commercialisation and a lack of meaning has appeared. Similarly the ever-increasing popularity of a holiday like Anzac Day has arguably been secured by its association with national identity, sacrifice, and shared loss.

For Guy Fawkes Day, discursive unease in the mid to late nineteenth century related to its relevance, particularly the relevance of an old tradition to a new colony. For some, the day represented ‘a peculiar form of loyalty’ and colonists looked ‘forward to events which it may be worthwhile to commemorate’, such as settler anniversaries like Arthur Wakefield’s 1841 arrival on the *Whitby* or imperial victories such as the Crimean Battle of Inkerman.  

Perhaps too because of its increasing association with small boys, newspapers began to describe the day as ‘silly’ and ‘senseless’, mocking the ‘absurdity of old rites’. There was a sense that because the event was dying out ‘at Home’ as well, that the date no longer served as an effective shared commemorative space with the metropole. However the main reason that there was little consensus about the day’s meaning was that the celebrations were local and small in scale. What these meant to their participants is hard to generalise, but in the absence of any municipal organisation, the primary meaning of the nineteenth-century event in New Zealand was most likely fun, excitement, and cheap entertainment.

Even so, there was a ritual element to the day, a set of British practices, initially seeded around the colony by those repeating their own memories and increasingly by others imitating those which they saw in their neighbourhoods each year. First the boys collected material to make a guy in the days before November 5. Towards the end of the century this New Zealand ‘guy’ appears to have been a somewhat miserable creation made from old clothes, stuffed with ‘shavings ... purloined or begged’ or ‘potato peelings if properly dried’, and representative of nothing beyond the ‘universal villain’. (Figure 1.) This reflects the fact that there was seldom an adult purse funding the creation. After making their guy, the boys set out very early on the morning of the fifth, often before daybreak, waking their neighbourhoods calling for donations and chanting various rhymes. The flavour of which were either those of the junior lynch mob: ‘Guy Fawkes! Guy! Stick him up high. Hang in to a lamp post and there let him die’ or later the patriotic, ‘Please to remember the fifth of November, gunpowder treason and plot… a stick and a stake for King Edward’s sake, halloa boys, halloa boys, God save the king’. The most common cry though was the call for ‘a penny for the guy’. Children

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50 WHD, 5 November 1869, p.2.; EP, 6 November 1868, p.2.; C, 5 November 1878, p.3.; DT, 5 November 1891, p.2.
51 NZH, November 6 1874, p.2.; *Waikato Times*, 4 November 1875, p.2.
52 *Daily Telegraph* (DT), 4 November 1893, p.2.
53 Hutton, p.402.
54 *Nelson Evening Mail*, 10 November 1877, p.4.; NZH, 7 November 1894, p.3.
55 TT, 12 November 1904, p.3.; Hutton, p.404.
56 *New Zealand Times*, 6 November 1906, p.6.; *Dominion* (D), 6 November 1909, p.4.
57 *Christchurch Star* (CS), 4 November 1933, p.29.; *Paihiatua Herald* (PH), 5 November 1904, p.5.
rattled old tobacco and cocoa tins at people passing, using their collection of coins to then buy crackers and squibs, which they let off during the day or at night around small fires lit in vacant lots, on hillsides, or in Auckland on the harbour reclamations.\footnote{NZH, 6 November 1891, p.5.}

Fig. 1. Rival Fox's at Ohingaiti, c.1900, National Library, 1/2-038752-G.

This annual repetition of the ritual elements of the day was important because it normalised the practice. However, by the beginning of the twentieth century it was still unclear to commentators whether the day had any useful future within the colony. There was as yet only an ‘embryonic collective identity’ with Britain.\footnote{Belich, 2001, p.78.} That began to change when New Zealand troops took part in the South African War in 1899, and ‘Paul Kruger the Pig’, a ‘limp helpless figure in an aged tail coat and an antique tall hat’ appeared on bonfires, thereby resuscitating the explicitly patriotic in the day’s symbolism.\footnote{Wairarapa Daily Times, 7 November 1899, p.3.; CS, 5 November 1900, p.3.} Importantly this also suggests the return of adult involvement in the day, both in the management and message of the bonfire. As the English settler population increased in the colony, the tradition of Guy Fawkes also began to offer a connection not to the events of 1605 or to the civic disorder of England’s industrialising urban centres, but to a rural idyll, where ‘the tradition holds good and annually …is celebrated in ancient form’.\footnote{Patea Mail, 5 November 1906, p.2.} At the heart of this imagined past was the rural bonfire where the ‘preparation of the big stack of wood is participated in by the elders of the village
while the honour of lighting it is eagerly sought after’. This romanticised version of Guy Fawkes written in 1906 extended the raw patriotic Britishness of Kruger burning into a sacred rite in which adults participate. It may relate in part to the kind of arcadian sentiment and urban anxiety that Miles Fairburn and others have identified in New Zealand society around the turn of the century. However, it also suggests that a reverence for social order and benevolent hierarchies like the ‘elders’ of the bonfire was part of the attraction of tradition, and an aspect of Britishness of the time.

The arrival of World War I further boosted the popularity and the patriotic content of the Guy Fawkes celebrations. Not only did the number of community-led fireworks displays and bonfires increase, the day also became a fundraising event across the country with bands of ‘British boys collecting in the name of Guy Fawkes and the glory and honour of the British Empire’. Their Guy collections were donated to the Belgian Fund, Ladies Committees organised fancy dress balls and suppers, and the Kaiser became the Guy. This community embrace of the day continued and grew into the 1920s, where it became part of the wider entertainment culture. Cabarets like the Dixieland and the Click Clack Club held Guy Fawkes nights with ‘illuminated guys placed around the room’, there were screenings of Guy Fawkes matinees in local picture halls, the social pages reported the ‘delightful’ little dances of hostesses in the wealthier city suburbs, and community organisations like Rotary and the RSA organised large public fireworks displays with competitions for the best Guy and masquerade dances. One in Christchurch was attended by 7,500 people. Another in Auckland illustrates how the imperial, the patriotic, and the local had become interwoven in the day’s celebrations. Along with a pageant re-enacting the Gunpowder Plot, the programme featured military displays, cabaret dancing, and a band playing ‘God Bless the Prince of Wales’. The fireworks included ‘Prince of Wales Feathers’ as well as ‘Pohutukawas in Bloom’ and the ‘Ngaruahoe Eruption’.

This inclusion of the local culture is an important factor in the history of the celebration in New Zealand and in Britain, and one that may explain its resilience. Although it was the only secular festival universally celebrated across Britain, its expression was localised, particularly in the form of the Guy. The Guy had emerged in the late eighteenth century as a specific object of derision identified with the historical Guido Fawkes, but by the nineteenth century it had become generic, a placeholder

62 ibid.
64 New Zealand Truth, 7 November 1914, p.8.
65 C, 6 November 1914, p.4.; Taihape Daily Times, 5 November 1915, p.4.; CS, 5 November 1914, p.6.
68 Auckland Star (AS), 5 November 1926, p.11.
for popular rage.\textsuperscript{69} One early colonial suggestion, that the ‘guy of the day’ should be the first Lord Mayor of Auckland, demonstrates how easily this flexibility both in form and message allowed the tradition to transfer.\textsuperscript{70} In addition, despite being a primarily English celebration, Guy Fawkes Day did not celebrate this Englishness in the same way that imported events like Burns Night or Saint Patrick’s Day reinforced different ethnic identities. Instead, it extended a pan-British identity beyond the metropole and into the colony, while also allowing ‘the young Dominionist… a style of his own in connection with this firmly established custom’.\textsuperscript{71} As Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich have pointed out, an imperial identity did not preclude a local one.\textsuperscript{72} Elements of the day therefore began to include a kind of cultural mash-up including Highland pipers, bowler hatted-Charlie Chaplins as Guys, and haka performances by Māori ‘dance parties’.\textsuperscript{73} All cultures were up for grabs in the spectacle of the day. Actual Māori participation however is mostly unrecorded in a century of newspaper coverage, until 1945, when one newspaper mused that visitors found it curious that ‘not only Europeans but Māoris’ kept the anniversary, evidence both of the increasing ubiquity of the tradition and the settler sense that Māori assimilation was entirely unremarkable.\textsuperscript{74}

The combination of the imperial and the local in the symbolism of Guy Fawkes Day occurred at the same time that the middle class began to own and domesticate the event, a trend that was also happening in Britain.\textsuperscript{75} Small boys needed to be kept off the street, property protected from fires, and the dangerous heart of the occasion tamed. Various legislation restricting the sale and release of fireworks was passed.\textsuperscript{76} Middle class attitudes to gender and race also became evident in the celebrations. Small boys were now increasingly supervised by men, ‘who take charge of the proceedings …to avoid all danger’.\textsuperscript{77} This male supervision added to the already heavily gendered nature of ‘a day more dear to the heart of the small boy than the fourteenth of February is to the maiden’.\textsuperscript{78} Although girls did participate, this was still a novelty attracting jeers about their unwelcome intrusion into the male world of ‘mischief’ and questions about ‘how far woman’s invasion of the male creature’s rights was going to extend’.\textsuperscript{79} The clandestine and rule-breaking quality to the day was sanctioned for boys, but inappropriate for girls. During World War I, for

\textsuperscript{69} Sharpe, p.138.
\textsuperscript{70} DSC, 4 November 1851, p3.
\textsuperscript{71} NZH, 6 November 1900, p.8.
\textsuperscript{73} Waipa Post, 6 November 1926, p.4.; NZH, 6 November 1922, p.8.; Hawera Star, 3 November 1926, p.5.
\textsuperscript{74} AS, 29 October 1945, p.4.
\textsuperscript{75} Storch, 1982, p.93.
\textsuperscript{76} For example: In 1906 the Sale of Explosives Act made it an offence to sell fireworks to anyone under the age of fifteen. Taranaki Daily News, 12 January 1907, p.2.
\textsuperscript{77} NZH, 4 November 1939, p.6.
\textsuperscript{78} Feilding Star, 5 November 1907, p.2.
\textsuperscript{79} ibid.; Timaru Herald, 9 November 1898, p.2.; Mataura Ensign, 15 November 1898, p.2.; PH, 9 November 1907, p.5.
example, while ‘teams of enthusiastic boys commanded by men’ were out at six in the morning to collect donations, the girls appear ‘in the care of chaperons’ selling ‘flowers and badges, their ‘white frocks’ in obvious contrast to the black faces and raggedy costumes of the boys of the period.  

(Figure 2.)

The boys’ appearance changed considerably from the 1900s to the 1930s. Initially, costume was confined to the dressing of the Guy, as Figure 1 illustrates, but by the 1920s, soot and charcoal-blackened faces had entered the event’s symbolic lexicon. In combination with ragged clothes these suggested the Victorian street urchin, waif, and Dickensian chimney sweep, all effective cues for middle class purses to open. (Figure 2.) As masks started to become a popular part of the costume, they also evoked the black and white minstrelsy popular in Victorian entertainment, the racialized tropes of the carnivalesque, and the racial stereotypes of the time, as Figure 3 demonstrates.  

Although sectarian intolerance towards other white settlers was deemed ‘un British’ by this time, bigoted racial attitudes towards non-whites remained firmly in place in the tradition. Guy Fawkes masks also afforded their wearers license to subvert social norms. Disguise freed participants from responsibility and is typical of events which Amitai Etzioni and Jared Bloom have called ‘tension management holidays’. These are moments when the normal rules of social conduct are suspended, and in the case of Guy Fawkes, gave participants ‘license to play with fire’. 

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80 D, 5 November 1917, p.7.
82 Freelance, 7 November 1903, p.22.
83 Reid, p.126.
84 Amitai Etzioni and Jared Bloom, We are What We Celebrate: Understanding Holidays and Rituals, New York, 2004, p.12.
85 NZT, 5 November 1923, p.3.
Interestingly, commentators at the time also noted that ‘a little collective excitement may …release inhibitions in a society that is strongly introvert[ed]’. As well as being an early instance of the view that New Zealanders were a somewhat passionless people, the idea that society requires the carnival to release otherwise dangerous energies reflects the influence of the middle class on the day. This influence was one of moderation and social control, in which danger was expressed symbolically through representations of the feared racial other, and rage was ritualised in the managed burning of the Guy. The latter became a centrepiece during both World Wars I and II when burning first the Kaiser, and then Hitler, connected the colony to a shared British enemy. (Figure 4.)

By the 1930s, the sense that ‘young Foxton is not behind thousands of other British boys throughout the Empire’ was firmly in place. Generally posed around rockets and pyrotechnic paraphernalia, clean cut, white, ‘British boys’ full of curiosity and attitudes of scientific interest had become the face of the day. (Figure 5.) The press now read the annual enactment of Guy Fawkes Day, not as nostalgia, but as a natural consequence of New Zealand’s membership in the wider imperial family where British boys imitated their cousins. This explicit sense of shared Britishness in the day’s celebration fits James Belich’s model of recolonisation, in which, after a period of explosive growth and a progressive sense of an emerging national identity, there followed a period of tightening when links between the metropole and the periphery were bound more closely via a shared sense of imperial identity. Fifty years earlier, the settlers on board the William Miles had believed that everyone across the globe celebrated the day, and within a generation this sense of the ‘naturalness’ of the British

86 AS, 29 October 1945, p.4.
87 Manawatu Herald, 5 November 1912, p.2.
seasonal calendar had become a feature of the new Dominion. The extent to which the Britishness of the tradition now hid in plain sight is evident from one final example. As Guy Fawkes celebrations resumed in 1946 after wartime restrictions, the men’s committee of a Lower Hutt Plunket Society organised ‘the lighting of a giant bonfire’. It was, according to the press, the signal that things were ‘getting back to normal’.

89 Hutt News, 13 November 1946, p.5.
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What are the advantages, and limitations, of attempting to understand Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War* in terms of the intentions of the author?

_Hanna Lu_

κτῆμα τε ἐς αἰτὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν ξύγκειται | My work is not a piece of writing designed to meet the taste of an immediate public, but was designed to last for ever.¹

— Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, translated by Rex Warner

…his work, like other great Greek writings, rises at times to a plane of simplification on which it seems to deal directly with certain of the basic forces that make life what it is.²

— John H. Finley Jr, *Thucydides*

Any statement, as I have sought to show, is inescapably the embodiment of a particular intention, on a particular occasion, addressed to the solution of a particular problem, and thus specific to its situation in a way that it can only be naive to try to transcend. The vital implication here is not merely that the classic texts cannot be concerned with our questions and answers, but only with their own.³

— Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’

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‘Intention’ is a slippery term. For this essay about the advantages and limitations of attempting to understand Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War* in terms of the intentions of the author, I am adopting Quentin Skinner’s formulation, which asks what an author was doing in writing a text. Skinner is a currently-practising intellectual historian who has published extensively on the political thought of early modern Europe. Thucydides wrote about one contemporary war, twenty-five centuries ago. Although Thucydides’ writing has since been used by scholars of philosophy, politics, military theory, and the classical period, I want to consider it here as a work of history and a piece of evidence about Thucydides’ world. If history is a story about the past remade with every telling, how can Skinner’s method of interpretation remake what has been told? To bring the two very different authors together productively, I structure my answer in three sections after making the necessary introductions: advantages, limitations, and evaluation. Throughout, I deal with themes such as the tension between transcendence and determination by context; the dimensions of historical study and what is contained in a text; genre and means of communication; the substance of intervention; and the relationship between a text and subsequent historiography. Thucydides and Skinner are the focuses of this essay, but it is also just as much about the historians who have written about Thucydides and Skinner — both because I defer to their expertise and because they offer useful foils against which I can emphasise the characteristics of this attempt at understanding. My interest is in what this interpretation does to Thucydidean historiography as well as what Thucydides was doing. By the end I hope to emerge with a better grasp of the *History*, intention, and the immense complexity of the task of interpretation.

Existing interpretations of Thucydides’ *History* have varied. The two that I would like to highlight here are those that centre Thucydides’ unique truthfulness, and his modernity. Philosophers and political scholars from the seventeenth century to the twentieth valued Thucydides for his messages about democracy, power, and empire, extracting a coherent system of thought about human nature.⁴ For some this came in the form of applicable maxims.⁵ For Thomas Hobbes, Thucydides’ first English translator, the instructive power of the *History* took on urgent relevance in a post-civil war English context — Thucydides’ assessment of his own experience brought a warning that was important to understand if Hobbes’ contemporaries were to ‘bear themselves prudently in the present and providently towards the future’.⁶ Clarity of viewership and record was as important here as it was later in 1942, when John H. Finley, Jr. wrote that Thucydides had a mind which ‘realistically

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concerned’ itself with a ‘harsh and shattering present’, making sense of an extraordinary conflict in an exemplary way.\(^7\) Reclaimed by these historians, Thucydides as a founder of the discipline was a ‘modern historian before modernity’, with the truth of his methods and wisdom revealed only after his time.\(^8\) He may have put down his words in the past, but interpretations made them timeless.

Skinner, on the other hand, is relentlessly time-bound. Working in the fields of intellectual history and political thought and in the tradition of speech act philosophers such as J.L. Austin, Skinner described history as ‘a sequence of episodes’ with both questions and answers that changed.\(^9\) If Ludwig Wittgenstein was to be taken seriously in the idea that words are open to diverse applications and therefore the meaning of a word is less useful a measure than its function, then understanding a text would require that it be placed in its functional context.\(^10\) The rules, players and consequences of a language game are specific to a time, consciously used by a speaker so as to be understood and to elicit a response — carrying an ‘illocutionary force’.\(^11\) Thus each text had a place in history as an instance of speech, bringing about change and making up a series of negotiations that explained how modern political thought came to be.\(^12\) Studying a text meant asking why it appeared in that way and what it did in that particular place and time.

Thus, applying Skinner to Thucydides is to introduce opposition to a collection of existing interpretations. Perhaps there was a problem with celebrating the History’s ‘immediate applicability’, and when Robert W. Connor wrote of Thucydides as ‘one of the most lucid of ancient writers’, was that a statement about Thucydides, or Connor’s own time?\(^13\) Using Skinner’s more historically-sensitive approach is productive in several ways: it challenges the historian’s temporal priorities, it asks for the relationship between the History and other texts that make up its ideological context, and it makes space for the purpose of the work as performing an action with possibly different characteristics than those of most relevance to a later reader.\(^14\) The exercise is useful in the other direction as well. It tests Skinner’s theories, investigating how well they can be applied to Thucydides and whether there are dimensions of his work they cannot accommodate. Out of the clash comes better understanding.

The question of this essay specifies ‘intentions of the author’, and so I should clarify that here before the sections on advantages and limitations. Intention does not refer to an unspoken motivation

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\(^7\) Finley, p.4.
\(^8\) Morley, p.22.
\(^12\) Tully, p.18.
\(^13\) Connor, p.4.
\(^14\) Tully, pp.8-9.
inside an author’s head. Nor does it mean acceptance of the author’s own explicit statements of their intention — Skinner notes that the possibility of self-deception or incompetence in stating intentions should make us wary of making the author the final authority on the matter. Certainly if an author’s own statements were enough, the definition of Thucydides’ intentions could just start and end with this sentence: ‘It will be enough for me…if these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future.’ But that would be a simple textual reading without the necessary context. It would also seemingly reveal contradictions between Thucydides’ intentions and his execution — such as his reliance on speeches and myth when he wanted truth — that are, upon closer reading, not contradictions at all. The complexity of intention means that study is more than a determination of a single fact — it requires a process through which we might get closer to an answer.

To begin: looking at context advantages us by revealing where credit is due. ‘Prevailing conventions governing the treatment of the issues or themes with which the text is concerned’ points first to what already existed, which could include a great variety of authors. Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey are narratives of battles and heroes’ journeys. Sophocles incorporated pairs of arguments in Ajax and Antigone, of the kind introduced by Protagoras. Herodotus recorded ‘what was said’, and tragedians relayed their stories using the structure of drama. Of course they are more than these discrete characteristics, but what is relevant here for Thucydides is how the History echoes the conventions and ways of thinking displayed by these figures: the existence of types of characters with set roles, the contrasting of arguments in parallel pairs, the use of oral sources in research, and the drama of triumph, hubris and defeat. H.D. Westlake goes as far as to link Thucydides’ interest in natural phenomena such as eclipses and earthquakes to the prominence of Anaxagoras as a great physicist. This way, we are prevented from claiming uniqueness where it did not exist, a risk if the only other comparison is our own time — with context, our analysis of Thucydides as a writer is tempered by knowledge of the ways he drew on what was around him.

The extent of the influence of contemporary tragedy and drama is used by F.M. Cornford to argue that Thucydides could not help but create a work of art instead of a work of science. While

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16 Thucydides, p.48.
18 Finley, p.38.
19 ibid., p.45.
20 Rosalind Thomas, Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece, Cambridge, 1992, p.112.
this could lead to the conclusion that Thucydides failed in his endeavour and therefore the value of his work is compromised (though Cornford does not quite mean it as a criticism), an interpretation using intention casts that structure in another light: it is not a flaw, but instead the means through which Thucydides makes his contribution. Cornford asserts that Thucydides ‘had forgotten that he was an Athenian…it did not occur to him that he might have a standpoint’. 23 But the alternative would be to demand that Thucydides not be of his place and time. Considering Skinner’s contention that a text is a response to ‘relevant characteristics’ of a society, and the centrality of tragedy to Thucydides’ context, we could interpret the History this way: the political problem of the day has to do with Athens’ trajectory, the beats of tragedy will be recognisable by readers, individuals are storytelling devices, and collectively these elements are ‘means of the truth’. 24 It is only through the tragic structure that Thucydides is able to organise his text and communicate, and intention makes that a feature of the text.

Clarifying context and tragedy then begs the question of substance — what Thucydides might have seen as the nature of his intervention. Historical method was evidently part of it. The introduction gives us some clues: how he writes that he ‘saw what was being done on both sides’, that he lived through its entirety at a stage of life when he was able to ‘understand what was happening’, and that his exile gave him ‘rather exceptional facilities for looking into things’. 25 His view was important because he conducts research, is sceptical about accepting any story as truth, and has an especially impartial way of seeing — the account he created would be deeper and founded on evidence. Scholars recognise how much this differed from existing methods, and compare him often to Herodotus (Simon Hornblower: ‘he wanted to record…with un-Herodotean precision’) and the poets (Emily Greenwood: ‘Thucydides dissociates himself from…poets who offer entertaining, aggrandizing and fictional accounts’). 26 Westlake and Hunter R. Rawlings, III add to the explicitness of Thucydides’ intervention through studies of his digressions. The one on Cylon, Pausanias and Themistocles was a correction of existing accounts, and his note about Harmodius and Aristogeiton conveys that misunderstandings had serious political consequences — the demos of the Athenians laid suspicion upon the wrong people. 27 By approaching the historical craft in a different way, Thucydides aimed to change the existing conversation.

23 ibid.
24 Tully, p.11.; Morley, p.130.
25 Thucydides, p.364.
The other part of intention is a message about rhetoric, communicated through speeches and the events of the text. For Hobbes, this was Thucydides’ main lesson. Though he was someone who ‘was sufficiently qualified to have become a great demagogue’, Thucydides saw that giving wise counsel was not possible in the existing government, for the demos was prone to casting out the ‘good men’ for ‘wicked men and flatterers’ who would drive them to ruin.28 Not wanting to choose either role, Thucydides retreated to a private life and aimed to warn others through his History.29 The prominence of speeches reflects this sense of oratory as causes of war, and their detail places the audience at the scene — they feel the urgency of proceedings such as The Mytilenian Debate (over the sending of an Athenian trireme to put all Mytilenian men to death and enslave the women and children), and hear Diodotus’ judgement of Cleon and the process of democracy, what it means to be a good citizen, and how advice should be given and accepted.30 The conventions of tragedy, played out through the History’s events, are manipulated by Thucydides to reinforce the message. As we see the effects of certain passions and haste on Athenian action knowing that tragedies turn on hubris as shown in the first part of the story, it becomes clear that Thucydides is using rhetoric to say something about rhetoric itself.

Interpreting Thucydides’ intention in this way has the advantage of clarity. I do, however, wish to stress that Hobbes’ description is by no means definitive, though we do benefit from his lens. The rigour of Skinner’s theory of authorial intention, specifying that a text be assessed on the nature of its intervention in its own context, sits uncomfortably with the fact that Hobbes’ emphases and reason for publication have an ‘admonitionary purpose’ directed at his English readers.31 The goal of using intention is to reinterpret texts in a different way, not as ‘perennially important attempts to set down universal propositions about political reality’ — casting doubt on the pronouncements Hobbes makes about how Thucydides liked democracy the least, and calling into question his summary of Thucydides’ intention.32 But having a primary concern does not mean that Hobbes should be dismissed. His observations about rhetoric and tragedy are still valuable, even if they do not constitute the entire picture. My point here is that the search for intention is an attempt, and the advantages come from multiple angles: in trying to understand the author’s intervention in their own context, in noting later interpreters’ use of the text in their own context, and in revealing the distance between those moments.

Among those later interpreters are others who debate how the History might be categorised, and there lies yet another advantage of authorial intention: that it steers our own approach away from

29 ibid.
30 Thucydides, pp.212-8.
31 Scott, p.417.
oversimplification. R.G. Collingwood, for example, agrees with C.N. Cochrane’s argument that ‘the dominant influence on Thucydides is…Hippocratic medicine’ because of his descriptions of plague and war neuroses, making him the ‘father of psychological history’.33 Finley labels him a scientist, D.L. Page a physician, Cornford a dramatist, A. Parry a poet, and many take him to be a political theorist.34 But these divisions are artificial and influenced by whatever the historian was looking for. Modern historians for a period saw their practice as distanced from literature, with the ‘critical investigation of truth’ elevating their work to something more empirical. This influenced their categorisation of Thucydides and encouraged identification with him as critical to the discipline’s origin.35 Then as creativity and subjectivity were recognised and history cleaved closer to literature, interpretations of Thucydides changed as well. Intention bypasses this debate. The conversation that Thucydides intervened in was a political one, aimed at improving the wisdom of a governing class.36 Its application was not theoretical but practical, and so different genres were united by necessity. Extraction of any one aspect on its own would have been an alien concept.

Collectively, these advantages of attempting to understand the History in terms of Thucydides’ intentions furnish us with a sense of how the text arose from a past contextual web and performed an action there. I have outlined how intention gives credit, makes sense of drama, highlights originality in historical method, assembles the message of rhetoric, differentiates other interpretations, and discourages simple categorisation — advantages that would not be accessible in the same way under another approach. The final advantage is related to the broader landscape created by interpretations through intention: that rationality of the content of the History is irrelevant compared to the reasons Thucydides wrote it.37 We care only about the text, its surrounding context, and how it was a part of and a response to that context. We turn away from weighing the correctness of his ideas, and instead to asking questions about Thucydides’ world — a world where Attic sea power had grown, Athens had ruled with great imperial might, and where their relentless conquest and eventual ruin needed explanation.38 It is an approach that demands more work, but it places the text as a living document in a place and time, expanding our understanding in an infinitely advantageous way.

On the other hand, limitations do accompany these advantages. Skinner has no shortage of opponents. While some of them have merits, a few miss the point: Joseph Femia, for instance, argues that interpretation using intention ‘improverish[es] our approach to the history of ideas’ because

34 Finley, p.109.; Rawlings, p.270.
35 Morley, p.135.
38 Finley, pp.13-28.
‘study of the past is valuable only in so far as it throws light on present problems or needs’. To others, Skinner has responded. W.K. Wimsatt and M.C. Beardsley charge that intention is not ‘available’ to an historian, while John Keane has concerns about the idea of thinking a thinker’s thoughts in their place, ‘empathetically looking them in the eye and stepping into their shoes’, and to this Skinner’s answer is that reading intention is about grasping what is ‘publicly legible’ in acts of communication — not that a person waving their arms wants to warn someone, but that the act of arm-waving in that situation can be taken as a warning and that is the convention exploited. This also refutes John G. Gunnell and Dominick LaCapra’s criticisms that intention is about a singular projection of what an author would have wanted to say. Skinner adds that illocutionary forces may be present without illocutionary acts, and that a text can bear meanings other than those intended by the person writing it. I find these responses satisfactory, and so will focus my attention on limitations that remain.

The first major limitation to the intention approach is that it is a stretch to accommodate the History’s density. Skinner’s formulation is about understanding why a proposition has been put forward by seeing it as ‘a move in argument’. Placed in an historian-defined conversation, this leads easily to narrowness of angle. In Skinner’s own work, Blair Worden, in an analysis of Liberty before Liberalism, judges that what Skinner defines as the ‘core’ of his texts is found because Skinner was deliberately looking for it. Likewise, Thucydides’ History can yield a variety of cores to any reader with an interest. The work can be a move in arguments about military strategy, history, politics or philosophy. I have argued earlier in this essay that approaching using intention resists simple categorisation, but on a technical level it is difficult to see how the product of this interpretation can encompass the History’s multiplicity. Visions of Politics does have an assertion that ‘an immense range of illocutionary acts will normally be embedded’ within texts and that ‘even the smallest individual fragments of such texts may carry a heavy freight of intended illocutionary force’, with the example of E.M. Forster’s ‘Weybridge, 1924’ in A Passage to India in the convention of sign-offs,

42 Skinner, Visions of Politics, p.10.
45 Morley, p.xiv.
but the act of intervention is more difficult to apply to this scale — intention’s original target was still the text as a whole, texts with more singular aims.46

Contextually, the foundation constructed by the intention interpretation can be called into doubt, and this is a limitation on our certainty. There are barriers on a general level to the completeness of our knowledge: elapsed time, loss of evidence, and the fact that common beliefs — interesting to historians but mundane for those living at the time — are not always recorded.47 Establishing intellectual relationships is a shaky enterprise because our view of Greek literature is so partial, and we can only draw on what we have, the significance of which may be different to what Thucydides knew.48 When connections are made, the conclusions we can draw are limited. Homer looms large enough in Thucydidean scholarship that the History comes close to being seen as a direct attack on Homer’s methods, but proving that connection is tricky: Thucydides mentions Homer by name in the introduction, and Hornblower points out that there are quotations from Homer’s Hymn to Apollo and the common use of adjectives such as ‘wealthy’ for Corinth and ‘Minyan’ for the Boiotian Orchomenos — demonstrating only that Thucydides knew of Homer, and used him for information.49 In other cases, we would need to consider the presence of another unknown author that both figures drew on, or that they reached their similar conclusions independently.50 Since intention depends on the author’s context and the conversation they were participating in, these many variables and uncertainties limit the trustworthiness of the interpretation.

Performance and orality are also parts of a text, but Skinner’s method makes little mention of these dimensions. We know that Thucydides contrasts his History with works ‘designed to meet the taste of an immediate public’ (the untranslated Greek makes the aural aspect more explicit: ἐγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν ζύγκειται, a show-piece to be listened to on the spot), reflecting the role of oratory in Greek life and politics.51 The most straightforward interpretation would be, as Lowell Edmunds, John Moles and Hobbes write, that the relationship between Thucydides and this context is that of opposition, and he is endorsing the superiority of writing, which is ‘pithy’, ‘full’, and ‘true’.52 Against this, Rosalind Thomas argues that orality and literacy cannot be entirely separated, that they do not exist in opposition.53 While Thucydides makes reference to readers, poets

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48 Greenwood, p.7.
53 Thomas, p.123.
did too, and the complexity of his text does not necessarily preclude it being read out; dense literature was regularly heard by the public, and Thucydides’ style can be compared to that of the Sophists who certainly valued performance. There is a way of reading Thucydides using intention that takes performance and orality into account, but that is up to the reader — the method itself does not prompt these questions about textual and oral interaction, or the remnants of selectivity.

Even more crucially, interpreting Thucydides in terms of a linguistic move distorts the text. Thucydides’ wish for the History is for it to be useful to those in the future who want to understand past events — it is meant to be a record in good faith, not polemic. Though it is true that the structure of the History has the author’s influence, and that his choice of causes, emphases and events may lead a reader to a certain moral lesson, the author of any narrative must shape it in some way and that fact in itself does not mean that they set out to make an ideological negotiation in an argument. In narrating events in their complexity, presenting speeches so as to (in Hobbes’ words) ‘maketh his auditor a spectator’, and weighing up evidence, Thucydides tries to deepen his audience’s understanding and instil an awareness of the ambiguity of the past. From John Burrow we can add that Thucydides tried to avoid moralisation — when he narrates, it is not in an intrusive way, and his ‘overt moral judgements are few and terse’. The rhetoric contained in the speeches are reconstructions by Thucydides and thus likely to be affected by his own view, but they are at least meant to be appropriate to their situations and their speakers. The History is a history, aimed at truth, but intention needs something more specific and would have the text become something else.

That something else would be moral and political philosophy, which make up the bulk of Skinner’s work as an historian of political thought. Machiavelli’s The Prince is an instructional political treatise written for Renaissance Italy about rulership; Thucydides’ History was written for an undefined future about a twenty-seven-year war about the experiences of many cities, cultures and individuals — perhaps it should be no surprise that it is not quite enough to interpret the History in terms of Thucydides’ intentions. Would Skinner have a response? Actually he has addressed this already: ‘It is certainly a mistake to suppose that the recovery of this dimension will be of no interest except in the case of certain restricted genres of texts.’ To support this he gives the example of Don Quixote by Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, that by using intention as an interpretation we see that Cervantes was discrediting the values and possibility of a chivalric life, revealing a new way of seeing

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54 ibid., p.4, 104.  
57 Thucydides, p.47.  
the protagonist’s character and the work’s morality — an important point, but vague and accessible to anyone who reads the text anyway. At most, something might be gained, but much is still lost.

So what is left of the case for using Skinner to interpret Thucydides? I have highlighted that there are the limitations of density accommodation, contextual uncertainty, performance and orality, and form, but I would argue none of these negate the advantageous effect of the exercise as a whole in recognising difference and reorienting our approach. Thinking about intention means that we read the History on its own terms, judged by the needs of Thucydides’ time and the communicative acts that would have been performed then. It draws attention to specificity of aim, situation, and problem in a way that makes clear that transcendence would be impossible. It helps us resist the temptation to think that Thucydides was writing for us, admitting that the study of history can be more than seeing reflections of our own beliefs — it is an ‘irreplaceable means of standing back from our own…structures of thought’. LaCapra’s ‘dialogical’ approach is problematised because past and present cannot speak on the same terms, but he is given an alternative that honours his wish to have an ‘openness to what one does not expect to hear from the past’, making illumination of difference possible through a more concrete method. Thucydides may address a future audience, but an approach using Skinner means that we have to understand that at the time of writing, the future was not accessible.

This evaluation can still admit that Thucydides strove to make a work that lasted, and that what shows in his writing can be interpreted as innovative relative to context. A high proportion of his work consists of neologisms. Many are the only surviving occurrences of the words, and June Allison shows that in an environment of increasing use of abstract nouns ending in -sis, Thucydides invented more than anyone else. Greenwood surveys other research on Thucydides’ language to conclude that it was ‘sufficiently unintelligible and idiosyncratic to suggest that he found conventional linguistic usage inadequate’ for what he wanted to communicate. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, too, at the end of the first century BC: Thucydides’ prose was ‘complex’, ‘convoluted’, and ‘difficult to unravel’. Their conclusions are that the work was indeed written to go beyond his contemporary context — an intention that can stand on its own apart from its level of success. Interpreting Thucydides in this way is therefore a balancing act, between novelty and definition by
context, between making the most of its advantages while taking into account its limitations. It moderates the grand conclusions we might otherwise draw from an initial reading of the text, and gives us a more measured sense of Thucydides’ agency, recognising that he could come from a context while also acting on it.

For historians practicing their craft, the interpretation of the *History* in terms of Thucydides’ intentions has an additional overall advantage undiminished by the limitations I’ve addressed — it engenders humility and reflection. Some critics would disagree, accusing Skinner of believing in the ‘reproductive fallacy of the unvarnished recovery of meaning’, but looking at the context of their conversation reveals that it arises out of a preoccupation with Derridean phenomenology that if taken too far would render historical study undoable.68 I would argue that the attempt at interpretation through intention produces something much more meaningful about interminability, for its requirements — context, tools, forms, intervention substance, hypotheses about reception — cannot ever be identified for certain, and trying to do that would generate much doubt. Doing this is to learn that there is a great distance between our own time and that of Thucydides, and that the point is to understand how Thucydides wrote what he did, and why. Appreciating the difficulty of this enterprise and attempting it anyway is not only to make historical study relevant through reassessment of our present beliefs, but is also to grasp how constrained our imaginations are, moving us closer to self-knowledge and creating the potential for continuing re-examination.69

In the end, attempting to understand Thucydides in this way is to play with the gap in time between his world and ours. It frees us from the idea of the text as having a special hold on the future and replaces it with the uncertainty of survival. He may have hoped to create a possession to ‘last for ever’, but the meaning of that is complicated, there are other intentions woven in, and it is only because of others that his wish comes true.70 G.B. Grundy notes the periods in which Thucydides ‘passed almost into oblivion’.71 Hornblower proclaims that ‘Thucydides, for any student of historiography, is The Master’, but Morley observes that by the twentieth century, Hornblower no longer represents the majority — major works such as E.H. Carr’s *What is History* do not mention Thucydides at all.72 The *History* has remained prominent for so long because, among other reasons, historiography has identified with it, and as historiography changes, the *History*’s role in it changes as well.73 Knowing that Thucydides’ intentions are limited to his time, we avoid fixations on his

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70 Thucydides, p.48.
71 Grundy, p.52.
inherent relevance and realise that every generation uses what exists to remake history. We are left with the flexibility of a contingent afterlife that allows for new understanding.

This essay started with the challenge of attempting to understand Thucydides in terms of Skinner’s theory of the intentions of the author. Having established the timeless character of some existing interpretations, Skinner’s context, the potential of this combination, and the meaning of ‘intention’, I turned to the advantages. The first of these was that an approach through context gave credit where it was due, showing us where convention was used. Other advantages were that it reclaimed the History’s use of drama, highlighted historical method and Thucydides’ use of rhetoric as an intervention, critiques interpretations such as that of Hobbes, avoids simple genre categories, and situates the work in a past contextual web, a living document that did something in a place and time. Some limitations I dismissed through Skinner’s responses, but others I did address: the approach’s accommodation of the History’s density, doubt of what we can determine about context, the effect of performance and orality, the distortion of the text when fitting it into the framework of a linguistic move, and how perhaps what is lost comes down to the way that intention was originally meant for a specific type of text. Finally, I evaluated what this all means. The presence of limitations did not negate the advantages of undertaking this attempt, for in the process we read the History differently, reorienting our approach to an aim, situation and problem, to a time when Thucydides’ future had not yet come to pass. It casts his wish to create a work that would last forever in a different light, not as proof that he was writing to speak directly to us as readers but instead as coming from a vision of the future shaped by his existing context. Considering both advantages and limitations gives us historians a sense of humility, expands the distance of time and place, makes clear the contingency of textual survival, invites reflection on how our own world came to be, and makes necessary the re-examination of historiography. The emphasis of this understanding is on action — that authors exist in a world and do something in it with a text, and so our study of them must be sensitive to this agency. It is not to deny the romance of tragedy and circularity, but it is a particularly historical approach. It has the past as its subject, with a specificity that fosters an awareness that knowledge of history does not preclude involvement in our own world; it only supplants it and draws attention to the distinct nature of our own conversations and linguistic actions, eventuating as a result of the past but not the identical to it. There is much more to be done with this topic, other directions in which to push the analyses and the text to examine in detail, but I hope this essay can serve as a beginning. In a way, Thucydides’ History can last for ever — just not in the exact way he might have intended it.
Bibliography


How do the experiences of the Chinese Labour Corps fit into the wider historiography of imperial labour during the First World War?

Henry Chignell

‘In grateful remembrance of those who served in the Chinese Labour Corps during the First World War. A noble deed, bravely done. From Her Britannic Majesty’s Government.’

Accompanied by Chinese text, so reads the plaque presented by the British Government in 2018 to Shandong Province’s newly-opened museum commemorating those who made the journey from China to France to serve in the Chinese Labour Corps (CLC). ‘Let us never forget that more than 2500 made the ultimate sacrifice, most of whom now lie at rest in the fields of France and Flanders’ is inscribed on a similar plaque in Arras, France. Painfully-scarce memorials have for so long comprised the Allies’ recognition of the CLC. In all, 140,000 Chinese labourers served during the war for Britain, France, and the United States, often enduring harsh treatment and significant personal risk to do so. Demeaned as ‘children’ by overriding public opinion, which at home and abroad worried about the prospect of imperial labour working alongside white workers, the men of the CLC were commended over and over by those they served under. The story of the CLC may recognise how pragmatism and reality can overcome racial prejudice, but the labours of each individual should be seen in their own context. With a growing focus on the New Social History and

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the history of ‘Others’, historians have uncovered that the primary motivation for many to serve overseas was economic, and the bettering of one’s family. This perspective is familiar to many who served in equivalent labour corps, such as the Indian, Maltese, South African, and Egyptian corps. It is by examining their counterparts, that we might gain a fuller picture of the CLC’s place in history. My primary focus is on the labourers that worked in the British Chinese Labour corps. Though Chinese workers were also recruited by France and the United States, a focus on the CLC allows for a closer study and comparison to other, aforementioned British-led imperial labour corps.

As the war wore on into 1916, and the machine guns of the Somme chirped out their deadly rhythm, the British Army was coming to grips with an increasingly worrying shortage of labour. Conveniently, the Chinese government had presented a plan to the War Office in 1915, known as the ‘labourers-as-soldiers’ programme. This was the latest in a series of Chinese overtures to the Allies, originating in 1898 when they offered troops to help take the German protectorate of Qingdao. When Japan took the territory and issued the infamous Twenty-One Demands in 1915, a new urgency drove the Chinese elite to join the international community. Liang Shiyi, government minister and mastermind of the ‘labourers-as-soldiers’ program, had initially offered 300,000 military labourers and 100,000 rifles to the British in June 1915, but the War Office was hesitant to accept the proposal, for the reasons that they were suspicious of Chinese intentions, and adopting workers in a military capacity meant increased liability for the British. As Nicholas Griffin has argued, recruitment of military workers would have placed legal responsibilities both for the workers and their families back home in the hands of the British Army. As such, the solution was becoming increasingly clear — a ‘volunteer’ scheme. Though Chinese workers had long travelled overseas as indentured labour within the ‘coolie-trade,’ it was an illegal and unregulated practice, owing to the Qing dynasty’s ban on emigration, so a government-supported program of worker migration was unprecedented in Chinese history. Liang established the Humin Company, a private enterprise that was, in reality, anything but. Through the company, workers could be recruited as ‘private’ labourers rather than Allied labourers. Germany was certainly aware of the scheme — they protested to the Chinese government and received nothing more than a shrug of the shoulders in return. Peking was simply able to deflect protestations by pointing to the Humin Company’s ‘private’ nature, and as such China could maintain its neutrality whilst Britain and France received workers in a non-military capacity.

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4 ibid., p.23.
7 Xu, Strangers on the Western Front, p.17-18.
Historians have tended to discuss the CLC in strictly macro terms, yet on an individual basis there were a number of benefits to be had from volunteering. To be sure, the British were not at all innocent with regards to forced recruitment of imperial labour, yet the CLC is uniquely placed in history for its comparative spirit of volunteerism. Advertisements were placed throughout China, though primarily around Britain’s protectorate of Weihaiwei on the Shandong Peninsula, and they contained the CLC’s recruitment charter. Prospective labourers would receive 30 francs per month, roughly 12 yuan, and a further 10 yuan would be paid to their families.\(^8\) This was considerably more than a labourer could expect to earn at home. Moreover, the CLC would receive the same holidays as French workers, as well as days off for Chinese holidays and festivals — comparatively generous conditions. Yan Zhang has argued that the European and American understanding of Chinese customs and traditions was a key catalyst for the successful mobilisation of Chinese labour.\(^9\) The Allies were not above a degree of cultural misunderstanding, though. The American habit of saying ‘let’s go’ before work almost set off a rebellion in one instance — the phrase sounding like the Chinese word *gou*, or dog.\(^10\) Labourers would be expected to work for around ten hours, seven days a week, though this was not unexpected as it was the norm for Chinese labourers back home.\(^11\) Inadvertently, the CLC was aided by French trade unions, since if they were paid anything less than their French counterparts the French government would be accused of importing cheap labour.\(^12\) Hopefuls were often bitter at failing the prescribed physical tests and Zhang has noted how the traditional hierarchy of the agrarian family compelled individuals to seek work in such a dangerous environment in order to meet their families’ material needs, but there was also a sense of adventure at play.\(^13\) Sun Gan asked, instead of remaining ‘stuck in poverty at home, why not work as a coolie?’ Workers’ intentions should not be misconstrued as altruism for the Allies’ cause. The ‘Song of Greed’ by Sun Kan tells us that ‘one goes abroad mostly expecting to get dirt rich’.\(^14\) One of the most important aspects of studying the CLC, though sometimes overlooked, is the worker’s actual intentions for working in such a dangerous environment. Clearly, the CLC provided a means to provide for one’s family to an extent that simply did not exist at home.

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9 Zhang, p.407.
12 Bailey, p.184.
13 Zhang, p.401.
14 ibid., p.399.
Despite contributing heavily to the Allied war effort, the CLC was treated harshly, and in some instances odiously, by their European counterparts and military commanders. The general assumption in nineteenth-century British society was that Asians and Africans were children and should be dealt with as such. Race was the lens through which Europeans primarily viewed the CLC and other non-white labourers, and they were acutely aware of the dynamics of non-white workers being given benefits comparative to their French and British colleagues. Guoqi Xu recounts how a British officer, hearing that black South African dock workers had been served tea by French women in Rouen, told them: ‘When you people get back to South Africa again, don’t start thinking that you are whites just because this place has spoiled you. You are black and you will stay black.’ Part of the initial reticence on the British part to have Asians and Americans as soldiers was that doing so would be an acknowledgement of equality. It was as though this would undermine the black/white divide and devalue race as a means of devaluation, whereby the soldiers would be united by class rather than race. Workers were generally treated like prisoners, kept behind barbed wire, and forbidden from leaving except for special circumstances. The CLC also encountered military discipline. Field punishment was not uncommon, and labourers were also tied to the barbed wire for infractions, leading some workers to defect to the French camps. Though the CLC were not soldiers, and their contracts stipulated that they could work no closer than sixteen kilometres from the front lines, their work often took them into dangerous situations, exposed to air raids and residual fighting. An article in The Times reported that the CLC was bringing ammunition to the front line, and remaining there to repair trenches and maintain machine gun emplacements. Paul Bailey suggests that at least 2,000 Chinese workers died in France, either of illness or German attacks, but the actual figure is likely to be much higher.

Travel to the front was just as fraught with danger as the conditions that the CLC found in France. Labourers that travelled through Canada and by sea to France were denied life-saving equipment by the Canadian shipping company, cutting corners in the name of military need. This was even encouraged by the British military authorities. The workers of the CLC were generally crammed into ships’ holds or overstuffed cabins, in poor conditions and plagued by disease and sickness. Vietnamese workers, in particular, were forced to sleep with livestock during their voyage to France, which is evident of a wider theme of dehumanisation that confronted the CLC and other

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15 Xu, Strangers on the Western Front, p.104.
17 Xu, Strangers on the Western Front, pp.114-116.
19 Bailey, p.185.
20 Xu, Strangers on the Western Front, p.61.
imperial labourers.\textsuperscript{21} The \textit{New York Times} reported the recruitment of the CLC as the only ‘the best selected stock’ selected from the Shandong province, where the locals were characterised for their sturdy builds.\textsuperscript{22} Names, backgrounds, and personal identities were largely irrelevant. Upon volunteering for the CLC, each worker was given an identification sheet and an assigned number — their name was no longer of any importance.\textsuperscript{23} The CLC tried to remain in high spirits for much of their travels. During their journey through Canada, the workers benefited from a number of benevolent British officers, who at least treated the men with a modicum of respect. A particularly memorable part of Xu’s work on this subject is a concert that was put together on board their ship by the escorting officers, where a traditional Chinese orchestral performance was stopped as the substantial noise might attract nearby submarines.\textsuperscript{24} Historians have disagreed over the risk to the CLC from German U-boats. Brian Fawcett has pointed to the secrecy of the CLC’s transport routes to assert that no workers were lost from U-boat attacks. This has been refuted by Zhang and Bailey, the latter recounting the sinking of the \textit{Athos} and death of 540 workers, while Zhang has stated that at least 700 workers died from submarine attacks.\textsuperscript{25} It is important though, that these attacks do not totally obscure the day-to-day hardship the CLC endured en route to France, despite isolated instances of benevolent officers.

The lack of Allied recognition for the work of the Chinese Labour Corps is made more shocking by the merit of the labourers’ work in France. Though workers were primarily occupied with digging trenches, cleaning up battlefields, as well as loading and unloading ships and trains, some engaged in more skilled work. After all, those who had signed up were not just agrarian labourers — the CLC counted carpenters, blacksmiths, bakers, and mechanics amongst their numbers, and others had left good jobs behind in China. Zhang has argued that they were united by economic gain, Xu argues that they were eager to see the world.\textsuperscript{26} Nevertheless the CLC is unique within the context of imperial labour in that they were employed in skilled and semi-skilled labour that was usually only the realm of white workers. Otherwise, the CLC tended to be classed as ‘mere coolies’.\textsuperscript{27} Skilled members of the CLC were spread across a range of industries and impressed both the French and British. Three companies of the CLC were assigned to work repairing and maintaining tanks, where they ‘became so skilled that they are practically running some of the shops entirely’, as reported in the British Expeditionary Force Directorate of Labour’s war diary, in which 4,725 Chinese workers

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\footnote{Xu, \textit{Strangers on the Western Front}, p.42.}
\footnote{Dominiek Dendooven and Piet Chielens, \textit{World War I: Five Continents in Flanders}, Lannoo, Tielt, 2008, p.137.}
\footnote{Xu, \textit{Strangers on the Western Front}, p.60.}
\footnote{Bailey, p.184 ; Zhang, p.387.}
\footnote{ibid.}
\footnote{Griffin, p.105.}
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were designated as ‘skilled’. In terms of the general labourers, they acquitted themselves with distinction. A British officer noted that of the 100,000 men under his command, which included Englishmen, Indians, and Chinese, the CLC were able to dig 200 cubic feet per day, while the Indians managed 160, and the ‘Tommies’ 140. Throughout the work of the Chinese Labour Corps, it is clear that for those working with the Chinese labourers, the lens and context of racial superiority often gave way to respect for the CLC’s industriousness. Nonetheless, the instances of positive recognition should not overshadow the abuse and vitriol that the Corps had to face in France.

One of the leading voices in the recently-emerged scholarship regarding the Chinese Labour Corps is that of Xu. Across multiple works, Xu takes a primarily macro-historical perspective, arguing that the formation of the Chinese Labour Corps should be seen within the context of Chinese internationalism. Essentially, following defeat in the Sino-Japanese War and the Twenty-One articles, Chinese elites discovered the newfound importance of China doing away with its isolationist mindset and joining the community of nations. Xu writes that the experiences of the CLC in France, and their exposure to Western culture, acted as a catalyst for the development of a new Chinese national identity. This perspective is roughly similar to that of Bailey, who argues that the CLC heralded an emerging national consciousness, which rejected regional loyalties in favour of more of a national identity. Furthermore, the CLC was significant in that it enjoyed the support of Chinese governmental and cultural elites, which granted the project a wider political, social, and cultural agenda than just a strictly commercial one. It is fair to say that Dominiek Dendooven and Piet Chielens subscribe at least somewhat to this category. They draw on Yan Yangchu, who wrote in The Chinese Labourers’ Weekly in 1919 about how before coming to Europe the CLC had not understood the relationship between oneself and their country, but seeing Europeans fight each other in defence of their countries had sparked a sense of Chinese nationalism. Dendooven and Chielens characterise this evidence as part of a wider ‘social experiment’ that brought poor Chinese workers in contact with ‘education and modern social ideas’. It is true that the CLC did foster a spirit of self-improvement, with members learning new skills and languages, but in my estimation this perspective discounts the significantly skilled and educated members of the labour corps, in favour of a wider macro-historical narrative. In fact, Yan Yangchu himself was a Yale graduate.

28 Xu, Strangers on the Western Front, p.90.
29 ibid., p.89.
30 Xu, Strangers on the Western Front, p.4.
31 ibid., p.221.
32 Bailey, p.189.
33 Dendooven and Chielens, p.141.
34 ibid., p.140.
Other historians have written against the macro-historical perspective of the CLC in favour of an outlook that takes into account individual experience and microhistory. Zhang has criticised the tendency by historians to fit the CLC into a wider narrative by branding them as heroes and as the closest substitute to Chinese soldiers during the First World War. Through this, the actual motivations that compelled each individual to travel far from home to a dangerous war have been written over in favour of arguments surrounding national identity and consciousness.\(^{35}\) The decisions of each man to join did not, as has been argued, originate with the conscious push of Chinese elites to join the international community — this only provides an external form to China’s participation in the war — but came about due to economic circumstances or the urge to see the world.\(^{36}\) Historians have increasingly taken a micro view of Chinese labour. Writing about Chinese workers in Russia, Tatiana Linkoeva has traced communist propaganda implemented by the Soviet government to wider communist influence in China.\(^{37}\) This is reflected by the words of French minister Marius Moutet, who claimed that after working in France, the CLC would return to China as the ‘best agents for French propaganda in their own country’.\(^{38}\) Though Zhang and Linkoeva bring relatively newer interpretations to the table, one of the first articles written about the CLC was that of Judith Blick, who argued in 1955 that instead of a grand national strategy, the corps were simply commercial in nature.\(^{39}\) A middle ground between the two general perspectives could be that of Roy Anthony Rogers and Nur Rafeeda Daut, who noted that the new life experiences that the CLC encountered in Europe would be spread upon returning home to China, but that cultural elites also considered the CLC as a point of national pride. They draw on Chen Duxiu, who states: ‘while the sun does not set on the British Empire, neither does it set on Chinese workers abroad.’\(^{40}\)

One of the primary opportunities to compare the experiences of the CLC are those of the Indian Labour Corps. As part of the British Empire, freed from operating under the illusion of neutrality, there were few limitations on British capacity to recruit labour in 1916. Operating in a similar manner to the CLC, recruiters across India promoted benefits and experiences that were normally impossible for labourers to attain, including a good monthly wage, clothing and food. The ‘coolie’ was replaced by the ‘Indian Labourer’ as a more politically palatable term, though this recognition was somewhat undercut by their status at the lowest reaches of the Indian army.\(^{41}\) Indian labour throughout the war

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35 Zhang, p.387.
36 ibid., p.388.
38 Bailey, p.187.
41 Singha, pp.38-39.
was characterised as particularly prone to the harsh European winters, and was often dehumanised, as ‘from the hills and jungles, who have barely emerged from barbarism’. Radhika Singha compares the Department of Labour perception of both the Indian Labour Corps (ILC) and the CLC. One on hand, the ILC were seen to be motivated by King and country, whilst the CLC are perceived as contract-abiding and had come ‘primarily for money’. This interpretation falls into line with that of Zhang and Blick — there was a colonialist undertone whereby imperial subjects were assumed to be fighting on behalf of the colonial power. Singha has also discussed the ILC in more macro terms. The government of India hoped to restore some of its international reputation following the Mesopotamian disasters, and it was hoped that the ILC would be a part of that effort. This is different to the Chinese case though, as the ILC was not a ‘private’ enterprise in the same manner as the CLC, and was governed directly by the Indian Government, as opposed to the CLC’s contractual organisation.

The experiences of the CLC and the ILC both denote a dynamic of volunteerism and recruitment, while for those who made up the Egyptian Labour Corps (ELC) in the war a degree of choice might have seemed a luxury. Throughout the war the British Government was at pains to characterise Egyptian labourers as ‘volunteers,’ but Egyptians knew otherwise. Rather than implement a system of conscription, British recruitment focused on village leaders to provide the labourers required for the war — a strategy that patently failed in its implementation. Kyle J. Anderson, writing on the subject, has noted that those who were initially recruited were volunteers only nominally: ‘of every three, one came to avoid the police, one was sent by the police, and one was a respectable wage earner.’ Thus, colonial authorities turned to umdas, Egyptian recruitment agents, whose tactics often amounted to forcibly kidnapping labourers in the fields, to ‘serve’ in the ELC. The mechanism of imperial service as a form of punishment was certainly not limited to the British. Abdallah Hanna’s important work on Syrians in the Bilād Al-Shām describes how authorities justified conscription as a punishment, rather than national duty or in terms of religious war (jihad).

While at the front, deployed primarily to Palestine and Turkey, the ELC was both loathed and mistreated. Singha has noted how the ELC was particularly reviled because they were politically aware, in the fact that they supported the Turks rather than the British Empire. Robin Kilson has argued that the ELC’s contract structure set it apart from equivalent contractual labour such as the

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42 ibid., p.37.
43 ibid., p.31.
46 Singha, p.31.
contracts varied heavily, and labourers were often unaware of their particulars.\textsuperscript{47} Lastly, David Killingray has argued that Egyptian Labour was treated so poorly that British officers questioned why they did not simply defect: ‘they would have hardly been worse off in Turkish captivity.’\textsuperscript{48} Thus, a key point of difference is that, while the CLC was certainly mistreated in France, the political dimension to the Egyptian Labour Corps may have granted it a unique level of mistreatment and scorn on the part of the British authorities.

Various other imperial labour corps served in some capacity during the First World War, and their historiography and experiences can be compared to that of the CLC. The work of the South African Native Labour Contingent (SANLC) was highly valued by the British, with Sir Douglas Haig noting his ‘warm appreciation’ of their work, but statements in this manner are undercut by the significant racial discrimination that the SANLC faced in Europe.\textsuperscript{49} I have already mentioned the dock workers of Rouen, but the prospect of non-white troops fighting alongside white troops elicited similar racial reactions, even back home. B.P. Willan has drawn on the \textit{East Rand Express} in this instance, which lamented that if non-white soldiers are used against the Germans, they might return home disabused of the notion that white men were their superiors.\textsuperscript{50} This is certainly an explicit example, but not completely different to the racial categorisation facing the Chinese Labour Corps — British authorities were certainly reluctant to field them in a war thought to be fought by white men. Though historiography on the Maltese Labour Corps is scarce, Albert Caruna and William Zammit have argued that the prime motivation of the labourers was an economic one, to receive attractive pay in a similar fashion to the Chinese and Indian corps.\textsuperscript{51} Lastly, for New Zealanders serving overseas, motivations have differed. Paul Baker has argued that New Zealanders’ initial spirit of volunteerism was built on the idea that doing otherwise meant a lack of ‘colonial initiative.’\textsuperscript{52} For Māori, Robert Aldrich and Christopher Hilliard have argued that volunteering could lead to leverage in collective political bargaining, while soldiers in other imperial territories such as French Africa could only hope for individual recognition.\textsuperscript{53}

‘The Carriers who were the feet and hands of the Army.’ These words of Rudyard Kipling, written on the Nairobi War Memorial are an apt summary for much of the experiences of imperial

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49 Willan, p.61.
50 ibid., p.63.
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labour. Even as they receive some semblance of recognition, imperial labourers have been systematically dehumanised, with their individual experiences often wiped from the pages of the history of the First World War. Scholarship, emergent in the latter half of the twentieth century and gaining steam around the turn of the millennium, has begun to bring the experiences of imperial labour to light. In this way, the Chinese Labour Corps occupy a unique milieu. Comparatively, they received more rights and benefits than many of their counterparts, but these small concessions were overshadowed by the abuse and mistreatment that they faced at the front. Some unifying themes run through the experiences of all labour corps. With the exception of forced labour, in this instance primarily the Egyptian Labour Corps, those men who braved the journey from their homelands to France were primarily motivated by economic gain, with a sense of adventure coming in a reasonably distant second. Historians have thoroughly backed up this perspective, though some have chosen to take a more macro perspective. In my opinion, while said perspective is completely valid and is important to understand the internationalism that was at play during the war, I am inclined to agree with Zhang, in that the macro-historical aspects of the Chinese Labour corps should be viewed through the lens of individual experience. Rather than inserting overriding or grand narratives into the lives of the everyday labourers, historians going forward are increasingly inclined to let the labourers speak for themselves, from which point we can build wider historical narratives and conclusions. Nonetheless, a single fact is clear. The history of the First World War cannot exist without the Chinese Labour Corps and their counterparts.

54 Killingray, p.484.
55 Zhang, p.408.
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