



New Zealand

Attitudes to

Social Citizenship

in the Context of

Neoliberalism

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is a summary of a Royal Society Marsden Fund project which attempts to grapple with the question: *Have neoliberal policy reforms implemented since the 1980s radically changed public beliefs about the idea of social citizenship in New Zealand?* 'Social citizenship' refers to the idea that all citizens should be guaranteed a basic level of social and economic security through rights to health, education, work and welfare. It has been argued that social rights are necessary in order for citizens to be able to activate the civil and political rights traditionally associated with citizenship.

The study's key question emerges out of several theoretical assumptions about the likely impact of neoliberal policies on social citizenship which have never before been tested in New Zealand. In trying to answer this question, interviews and focus groups were undertaken with 87 New Zealand adults from a wide range of backgrounds in 2007-2008. The major focus of the study reported here is on the qualitative analysis of contemporary public opinion rather than the tracking of specific changes in attitudes over time. The latter has been published elsewhere using New Zealand Election Study data (see Humpage, 2008).

Overall, the study found that support for social rights of citizenship is *not* dead in New Zealand, nor have New Zealand attitudes to social citizenship been totally immune to the rhetoric and reality of neoliberal reforms. Indeed, by considering the broader issues of citizenship, identity and belonging in New Zealand, this report highlights how the impact of New Zealand's neoliberal reforms have been far wider than a narrow focus on *social* citizenship would indicate. Social, cultural and economic differences and inequalities that are associated with such reforms clearly shape not only what people *think* but also how they *feel* about living in New Zealand *and* how others feel about them. As such, the report indicates key policy implications emerging from the study's findings.

Assumption 1: User-pays will reduce support for social citizenship

It has been assumed that user-pays and the privatisation of social services reduce support for health, education, welfare and work as social rights of citizenship because fewer people have contact with state-funded and state-provided arms of the welfare state. This argument is based on the principle that public attitudes always reflect 'self-interest' i.e. that people will support or oppose a particular policy depending on the extent to which they personally (or people 'like' them) benefit or lose out. However, international empirical research has found that not only can altruistic ideas influence public opinion, but growing dissatisfaction with the quality and availability of social services may also increase support for government spending in these areas. In addition, it is believed likely that benefit recipients will offer less support for social citizenship over time because they are more heavily subject than other citizens to a neoliberal focus on 'individual responsibility'. This is due to the way in which conditions on their receipt of benefit are framed.

Finding 1: Participants strongly supported social citizenship rights

1.1 Four-fifths of participants agreed with the statement: *'Government should take responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for'* (referred to here as the 'government responsibility' statement). Less than one-fifth thought that government should *not* be responsible for ensuring everyone is provided for at all. However, over two-fifths of the former group qualified their agreement with the government responsibility statement, saying that government should be responsible only for *some* groups of people *or some* activities. Importantly, participants expressing high levels of distrust in government were usually *more* likely to support the government responsibility statement. This suggests that

disenchantment with government services as a result of cutbacks, privatisation and user-pays may have actually increased, rather than diminished, the expectations New Zealanders have of government agencies and political representatives.

1.2 The activities participants most frequently named as a government responsibility are all clearly associated with 'social citizenship'. At least two-thirds thought 'help the needy' and 'health' should be government responsibilities, while half said the same for 'education'. Approximately one-third named 'ensure basics affordable', 'housing' and 'decent work/wages' as areas where government should take responsibility. In contrast, few named 'redistribution' or 'supporting business/industry' and other activities were mentioned even less often. Alongside data from the New Zealand Election Study, these findings suggest that participants still strongly believe government has significant responsibilities in social policy, even if neoliberal ideas appear to have gained greater support, or at least acceptance, in economic policy areas (significant minority support for issues relating to work and wages being the notable exception).

1.3 When asked what *rights* they associated with citizenship, it is notable that the political or civil rights traditionally associated with this status were hardly mentioned by participants. Again, *social* rights were those most frequently mentioned:

a) *Health and education:* Two-thirds of participants strongly believed they have a right as New Zealand citizens to 'health' and over half thought the same of 'education'. Although fewer saw *free* access to health or education as either possible or advisable, over half the participants supported these ideas. When asked about activities they thought should be an individual responsibility, only a quarter mentioned 'look after &/or pay for own health' and fewer than one-tenth named 'educate yourself &/or pay for it'.

b) *Welfare:* A third of participants thought they had the right to have their 'basic needs met'. This referred to comments about income supplements such as In-Work Tax Credit and income support payments, both of which aim to ensure a basic standard of living for all New Zealanders. Indeed, a third of participants explicitly indicated that 'welfare entitlement' should be regarded a right of citizenship. When asked what people need to feel 'first class' in New Zealand, it is notable that almost a quarter of participants also said 'basic needs met' or 'money', indicating they believed that a certain level of economic security is critical to feeling valued and equal in society.

Four-fifths of all participants also thought that such social rights should be considered *human rights*, indicating they saw them as critical to a well-functioning society. These findings suggest there is still a strong sense of entitlement regarding social rights, despite three decades of neoliberal reforms.

Policy implications: New Zealanders are likely to be resistant to significant cutbacks in key social policy areas, such as health and education, and any diminishing of the 'welfare safety net' principle.

Finding 2: Participants thought that individuals should take responsibility for some aspects of their lives, notably families and children

2.1 When participants were asked to respond to a further, 'individual responsibility' statement – '*People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves*' – almost nine-tenths of them agreed in some way and just over a tenth completely rejected the statement. However, two-fifths of those who offered affirmative responses were ambivalent, with many saying *some* people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves or that *both* individuals and government should share responsibility for provision.

2.2 Strong support for individual responsibility seems to contradict responses to the earlier statement about government responsibility. The qualitative data suggests that the 'commonsense' nature of both statements makes them difficult to disagree with completely; participants also responded differently to the abstract statements than more specific questions. Indeed, when participants were asked about the *types* of activities which should be individual responsibilities, they mostly offered very different responses than when naming government responsibilities. The most frequently named individual responsibilities were:

a) *Children and family*: Just over a third of participants named 'discipline/teach own children' and/or 'care for family'. This finding was influenced by the repeal of Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961, which was being debated at the time the focus groups and interviews were conducted. However, it is notable that when participants were asked to consider where they found their greatest sense of belonging, 'family' was the most common response with around one-fifth of participants giving this answer. Gendered norms, which tend to situate family and caring roles with femininity and discipline and authority with masculinity, shaped participant responses: females were more likely to name 'care for family', while males more often named 'discipline/teach own children'. But it is clear that family is important to most New Zealanders and they feel very protective of their responsibilities in this area.

b) *Work and tax*: The activities named third and fifth most frequently as individual responsibilities were 'work' and 'pay tax', with just over a quarter naming the former and just over a fifth indicating the latter. This is an important finding because it suggests that a notable minority of participants agree with government rhetoric which frames paid work as the most important way of demonstrating individual responsibility. However, when asked how one might characterise a 'good citizen', only a fifth of participants responded 'pay tax' or 'work' and only about a tenth thought 'not work and can' was the characteristic of a 'bad citizen'. Although paid work was considered very important by many participants, there was thus no overwhelming belief that it constitutes a crucial aspect of *citizenship*.

2.3 Indeed, when asked about an individual's responsibilities, participants named a total of 23 activities, indicating a far broader understanding than is evident in government welfare-to-work policies. These activities included 'participate in democracy', 'contribute to community' and 'care for others', although less than one-fifth of participants mentioned them. Similarly, when asked how they would characterise a 'good citizen', most equated this with being a good person: almost half said 'help others' or 'participate in community' and a quarter said 'good morals/norms'. 'Law-abiding' was named by almost two-fifths of participants, while 'participate in democracy' was mentioned by a quarter, both well above 'pay tax' or 'work'.

Policy implications: The strong belief that children and family are individual responsibilities helps explain public reaction to the repeal of Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961. However, earlier evidence suggests that participants look to government to help *support* families take care of their own, through health, education, welfare and – to a lesser but still significant degree – employment policies. While New Zealanders clearly conceive paid work to be an important way of demonstrating individual responsibility, other aspects of life (such as family and community) were mentioned as important. This challenges the government's rather one-dimensional focus on paid work.

Finding 3: Participants supported work-related conditions being placed upon main benefit recipients in some way, but most considered 'education' to be the best way to encourage greater individual responsibility

3.1 When asked specifically about 'work-for-dole', 'work-tests' or 'other conditions', around a third of participants fully agreed that main benefit recipients should be expected to meet each of these obligations in return for financial assistance from the state. When 'yes' and 'sometimes/maybe' responses are combined, between seven- and almost nine-tenths of participants supported the three types of conditions in some way.

3.2 The above findings suggest that New Zealanders believe main benefit recipients should be expected, encouraged and possibly even coerced into employment, which challenges the idea that work is a right rather than an individual responsibility. This seems to indicate that participants believed work-related obligations placed upon benefit recipients are an appropriate way to get this group to be more independent and self-reliant. Yet, when asked how we might encourage people to take greater individual responsibility, just under one-fifth of participants supported 'sanctions', such as the conditions noted above. The activity most frequently mentioned was 'education', which almost half named. A third of participants also named 'incentives', while a fifth indicated 'role-model values' as a way of encouraging individual responsibility. These results suggest that there is no majority support for coercive or punitive means for encouraging 'responsible' behaviour when participants were asked about this in a way that does not specify work-related obligations. This is especially the case for the 'sick/disabled' and 'Domestic Purposes Benefit (DPB) recipients', who the qualitative data indicates participants considered to be the most 'deserving' groups in society.

a) A noteworthy exception are middle income participants with no tertiary qualification whose beliefs regarding individual responsibility were more consistent with government rhetoric. They were most likely to support both 'work-for-dole' and 'work-tests', to name 'sanctions' as a way of encouraging responsibility and to consider it appropriate that benefit recipients are made to feel 'second class'. They were also most likely to name 'work' and 'tax' as individual responsibilities. The qualitative data suggests that this group felt particularly vulnerable in the labour market yet were unable to access subsidies available to lower income New Zealanders to mediate the cost of user-pays charges and rising living expenses. This made them feel disgruntled and thus tougher on the unemployed.

b) A less significant exception, but one no less important given gender had little impact on shaping responses to most questions, was that males were more likely to support 'sanctions' and 'role-model values' as ways of encouraging individual responsibility, to associate 'responsibilities' with citizenship and to believe we have more responsibilities today than in the past. Likely influenced by traditional gender norms, this finding further reflects the way neoliberal deregulation of the labour market has disproportionately affected some groups of males. This vulnerability was expressed in harder attitudes towards the unemployed.

Policy implications: Although there is strong support for placing some kinds of work-related conditions on main benefit recipients generally, participants preferred positive means of encouraging individual responsibility (such as 'education' and 'incentives') rather than more punitive sanctions. There is no clear indication that the New Zealand public overall supports a tightening of work-related conditions, especially those targeting the sick/disabled and DPB recipients.

Assumption 2: Income support recipients will experience a 'second class' form of citizenship, reducing both their support for social citizenship and social cohesion more generally

The international literature theorises that income support recipients who are subject to work-related obligations may experience a 'second class' form of citizenship. This is because some of their rights are conditional on adopting the attitudes or behaviours promoted by such obligations. While income support recipients are usually thought to support social citizenship rights more than wage/salary earners because of their 'self-interest' (i.e. they directly benefit from the welfare state), there has been concern that support for social citizenship would diminish over time amongst benefit recipients who are subject to such conditions because they come to believe the overriding rhetoric of 'individual responsibility' that frames them. In the long-term, it has also been thought likely that experiences of 'second class' citizenship would affect individual and societal belonging and thus reduce social cohesion.

Finding 4: Main benefit recipients strongly supported social citizenship rights – often more than New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients and wage/salary earners

4.1 Almost a third of both main benefit and New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients fully agreed that *'government should take responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for'*, compared to only one-tenth of wage/salary earners. This would appear to confirm the 'self-interest' argument and challenges the assumption that support for social citizenship would have diminished amongst main benefit recipients. In addition, some wage/salary earners did not support the government responsibility statement because they perceived little benefit for themselves from government services. Distrust of government is particularly strong amongst main benefit recipients, more than nine-tenths of whom indicated considerable distrust compared to only two-fifths of wage/salary earners and a third of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients. There were also qualitative differences in the causes of such distrust: amongst main benefit recipients this emerged from their frequent interaction with government services and dissatisfaction with assistance offered to New Zealanders in need, while wage/salary earners were more concerned with the perceived burden of regulations and intervention in an individual's life.

4.2 Main benefit recipients were also most likely to name all of the government responsibilities associated with social citizenship, with a majority naming 'health', 'education' and 'housing' and a prominent minority mentioning 'decent work/wages', 'ensure basics affordable' and 'childcare/children'. New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients were second most likely to name these activities, with the exception of 'health', 'education' and 'ensure basics affordable' which wage/salary earners named most often. Those receiving main benefits were also most likely to name 'basic needs met' and 'welfare entitlement' as rights of citizenship. In many cases, these results appear to be independent of income level, with low income participants generally only most likely to name 'housing' as a government responsibility, while low income earners with no tertiary qualification (along with middle income earners of the same educational status) were most likely to also mention 'decent work/wages'.

4.3 Given the findings above, it is surprising that main benefit recipients were least likely to support 'free health' or 'free education' and least likely to name 'health' and 'education' as rights of citizenship. This may be because main benefit recipients have been sheltered from user-pay charges more than other groups, with their benefit status and low incomes offering them access to more subsidies than wage/salary earners (particularly middle income earners). Many of the latter expressed considerable frustration with user-

pays and expectations that they were able to fully support themselves. Both low and middle income earners without tertiary qualifications were particularly vulnerable and were most likely to indicate that it was a right of citizenship to have their 'basic needs met'.

4.4 In addition, participants receiving a main benefit were slightly *more* likely than other groups to agree with the individual responsibility statement. Given other findings, the difference was not great enough to be able to argue in support of the theoretical assumption that benefit recipients subject to work-related obligations have 'bought into' the individual responsibility rhetoric of welfare policy. Indeed, although 'pay tax' was the only activity named as an individual responsibility more often by main benefit recipients than by other groups, they were also least likely to name 'work'. It is possible that past and present debate about using income support payments as a way of influencing the behaviour of parents may also explain why income support recipients (but especially those on a main benefit) were far more likely to name 'discipline/teach own children' as an individual responsibility than wage/salary earners. Furthermore, when asked what they associated with the term 'citizenship', main benefit recipients were most likely to name 'responsibilities' *and* 'rights', suggesting their experience of being on a benefit may have enhanced their awareness of both. Main benefit recipients were also most likely to believe we have more rights, and least likely to think we have more responsibilities, today than in the past.

4.5 Main benefit recipients also did not seem to accept conditions being placed on benefit recipients more than other New Zealanders. Most did not *disagree* with such conditions outright and they were slightly more likely to support 'work-tests' than other main income source groups, but main benefit recipients were ambivalent about most forms of work-related conditions or other means to encourage individual responsibility. This was often because they agreed in principle (wanting to deter people who 'abuse' the system) but knew from their own experiences the difficulties of applying a general rule to people with different needs and capabilities. In contrast, the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group was most likely to offer 'yes' responses to the two other types of conditions discussed ('work-for-dole' and 'other conditions'); however, there are strong indications this was linked to the older age of most participants in this group, rather than their main income source status. When participants were asked to think of ways in which we might encourage individual responsibility, New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients were also most likely to name the top response, 'education', while wage/salary earners were more likely to say 'sanctions'. Both groups named 'incentives' and 'role-model values' far more than main benefit recipients.

Policy implications: There is no overwhelming evidence that main benefit recipients' attitudes towards government responsibilities and social rights of citizenship have been diminished by the rhetoric of individual responsibility that frames the welfare policies to which they are subject. But that this group was generally ambivalent about, rather than completely against, placing conditions on benefit receipt suggests that current policy conditions and obligations may be having some impact on their opinions. It is difficult to separate this effect from other variables such as ethnicity, gender and education but, in tandem with the findings below, it suggests a review of welfare policy is needed.

Finding 5: Main benefit recipients are often treated as if they are 'second class' - but resisted this positioning

5.1 To assess whether benefit recipients experienced citizenship differently from other New Zealanders, participants were asked to respond to the statement: *'People receiving social security benefits are made to feel like second class citizens'*. Seven-tenths of participants agreed this 'second class' statement was true, with a further fifth answering 'sometimes/maybe'. Only just over a tenth of participants disagreed with the statement.

5.2 Not surprisingly, over two-thirds of main benefit recipients compared to just over two-fifths of wage/salary earners and a third of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance fully agreed with the statement. The difference between these two groups indicates the differential treatment that New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients experience because they are widely considered to be more 'deserving' than main benefit recipients.

5.3 When asked *why* benefit recipients might feel 'second class', the most common response related to the treatment of benefit recipients by 'Work & Income/Accident Compensation Corporation (WINZ/ACC) officials and policies'. Almost half the participants named this but both main benefit and New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients were far more likely to do so than wage/salary earners. A third of the total sample also felt that 'stigma' was an important factor in benefit recipients feeling 'second class'. This referred to a broader societal perception of benefit recipients as 'lazy' and 'undeserving', rather than the specific actions of WINZ/ACC officials (although the two are clearly related). Not surprisingly, main benefit recipients were most likely to name 'stigma' and were far less likely than other groups to individualise the problem by naming 'low self-esteem' as a reason benefit recipients might feel 'second class'. New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients' responses were the reverse (least likely to say 'stigma' and most likely to say 'low self-esteem'), stressing again that the two groups have very different experiences of benefit receipt. Wage/salary earners were least likely to name 'WINZ/ACC officials and policies', possibly because most had had little to do with these government agencies.

5.4 There is some evidence that the stigma and unequal treatment main benefit recipients experience may have a longer-term effect on belonging and, potentially, social cohesion. It is important to note that only about half the total number of participants said 'yes' when asked if citizenship was an important identity for them and that almost as many (two-fifths of participants) said 'no'. But main benefit recipients were a little less likely to give an affirmative answer (with almost a quarter doing so) than the other main income source groups.

5.5 Responses as to *why* citizenship is important to participants help us to understand the above finding. Almost three-fifths of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients said they feel 'pride' (making them more than twice as likely to say this than wage/salary earners and main benefit recipients). The New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group was also most likely to say New Zealand gave 'respect overseas', while wage/salary earners were slightly more likely to believe citizenship important for 'practical' reasons. Qualitative evidence from this study and from overseas research suggests that citizenship and national identity often become more important when citizens travel overseas. It is possible that because most main benefit recipients cannot afford such a luxury, a citizenship identity is less important to them. That main benefit recipients were most likely to mention 'passport/travel/migration' (with almost half naming this) when asked what they associated with citizenship seems to contradict this argument, but they spoke about such things in regards to immigrants to New Zealand, rather than themselves. More troublingly, main benefit recipients were less likely to associate citizenship with positive, collective concepts such as 'belonging' and 'national identity' than wage/salary earners and New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients. In general, main benefit recipients were not likely to name any responses given compared to other groups.

Policy implications: There is a strong perception and plenty of anecdotal evidence that government agencies, such as Work & Income, contribute to a wider stigmatisation of main benefit recipients. This is likely to be detrimental to their sense of belonging as citizens and

as New Zealanders. Current policies regarding the treatment of main benefit recipients should be reviewed.

Finding 6: Surprisingly few participants felt themselves to be ‘first class’ (valued and equal) citizens in New Zealand

6.1 Having discussed the ‘second class’ treatment of benefit recipients, participants were asked if *they* felt like a ‘first class’ (i.e. a valued and equal) citizen in New Zealand. Many found it difficult to answer and some resisted labelling themselves this way. However, about a third of participants gave each of the three responses: ‘yes’, ‘sometimes/maybe’ or ‘no’. A small minority said ‘don’t know’. A very surprising result is that those on main benefits were *more* likely to answer ‘yes’ and ‘sometimes/maybe’ than wage/salary earners and other benefit recipients (super annuitants and students) who are considered more ‘deserving’. Discussion highlighted that this was because main benefit recipients used a human rights discourse to challenge any suggestion they were not equal citizens. The other groups were more likely to associate the word ‘class’ with income-based divisions and either resisted the idea that ‘class’ existed in New Zealand or did not feel ‘first class’ in the economic sense. The middle income/no tertiary qualification group was the major exception: they were most likely to say they felt ‘first class’, apparently because they wished to dispute any perception they were any less a citizen than their wealthier, more educated counterparts and – given their economic vulnerability – in some cases to assert their superiority over those who were worse off than them.

6.2 To understand why so few participants felt ‘first class’ in contemporary New Zealand society, they were asked what people *need* to feel ‘first class’. Almost a third considered ‘respect/kindness’ as essential and another fifth identified ‘feeling valued’. Not surprisingly, given their frequent engagement with WINZ and ACC officials where a lack of respect and recognition was often apparent, main benefit recipients were most likely to name both of these preconditions. But so were low income, Māori and female participants, suggesting that those who are vulnerable or disadvantaged in society are more likely to consider these recognitive factors as a precondition to feeling ‘first class’. Almost a quarter of participants said that people need to have their ‘basic needs met’ or ‘money’ to feel ‘first class’; interestingly, these responses were more likely to be named by more advantaged groups in society (wage/salary earners, middle income earners, European/Pākehā – with the exception of ‘money’ which was most often named by Māori). Only a small minority of participants indicated that individuals need ‘to work’ and have ‘self-esteem’, ‘education’ or ‘belonging’ to feel ‘first class’.

Policy implications: Many people feel under-valued in New Zealand society, with participants often implicating current policy mechanisms, including a relatively low-wage economy, relatively poor practical and financial support for families with children, growing credentialism and a lack of discussion about multiculturalism, as contributors to this phenomenon. Participants’ comments indicate that both recognising devalued groups *and* improving socio-economic conditions is necessary to make all New Zealanders feel ‘first class’.

Assumption 3: Younger citizens are less likely to support social citizenship

It has also been assumed that support for social citizenship would have diminished since the implementation of neoliberal reforms because most New Zealanders under the age of 30 will have grown up in the neoliberal era and, having known nothing else, will more likely accept neoliberal policy and rhetoric. In contrast, older New Zealanders (particularly those over 60) are likely to remember a time when education and health were largely free of charge, make-work schemes aimed to support full employment policies and income support

recipients were not subject to work-related obligations; as such, they are more likely to support social citizenship rights. However, education mediates people's attitudes to social citizenship and because younger New Zealanders are more likely to have a tertiary qualification than their older counterparts, this may in fact make them more supportive of social citizenship.

Finding 7: In general, younger participants were less likely to support social citizenship rights than older participants

7.1 Although the difference is small, those over 45 years old *were* more likely to say 'yes' to the government responsibility statement. When 'yes' and 'sometimes/maybe' responses are combined, this lead became more substantial: around half of the over 45s offered some agreement in comparison to around a third of the under 46s. But the younger participants were also much less likely to answer 'no' to the statement, while both the under 31s and the over 60s tend to distrust government far less than the 31-60 age group. The sample was not large enough to disaggregate the variables of age and education, but in that participants with tertiary qualifications were generally more likely to name support for the government responsibility statement and the under 46s were less likely to do this suggests that education does not always lessen the effect of age. Indeed, it is notable that the effect of tertiary education upon participants' responses overall was rather mixed, being strongly mediated by income level and income source.

7.2 When naming the activities they considered to be government responsibilities, participants from the under 31s group did not offer the highest level of support for any activity, but the over 60s were most likely to name two: 'education' and 'infrastructure'. The 46-60s age group was most likely to name the greatest number of activities ('elderly', 'superannuation', 'childcare/children', 'housing', 'decent work', 'health', 'help the needy' and 'ensure basics affordable' (tied with the 31-45s). Overall, it appears participants in the middle age groups named the greatest number of activities as government responsibilities because they are raising families, saving for retirement, paying for health insurance *and* funding their children's education all at the same time, while their younger and older counterparts do not face these cumulative responsibilities and life risks in the same way. Interestingly, younger participants were not even more likely to favour 'free education' or name 'education' as a government responsibility. This is the case even though participants with tertiary qualifications were generally more supportive of this and even though education is the arm of the welfare state younger people will most likely to have personally experienced. However, the under 31s group was within six percentage points of the mean for all activities named as government responsibilities and their attitudes were not *substantially* more negative than the older participants, as the international literature would lead us to expect.

7.3 The over 60s were most likely to name activities associated with social rights of citizenship except 'welfare entitlement' which was most frequently mentioned by the 46-60 group. Indeed, when comparing the youngest and older generations, the under 31s were about one-third less likely to name 'welfare entitlement' and half as likely to name 'basic needs met' than the over 60s. This is the case even though both named 'help the needy' as a government responsibility and 'basic needs met' as a right more often than those with a tertiary qualification (although this was mediated by income level). The rights named most often by the under 31s were 'education' and 'health' (with around half of this group doing so) but this was only about two-thirds of the support offered by the over 60s. This does suggest a considerable weakening of a social rights discourse amongst the younger generation, although it – once again – may also reflect their lack of engagement with many of the life risk's older participants have experienced across the life course.

Policy implications: While there is some evidence that support for social citizenship may diminish over time because younger New Zealanders have been influenced by the neoliberal policy reality in which they have grown up, attitudes towards social citizenship may equally be influenced by life-stage rather than a simple generational effect. This means that younger people, who at the current time do not consider social policy issues to be particularly important, may well change their minds once they have children, want to buy a house or take on other major life responsibilities. Thus political representatives should not anticipate that social policy will become less important to voters over time.

Finding 8: Older participants were more concerned individual responsibility and were often tougher on main benefit recipients than younger participants yet were more open to non-punitive ways of encouraging responsibility

8.1 Although the 31-45s group was most likely to offer 'yes' responses to the individual responsibility statement, when 'yes' and 'sometimes/maybe' were combined participants 61 years and over were much more likely to agree in some way: over four-fifths did so, compared to just over half the 31-45s and seven out of ten of the under 31s. The over 60s were also the only group to give no negative answers. That younger participants offered more clear-cut responses provides some support for the assumption that the younger generation are more likely to endorse neoliberal ideas about individual responsibility. However, that the over 60s offered more, if ambivalent, support for the individual responsibility statement overall suggests that attitudes may reflect life experience rather than a simple generational effect.

8.2 Differences between age groups were minimal when it comes to the types of activities named as individual responsibilities. The over 60s were twice as likely as the under 46 age group to name 'discipline/teach own children' and/or 'care for family' as individual responsibilities, with responses suggesting some nostalgia for more traditional family forms and morals. The under 31s were a little more likely to say 'look after &/or pay for own health' than the over 60s but the over 45s were far more accepting of user-pays in health and education than the under 46s age group (although the over 45s were also most likely to say 'no'). The under 31s were more likely to say 'work' was an individual responsibility but differences were very small, as they were regarding 'pay tax'. These mixed findings offer no clear evidence that younger participants have been more heavily influenced by individual responsibility rhetoric in the social policy arena.

8.3 The over 60s were the strongest supporters of 'work-for-dole' and 'other conditions' and were a close second runner-up on 'work-tests', which was named most frequently by the under 31s (although responses overall were small). When considering how we might encourage greater individual responsibility, the under 46s were slightly more likely to say 'sanctions' than the over 45s, a little less likely to name 'incentives' and far less likely to mention 'role-model values' or 'education'. These mixed results do not offer enough evidence to say that younger people have harder attitudes towards main benefit recipients than their older counterparts, but the latter do appear to be more open to more varied means of encouraging individual responsibility. This is the case even though participants with tertiary qualifications were generally more likely than those without to mention all five most commonly named ways of encouraging individual responsibility; thus suggesting education did not mitigate the responses of the younger participants, as one might expect.

8.4 The 46-60 years age group was most likely to agree that social security recipients are made to feel that are 'second class' and the over 60s were *less* likely to agree with this statement than the under 46s. This might be because New Zealand super annuitants are generally framed as far more 'deserving' than main benefit recipients and their personal experience thus did not support this statement. The over 60s also named 'low self-esteem'

as a reason why main benefit recipients might feel 'second class' more frequently than other age groups, suggesting an individualisation of this problem. But the over 45s were most likely to name 'WINZ/ACC officials and policies' and 'stigma' as contributors to this phenomenon and to consider it *inappropriate* to treat main benefit recipients as 'second class'. Thus, although older participants were more ambivalent about whether such a 'second class' status existed, they disagreed with and were able to offer more reasons for it than younger participants who grew up during the 1980s and 1990s.

Policy implications: There is no clear evidence that New Zealand public opinion about the treatment of main benefit recipients will harden as the population ages. Government agencies and elected officials thus must make no assumption that punitive policies will be easier to implement in the future.

Finding 9: Financial factors were more important in making younger participants feel 'first class' than they were for their older counterparts

9.1 Age was not an important factor influencing whether participants felt 'first class' or not. But there *was* a clear difference as to whether recognitive or financial factors were necessary preconditions for this. The 46-60s were most likely to say 'respect/kindness' and 'self-esteem', while the over 45s also said 'feel valued' more often. But the 31-45s named 'basic needs met' (although differences were small) and 'money' more frequently than the older age groups. Notably, no one 61 years and over said the latter and this group was least likely to name the former. The under 31s also did not name 'basic needs met' and 'money' nearly as often as the 31-45s. The differing responses from within the under 46s age group suggests that these findings do not reflect a more 'selfish', consumer-oriented generation but rather the varied economic circumstances and responsibilities of participants. Interview and focus group data suggests that the middle age participants were more interested in financial issues because they faced greater economic vulnerability and a greater burden of responsibility than their older (and more financially secure) or younger (and more financially dependent) counterparts.

9.2 Finally, it is notable that participants aged over 45 years were most likely to say citizenship was an important identity to them. This was especially the case for the over 60s, who were almost twice as likely as the under 46s to say this was so. It is difficult to know if this finding reflects a general weakening of citizenship as an identity in recent years or whether citizenship becomes a more important identity as an individual grows older. There is some evidence that the latter may be true, with many of the younger participants being rather narrowly focused in terms of identity and belonging. For instance, 'family' was the most common site of belonging for the under 31s, especially when compared to the over 60s (none of whom named this), and references to 'national community' and 'local community' were also far lower amongst this group. Similarly, when asked what they associated with the term 'citizenship', younger participants were focused largely on travel-related issues ('passport/travel/migration' and 'gives respect overseas') while the over 60s were more than twice as likely to name 'belonging' than the under 31s. The over 45s also mentioned 'national identity' a little more frequently than those aged under 46. When asked why citizenship was an important identity, the over 60s were most likely to say 'pride', with about half saying so compared to around a third of the under 31s and 46-60s, while only a tenth of the 31-45s did so. Once again, it is difficult to know if the attitudes of younger participants will change over time, as they travel, raise families and develop a greater awareness of their citizenship role (possibly through tertiary education) or whether their current attitudes reflect a significant shift in the importance of nation-based citizenship identities more generally.

Policy implications: In that financial insecurity and economic vulnerability can shape citizens' sense of belonging and identity in New Zealand, it is important to ensure income adequacy so that the basic needs of *all* New Zealanders are met. In addition, although there is some indication that citizenship knowledge and belonging may increase with age, it is possible that improving citizenship education amongst young New Zealanders could be beneficial for social cohesion and democratic participation.

Assumption 4: Growing cultural diversity may reduce support for social citizenship rights

There have also been theoretical assumptions that increasing cultural diversity will diminish support for the welfare state and social citizenship. This is partly because placing a policy emphasis on forms of cultural recognition (such as 'biculturalism') is thought to come at the cost of the traditional focus of the social rights of citizenship, which is on the material disadvantages (such as income inequality and income inadequacy) that affect *all* ethnic groups and which have worsened since neoliberal reforms were implemented. In addition, there is some concern that the welfare state may become negatively associated with new migrants and ethnic minorities, who are perceived as relying heavily on its assistance. The attitudes of citizens born overseas may also be more influenced by the policy settings of their country of origin than any past focus on social rights that may have existed in their new place of residence.

Finding 10: New Zealand's colonial history shaped the strong support for both government *and* individual responsibility found amongst Māori

10.1 About a quarter of both European/Pākehā and Māori fully agreed with the statement but when the 'sometimes/maybe' answers are added almost half of Māori agreed compared to only two-fifths of European/Pākehā. Despite the similarity in results for these two groups, qualitative analysis shows that there were quite different reasons for their responses: while European/Pākehā were concerned with the democratic process and the idea that government represents all New Zealanders effectively, Māori articulated a need for government to address New Zealand's colonial history with improved recognition of their indigenous and Treaty rights. Indeed, over three-quarters of Māori participants expressed considerable distrust of government, compared to only half of European/Pākehā, largely due to this history of colonialism and its ongoing effects.

10.2 Māori were by far the most likely ethnic group to name 'help the needy', 'housing', 'decent work/wages' and 'ensure basics affordable' and were second most likely to name 'health' and 'education' as government responsibilities. Māori participants offered little or no support for the idea of 'free health' or 'free education' yet, when asked specifically about support for user-pays in social policy areas, they offered only 'no' responses. Despite this discrepancy, overall Māori support for government to take responsibility in social policy areas was very strong.

10.3 Although Māori most commonly indicated social policy issues were a government responsibility, European/Pākehā were most likely to name 'health', 'education' and 'basic needs met' as *rights of New Zealand citizenship*, while the 'Other' ethnic group was most likely to name 'welfare entitlement' as such. A small number of Māori participants referred to 'Treaty/indigenous rights' when asked about the rights of citizenship and it is likely this incorporated some focus on issues associated with social citizenship. It is also possible that Māori participants supported government taking responsibility for a range of social policy areas but did not consider these *rights* given the unequal treatment Māori have often historically received from government agencies.

10.4 Despite strong support for government responsibility, almost two-thirds of Māori participants agreed with the individual responsibility statement, meaning they were substantially more likely to provide an affirmative response than any other ethnic group. They were also least likely to disagree. While this finding counters popular myths about 'welfare dependent' attitudes amongst this group, it is important to note that Māori participants did not strongly associate the idea of 'individual responsibility' with paid work or work-related conditions being placed on benefit recipients. When asked about these specific conditions, Māori were most likely to name 'work-tests', but less than a quarter said 'yes' and they were most likely to say 'no' to 'work-for-dole', while support for 'other conditions' was very ambivalent. The qualitative evidence suggests many Māori associated the individual responsibility statement with a Māori self-determination discourse focused on regaining Māori control over decisions pertaining to their own lives. While there is some overlap between neoliberal ideas of individual responsibility and Māori self-determination, it is important to stress that they have quite different cultural drivers.

10.5 Māori comments about citizenship generally reflect this group's troubled relationship with government and the concept of the New Zealand nation-state, as well as the group's disproportional socio-economic disadvantage. Māori participants were least likely to say citizenship was an important identity for them, with less than one-tenth giving this response. In addition, none associated it with 'national identity' or 'belonging', given they tended to have a very negative viewpoint on citizenship due to its association with breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi or with immigrants coming to New Zealand and receiving resources ahead of Māori. Few Māori participants also offered any of the main responses mentioned by other groups as to why citizenship was important to them; notably less than a tenth said this was because of 'pride'. Not surprisingly, 'local community' and 'ethnic group' were considered more important sites of belonging than citizenship.

Policy implications: Given Māori are a significant and growing proportion of the New Zealand population, their strong support for government responsibility in a range of social policy areas should not be ignored by political representatives. Nor should the apparent support for individual responsibility be mistaken for a widespread endorsement of punitive work-related obligations for main benefit recipients, which are likely to disproportionately affect Māori as a group. The negative views that many Māori have of citizenship (and of government) are troubling, given they do not offer much hope for developing greater belonging and social cohesion. Both institutional acts of recognition, as well as improvements in the socio-economic status of Māori as a group, are likely needed to address these issues.

Finding 11: Ethnic minority groups were more ambivalent about social citizenship but were not tougher on main benefit recipients than Māori and European/Pākehā

11.1 As noted, European/Pākehā and Māori participants were most likely to fully agree with the government responsibility statement. Pasifika and 'Other' participants did not offer 'yes' or 'no' responses but over half the former and over a fifth of the latter group gave 'sometimes/maybe' responses. This suggests substantive (if more ambivalent) support overall. The qualitative evidence indicates that a strong work ethic and community focus may have made Pasifika participants hesitant to *completely* agree with the statement but considerable distrust of government and concern about the disproportionately poor socio-economic status of Pasifika peoples meant they still supported a strong role for government in social policy matters. It is less clear why participants from the 'Other' ethnic group offered strong but mostly ambivalent support for the government responsibility statement, especially since only a third of them were distrustful of government. Asian participants were even less distrustful (only a tenth expressed such a feeling) but they offered no direct responses to the government responsibility statement at all. It is possible 'Other' and Asian

participants were less likely to distrust government because they either did not have enough experience of New Zealand to have formed an opinion (although only the Asian ethnic group included participants who were new migrants) or they rated the New Zealand government favourably against those overseas. Either way, ethnic minority groups were overall more ambivalent about the government responsibility statement than European/Pākehā or Māori participants.

11.2 Nonetheless, differing ethnic minority groups strongly supported government responsibility in specific areas. Of the ethnic minority groups, 'Other' participants offered the highest levels of support across most areas, probably because they shared many characteristics with the European/Pākehā ethnic group who were also very supportive. Four-fifths of the 'Other' ethnic group also named 'health' and 'education', making them most likely to do so by far, while over half said 'help the needy'. Pasifika participants were most likely to name 'childcare/children' as a government responsibility (with a third doing so), while half supported 'health' and 'education' and a third 'help the needy' and 'decent work/wages'. The qualitative data suggests this is likely for similar reasons as above. The Asian group named the fewest number of government responsibilities, probably because all but one of its members were recent migrants and thus were still heavily influenced by their experiences living in China or Taiwan. Just over half of Asian participants thought government should 'help the needy' but they were far less likely than other groups to name 'health', 'education' and 'childcare/children' (only just over a tenth gave these responses). None of the Asian group named 'housing' or 'decent work/wages' at all.

11.3 In general, minority ethnic groups were less likely to use the language of rights to discuss social policy issues. With the exception of 'welfare entitlement' - where the 'Other' ethnic group was ahead - European/Pākehā were more likely than other groups to name all the rights associated with social citizenship. However, this appears to be part of a broader problem of knowledge about citizenship, with ethnic minority groups also less likely to name civil and political rights. While this might be partly associated with the fact that many of these participants had not grown up in New Zealand, the qualitative evidence also suggests a relationship between relative disadvantage in New Zealand and poor knowledge of citizenship and its rights.

11.4 Two-fifths of Asian and 'Other' participants offered 'yes' answers to the individual responsibility statement, making them most likely to do so after Māori, while none disagreed with it. These viewpoints were likely shaped by experiences in their home country. For instance, discussion suggested that a strong cultural emphasis on family responsibility in many Asian countries meant the government takes less responsibility for the kinds of social services offered in New Zealand. Pasifika participants were the least likely to offer a clear-cut response but more than two-fifths said 'sometimes/maybe'.

11.5 These findings would suggest there may be some basis for the theoretical assumption that cultural diversity may harden attitudes towards benefit recipients. However, 'work' and 'pay tax' were mentioned infrequently as individual responsibilities by the ethnic minority groups, suggesting no overwhelming support for paid work to be considered a notably individual responsibility. Ethnic minority groups were also less likely to mention specific activities as individual responsibilities overall. The 'Other' group mentioned 'care for family' and 'contribute to community' more frequently than other groups, and were not far behind European/Pākehā regarding 'discipline/teach own children'. Pasifika and Asian were not more likely to name any activity as an individual responsibility, although over two-fifths of the former named 'care for family'. However, almost a third of both the 'Other' and Asian groups gave responses coded as 'look after &/or pay for own health', suggesting some support for user-pays in this area.

11.6 In addition, there is no clear trend towards ethnic minority groups being more supportive of conditions being placed on main benefit recipients than other New Zealanders. Pasifika participants supported 'work-for-dole' more than other groups, but only just over one-tenth did so. This group did not offer 'yes' responses to any other type of conditions that could be placed on main benefit recipients, although a third said 'sometimes/maybe' to 'other conditions' and a tenth said the same to 'work-tests'. The 'Other' ethnic group was most likely to say 'yes' to 'other conditions', with over two-fifths giving this response, while less than a quarter said 'yes' to 'work-tests' and less than one-tenth did the same for 'work-for-dole'. Asian participants made no direct responses to these questions.

11.7 When asked how we might encourage greater individual responsibility, Asian participants were on par with European/Pākehā regarding 'education' with almost three-fifths of each group naming this. Almost a third of Asian participants also named 'incentives' or 'get alongside/support people' but they did not name 'role-model values' or 'sanctions'. All four activities were named by almost a third of the 'Other' ethnic group, which was most likely group to mention the latter two activities. Pasifika participants made few responses to this question, with just over a fifth naming 'education' and a tenth indicating 'incentives' and 'role-model values'; none named 'sanctions'. These findings suggest that minority ethnic groups are open to a range of means for encouraging individual responsibility and, given only the 'Other' group named 'sanctions' at all, there is no preference for punitive obligations to achieve this goal.

Policy implications: Policy-makers and elected representatives should not assume that as the proportion of overseas-born citizens living in New Zealand increases, support for social citizenship will diminish. While there is some evidence that ethnic minority groups offer less support at the moment, it is notable that the 'Other' and Pasifika participants, who had lived in New Zealand longer, were more likely to distrust government and support social citizenship more than the Asian migrants who had arrived more recently. There is also no clear evidence that ethnic minority groups are tougher on main benefit recipients than other New Zealanders and thus will support a tightening of their conditions.

Finding 12: Ethnic minority groups associated being 'second class' with ethnicity, rather than benefit receipt

12.1 European/Pākehā were most likely to fully agree that benefit recipients are treated as 'second class' citizens, with almost three-fifths doing so, compared to almost half of Māori and two-fifths of 'Other' participants. It is perhaps surprising that Māori were not the front-runners here given Māori constitute a disproportionate number of benefit recipients, while Māori participants had the highest levels of distrust of government and placed a strong emphasis on government responsibility. This finding appears to be linked to Māori, along with Pasifika participants, tending to frame any disadvantage in terms of ethnicity rather than benefit receipt. To a certain degree this was true of other participants, in that when they were asked what other groups might feel 'second class' in New Zealand society, two-fifths of participants thought 'Māori', a tenth said 'immigrants' and just under a tenth said 'Pacific peoples'. Participants thus saw ethnicity as a major source of disadvantage in New Zealand.

12.2 However, while over half the European/Pākehā and 'Other' participants said benefit recipients might feel 'second class' due to the treatment they received from 'WINZ/ACC officials and policies', just over two-fifths of Māori and Pasifika did so – even though members of these ethnic groups are more likely to receive a benefit in New Zealand. European/Pākehā were also far more likely to say 'stigma', with half saying so, compared to just over a tenth of Māori and 'Other'. When it comes to 'low self-esteem', no Māori named this, few Pasifika did but 'Other' participants were ahead, with almost a third naming this.

These findings again suggest that ethnic minority groups (including Māori) did not consider benefit receipt the most important source of feeling under-valued and unequal in New Zealand society.

12.3 Support for this argument is found in the fact that although a similar number (about a third) of Māori, Asian and European/Pākehā participants said 'yes' they felt 'first class' in New Zealand society, this response was far less common amongst 'Other' and Pasifika participants. The 'Other' and Asian groups were also by far the most likely to say 'no' they did not feel 'first class', with European/Pākehā least likely to offer this response. These results indicate that being European/Pākehā is associated with feeling 'first class' and generally ethnic minority groups are more mixed in their views (and experiences) about feeling valued and equal in New Zealand society. But Māori were second most likely to say 'yes' and second least likely to say 'no', with discussion suggesting that many Māori participants felt that although they were treated as 'second class' in society, they could draw upon an indigenous/Treaty rights discourse to claim a 'first class' status. Some participants also noted the importance of whakapapa as a source of feeling 'first class'.

12.4 Given the above findings, it comes as no surprise that ethnic minority groups (along with other disadvantaged groups) were more likely to mention recognitive, rather than redistributive, factors as preconditions of feeling 'first class'. However, the 'Other' group was most likely to name 'basic needs met' and Māori said 'money' most frequently (with over two-fifths doing so in both cases). This suggests material conditions were still important to these groups. Importantly, European/Pākehā were most likely to name 'feel valued', with the qualitative evidence suggesting that a strong focus on 'ethnic' issues, along with neoliberal policies which have increased income inequality and kept wages relatively low, meant that some ethnic majority members felt marginalised in New Zealand.

12.5 Despite this finding, the European/Pākehā and 'Other' ethnic groups were also most likely to say citizenship was important to them, with around two-fifths doing so in each case. Only a quarter of Pasifika peoples did the same, while no Asian participant did; indeed, they only offered 'no' responses. New Zealand's high levels of immigration and the common experience of travelling overseas seem to have influenced understandings of citizenship. Many participants considered 'citizenship' to be simply a practical device for gaining access to rights and services within a country and did not necessarily associate it with 'belonging' or a New Zealand 'national identity'. This was particularly notable amongst Asian and, to a lesser extent, Pasifika participants. Importantly, European/Pākehā participants were also more likely to give 'pride' as a reason for why citizenship was an important identity to them. When asked to consider where they found their greatest sense of belonging, 'family' was most important for Pasifika participants, while for Asian participants it was 'national community' (usually China rather than New Zealand). These findings highlight that citizenship was a rather latent identity for most participants and many did not see it as relevant to their daily lives. This is not *necessarily* a problem. But given democratic participation is critical to the functioning of society and citizenship is often theorised as having the potential to offer a shared identity to a diverse population, it is concerning that *no* Pasifika and Asian participants named 'participate in democracy' as an individual responsibility and few indicated that citizenship was important to them because they had 'pride' in New Zealand.

Policy implications: While specific citizenship education may be useful to encourage a better and shared knowledge of citizenship rights and responsibilities amongst New Zealanders, it is not clear that it will be able to overcome the differences in levels of citizenship identity and belonging found amongst different ethnic groups. There is a need to recognise Māori rights while also accommodating the diverse needs of New Zealand's multicultural population. But in that the differences in knowledge, identity and belonging appear to be

linked to existing socio-economic inequalities, social cohesion may not be radically improved until these material inequalities are reduced.

Conclusion

The changes in social and economic policy that neoliberal reforms brought to New Zealand *have* shaped attitudes towards government and individual responsibility and to particular aspects of social policy, if not in as negative or as clear-cut way as the theoretical literature would suggest. Indeed, frustration with such reforms has often enhanced support for social citizenship, rather than diminished it. However, predictions that neoliberal policies would impact negatively on broader understandings of citizenship and belonging have stronger ground. This study has found that both are heavily influenced by forms of inequality and disadvantage (based on ethnicity, main income source, age and – to a lesser extent – socio-economic status and gender) that have grown since neoliberal reforms were implemented in New Zealand from the 1980s. There is some evidence that citizens *do* need a basic level of social and economic security to activate their civil and political rights and, until these broader inequalities are addressed, many New Zealanders will continue feeling undervalued and social cohesion at the society level will remain vulnerable.

INTRODUCTION

This report tells a fascinating story about contemporary public opinion in New Zealand. In asking whether neoliberal policy reforms implemented since the 1980s have radically changed public beliefs about the idea of social citizenship, it analyses the views of 87 research participants on a diverse but related range of topics, including: What activities should government and individuals be responsible for? What rights are associated with citizenship? Should the unemployed have to meet work-related obligations to keep receiving a benefit? And what do New Zealand citizens need to feel 'first class' in this country? The report argues that support for social rights of citizenship is not dead in New Zealand, nor have New Zealand citizens been totally immune to the rhetoric and reality of neoliberal reforms. Indeed, in considering broader issues of citizenship, the report highlights how identity and belonging in New Zealand are heavily shaped by social, cultural and economic differences and *inequalities*.

What exactly is social citizenship?

The term 'social citizenship' was coined by a British scholar, T. H. Marshall (1950/2000). He argued that in order to activate the civil and political rights of citizenship, individuals needed a guaranteed, basic level of economic welfare and security. This was to be achieved through a set of 'social' rights to decent education, health, housing, income and state assistance in times of need. From the 1930s to the early 1980s, New Zealand governments made a strong commitment to these social rights of citizenship through (mostly) free health and education, a system of wage regulation and a well-developed system of social support for the needy. However, from the mid-1980s, neoliberal reforms significantly challenged this commitment to social rights (Cheyne, O'Brien, & Belgrave, 2008).

What are neoliberal reforms?

'Neoliberalism' is a contested term but, at its core, is an amalgam of theories that together advocate:

- A minimum of government intervention in the economy, usually limited to ensuring laws allow individual freedom and unrestricted market competition, leading to deregulation of trade, finance and the labour market;
- 'Small government', leading to the corporatisation and privatisation of many former government departments and the contracting out of many social services to private or community organisations;
- The introduction of a 'market model' in many social policy areas, including health and education, as a means to encourage greater 'efficiency', 'choice' and 'individual responsibility'. A focus on the latter also encourages greater restrictions on the eligibility for income support and extends obligations for those receiving income-tested benefits (Cheyne, et al., 2008; Duncan, 2004).

These neoliberal ideas shaped policy in many countries from the late 1970s but were first implemented in New Zealand under the Fourth Labour government from 1984 and extended under National-led governments during the 1990s. Upon their election in 1999, Labour-coalition governments made minor modifications to minimise the social harms of neoliberal reforms but largely continued with its economic agenda. The current National government elected in 2008 has adopted a similar approach, continuing to pursue the

general principles of neoliberalism while placing a minor focus on 'social' issues (Cheyne, et al., 2008; Humpage & Craig, 2008).

In determining whether these reforms shaped attitudes to social citizenship in New Zealand, it is necessary to consider different types of reforms and what kinds of effects they may have had on public opinion. This is discussed in the next two sections.

Potential effects of reforms to education and health

In New Zealand, user-pays charges were introduced in health and education, while cuts were made in other areas of social support and many social services were contracted out to non-governmental organisations to deliver. The international theoretical literature suggests that user-pays and privatisation reduce support for the welfare state because fewer people have contact with it (Brook, Hall, & Preston, 1998; Gilens, 2000). One might predict, then, that the New Zealand public's support for social citizenship (and the welfare state more generally) would have diminished as a result. There is also some evidence that the younger generation are less likely to support social citizenship, either because they have grown up in the neoliberal era and have thus known nothing else or because they contribute to a long-term decline in support for welfare state that may be occurring across successive generations (Eardley, Saunders, & Evans, 2000; Sefton, 2003; Svallfors, 2003). However, it is equally possible that public support for government responsibility in a range of social and economic policy areas has been reinforced or enhanced by the same policy trends, due to growing dissatisfaction with the quality and availability of such services (Sefton, 2003). In addition, younger people are more likely to have a tertiary education than their older counterparts. In that tertiary education often makes people more supportive of social citizenship rights, young New Zealanders may thus have more positive towards social citizenship than expected (van Oorschot, 2002).

There are further arguments that as the cultural diversity of a country increases, support for the welfare state and social citizenship decreases. This is partly because placing a policy emphasis on forms of cultural recognition is often thought to come at the cost of a focus on material disadvantage (such as issues of income inequality and income adequacy) across all cultural and ethnic groups (Fraser & Honneth, 2003; Giltlin, 1995). For instance, Poata-Smith (2004) argues that government's preference for institutionalising aspects of Māori culture (such as in bicultural policies introduced in the public sector) have marginalised the class-based disadvantage many Māori face, just like other New Zealanders. This is the case even though income inequality, income adequacy and other forms of material disadvantage have grown in New Zealand since (and some would say because of) the implementation neoliberal reforms (Kelsey, 1997; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – OECD, 2008; 2009a). In that social rights of citizenship have traditionally aimed to address mainly material forms of disadvantage, it is possible that growing recognition of the cultural diversity that exists in countries like New Zealand may simultaneously diminish support for such rights, even if this argument has been disputed by some international research (Banting, Johnson, Kymlicka, & Soroka, 2006; McEwan, 2006) (Keating, 2005).

In addition, there has been concern that the welfare state may become negatively associated with new migrants and ethnic minorities who are perceived to rely heavily on its assistance (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Barry, 2001; Salter, 2004; van Oorschot, 2006). Citizens born overseas may also be more heavily influenced by the policy settings of their country of origin than any past focus on social rights found in their new place of residence. Because immigration policy was liberalised (opening it up to immigrants from a wider range of countries) as part of the neoliberal reform agenda, this argument may hold some ground in New Zealand (McMillan, 2004b).

Existing public opinion data from the New Zealand Election Survey (NZES) *does* highlight that attitudes to some aspects of social citizenship have changed since the reforms, although often not as clearly as one might expect, as the examples in the box below indicate:

- Support for the idea that 'government should provide free health care' dropped from 76% in 1993 to 65% by 2005, but then rose again to 77% in 2008. In contrast, support for 'government should increase spending on health' grew from 70% in 1990 to 86% in 2002, before dropping to 79% in 2008. In both cases, there was *greater* support in 2008 than 1990 and attitudes seem to have been influenced by the worsening economic conditions in 2008 (NZES, 1990; 2005; 2008).
- Support for the idea that 'government should provide a free education from preschool to tertiary education' dropped more dramatically than health, from 81% in 1990 to between 64-68% in the 1990s and early 2000s, before rising again to 76% in 2008. Support for 'increased government spending on education' rose steadily from 64% in 1990 to 81% in 2002, before dropping to 70% in 2008 (NZES, 1990; 2005; 2008). As with health, there seems to be an inverse relationship between support for free education and a desire for education spending, indicating these two things are not necessarily linked in New Zealander's minds.
- Support for reduced taxes as one means 'to help solve New Zealand's economic problems' grew from 36% in 1993 to 73% in 2008. But when respondents were asked whether 'government should reduce taxes and people should pay more for their own health and education', support grew only from 19% in 1993 to a high of 48% in 2002, before dropping again to 24% by 2008 (NZES, 1993; 2002; 2008). That only a quarter of 2008 respondents agreed with this question, compared to that referring to solving New Zealand's economic problems, suggests that the desire for tax cuts remained conditional on social concerns – even when the economy is bad.

Overall, these findings indicate that although the number of New Zealanders supporting health and education as a social right may have declined, the majority still favoured free health and education in 2008 and more wanted increased spending on these, even if that meant paying more tax to fund them. One can assume that this desire for increased social spending might be caused by dissatisfaction with declining health and education services, but a quantitative survey like the NZES cannot confirm this nor explain why New Zealanders might support tax cuts in regard to the economy but not in relation to social services.

Potential effects of reforms to work and welfare

Other types of neoliberal reforms shifted New Zealand policy away from the idea that government was responsible for providing 'decent work' to all who wanted it. This included deregulation of the labour market, bringing the abandonment of wage regulation with the introduction of the 1991 Employment Contracts Act and of government's role in developing job creation schemes in tough economic times. Instead, emphasis was placed on improving the jobs skills and attitudes of unemployed individuals without consideration of the labour market context in which such skills and attitudes would be tested. This saw increased surveillance of the behaviours and actions of income support claimants through measures such as work activity requirements, the development of Job Plans and a work-for-dole programme between 1998 and 2001.

Again, there are theoretical arguments that public attitudes towards social citizenship are based on 'self-interest', in that people will support or oppose a particular policy depending on the extent to which they personally (or people 'like' them) benefit or lose out (Brook, et al., 1998; Orton & Rowlingson, 2007). For instance, an unemployed person may be more

supportive of government intervention than other groups, simply because s/he is more likely to be benefiting from such assistance (Svallfors, 2003). Although there is competing evidence to suggest that some attitudes are driven more by altruistic ideas about what is good for society, we might thus anticipate that the New Zealand government's framing of unemployment as an individual responsibility would encourage the public to think only of their self-interest and for their attitudes to the unemployed to harden (Eardley & Matheson, 1999; Sefton, 2003). This may be especially the case if, as theorised, increasing cultural diversity and age has an impact on such attitudes (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Salter, 2004; van Oorschot, 2006).

Furthermore, there is some international evidence that income support recipients subject to these work-related obligations experience a 'second class' form of citizenship (Dean & Melrose, 1999; Dwyer, 1998). This is because some of their rights are conditional on adopting certain attitudes or behaviours; for example, taking any job offered to them even if it does not utilise their qualifications or previous work experience and even if they have significant caring responsibilities, disability or health issues (Breitkruez, 2005; Gilbert, 2002; McDonald & Marston, 2005). There is concern that such changes in work and welfare may affect individual and societal belonging and traditional notions of equality and solidarity in the long term (Brodie, 2002; Dean & Taylor-Gooby, 1992; Shaver, 2004; Wilkinson, 2005). However, these theoretical ideas are widely contested (Barbalet, 1988; Mead, 1992; Selbourne, 1994).

Existing public opinion data suggests that New Zealand attitudes *have* changed towards *some* types of benefit recipients as a result of neoliberal reforms but that public opinion has not shifted across-the-board. The boxed examples illustrate this:

- The majority (94%) of New Zealanders in 2008 agreed that it is the 'government's responsibility to ensure a decent standard of living for old people', a group who have traditionally been regarded as very 'deserving'. This represents no change on the 1990 figure, with virtually no fluctuation in the intervening years (NZES, 1990; 2008).
- Support for 'government spending on the Domestic Purposes Benefit' (DPB) also rose slightly between 1989 (13%) and 2004 (17%) (P. Perry, 2004; P. Perry & Webster, 1999). Although DPB recipients have tended to be viewed less positively by the public than the elderly, it appears that public concern about this group (and/or their children) grew during a significant period of reform when they were a target of the focus National governments placed on 'welfare dependency'. This finding contradicts expectations.
- A similar number of NZES respondents agreed that it is 'government's responsibility to provide jobs for everyone who wants one' in both 1990 (60%) and 2008 (61%). Although support was slightly higher in 1999 (65%) and slightly lower through most of the rest of the 1990s (57%) and in the early 2000s (56-59%), this minimal variation suggests government responsibility for jobs has remained steady and strong. This is despite significant employment relations and trade regulation reforms (NZES, 1990; 1993; 1996; 1999; 2002; 2005; 2008).
- Support for the idea that it is the 'government's responsibility to ensure a decent standard of living for the unemployed', a group traditionally regarded as 'undeserving', was the same in 1990 and 2008 (53%). However, support rose dramatically in the early 1990s, with 69% of respondents supporting this statement in 1993 and it remained high (65-66%) during the 1990s, before dropping substantially (53-56%) in the 2000s. Public attitudes towards the unemployed are clearly not rigid; support increases in times of economic downturn and decreases when the economy improves. This suggests that unemployment is

not perceived as something individuals have complete control over (NZES, 1990; 1993; 1996; 1999; 2002; 2005; 2008).

- Yet, New Zealand Value Survey (P. Perry, 2004; P. Perry & Webster, 1993) data show a slight drop in support for 'government taking responsibility for increased spending on job training/assistance' between 1989 (61%) and 2004 (57%). This is despite the record lows in unemployment experienced in the early 2000s. Furthermore, support for the idea that 'government should redistribute more wealth from the rich to ordinary people' dropped dramatically from 49% in 1993 to 29% in 2005 (NZES, 1993; 2005).
- There is also some evidence of increasing support for conditions being placed on benefit receipt. Between 1999 and 2008, support for the idea that 'the unemployed should have to work for their benefit' increased from 68% to 75% (NZES, 1999; 2008), while the number of people regarding 'laziness' as the main reason 'why people who live in need are poor' grew from 38% to 60% over the period 1989-2004 (P. Perry, 2004; P. Perry & Webster, 1999). However, in 2008 this same question was asked in the NZES and only 38% said 'laziness'; the number of respondents who said 'welfare benefits make people lazy and dependent' also stayed steady between 2005 and 2008, even if a large majority (62%) supported this statement (NZES 2005; 2008).

These findings indicate that while some attitudes towards the needy have hardened since the early 1990s, the New Zealand public distinguishes between different groups of benefit recipients and their ideas can shift dependent on economic conditions. Indeed, there remains some support for the idea that work is a social right but the quantitative research leaves us wondering whether attitudes harden in certain circumstances or in certain groups of New Zealanders more than others.

This study

To date there has been little detailed analysis of such attitudes to social citizenship in the New Zealand context. This study aims to not only answer theoretical questions about the impact of neoliberal reforms on attitudes to social citizenship but also to flesh out the existing quantitative data by helping to explain why some changes in attitudes may have occurred and whether they have occurred uniformly or only within certain groups of society (based on income source, socio-economic status, ethnicity, age and gender). In addition, the study aimed to demonstrate why individuals can appear to support statements that seem to contradict each other, such as a desire for increased taxes *and* increased spending in health. Finally, the study empirically tests claims about the impact of welfare reforms on understandings of social citizenship with a particular focus on assessing whether the conditions placed on welfare claimants shape their experience of citizenship. To explore these issues, the study asked three key questions:

- **How strongly do New Zealanders support social rights of citizenship today?**
- **How do main income source, socio-economic status, ethnicity, age and gender impact on understandings of social citizenship?**
- **Do certain groups of New Zealanders experience citizenship differently?**

While analysis of existing public opinion data regarding attitudes towards social citizenship provides some answers to these questions, a qualitative methodology was necessary to fully explore them. This involved:

- **Nine exploratory focus groups with selected key target groups**

A total of 50 participants took part in focus groups conducted in March-November 2007 and August 2008 in Christchurch and Auckland. As identified in Table 1, participants were recruited based on their belonging to a specific target group. Each group discussion lasted between 90 and 130 minutes.

- **37 interviews with a wider range of New Zealanders**

These were conducted in Christchurch and regional Canterbury, as well as Auckland and the greater Auckland region, between March and October 2008. Each interview lasted between 40 and 135 minutes.

All participants were adults aged 18 years or over. They were recruited through: personal networks; key community organisations; and advertisements placed in community papers in Ashburton, Manukau, Pakuranga/Howick, North Shore and Rodney. In appreciation for their time, participants were offered a \$20 supermarket voucher.

Table 1: Number and location of focus groups and interviews

Focus groups	Number	Location
Main benefit recipients	2	Christchurch & Auckland
NZ Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients	1	Christchurch
Wage/salary earners	2	Auckland & Christchurch (pilot)
Women	1	Christchurch
Māori	1	Auckland
Pasifika	1	Auckland
Asian	1	Auckland
Number of focus group participants:	50	
Interviews	Number	Location
	14	Christchurch
	4	South Canterbury region
	17	Auckland
	2	Greater Auckland region
Number of interview participants:	37	
Total number of participants	87	

Sampling design

One of the key innovations of the research was its focus on understandings of citizenship expressed by a range of citizens, not just welfare benefit recipients. There is international research evidence to suggest that income source, income level, gender, ethnicity and age can influence both support for social rights and understandings of citizenship more generally (Dwyer, 1998; Lister, 1997; Lister, Smith, Middleton, & Cox, 2003; Orloff, 1993; Williams, 1989). Participants for focus groups and interviews were selected purposively according to these variables. Table 2 indicates that the final sample was not entirely representative of the general population, as is often the case with qualitative research. Nonetheless, a good cross-section of New Zealanders was included in the study. Note that the rationale for such selection and greater detail about participant characteristics, along with definitions of key categories (such as 'main benefit' or 'high income'), are found in the Appendix.

Table 2: Attributes of research participants

Sex	Female	Male			
	52	35			
Age	30 and under	31-45	46-60	61 and over	
	17	33	24	13	
Ethnicity/ origins	European/ Pākehā	Māori	Pasifika	Asian	'Other'
	44 NZ-born 8 Born overseas	All NZ-born	3 NZ-born 6 Born overseas	1 NZ-born 6 Born overseas	All born overseas
	52	13	9	7	6
Education level	No tertiary qualification		Tertiary qualification		
	31 Secondary school or less 11 Trades or industry 10 Undergrad dip or cert		16 Undergrad degree 19 Postgrad degree		
	52		35		
Main income source/ occupation	Main benefit	NZSuper/ Student Allowance	Wages/salary		
	9 Invalid's 9 DPB 5 Unempl. 2 Sickness	12 Retired 5 Students	18 Professional 8 Managerial 4 Self-employed 3 Sales 2 Home-maker 7 Community & Personal Services 3 Other		
	25	17	45		
Household income (\$)	Low income	Middle income	High income	Refused to give info	
	16 up to \$15,000 26 \$15,001-30,000	9 \$30,001-45,000 12 \$45,001-60,000	8 \$60,000-75,000 14 \$75,001 and over		
	42	21	22	2	

Presentation of data

Information in this report is presented in three main ways:

First, responses from the 87 focus group and interview participants have been analysed quantitatively so that graphs of key trends can be produced. It must be stressed that these quantitative findings should be read with some caution, given the small number of participants and the qualitative methodology of the study, which means responses have been coded into categories by the researchers from interview/focus group transcripts. However, identifying such key trends is useful because participants were asked to respond to three key statements based on questions in previous quantitative studies and this study's basic quantitative findings allow for comparison with such previous research.

Second, responses have been analysed according to key variables such as main income source, socio-economic status, ethnicity, age and gender in an effort to distinguish whether attitudes are different amongst varied demographic groups. These are presented as a percentage of the number of participants who responded to a particular question and results have been recalculated to account for imbalances between different groups within

the sample. Note that such demographic analysis has been conducted only for the most frequent responses given, as the number of participants responding was often very small. Again, these results can be read as indicative only.

Third, some of the most interesting comments made by participants are presented as quotations. These are verbatim quotes from interviews or focus groups but some have been modified for clarity or ease of reading (ellipses or notes in square brackets indicate where this has occurred). To maintain the anonymity of participants, their names have been removed and only basic demographic data is provided to give a broad sense of their background. These quotes enable us to develop greater understanding of the reasons why New Zealanders respond to questions in quantitative surveys in the way that they do and why many still support the idea of social citizenship, even after three decades of neoliberal reforms.

Structure of the report

Following this Introduction, the remaining sections of this report each cover a key theme of the study's findings:

Section 1: Government responsibility. This discusses responses to the statement *'Government should take responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for'* and the activities the research participants considered to be government's responsibility. It indicates that 'help the needy', 'health' and 'education' are seen as the government's top responsibilities and, when asked about the rights they have as New Zealanders, *social* rights are more current in participants' minds than the civil and political rights more traditionally associated with citizenship.

Section 2: Individual responsibility. This focuses on responses to the statement *'People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves'*, as well as the activities participants thought to be an individual's (rather than government's) responsibility. This section highlights that there was strong support for individuals taking responsibility over *some* areas of activity – particularly children, family and work – as well sizeable minority support for a range of obligations to be placed on main benefit recipients. However, overall 'education' was the most favoured means of encouraging greater individual responsibility in New Zealand.

Section 3: Experiences of citizenship. This explores whether main benefit recipients are able to access the full and equal rights of citizenship by considering responses to a statement about whether *'People receiving social security benefits are made to feel like second class citizens'*. It finds that many participants believe main benefit recipients *are* treated as less than full citizens, mostly due to 'WINZ/ACC officials and policies', 'stigma' and to a lesser extent 'low self-esteem', but that only a third of all participants always feel 'first class' in New Zealand anyway. Participants named both relational and redistributive factors to be critical conditions for feeling 'first class', indicating that experiences of citizenship are greatly shaped by broader ethnic and socio-economic inequalities rather than simply the stigma associated with benefit receipt.

Section 4: Citizenship knowledge, identity and belonging. This finds that when participants were asked to think about the term 'citizenship', they were most likely to associate this with 'passport/travel/migration' but that there was a sense of collective consciousness with responses such as 'belonging', 'national identity' and 'participation' also being common. Importantly, many of the characteristics participants associated with being a 'good citizen' and a 'bad citizen' placed a focus on relational activities concerned with how people get along together. In that this section finds less than half of participants considered 'citizenship'

an important identity, it then considers how 'family' and, to a lesser extent, 'national community' and 'local community' are where most participants gain a sense of belonging.

Section 5: Policy implications. An overview of the key findings of this study are found in the Executive Summary. The report ends by exploring the policy implications of the study's findings, suggesting that New Zealand's political representatives need to be wary that any radical transformation of social policy would go against the wishes of many New Zealanders. In addition, significant effort needs to be placed on developing social cohesion through a citizenship identity by addressing not only issues of citizenship knowledge and cultural acceptance but also by attacking the social and economic inequalities that have divided New Zealand over the past three decades.

SECTION 1: GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY

One of the key beliefs underlying the neoliberal reforms implemented in New Zealand is that government's role should be very minimal, usually limited to ensuring laws that allow individual freedom and unrestricted market competition. Deregulation of the labour market, finance and other aspects of economic activity aim to allow 'natural' market forces to prevail, while previous attempts to manage the economy to minimise the income inequality and poverty that can result from such market forces have largely been rejected. In the social arena, competition and user-pays were introduced in health and education to encourage greater individual 'choice' and financial responsibility, while changes to the welfare system have aimed to encourage greater 'individual responsibility' through benefit cuts and the introduction of work activity tests for the unemployed (Cheyne, et al., 2008).

Introducing a market model in such areas reframed health, education and welfare less as *rights* of citizenship and more as *responsibilities* for which individuals or families should be financially accountable. Yet, governments have hardly relinquished all responsibility for these and other social policy areas, retaining a significant role in funding, monitoring and often delivering such services. Indeed, public social spending increased slightly between 1980 and 2005, although there were some fluctuations in intervening years (OECD, 2009a). The global financial crisis of 2008 also saw governments around the world reassess, if only temporarily, some of the economic assumptions behind neoliberal reforms.

In that this policy context has sent very mixed messages about government versus individual responsibility, it was important to assess participant attitudes about both these issues. This section deals with government responsibility, analysing participant responses to a statement about this before providing further data about what types of activities participants thought government should be responsible for, the types of rights they felt they had as citizens and finally whether the balance between rights and responsibilities has changed over time. Together these data allow us to make some judgements about New Zealanders' support for social rights today.


Should government take responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for?

To get participants thinking about government and its role, they were shown the statement: *'Government should take responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for'*. Referred to in this study simply as the 'government responsibility' statement, this statement was used because it has been included in the New Zealand Values Study (NZVS), an international survey programme. This allowed some comparison with existing data both in New Zealand and internationally. In the NZVS survey, this statement was placed on a scale, with another statement *'People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves'* placed at the other end of the scale and respondents were asked to indicate where their viewpoints would sit on this continuum. In 2005, slightly more respondents agreed with the latter statement (Rose, Huakau, Sweetser, & Casswell, 2005) and in 2008, when this question was repeated in the 2008 NZES, an overwhelming majority did the same (NZES, 2008). In the qualitative study, these statements were asked individually (rather than on a scale), so as to get a better sense of people's view points on each. The second statement, which is referred to as the 'individual responsibility' statement in this report, is discussed in the next major section, while responses to the 'government responsibility' statement are described here.

Figure 1 shows that only about half of participants gave a clear 'yes' or 'no' answer to this question, but the majority (82%) who did respond agreed with the statement in some way. Some were very certain in their responses; for instance, one woman responded to the

statement by saying: *"I think that's what a government is, that's why you have a government. A government is, that's its job."* [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Figure 1: Responses to: 'Government should take responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for' (n=44)



Importantly, however, 43% of the participants qualified their agreement, indicating government should be responsible only for *some* activities or *some* groups of people. Alternatively, they felt that it was a 'two-way' street where both government and individuals worked together. A male participant responded: *"Well, no ... government shouldn't be responsible to ensure that, provide for me if I'm able to do it for myself. They're responsible to provide ... an environment where I'm able to do that."* [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

A much smaller number of participants (18%) completely disagreed that government should be responsible for ensuring everyone is provided for. Referring to the statement, one woman declared:

Oh dear, that makes you see red, doesn't it? I mean anything goes wrong, they blame the government! (laughter) I know they do some stupid things but 'government should take responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for': Oh jeez! (laughter). [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over.

However, that this same woman later supported 'free health' and 'free education' for young people to the end of high school highlights that many participants often responded differently to this abstract statement than to specific examples of government responsibility.

Income support recipients were more than twice as likely (29%) as wage/salary earners (11%) to fully agree with the government responsibility statement. This was expected, given that they were financially reliant on government support at the time and benefited from other government subsidies, such as those available through the Community Services Card. There were no sizeable differences between recipients of main benefits or New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance. However, the number of wage/salary earners and income support recipients answering 'sometimes/maybe' and 'no' were very similar, while those on main benefits were less likely to say 'sometimes/maybe' and slightly more likely to answer 'no' than the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group.

The latter finding suggests that the support for government taking responsibility found amongst income support recipients was not as clear-cut as one might expect. A woman who had been receiving the DPB for some years noted: *"No, I don't agree [with the government responsibility statement] actually, although I'm sitting here as a beneficiary, which is kind of*

contradicting it really, isn't it?" [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years]. She highlights how the attitudes of income support recipients were shaped not only by their experience on a benefit but also by other values and experiences.

Wage/salary earners were less likely to support the government responsibility statement because they perceived little benefit for themselves from government services. For instance, one participant said: *"You seem to give out a lot and get nothing back."* [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years]. The tightening of many benefit eligibility restrictions and the introduction of user-pays in many social services areas mean that those who are working and earning good salaries are often unable to access neither income support assistance in times of need (because they have savings or assets) nor subsidies available to Community Services Card holders. The same woman who provided the above response illustrates this dilemma:

... I have tried to save some money in case anything ever happens, because I am a working class person. I do have something behind me, so I'll never get anything back from the government. I've been sick, I've been, tried to be on a, sickness benefit and they – because you have money in the bank – they won't give it to you. So you basically get bled dry. So you don't even get it then. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

There seems to be a relationship between main income source and distrust of government, but this does not necessarily influence support for government responsibility. While participants were not asked explicitly about their distrust of government, 48% of all participants offered comments that were coded as indicating they distrusted government to a considerable degree. Importantly, main benefits were more than twice as likely (92%) than wage/salary earners (40%) and New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients (35%) to distrust government. This was the case even though income support recipients were most likely to support the 'government responsibility' statement.

Importantly, when it comes to distrust of government, there appear to be qualitative differences in the comments of those who were living on the very low incomes provided by main benefits and those in paid work and earning good incomes. Not surprisingly, the opinions of the former were often shaded by negative experiences with Work & Income (known as 'WINZ') and other government agencies. One woman explained how a friend's benefit was stopped without warning by WINZ, for no apparent reason:

Now imagine the fear of that, if you didn't have a happy family who could say 'oh, don't worry about it, we can pay your next grocery bill'. It just, it makes me absolutely steaming hot. Steaming bloody hot, you know, you don't know what to do about it. I think bureaucracy in New Zealand is so elderly and creaking it's scary. I think we should bomb it! [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

Alternatively, main benefit recipients often felt that government did not represent the concerns of the needy, with one stating: *"It doesn't matter which party gets in, they're not in to help us, are they? They [are] only into what they can get out of the country."* [European/Pākehā male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

In contrast, when wage/salary earners, especially those in business or earning very high incomes, talked about their distrust of government they were more likely to comment on the perceived burden of regulations and intervention in an individual's life. For instance, one participant said:

... I think we could, you know, we should do away with nine-tenths of the legislation we have in this country, it's just namby-pambying people. Teach them how to recognise risk because, you know, the sort of idea that you're no longer responsible for anything is really, I think that's a pretty negative consequence in the sense that now, you know, you've got a steep cliff and if there's not a big three-metre fence on the sign saying 'don't jump off this cliff', you know, someone will be dumb enough to do it and then go and try and sue the council so for not putting up the sign. ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 year].

Another wage/salary earner indicated how distrust of government shaped her own financial decisions:

... I don't think there should be an over-reliance on the government and I'm probably slightly extreme ... I won't go near a lot of the government place[s] - like I won't even be a KiwiSaver because I don't, I have a lack of trust at times for the government, especially when it's so likely to change. And another government comes in and then we just change everything, and there's not always stability in some areas. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Finally, a high-income wage/salary earner commented how, in his view, government could be trusted to be responsible for very little:

Okay, to me the government should be purely responsible for very few things. Defence cos that's a truly public good, one of the only ones that exists - you know, provision of true public goods, not the misused term that you see in the press, you know, so true public good in the economic sense. Second, I think you do need a judicial system and the only reason you need that is because if I infringe someone's rights there has to be means of redress and that is again a public good I think which everyone benefits from and in the economic sense it fits the criteria. And apart from that, I mean, you could even contract out policing, I think I'd roll it right back down to that. I mean policing, okay to be reasonable I think you can have a debate about that, but I certainly don't believe that welfare of any kind [should be provided by government]. ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Education level seems to have a mild impact on responses to the government responsibility statement. The low income/tertiary qualification group (38%) was most likely to completely agree with the government responsibility statement, with this figure growing to a clear majority (61%) when 'sometimes/maybe' responses were added. The middle income/tertiary qualification group was least likely to provide any support for the statement (with 13% saying 'yes' and 13% saying 'sometimes/maybe'). While income level does not seem to have any real impact on responses, education level does have a mild affect: in all income groups, those with tertiary qualifications were slightly more likely to offer 'sometimes/maybe' and, with the exception of the middle income earners, 'yes' responses.

There appears to be no relationship between income level and distrust of politics and government, with the middle income/no tertiary qualification group (78%) offering the highest level of distrust, followed by low income participants without (68%) and with (62%) tertiary qualifications. The high income/tertiary qualification group (48%) was far less likely to be distrustful but the middle income/tertiary qualification group (19%) was least distrustful of all. Generally, those with tertiary qualifications were less distrustful (19-62%) of government than those without (68-78%) but the effect was not clear cut. This was possibly because participants with tertiary qualifications often saw the 'bigger picture' behind some of the policy initiatives implemented by government, even if they did not

benefit or engage with them personally. For instance, one participant talked about KiwiSaver, saying:

Yeah, I think the idea behind it is good, because we spend more than we earn, horribly And that mentality isn't going to change, because, you know, consumerism's just overtaking, so, you know, there needs to be something in place, again. And I think the idea of it is good, [but] I think – again - it was rushed in, bit like the smacking policy, and, and untested and there is so many, I guess, so many options in the way that you can manage your, your KiwiSaver that I'm ... still standing on the sidelines, waiting for a bit more time to pass. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

In contrast, some participants without tertiary qualifications expressed their distrust in far more clear-cut terms: *"I think the government have got a lot to answer to, they're the ones who have stuffed the country up, not us."* [European/Pākehā male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60years]. However, in that these same participants often lived on low incomes and had regular interaction with government agencies such as WINZ, it is possible these experiences shaped their views more than their education level.

Ethnicity was also an important variable in understanding support for government responsibility, although it is important to note that the number of participants from minority ethnic groups and thus the number of responses to be analysed was rather small. European/Pākehā were most likely to fully agree with the statement (27%), with Māori close behind (23%), although when the 'sometimes/maybe' answers are added Māori were slightly more likely to agree (46%) than European/Pākehā (43%). However, despite the similarity in results for these two groups, qualitative analysis shows that there were quite different reasons for their responses. For European/Pākehā, the concern was often with the democratic process and the idea that government represents all New Zealanders effectively:

My response to that is the government's elected by people, but not everybody, and usually not by much of a majority either what I'm hinting at is that there's going to be the people who didn't vote for them that may disagree ... with them taking responsibility for everyone - and perhaps some people will see that as patronising as well: 'I don't need a government to look after me, I can look after myself.' So ... I tend to disagree with that. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

In contrast, support for the government responsibility statement in the Māori-specific focus group was linked to the articulated need to amend for the history of colonisation Māori had endured. For instance, following discussion about how Māori organisations tried to take responsibility for their people but were constantly under-funded, one participant said:

For Māori it is about entitlement. Because, how did we get in this position? How did it turn out to be this way? So we were disowned from our land, put into a position of poverty, government says 'Oh, we'll take care of you' but are they taking care of us in a standard that we want to be accustomed to be taken care of? [Māori female wage/salary earner, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Given this history and a perceived lack of recognition of the special rights Māori have as indigenous peoples and through the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, others in the focus group disagreed with the idea that government should ensure *everyone* is provided for:

I think first, before government thinks of everyone, they should fix up what they damaged in the beginning. They have never ever dealt with Māori issues first in terms of we always come behind everybody else and I totally agree with [another participant]. Even whānau [sic] from over in Iran and that, they can just come into our country and we have whānau

with seven kids sometimes been waiting and they went in with whānau and squashed in a house still waiting for a house and they [immigrants] can just move into brand new homes. [Māori female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Notably, participants from the Māori and European/Pākehā ethnic groups were the only ones to offer 'yes' or 'no' responses to the government responsibility statement, with participants from the Pasifika and 'Other' ethnic groups providing only 'sometimes/maybe' responses and Asian participants not offering any clear-cut responses that could be coded regarding this question. Even though Pasifika participants gave only 'sometimes/maybe' responses, that over half (56%) did so means that more of this group supported the government responsibility to some degree than either Māori or European/Pākehā. This finding suggests that the disproportionately low socio-economic status of Pasifika peoples in New Zealand may lead them to recognise a need for greater government responsibility. Yet, there remains both a strong work ethic and community focus that made Pasifika participants hesitant to completely agree with the statement. This is illustrated in the following interview excerpt:

... I think it's a two-way street, the government should provide for the public, and the public should also do their bit as well, so it's like a, a go hand-in-hand sort of thing, yeah. I go back to what President Kennedy used to say [it] is [not] what your country can do for you, it's the other way, it's what you can do for your country' and I think that's right, you can't always say 'okay, if I'm in trouble ring the welfare department sort of thing, ring the police' and, you know, try and sort it out if you can. And if, failing that then, of course, you, I think in my view, that's where you could ask the government for help, assistance. [Pasifika male wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

In the Pasifika focus group, a participant further stated: *"People can't take more responsibility to provide for themselves unless the government comes in and support [them]."* [Pasifika female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years]. She indicated that free education and health care, along with support for mothers that stay home, were the types of support needed. A younger participant in the same focus group added a little later: *"Yep. Government provides the means and the resources and the services and then the individuals and families and communities should use that in order to provide for themselves."* [Pasifika female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under]. In all three comments, there was a strong sense that government, individuals *and* communities must share responsibility, an issue discussed further later in this report.

The 'Other' ethnic group (43%) also offered a high number of 'sometimes/maybe' but no other responses. All members of this group had immigrated to New Zealand or had considerable experience living overseas, so possibly their responses were influenced by the differing attitudes to government responsibility found in other countries. This might also explain the lack of clear-cut responses to this question from the Asian group.

However, the varied attitudes towards government responsibility amongst different ethnic groups may also be related to levels of distrust towards government. Distrust amongst Māori participants (77%) was much higher than amongst members of European/Pākehā (49%), Pasifika (44%), 'Other' (29%) and Asian (14%) ethnic groups. As noted before, this distrust of government by Māori was framed by the perceived failure of the Crown to live up to its Treaty obligations and government's desire to control negotiations of Treaty claims. However, there was also cynicism about government's stated aim of trying to close the socio-economic disparities between Māori and non-Māori, because it kept a huge number of bureaucrats and politicians in jobs:

... they won't relinquish that power to tāngata whenua to look after their own because without us being statistics they will not have a reason to be in Parliament. So we're in a no-win situation. [Māori female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

It is possible the 'Other' and Asian participants were least likely to distrust government because they either did not have enough experience of New Zealand to have formed an opinion (although only Asian participants were new migrants to New Zealand) or they rated the New Zealand government favourably against those overseas.

Age also shapes responses to the government responsibility statement, although less clearly. Participants aged 46-60 years (25%) were most likely to completely agree with the statement but other groups only ranged 16-20%. However, when we add the 'yes' and 'sometimes/maybe' responses together, the 46-60 year olds remained ahead (54%) and the over 60s were close behind (50%) but the under 31s (35%) and 31-45s (32%) offered far less agreement. This would support claims that growing up under neoliberalism has shaped the attitudes of this younger generation. Yet, the two younger age groups were much less likely (6%) to answer 'no' than the 46-60s (13%) and the over 60s (17%). They also distrusted government much less (at 5%) than the 31-60 age group (but the same as the over 60s).


Gender shaped the willingness of participants to offer responses to the government responsibility statement. Males and females offered a very similar number of 'yes' and 'no' responses but only one third of females answered this question at all. This may explain the lack of 'sometimes/maybe' answers amongst females: those who were uncertain may simply not have answered. Of the males that did provide a response (about half the sample), almost a quarter (23%) were ambivalent about fully agreeing or disagreeing with the statement. Thus, even if there was no gendered difference in actual opinion reported, there was a difference in willingness to respond when ambiguity or ambivalence was evident. This again may be related to levels of trust, with females (52%) more likely than males (43%) to distrust government.

In summary: A clear majority of focus group and interview participants agreed that *'Government should take responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for'*. Income support recipients were most likely to agree, even though those receiving a main benefit expressed significant distrust of government. European/Pākehā and Māori were also most likely to agree with the government responsibility statement but Māori expressed much higher levels of distrust in government than other ethnic groups. Participants aged 46 years and over were most likely to agree but while the 46-60s had high distrust in government, the over 60s did not. Gender was not important in terms of the quantitative results but it is notable that males and females appeared to demonstrate ambivalence in different ways; while males offered ambivalent answers, females preferred not to respond at all. Overall, these findings suggest that distrust of government does not diminish a participant's support for the idea that government should take responsibility but, instead, has the opposite effect. This seems to counter expectations that neoliberal reforms, which are least partly the cause of such distrust, would diminish support for social rights.

What should government be responsible for?

To get a better sense of their attitudes to government responsibility, participants were also asked what specific activities they thought government should be responsible for. Their varied answers have been grouped and coded as 16 different activities in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Activities considered to some degree to be a 'government responsibility' (N=87)



Social policy issues

Several of the activities named by participants, including the three named most often, concern social policy issues. New Zealand has long favoured targeted, selective social programmes which have aimed to 'help the needy', while expecting others to fend for themselves. This goes back to the early basis of the welfare state, which was reliant on charitable organisations providing assistance to the 'deserving poor' (Cheyne, et al., 2008). Given the strong government emphasis placed on 'welfare dependency' and the need to encourage greater 'individual responsibility' since the 1990s, however, one might expect that New Zealanders would no longer support government taking responsibility for even the needy.

In addition, the Keynesian welfare model promoted (largely) free and universal health and education systems with the aim of achieving equality of opportunity while also ensuring the steady supply of healthy and well-educated workers needed for a productive economy. In the neoliberal era, the New Zealand health system was transformed along commercial lines through radical decentralisation, cost-efficiencies and user-pays charges for all but the neediest. Similar reforms (but less rapid and radical) were undertaken in education, particularly at the tertiary level (Cheyne, et al., 2008; Easton, 1999). Given the costs of health and education have increasingly been framed as the responsibility of citizens, rather than a government responsibility, we might expect that fewer New Zealanders would regard them as social rights. As noted in the introduction, the international literature suggests this might be particularly the case for main benefit recipients, younger participants and members of ethnic minority groups.

Help the needy

A clear majority (66%) of the participants named 'help the needy' as a government responsibility. This included specific mention of income support and Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) payments, as well as more general comments about assisting those who cannot help themselves through sickness, injury or bad luck. This section offers detailed analysis only of the 'help the needy' responses, but it is interesting to note that relatively few participants named the 'elderly' (15%, along with 'superannuation' at 20%) and the 'sick/disabled' (13%) as a government responsibility. This is surprising given these groups have been traditionally been considered more 'deserving' of government assistance than other 'needy' people, such as the unemployed or sole parents. It is possible that these groups were not considered 'needy' as they once were, given age and ability are less likely to be framed as impairments in public discourse. However, discussion about deservingness in Section 2 indicate that participants felt that the 'sick/disabled' were the most deserving group in society, with much weaker mention of the 'elderly' in this context. This highlights how participants offered differing responses, depending on how the question was asked.

That 'help the needy' was the government responsibility named most frequently by participants suggests that there is still strong support for a 'safety-net' welfare system yet some felt government often did not set the right priorities for public spending. For example, one participant, referring to the deepening financial crisis in the United States of America, said:

...the NASA space programme, you know, they're spending billions of dollars to chuck things up into space when they've got something like 25 or more per cent of the American population live below the poverty line. And I look at that and I go 'man, why aren't you sorting out those problems before you try and chuck shit up into space?' When you've got that much money to throw on toys to throw up into the atmosphere you should have enough money to make sure everyone's got a place to live and have got food. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Similarly, a young Māori woman in one of the benefit recipients' focus groups argued, and her fellow participants agreed, that the government is more interested in New Zealand's image overseas than ensuring all people inside New Zealand can afford to feed their kids or take them to the doctor. An example offered as evidence of this was the huge funding allocated to build a new stadium in Auckland for the Rugby World Cup in 2011.

Main income source does not seem to be a particularly important variable in shaping 'help the needy' responses. New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients (71%) were most likely to name 'help the needy' as a government responsibility, followed closely by those on main benefits (68%) and then wage/salary earners (64%).

Socio-economic status does, however, have an impact on 'help the needy' responses. Low income participants (71-77%) were most likely to name this response, while those on middle incomes were least likely (55-56%). In both groups, those with tertiary qualifications were more likely than their counterparts without tertiary qualifications to see a role for government in helping the needy, which may explain why 62% of the high income/tertiary qualification group did so.

Age seems to have some impact on responses, with the 46-60 age group (75%) most likely to name 'help the needy'. But a majority of all the other age groups agreed 'help the needy' should be a government responsibility, with 67% of the over 60s and 60-61% of the under 46s also agreeing.

Ethnicity shapes responses to 'help the needy' quite substantially. Māori participants were far more likely to mention 'help the needy' (85%) than European/Pākehā (69%), Asian and 'Other' (each 57%) and finally Pasifika (33%).

Gender did not seem to be a very important variable for understanding 'help the needy' responses. Males (69%) were slightly more likely than females (62%) to offer responses coded as 'help the needy'.

Health

61% of participants regarded 'health' as a government responsibility. In general, these participants thought healthcare such a crucial need for all citizens, government had to take responsibility for at least ensuring access to it. For instance, a participant who was against government intervention in most social policy areas strongly believed:

... health is very important and I think government has a role [to] set the rules. I think we need to think about a tax write-off for health insurance and I think it's very important we do and, I know, yes, you are in effect subsidising an industry but I can live with that. Not well, but I can live with it. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

These findings fit with existing NZES data indicating that most New Zealanders still support social spending on health, even when respondents are aware of the tax cost. Although fluctuating greatly and peaking in 2002 (at 86%), more respondents favoured increased spending on health in 2005 (79%) than 1990 (70%) (NZES, 1990; 2002; 2005).

However, a minority of participants (2%) disagreed with government taking responsibility for health because they saw it as part of the 'nanny state'. As one participant said:

... you sort of force me to belong to this health scheme in New Zealand where I pay a lot of my money to get very little in return. Now because I'm forced to join that health scheme, as opposed to insurance myself, then it supposedly gives everyone the right to tell me what I should eat. Because if I get fat and cost the health system that I don't want to belong to, to spend money then just roll it back and say 'okay, you know, do what you like but be responsible for the outcomes yourself' and the problem goes away. ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Over half of all participants (56%) who directly answered questions regarding 'free health' supported it. If these 'yes' results are added to 'sometimes/maybe' answers, the majority in favour grows to 82%. It was earlier noted that in the 2008 NZES survey, 77% of respondents agreed to some degree that government should provide free healthcare. This had jumped from 65% in 2005. Differing methodologies and differently worded questions likely explain the minor differences between the qualitative study and NZES results. While

this makes it hard to compare them directly, the qualitative data does highlight the difficulties individuals face in answering such broad questions in public opinion surveys. Many people, for example, differentiated between emergency care (which they thought should remain free for all citizens) and visits to the General Practitioner.

Participants who supported 'free health' in the social citizenship study also provided reasons why they did so, which was often because of considerable worry about the state of the health system. For instance, a retired participant noted concern about the constant restructuring and under-funding of hospitals and squarely blamed this on neoliberal reforms:

.... you just think of the hospital boards, the way they seem to always be working in the red and their budgets just stretched and yet and I think too often accountants run these organisations instead of doctors and nurses, for instance. And I think all that happened with Rogernomics, I think there was probably a certain amount of pruning needed to be done. But I think his policies went overboard really and over the past years I think that the bottom line has been looked at, at the expense of the service that should be provided. [European/Pākehā retired male, middle income/tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

This comment supports the previous finding that those who most distrusted government were also most likely to support greater government responsibility.

However, a third (33%) of the participants explicitly disagreed with the idea of 'free health'. For some, government was responsible only: *"To a certain amount, by degree, you know. Half and half. Government and the ... individual, I suppose."* [Māori male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years]. For others, health was framed only as an individual responsibility (see Section 2). One participant who had migrated from the United States and had only recently become a citizen knew the current system was not working but thought reforming private health insurance might be the solution:

I really feel as though they're - I don't if it's that there aren't enough doctors or not enough money or not enough, I don't know, but there's not enough of something. My daughter had to have grommets when she was 18-months-old and we went private because the waiting list was a year and there are all these repercussions ... she couldn't hear properly, her speech was delayed. And I thought to myself 'we were lucky because we could afford to go private, but how many people can? What's happening to their kids, they're stuck on a waiting list for a year while their child's speech doesn't progress, while their hearing, they can't hear properly, while they have developmental delays', that just blew my mind, I just couldn't believe that. So I don't know if there needs to be, people need ... to have, you know, affordable insurance, because I don't know that, I don't think insurance is very affordable in New Zealand. I don't know if employers should start providing medical insurance the way [they] do in the [United] States so that everybody has better access to healthcare, or I don't know if they do actually in the States. ['Other' female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Indeed, the experiences of participants who had lived overseas under different health systems often influenced their views on whether New Zealand should have 'free health', although not necessarily in the same ways. A woman who had lived in Britain for some time before separating from her husband and returning to raise two children on the DPB, was all in favour of the British National Health Service (NHS): *"I really like the health system in England! (laughter) even like you were pregnant you had, all your prescriptions were paid for ... until your child was a year-old prescriptions were free, dental was free ..."* [European/Pākehā female on a main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years]. In contrast, a wage-salary earner who had also lived in Britain for some years did not

support the NHS system, believing a free system encouraged people to visit the doctor unnecessarily:

Because they could go in and see the doctor about their sniffles, so, the thing ... I noticed - it was a big difference compared to the UK - here was that, you know, generally there was half the number people in the waiting rooms - and maybe that's a population thing, I don't know - but, you know, it ... seemed to be that, you know, if you got a sniffle you just get over it, whereas if you're ill you go and see the doctor. So, I don't, like, again it might be a perception thing, I don't know, but if you're paying 40 odd dollars, or \$50 to go and do that then it makes you think about it. And I don't think that's a bad thing. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Main income source was an important variable for understanding attitudes towards 'health' as a government responsibility and 'free health' but in different ways. Main benefit recipients (68%) and wage/salary earners (62%) were more likely than New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients (47%) to believe 'health' is a government responsibility. In regards to 'free health', the number of participants offering a categorical 'yes' were fairly evenly low across all main income source groups (10-16%), with the exception of wage/salary earners of whom almost a third (29%) made this response. This group also offered the lowest number of 'no' responses (7%, compared to 18-24% in other groups). However, when the 'yes' and 'sometimes/maybe' responses are combined, support amongst wage/salary earners was much lower (36%) than within the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group (77%, with 18% saying 'yes' but 56% answering 'sometimes/maybe'). Those on main benefits were least likely to say 'yes' (16%) and most likely to say 'no' (24%). This contradicts the finding regarding 'health' as a government responsibility and comes as a surprise given that people receiving a benefit (and thus on a low income) might be expected to appreciate the benefits of 'free health' more than those who have greater ability to pay user-charges.

The reasons that main benefit recipients did not necessarily support 'free health' were complex. For instance, one long-term main benefit recipient (who now received New Zealand Superannuation) suggested that user-pays allow government to prioritise those in greatest need:

... they spend a lot of money on the health system, I know that, but wouldn't it have been better if people were contributing? And ... then the government don't have to fork out that much money, they'd be, they can be looking after what should be looked after in New Zealand. ['Other' retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

Certainly there was a strong sense amongst many participants that New Zealand could not afford a free health system, even if that would be their preference. As one participant indicated:

I think in an ideal world it would [be] a good idea to have free health, you know, coverage for people, you don't have to go to but then, of course, reality is at the moment that it's just not possible, you've just got to pay for these things, of course, the inflation going up like everything else and the cost of medicine and things like that, so. [Pasifika male wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

There was no clear relationship between socio-economic status and 'health' as a government responsibility and 'free health' responses but, contrary to expectations, low income participants were not most likely to support either. The high income/tertiary qualification group reported the highest level of support for 'health' to be a government responsibility, while those with middle income/tertiary qualifications were most likely by far (38%) to say

'yes'. This might be explained by the fact that low income participants are eligible for a Community Services Card and greater Primary Health Organisation (PHO) subsidies, while middle and high income participants are not, usually paying substantially higher costs for health care. As one high income group participant indicated: *"Nobody pays for my healthcare except me."* [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years]. Considerable media attention to the inadequacies of the public health system due to a lack of funding also seems to have ensured continued support for government responsibility in this area amongst those who are tertiary-educated (and thus most likely to be aware of current events).

Age also does not explain attitudes to 'health' as a government responsibility and 'free health' as one might expect. The 46-60s age group (75%) was substantially more likely to name 'health' as a government responsibility, while support amongst all other groups ranged between 55-58%. Only half (50%) of the 46-60 years age group strongly supported 'free health', but they were again well ahead of other age groups. Perhaps surprisingly, if one expects neoliberal discourse to have shaped the younger more than older generation, the second highest number of 'yes' responses for 'free health' came from the under 31s (15%) and then the 31-45s (13%), while the over 60s offered the lowest level of support (8%). This group was also most likely to say 'no' to 'free health' (25%), with the 31-45s second on 19%, the under 31s on 10% and only 4% of 46-60s disagreed with 'free health' completely.

While we might argue that the 46-60 years group is beginning to face costly health issues and are thus more supportive of free provision than the under 31s, this does not explain why the over 60s were the least supportive. Again, it might relate to the significant health subsidies this age group receives, being eligible for a Community Services Card and other free or low-cost health services. Some participants old enough to remember a time before free healthcare were also influenced by their previous experiences. For instance, one favoured an old Australian health insurance system, whereby health stamps were bought each week, providing physical, direct evidence of contributions to a health fund. This participants' comments suggested that she liked this direct link between contributions and service because it minimised the issue of 'deservingness' for recipients. Deservingness is discussed in some detail in Section 2.

The impact of ethnicity on attitudes to 'health' as a government responsibility and 'free health' was unclear. The 'Other' (86%) and Māori (70%) ethnic groups were far more likely to name 'health' as a government responsibility. A majority of European/Pākehā (63%) and Pasifika (56%) did so but only 14% of Asian participants thought 'health' to be an activity for which government should be responsible. This appeared to be because their countries of origin framed healthcare as an individual or family responsibility.

In some focus groups, there was no specific discussion about 'free health', making it difficult to analyse this issue fully. The incomplete data we have, however, suggests that the 'Other' (29%) and European/Pākehā (27%) ethnic groups were again most likely to offer 'yes' responses to questions about 'free health', while Pasifika (67%) and Asian (43%) peoples offered only 'sometimes/maybe' answers. However, the high level of these ambivalent responses means they out-numbered the combined 'yes' and 'sometimes/maybe' responses of the other two groups. In the case of the Asian participants, this would seem to contradict the comments made above. That Māori offered only a small number of 'no' responses to this question also sits in tension with their high support for 'health' as a government responsibility. However, as noted, incomplete data means such findings must be read with caution.

Gender was not an important variable in understanding attitudes to 'health'. Males (51%) and females (50%) supported 'health' as a government responsibility to much the same degree,

while they provided exactly the same number of 'yes' responses (23%) to 'free health'. There were only minor differences in the 'sometimes/maybe' and 'no' answers given.

Education

52% of participants regarded 'education' as a government responsibility, which was somewhat lower than for 'health' (61%). Although the NZES does not ask specifically about education as a government responsibility, it does find that support for increased *spending* on education (even when aware of the tax cost) was lower than for health. Support also seems more volatile than for health, growing from 63% in 1990 to 70% in 2005 but peaking at 81% in 2002 (NZES, 1990; 2002; 2005).

The qualitative study participants who believed 'education' was a government responsibility tended to frame this activity as a 'public good' and as a means for providing equal opportunity to all New Zealanders. For instance, one participant said:

That should be the government's responsibility, is to put everyone through free schooling, therefore everyone's had the same chance to be educated and it's up to them to provide for themselves once they're educated, so once they leave school it's their responsibility from then on. So, yeah, the government should take responsibility to ensure that everyone is educated for the real world. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Just over half (54%) of all participants who answered questions about 'free education' directly supported this activity. If these 'yes' results are added to the 'sometimes/maybe' responses, the majority in favour grows to 67%. This is relatively close to the 76% of 2008 NZES respondents who said 'government should provide free education from preschool to tertiary education', although this figure is a little lower than that recorded in 1990 (81%) (NZES, 1990; 2008).

As with health, the NZES study required respondents to lump together all kinds of education when considering their responses. In interviews and focus groups, however, it became clear that most people favoured 'free education' in primary and secondary schools but were divided about tertiary education. For instance, having agreed primary and secondary schooling should be free, one participant said:

When it comes to tertiary education, again, I think that's actually [a] personal responsibility and, and maybe we need a system that they have in the [United] States where when your child's born you set up a fund, an education fund for that child. [European/Pākehā female, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

She did, however, support tax breaks or subsidies for those who could not afford to do this alone, thus accepting that it was government's responsibility to at least ensure access to tertiary education.

Furthermore, many participants believed that education, including tertiary education, was a 'public good' that should be funded by government. One, who was training to be a teacher, said:

I don't feel that student[s] should have to pay the amount that they do to get their education. Particularly for really sort of upper-echelon jobs - like for want of a better phrase - but, you know, doctors, dentists, that sort of thing, health care professionals that we need in the community shouldn't have to pay ridiculous amounts of money, yeah, you know, it's just sick ... all education and all healthcare should be free and training to be those people should be free as well and I'd happily pay a lot more tax if that was the situation. If you just knew

'oh, I've got a wisdom tooth that needs to come out, cool I'll just go and get it taken out', would be just one thing but, you know. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

A sizeable minority (18%) explicitly disagreed with the idea of 'free education'. Many considered it to be a benefit mainly to the individual and thus should be financed by that individual (see Section 2).

Main income source matters, but in different ways, when explaining support for 'education' as a government responsibility and 'free education'. In the former case, main benefit recipients (56%) were most likely to offer support, followed closely by wage/salary earners (53%) and then New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients (41%). Given one might expect benefit recipients, who are reliant on government for income support and other services, to believe more strongly than other groups in government responsibility generally, this finding in itself does not come as a surprise.

Interestingly, however, more participants on main benefits said 'no' (14%) to 'free education' than 'yes' (5%) or 'sometimes/maybe' (5%). It is possible the limited education of many of the participants made them less appreciative of its benefits. Wage/salary earners (31%) were most likely to support 'free education', then New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients (29%), although when 'sometimes/maybe' responses are added, the latter group rated 47%, three percentage points ahead of the wage/salary earners. The New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group's results are not surprising, given most of these participants were either old enough to remember when education was free or were currently tertiary students. However, responses were not always clear-cut; a young student supported retaining tertiary fees but wanted government to provide a universal Student Allowance:

... we got a lot of benefits from it [tertiary education], so we should be paying something, [but] I think it's ridiculous that you have to borrow to live. You have to borrow a \$150 a week – which is the maximum you can get – you can get more from being on the dole that, you know, and you have to borrow that money to live. On the presumption that your parents pay for everything till you're 25. So in that circumstance, as you're a student, the government ... should provide you with the necessities of life [through a Student Allowance] ... [European/Pākehā male student, high income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years or under].

There was no relationship between 'education' as a government responsibility and socio-economic status, but there was for 'free education'. Regarding the former, about half (50-55%) of each socio-economic group supported 'education' as a government responsibility. However, the low income/no tertiary qualification (21%) and middle income/no tertiary qualification (11%) groups were the only ones to say 'no' to 'free education', and the former group offered the least 'yes' responses overall (11% with the same number for 'sometimes/maybe' responses). Around a third (29-38%) of all other income groups with high education said 'yes' to 'free education', with the middle income/high education group rating the highest both for explicit 'yes' responses (38%) and when these were combined with the more ambivalent 'sometimes/maybe' answers (51% in total). Thus, education level seems to shape attitudes regarding 'free education' in a way that was not apparent in the naming of 'education' as a government responsibility.

Results are also mixed regarding the influence of age on attitudes to education. The 46-60s age group (46%) was least likely to name 'education' as a government responsibility, although other groups' responses were not considerably higher (ranging 52-58%). Yet, participants over 45 years were *most* likely to fully support 'free education'. 42% of those

aged 56-60 and 33% of those aged over 60 said 'yes' and none said they disagreed with this idea. While 20% of under 31s answered 'yes' and 25% said 'sometimes/maybe', support amongst the 31-45 year olds was around half these figures, making it difficult to claim that there was a clear link between diminishing support and younger age.

The 31-45 group may have been least supportive of 'free education' because they represent the first generation to face fees for both their own tertiary education (and thus feel if they had to have them, then younger people should too) and the compulsory education of their primary and secondary-aged children. Given considerable media coverage about the 'voluntary' fees that are increasingly needed to support primary and secondary schools in the latter stages of the project, this issue was mentioned quite frequently. For instance, one participant commented:

Well, certainly, yeah, primary and secondary schooling I think should be free and, of course, parents laugh at that – its no, no way do they feel it's free, you know, these donations aren't voluntary at all! [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Another participant, who was a primary school teacher, articulated the complexity of the situation for schools, saying:

... it's supposed to be free education but it's not ... you have to pay the full contribution activity fees and things like that (pause). It's hard, because, I think, because it's a difficult one, because you want everybody to be able to have access to quality education but to get that quality education you have to have someone paying the teachers and the resources and things like that, and if you haven't got the fees, then how are you going to pay for it? [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

That some of the under 31s were currently, or had recently been, in tertiary education may also explain why they supported 'free education' more than the 31-45 year olds. It remains, however, that the youngest group offered less than half the support of the oldest group of participants, suggesting that neoliberal rhetoric and reality regarding user-pays had shaped the attitudes of the former. When one young female participant was asked if she agreed with 'free education' even at tertiary level, she responded:

Oh yeah, I never experienced it free! (laughter) But, yeah, so that's a world I can't imagine but I strongly disagree with student debt so, (pause) you know, now we've got this whole generation that are starting out with debt and they have this numbness almost to debt they've lost (pause) touch which actually (pause) that that's an option in and it would be great if that was free. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

It is perhaps telling of the significant policy changes made during the 1990s that this woman, although liking the idea of 'free education', could not imagine a world where that would exist because her entire adult life had been shaped by neoliberal policies.

Ethnicity affects attitudes towards 'education' as a government responsibility and 'free education'. The 'Other' ethnic group (86%) and Māori (77%) were far more likely to support 'education' as a government responsibility than European/Pākehā (45%), Pasifika (56%) and Asian (14%). Māori participants provided no direct responses regarding 'free education', as this was not specifically discussed in the Māori focus group, while it was covered only in a limited way in the Pasifika and Asian focus groups. It is thus difficult to analyse these responses further.

From this same incomplete data set, 'Other' (29%) and European/Pākehā (27%) participants were again most likely to fully support 'free education', although at much lower levels than 'education' as a government responsibility. Pasifika and Asian peoples were far more ambivalent or agreed only with some kinds of education being free: while 11% of Pasifika said 'yes', 53% said 'sometimes/maybe'. This latter response was the only one made by Asian participants (but a substantial 43% of them did so). A young male in the Asian focus groups offers a typical 'sometimes/maybe' response when he indicated that he would support the abolition of tertiary fees:

To a certain extent. Yes, I certain think – probably not Bachelor or Diploma or anything – but probably Certificate courses, just something to get, something like what [name of participant] mentioned, the word 'stepping stone', just something to get them into the workforce kind of thing. [Asian male wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

This comment reflected the fact that participants in the Asian focus group participants generally tended to speak about education as a utility that would assist in getting a good job, rather than as a 'public good'.

Gender was important for explaining responses regarding 'education' as a government responsibility' but not 'free education'. Females again were less willing to offer ambivalent responses than males. Notably, 52% of males named 'education' as a government responsibility, compared to only 37% of females. But males were only slightly more likely to be supportive of 'free education' to some degree (29% saying 'yes', 14% 'sometimes/maybe' and 6% 'no') than females (21% said 'yes', none offered a more ambivalent affirmative response and 10% 'no'). Again, the lack of willingness of females to offer 'sometimes/maybe' responses might provide an explanation for their lower support for 'education' as a government responsibility.

Housing

Less than a third of participants considered 'housing' (30%) a government responsibility. Although affordability of home ownership was also a focus of discussion, the provision of State housing was the major issue referred to here. Some participants strongly supported government ensuring that all New Zealanders had an affordable home, while others believed that State housing should only be for the very needy in society. For one participant this was the:

Mentally ill, yeah, physically ill people who, yeah, disabled people and those that really struggle to get a job and then still they should be put in a house with three or four other people in the same situation, they are, so they shouldn't be given their own house cos that, I don't know, must put a huge struggle on the housing in New Zealand. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Participants on main benefits (56%) were more than twice as likely to name 'housing' as a government responsibility than the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance (24%) and wage/salary earner (18%) groups. This is not surprising given State housing is only available to low income New Zealanders, including main benefit recipients.

Importantly, 'housing' was the only activity of the eleven analysed in more detail where socio-economic status was a considerable explanatory variable. Low income earners (38-45%) were most likely to name 'housing', no matter how educated they were, when compared to middle/high income earners (6-22%). Again, this is likely because State housing is only available – and is thus more appreciated – by those on low incomes.

'Housing' was also more likely to be named by 46-60 year olds (42%) than the over 60s (33%) and under 46s (23-25%). As with other activities, this finding may relate to the wider range of family responsibilities that the middle-aged group face, meaning that housing was a bigger issue for them.

Māori participants were most likely to name 'housing' (46%) followed by European/Pākehā (37%), 'Other' (30%) and Asian (14%). Pasifika made no responses regarding this activity. This finding may have been influenced by considerable discussion in the Māori focus group about the way in which refugees were able to access State housing ahead of other needy groups, including Māori who had been on waiting lists for a long time. However, this does not explain the absence of 'housing' as an issue for Pasifika, who as a group are likely to face the same issue.

Gender was not a major variable. 29% of females mentioned 'housing' compared to 27% of males.

Childcare/children

17% of the participants named 'childcare/children' as an activity for which government should be responsible. For instance, a young Māori woman in one of the benefit recipients focus groups argued, and her fellow participants agreed, that it should be government's responsibility to ensure that an income support payment provides sufficient income to live on, especially for those with children. At present, she and others like her were forced to make hard choices. One example was childcare: because the '20 hours free childcare' programme introduced by the Labour-led government in 2007 (Maharey, 2007) did not cover the kōhanga reo where this participant sent her three children each week while she was in employment training, she has spent a considerable proportion of her DPB benefit on this expense. She did, rather than sending them to a subsidised childcare facility, because she felt it was important that they learn their culture and be educated in the Māori language.

A participant originally from the United States also talked about how New Zealand's mentality about childcare care is different to that in her home country and this appeared to restrain the New Zealand government's activities: *"now there's a stigma if you go to childcare, it's like, you know, put your baby in daycare, you're ruining their life kind of thing."* ['Other' female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

The New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group (12%) was least likely to name 'childcare/children' as a response. Given the finding below, this appears likely because this group were mostly too old to have dependent children of their own. Main benefit recipients (20%) and wage/salary earners (18%) gave a similar number of responses, suggesting that 'childcare/children' is an issue for all New Zealand families, no matter what their income source.

Socio-economic status was not important for understanding 'childcare/children' responses. The middle income/tertiary qualification (25%) and the low income/no tertiary qualification (21%) groups were most likely to indicate 'childcare/children' was a government responsibility, with the other groups ranging 8-14%. The low income/tertiary qualification group named this activity the least often.

The over 60s were least likely to name 'childcare/children' (8%), while the other age groups were reasonably similar (15-21%). As noted, older participants are less likely to have dependent children than the other age groups.

Pasifika (33%) mentioned 'childcare/children' most often, followed closely by 'Other' (29%) participants, then Māori (23%). This is perhaps not surprising, particularly for the family-

focused Pasifika and Māori ethnic groups, but it is uncertain why European/Pākehā (12%) and Asian (14%) participants mentioned this activity as a government responsibility least often.

Females (19%) were slightly more likely to mention 'childcare/children' than males (14%). This would appear to reflect typical gendered norms, whereby females are more likely to care for children and thus recognise this as an issue.

Economic policy issues

A further set of activities named by participants refer to the economic issues of work, wages, prices, redistribution and business. Arbitrated minimum employment conditions and industry protections have always been important to the New Zealand 'wage-earners' welfare state' (Castles, 1996). Under the Keynesian economic management model, work was considered a social right and government took responsibility for ensuring decent work was available through subsidies, import controls and centralised award setting from the 1930s until the 1970s. After 1984, rapid financial and trade deregulation saw New Zealand go from being one of the most protected to one of the least protected economies in the world. The labour market was also transformed by the 1991 Employment Contracts Act (ECA), which replaced compulsory arbitration and collectivism with voluntarism and individualism. This offered employers greater flexibility but reduced employee security at a time of high unemployment and benefit cuts (Boston, Dalziel, & St John, 1999; Ramia & Wailes, 2006).

In addition, the Keynesian welfare state's focus on material inequality favoured progressive taxation and redistributive policies that shifted income from the wealthy to the poor. However, neoliberal theory regards individuals to be self-interested and rational actors and inequality to be the result of poor choices; as such, it promotes reductions in personal and business taxes over redistributive policies. Although the political right promoted tax cuts as an important election issue in the 2000s, Labour-led governments offered a renewed, if limited, focus on redistribution from 1999 but largely without using the 'R-word' (Cheyne, et al., 2008; Liebschutz, 1999).

As a result, one might expect the New Zealand public to no longer offer significant support for government taking responsibility for wages, prices and regulating business practices. Certainly, NZES data shows that support for work as a social right to be protected seemed to diminish after such reforms were implemented in the 1990s, although it began to gain favour again by 2008. In that year, a sizeable majority supported unionism (67%) and almost half supported wage controls (48%), while around two-fifths of respondents supported import controls (42%) and remained suspicious of big business (48%). The introduction also noted that a similar number of NZES respondents supported the idea that it is government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one in 2008 (61%) as in 1990 (60%). These results collectively suggest that by the mid-2000s New Zealanders were in line with, or at least had their attitudes shifted by, the Labour-led government's attempt to modify some of the harsher aspects of economic liberalism from 1999 (Humpage & Craig, 2008).

Decent work/wages

30% of participants named 'decent work/wages' as a government responsibility. Although this represents only minority support, that almost a third of New Zealanders still considered work and wages as a right it is largely in line with the NZES trends described above. However, responses were clearly influenced by considerable concern about the food, petrol and housing cost increases faced by New Zealanders in the months preceding focus groups and interviews. For instance, earlier focus groups referred to the recent death of Folole Muliaga, a Samoan woman who died in 2007 when a power company cut off the supply that

kept her home oxygen-machine running because of an unpaid bill of \$168.40 (see *New Zealand Herald*, 2010). A participant in the Auckland wage/salary earners focus group questioned: *“how could a family within New Zealand, where someone’s working, not afford to be able to afford to pay their power bill?”* [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years], while another participant in the same focus group indicated that: *“You had three people in that household, all earn, working full-time on minimum wage and I still would see a – not surprised at all if the power bill didn’t get paid.”* [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years or under].

There was little discussion of the make-work schemes that had been developed during times of high unemployment during the era when full employment was an explicit goal. But one older participant remembered a time before the restructuring of the 1980s and 1990s, when New Zealand had a large state sector that provided significant employment. He talked of the benefits this offered individuals and society:

I’m a person who believes that in the days when New Zealand Railway was over-staffed and Mr Smith or Mr Jones got up every morning and they went down and did their eight hours at New Zealand Rail, they probably drank a lot of tea and coffee and stood on a lot of brooms. But they come home at the end of the day, those people put their kids through the education system and they had a reason for life. I think that is a much better way of structuring our society than having Mr Smith and Mr Jones’ modern equivalent not have a job to go to, so their day starts at four in the afternoon with a visit to the video shop and they still probably get a similar level of return but they haven’t got any equity in the prioritisation of their time and their self-esteem and self-worth just drops. And I think that we have to have a recognition in our society that you will see people perhaps brushing the same piece of metal on the side of the road eight hours a day or something, but at least they’re tired at the end of the day having done something that in their eyes is constructive and meaningful. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

This participant acknowledged that we could not turn back the clock but favoured subsidies to provide incentives for employers to take on and train an unemployed person for a permanent job, as well as the recognition of child-rearing as a valued form of work.

Discussion emerging from other questions, however, would indicate that support for a government role in these areas was much stronger than Figure 2 above suggests. For instance, a Pasifika participant talked with nostalgia about the 1970s:

... when we first got here [having migrated from Samoa] in 1974, those were the boom years of New Zealand economy anyway, I mean, you go to work and if you don’t like that work you finished there, go to the next, go up the road and you could find the next job. I mean, I’ve known of people work about two or three jobs the same time, full-time in one job and perhaps two other part-time employments. So those were the good old golden years But then in the ‘80s, then with share market crash, then ... things started to change. [Pasifika male wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Main benefit recipients (48%) were most likely to name ‘decent work/wages’ as a government responsibility, while only 33% of wage-salary earners and 29% of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients did so. This is interesting because it highlights that benefit recipients are still concerned with poor wages and work conditions, even while receiving a benefit. Indeed, these issues may be one of the reasons such participants remain reliant on income support from the government.

Low and middle income earners with no tertiary qualification were most likely to mention 'decent work/wages' (46% and 55% respectively). The other groups ranged between 19-38%. This is possibly because those without a tertiary qualification are more vulnerable to changes in the labour market.

The 46-60 age group was most likely to name 'decent work/wages' (50%), followed closely by the under 31s group (45%). The 31-45s (29%) and over 60s (17%) were far less likely to name this activity as a government responsibility. While one can understand that the oldest age group might not find 'decent work/wages' as relevant as younger participants, given most were retired, it is not clear why this appears to also be the case for 31-45 year olds.

Māori were substantially more likely to name 'decent work/wages' (62%) than other groups, where support ranged 29-33% with the exception of Pasifika participants who did not mention this activity at all. Māori concern with 'decent work/wages' could be explained by ethnic segmentation in the labour market, which makes Māori more vulnerable to downturns in the economy and makes them more exposed to poor wages and conditions. But Pasifika peoples have a similar experience of the labour market. This finding might be linked to particular Pasifika participants recruited to the study, who had disproportionately high incomes and levels of tertiary education.

Females and males were equally likely to name 'decent work/wages' (35% and 34% respectively).

Ensure basics affordable

Almost a quarter (24%) of the participants mentioned 'ensure basics affordable' as a government responsibility, although often not in these specific words. For example, when a participant was asked if he thought government should be responsible for ensuring decent work and wages, he said:

I'm not really sure how it all works, but I would like to see someone be able to take control over it, because it is - in relation to what you get paid and what you've got to buy - it doesn't seem to be much of a sort of a, you know, a nice relationship Buying a house, for example, around here, there's sort of like \$450,000, and even on \$50,000 a year wage, it's nowhere near what you're going to get for a mortgage and things like that So I think there's all those sorts of things which I don't know if the government could control. If the government could control it, then I think, yeah, perhaps they should Either lift the wages a bit or try and bring prices of things down, [so] the average New Zealander can afford I was listening to the radio this afternoon and they were talking about how families don't cook decent meals anymore, and I thought 'well, if you look at a 37c packet of two-minute noodles, as opposed to a dinner that you've got to, you know, pay for, which costs \$6, or \$7 each' ... [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Main benefit recipients (32%) were most likely to name 'ensure basics affordable', followed by wage/salary earners (25%). Few (6%) of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients mentioned this. In that this latter group was largely constituted of New Zealand Superannuation recipients suggests that the elderly were less threatened by labour market and price changes than younger age groups; certainly we know that New Zealand has one of the lowest rates of poverty amongst the elderly in the OECD (Ministry of Social Development, 2009).

The middle income/no tertiary qualification group most strongly supported the idea that government should 'ensure basics are affordable' (55%). Surprisingly, those on low incomes were far less likely (15-29%) to support 'ensure basics affordable', although the middle and

high income earners with tertiary qualifications also offered much lower support (13-19%). It is unclear why the middle income/no tertiary qualification group would feel this to be more important than the low income groups.

Almost a third (29%) of those aged 31-60 offered responses that were coded as 'ensure basics affordable'. Those aged 30 years and under (20%) were slightly less likely and those 61 years and over (8%) were much less likely to do so. The greater likelihood of having considerable family responsibilities may explain the 31-60s offering the most support. Although that this same group did not name 'decent work/wages' as often as older and younger groups would seem to challenge this assumption.

As with 'decent work/wages', Māori (38%) were more likely to name 'ensure basics are affordable' than other groups. The Asian group did not mention this activity at all, while other ethnic groups ranged 14-25%.

Males were slightly more likely to name 'ensure basics affordable' (29% versus 21% of females).

Redistribution

Despite the concern with decent wages and the affordability of basic living costs, it is notable that participants rarely named 'redistribution' (10%) as a means for fixing these problems. This was the case even though almost a third (31%) of the participants indicated in some way that they believed one of the key roles of government was to collect taxes to provide social services and, more generally, to represent the desires of the New Zealand people.

These findings reflect a broader trend, with NZES data showing that support for the idea that 'government should redistribute income and wealth from rich to ordinary people' steadily dropped from 49% in 1993 to 26% by 2005, with a correlating increase in the number of respondents disagreeing with redistribution over the same period (NZES, 1993; 2005). This is the case even though Ministry of Social Development (2009) data shows actual income inequality increased rapidly through the 1990s and into the 2000s. It is difficult to ascertain whether the diminishing support for redistribution identified by the NZES might be explained by slight differences in questions asked over the years, a growing tolerance towards inequality influenced by neoliberal rhetoric focused on self-reliance and welfare dependency or whether the public genuinely believed equality improved as the economy regained its strength in the early 2000s. But that almost a third (30%) of International Social Survey Programme (2000) respondents in 1999 also believed large differences in income were *necessary* for New Zealand's prosperity suggests that neoliberal discourses had some impact.

Tax as an issue will be discussed in Section 2, but it is worthwhile exploring here one reason given by participants for their wariness about redistribution: the lack of clarity about where taxes go and for what purpose. One participant noted that in Victorian times, taxes were lower but charitable donations were very high, allowing for a form of redistribution where individuals had direct control over where their contributions went. In contrast:

... these days the levels that tax is worth, it's sort of assumed that that money will be re-deployed to those other good works and there's not a lot of decision making - it's probably the decision making power, isn't it? There's not a lot of decision making power left to the individual any more as to where the outputs of their labour are applied in the community. Those decisions are made by central administrators not at a local community, and, you know, council's a joke... [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Another participant was concerned about transparency:

... I don't mind paying tax if I'm seeing that's it's improving Cos I've got that sense of wanting to help the wider community as well, cos it, it always comes back to you, it's always like, there's always a benefit for everyone ... if things are working the way they need to be working so, yeah, putting more money into that kind of stuff. Or maybe just being more transparent about, like I always find it quite funny when they tell on the news, like so and so's of the government, you know, this PM or MP's cellphone bill last year was like \$4000! (laughter) And I'm like 'what [the] hell, why weren't they on Vodafone?!' (laughter) that kind of thing, it's almost like there seems to be a lot of wastage and I think that's in any organisation, there are always going to be things that are a bit wasted and it's a huge organisation, the government, so they obviously need to figure some things out, but yeah, a bit more transparency around what they're spending my taxes on. ['Other' female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Support for business/industry

One way that government can ensure sufficient employment is to provide assistance and support to businesses that encourage them to take on workers and to pay them adequately. **However, few participants (6%) mentioned 'support for business/industry' as a government responsibility.** Importantly, most who did were not talking about subsidies for particular domestic industries but rather the minimisation of regulations and constraints on doing business. For instance, one participant said:

I think it's great that the government is backing business and they haven't just turned their back on it altogether but I don't think that's enough if the business was relying just on government backing to survive, it wouldn't be enough. They have to, it's a lot more than that to survive and especially to get global, if you want to be a big company and make your stamp on the world then you're going to have to be a lot more proactive than relying on a few government grants or a bit of funding [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Similarly, another participant who supported only a very minimalist role for government said:

I do think the government has a responsibility to encourage productivity, you know, and to basically make sure we can do the best we can given our productivity. But to me the solution is not by putting tariffs on stuff, it's actually to step out the way and let that happen and I think that is a responsibility that the government should have. ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

However, some participants were reassessing their attitudes towards deregulation given the economic downturn. For instance, a businessman whose interview took place after it had become clear New Zealand was following other countries into a global recession said he was coming to believe there had to be some regulations in place to avoid the likes of the American financial crisis: *"[S]o, there's a fine balance, I think, between the ... free market and ... you know, government taking care ... that it's not so free, that it's [not] a free-for-all."* [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

The small numbers of participants who gave responses regarding business/industry mean this topic cannot be analysed further. But it is worth noting that, although it was not a question asked specifically of participants, **a noteworthy minority made some mention of business (24%) needing to take more responsibility in society.** Examples offered to illustrate the need for corporate responsibility included banks that encourage people to get into debt,

even when they know they cannot afford to pay loans back. The poor ethics of corporate organisations was also a concern. One of the wage/salary earners' focus groups discussed the case of Folole Muliaga, not only as an example of wages being insufficient to cover basic living costs but also as an illustration of a business not taking its share of responsibility. In response to a comment made by another participant, who argued the Muliaga family could have called the power company to let them know their mother's medical situation, a young male answered: *"Yeah, but do people realistically believe that they can call these companies and expect to get help, when all they hear [from these] institutions every day is 'where's my money'?"* [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Further examples of a perceived lack of business responsibility included employers who did not care about the effects their industry has on the environment or about keeping jobs in New Zealand. Finally, one participant saw business as liable, along with government, for decent wages:

I think the government needs to take responsibility for the minimum wage and minimum conditions. I think businesses need to take responsibility in that they take practices that encourage labour productivity and when labour productivity occurs to actually reward their workers by increasing their pay. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Other activities

'Infrastructure' was named as a government responsibility by 28% of the participants. This seems surprisingly high but this result was influenced by considerable discussion in the benefit recipient focus group held in South Auckland, where participants expressed concern about the number of potholes in the roads and other forms of government neglect that was regarded as a sign that poor people did not matter. Another infrastructure issue mentioned by participants was the Labour-led government's decision to buy back the nation's railway network in 2008 (Clark, 2008), which was supported by those who named it because they believed investment in infrastructure was lacking.

It is surprising that the traditional roles of government regarding 'law and order' (15%), 'defence' (6%), and 'foreign policy and aid' (2%) were not mentioned more often. Indeed, 5% disagreed with government providing foreign aid at all while there were still New Zealanders in need. As one participant indicated, people paid their taxes to provide benefit to other New Zealanders:

Why send money overseas to, which aren't even really to do with New Zealand are they? I mean I feel sorry for them, but why don't you look after your own backyard before you go and look after someone else's? [European/Pākehā male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Also surprising was that only 8% of the participants named the 'environment' as a government responsibility, while only 6% referred to 'support for communities' (6%). The latter finding is particularly notable given discussion about this issue in many of the focus groups (but especially the Māori and Pasifika ones) and given the considerable emphasis the Labour-led government placed on 'community capacity building' from 1999 (Casswell, 2001). It is possible this lack of reference to 'support for communities' was linked to government responsibility often being associated with government *control* or *interference*, which many participants did not favour. For instance, one participant talked about:

... the sapping influence of government, trying to regulate every aspect of our lives and control everything from, you know - as you say - support in the community and

redistribution of wealth and so on. While there is a lot of positive things to be said for that, it becomes so intrusive and so pervasive really, I mean the law enforcement is an area where you see it, you know, historically most communities have a much greater involvement in preventing crime in their own neighbourhoods ... [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

In addition, although it was not a question asked specifically of participants, a notable minority (14%) made some mention of *communities* needing to take more responsibility in society. For example, a participant in the Māori focus group talked about how the Māori Women's Welfare League developed during the 1960s as a way for communities to help themselves, rather than waiting for government to do it. Another participant lamented:

You know when I was a kid in the '50s and '60s, the family were there, you know, you had that community support because your cousin or your uncle or, you know, there was always someone around who knew you who could get you out of trouble or give you a shilling to get home on the bus or buy you a pie if you were hungry or whatever. Now that's progressively gone and we're not responsible for each other now You know, it's become institutional rather than communal. [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Finally, 10% of the participants believed government had a role in 'recognising differences'. This category includes references to indigenous rights, the Treaty of Waitangi and/or other references to government taking into account differences in culture or need. Notably, 3% disagreed that this should be a government responsibility and, more specifically, 7% indicated that government should not offer assistance to immigrants and/or refugees, at least while there were 'real' New Zealanders in need. As one Pasifika participant who had migrated to New Zealand many years before indicated:

What makes me really angry at the New Zealand government [is] that we became citizen[s] of New Zealand, we work hard, as most of our parents and our family come here and work in labour, you know, doing all sorts of work, three or four jobs a ... day to keep up their family, but when – I'm not criticising – but when ... a Somalia[n] person comes to New Zealand that they get ten thousand dollars to start their family [Pasifika female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

While only a small number of participants offered these opinions about some citizens being more 'deserving' than others (a common theme in New Zealand's welfare history), it is notable that those who did most commonly were Māori or Pasifika, both groups often framed as 'undeserving' in New Zealand society. For some Māori there was a sense that the government needed to deal with Māori disparities first, given their status as indigenous peoples. As the above quote suggests, some Pasifika participants also felt there was a 'queue' in which new immigrants must wait in line after those who had already done their time in New Zealand.

In summary: Many of the most frequently mentioned activities that participants believed to be a government responsibility are associated with the social rights of citizenship. At least two-thirds considered 'help the needy' and 'health' to be government responsibilities, while half thought 'education' should be the same. Approximately a third named 'ensure basics affordable' and 'housing' as something for which government should be responsible. In contrast, while a third thought 'decent work/wages' an important government responsibility, few agreed 'redistribution' or 'supporting business/industry' was. Other activities were mentioned far less often. These findings suggest that participants believe government is far more responsible for social policy issues than economic ones, although sizeable minority support for government to be responsible for work and wages is a notable

exception. This may be because work has traditionally been considered one of the social rights of citizenship.

One might expect main benefit recipients to be more likely than other income source groups to name many activities as a responsibility of government because it is in their 'self-interest' to favour an interventionist state, given they currently benefit from government assistance (see van Oorschot, 2002). This was true for 'health', 'education', 'decent work/wages', 'childcare/children' and 'housing', suggesting some truth in this assumption. Similarly, 'help the needy', the most common response overall, was much more likely to be supported by those with low incomes (71-77%). But there is some evidence that education mediates attitudes towards government, sometimes encouraging supportive attitudes amongst middle and high income earners even when they, themselves, may not benefit from a particular government activity. It is also possible that the introduction of a user-pays system affected the middle and high income earners most obviously, in that they are not eligible for subsidies and other assistance targeted towards those on lower incomes. Thus, some support (for 'free health' and 'education', for example) may result from the financial burden and sense of inequity apparent amongst many middle-to-high income participants, particularly those with middle incomes and no tertiary qualification.

There might, however, be some truth in the theoretical assumption that a generation who has known nothing but neoliberalism take its tenets for granted. The under 31s did not offer the highest level of support for any activity, while the 46-60s age group was most likely to consider the 'elderly', 'superannuation', 'childcare/children', 'housing', 'decent work', 'health', 'help the needy' and 'ensure basics affordable' (tied with the 35-46s) as government responsibilities, the over 60s were most likely to support 'education' and 'infrastructure' and for the 35-60s it was 'law and order'. Overall, it appears participants in the middle age groups may have been most likely to name many activities as government responsibilities because they are raising families, saving for retirement, paying for health insurance *and* funding their children's education all at the same time, while their younger and older counterparts do not face these cumulative issues in the same way. However, the youngest age group was within six percentage points of the mean for all activities, meaning they were no obvious outlier.


Notably, Māori participants were also far more likely than those of other ethnic groups to agree that 'help the needy', 'education' and 'decent work/wages' are government responsibilities and were second most likely after 'Other' to name 'health' and 'education'. This finding supports the idea that participants from minority or disadvantaged groups are more likely to favour a strong role for government. However, although Pasifika participants reported strong support for government responsibility regarding 'health', 'education' and 'childcare/children', they did not mention two areas where Pasifika peoples as a group would benefit: 'help the needy' and 'decent work/wages'. In contrast, the major support amongst Asian participants for government taking responsibility to 'help the needy' is surprising, particularly when compared with their substantially lower support for government responsibility for 'health' and 'education'. This highlights the complex interaction of demographic variables that shape attitudes to social citizenship.

What rights are associated with New Zealand citizenship?

In addition to establishing what activities participants thought should be a government responsibility, the study asked what rights they associated with New Zealand citizenship. If a citizen has a strong sense of entitlement in a particular area (such as health or education), they are likely to believe government has a responsibility to ensure that right is upheld, even if they do not explicitly name it as a government responsibility. Through analysing the

rights participants associated with citizenship we can thus learn more about their attitudes to social citizenship rights. Only the responses offered most frequently were analysed regarding the importance of demographic variables.

Figure 3: Rights associated with New Zealand citizenship (N=87)
Affirmative responses ('yes' and 'sometimes/maybe')



Social rights

The four rights participants most frequently named were all 'social rights' intimately connected with the welfare state. This finding supports the previous section's finding that the majority of participants regarded the first four activities to be a government responsibility, although some also saw a role for individuals to take responsibility, for example through private health insurance or paying tertiary fees.

54% of participants thought 'health' was a right associated with citizenship. For instance, one participant talked of how: *"as a citizen, as a tax payer I pay my taxes, therefore I feel I'm entitled to be able to go anywhere, have free health, you know, things like hospital fees recovered as a citizen ..."* [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under]. Another supported the same, saying that she took pride in the current system when she compared this to other models overseas: *"it's really shocking when you go to the [United] States and with the whole health insurance thing and the costs of medical care and people just not being able to receive it basically"* [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years]. Interestingly, although dental care has not been considered a 'right' of citizenship in the same way as health, this was mentioned by several participants, who believed access to this should be free or more affordable than it currently is:

... dental care - I mean that's a really big one for me - I think we need, we need more subsidised dental care; I know - including myself - too many people with rotting teeth, no teeth because they can't afford it and there's not enough money available to help them ... there's too much fixing the problem afterwards and not enough preventative stuff in New Zealand, I think there needs to be more prevention ... [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance (71%) were much more likely to regard 'health' as a right of citizenship than wage/salary earners (51%) and main benefit recipients (48%). This finding appears to be related to the older age of most of the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group (see below).

However, there was no definite trend regarding socio-economic status. 54% of low income participants, no matter what their education level, considered 'health' a right. But those with middle income/no tertiary qualification (44%) were much less likely than their tertiary-educated counterparts (69%) to believe this was the case, while the high income/tertiary qualification group and the middle income/no tertiary qualification group were the same on 44%.

Ethnicity was a more important variable for the naming of rights associated with citizenship. 67% of European/Pākehā named 'health' as a right compared to 46% of Māori, 43% of Asian and 33% of Pasifika and only 14% of 'Other' participants. It is not entirely clear why European/Pākehā would support 'health' more than other groups, but this group was most likely to name all but one of the social rights as rights of citizenship, suggesting this is not an isolated occurrence. It is likely this is related to their status as the ethnic and cultural majority in New Zealand.

Older participants were much more likely to name 'health' as a right, with 75% of over 60s and 58% of 46-60s believing this was the case compared to 45-48% of the under 46s. This may be because such participants had experienced and remembered a time before user-pays were introduced in health, when healthcare was (more or less) free and available to anyone who needed it.

It was not apparent why males were more likely to consider 'health' (60%) a right than females (48%).

44% of participants considered 'education' to be a right. For some they considered any form of education to be crucial, with one participant declaring *"everybody has a right to be educated"* [European/Pākehā retired male, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over], while another said: *"what you chose to eat is up to you, so you go and pay for it at the supermarket and what things you have in your home is up to you. But it's, you can't really live without education"* [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over]. However, it is notable that a younger participant said of tertiary education:

... you have a right to education and I think it's good that we have a right to ... borrow money for education because not too many people have that much money sitting in their bottom drawer but, yeah, like I said, I think it's my responsibility to pay for part of it because I'll be getting such a benefit from it. [European/Pākehā male student, high income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

This comment indicates that while some participants supported a right to *access* education, they did not necessarily believe the government has a responsibility to entirely fund it. This was also reflected in the comments of another younger participant:

I think that everyone has a right to basics in life, you know, food, shelter, and an opportunity for education should they wish to take it. But it's up to them if they want to take it, and so everyone has the opportunity but then the ball's in their court. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Again, those on New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance (65%) were more likely to mention 'education' as a right than wage/salary earners (44%) and main benefit recipients (28%). This also appears to be related with the older age of the former group.

Level of education had a stronger effect on results for 'education' as a right than 'health'. Low/middle income earners without tertiary qualifications (32-44%) were less likely to support 'education' as a right than their tertiary-educated counterparts (56-62%). Although this trend does not hold for the high income/tertiary qualification group (43%), who sit somewhere in between, it does suggest that those with tertiary qualifications are more likely to consider 'education' to be a right.

As with health, European/Pākehā (54%) were most likely to name 'education' as a right but Asian participants were not far behind (43%). A significant minority of Māori (31%), 'Other' (29%) and Pasifika (22%) did the same.

The over 60s (75%) again offered the strongest support for 'education' as a right. But the under 31s were next (50%), then the 46-60s (42%) and finally the 31-45s (29%). These results suggest there is no clear relationship between age and support for 'education' as a right.

Gender was not a significant factor in shaping responses regarding 'education' as a right. But it is notable that, in contrast with 'health', females (44%) were slightly more likely than males (40%) to view 'education' as a right.

To have 'basic needs met' was viewed a right of citizenship by a third (34%) of the participants. One participant had a limited view on rights, saying: *"The only thing[s that] are rights are Maslow's basic needs"*, indicating that these were: *"You've got a right to food, you've got a right to clothing, you've got a right to shelter and a right to have friends and family, beyond that they become privileges."* ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years]. Another participant, who generally did not believe in an expansive welfare state, also conceded that: *"there are things that should be provided for, people should have power, a roof over their head, and public transport. Our public transport system is shit."* [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Wage/salary earners (24%) were considerably less likely to consider 'basic needs met' as a right than those on main benefits (47%) and New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance (45%). This is probably because most wage/salary earners are less vulnerable to price increases and other rising costs than those receiving a fixed income from government sources.

Low income/no tertiary qualification participants were most likely (50%) to consider 'basic needs met' a right of citizenship. This group was followed by the middle income/no tertiary qualification group (44%) then those with low incomes but no tertiary qualification (38%). Both the middle and high income participants with tertiary qualifications (19-20%) were much less likely to consider 'basic needs met' to be a right, probably because a tertiary qualification usually guarantees a higher income and greater job security, meaning this group are less likely to be struggling in meeting their own needs.

It is difficult to tell if ethnicity was an important variable in analysing this response. European/Pākehā (45%) and 'Other' (43%) participants were most likely to name 'basic needs met', followed by Māori (31%). But neither Pasifika nor Asian participants gave this response at all. While in the former case this is possibly because they were disproportionately wealthy and educated compared to the Pasifika population as a whole, this was not so for the Asian participants. It is possible that previous experiences living overseas shaped Asian (and possibly Pasifika) responses regarding rights in this area.

Once again, the over 60s age group considered 'basic needs met' a right (58%) more often than their younger counterparts (26-38%). However, it is notable that New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients were *not* the most likely to name this activity as a right, suggesting that a relationship between older age and the views of this income source group is not always apparent.

Females (37%) were slightly more likely than males (31%) to view 'basic needs met' as a right.

Almost a third (31%) of the participants thought 'welfare entitlement' was a right of citizenship. In many cases, 'welfare' was not articulated explicitly but participants spoke of the right to:

.... a reasonable standard of living, I guess ... that's what it boils down to a reasonable quality of life. And I think to have a reasonable standard of living and quality of life you need good housing, or reasonable housing at least and a reasonable income so that you're not starving and that you can afford power that you're not huddled in the bed at six o'clock at night in the winter. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, low income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Not surprisingly, wage/salary earners (27%) were less likely to consider 'welfare entitlement' as a right than those on main benefits (36%) and New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance (35%). But the difference between income source groups on this issue was smaller (less than 10%) than might be anticipated.

Socio-economic status was not a major factor in explaining responses. A similar number of the low income (31-36%) and middle income/no tertiary qualification (38%) participants named 'welfare entitlement', while the middle income/no tertiary qualification (22%) and high income/tertiary qualification groups (24%) offered this response somewhat less often.

The 'Other' ethnic group was most likely to name 'welfare entitlement' as a right (43%), but other groups ranged only a little lower (31-33%). The exception was the Asian ethnic group, who did not name this as a right at all.

The 46-60s (54%) were most likely to consider 'welfare entitlement' a right. 33% of the over 60s, 26% of the 31-45s and only 10% of the under 31s thought this should be the case.

Males (37%) were more likely to name 'welfare entitlement' than females (27%). This is surprising given women tend to be more vulnerable in the labour market and more reliant on state assistance when bringing up children, but the difference was relatively small.

'Decent work/wages' (7%) and 'superannuation' (5%), which we might also consider social rights, were mentioned only by a small number of participants.

Overall, 81% of participants who responded to this question thought social rights relating to health, education, welfare and work should be regarded as 'human rights'. 6% said

'sometimes/maybe' and 13% 'no'. The following quote is typical of those offering an affirmative response:

Yeah, I think it's a human right because we can't survive on our own as a race a system should be in place to take care of those basics because you're rich and born with a silver spoon in your mouth it, I know that you are going to get privileges but generally the, the ones with that haven't got those privileges still are entitled to a fair ... start in life, does that, do you know what I mean? [European/Pākehā retired male, unassigned income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

However, it is important to note that a few participants used the word 'privilege' rather than 'right', with these terms sometimes used interchangeably. For instance, when asked if he considered 'health' and 'education' to be rights, one participant said: *"Yes, I think so, that's one of the privileges of citizenship."* [European/Pākehā male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Participants receiving New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance were most likely (41%) to believe such social rights should be 'human rights'. Only 31% of wage/salary earners and 28% of those on main benefits thought this should be the case. This is likely a function of the older age of most New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients (see below).

The number of participants who believed social rights were 'human rights' was very close (32-38%) across all socio-economic groups, with the exception of the high income/tertiary qualification group (24%).

European/Pākehā (47%) were most likely to consider these social rights to be 'human rights'. While the 'Other' (29%) and Māori (15%) groups offered minority support, there are no results for the Pasifika and Asian focus groups because they were not asked this question.

Half (50%) of over 60s thought the four social areas should be 'human rights', while just under a third of all the other age groups agreed.

Males were also slightly more likely than females (37% compared to 27%) to believe that these kinds of social rights were 'human rights'.

Legal and other rights

Rights more traditionally associated with citizenship – 'freedom of speech' (17%), 'vote' (16%), 'legal' (15%) and 'passport/diplomatic protection' (13%) – were mentioned by only a minority of participants. For instance, when asked about her rights as a New Zealander, a participant who had migrated from China said: *"Free to talk (laughter)!"* [Asian female wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years], comparing her experience here with the more authoritarian view on freedom of speech taken by the Chinese government. Another participant mentioned: *"The right to travel on a New Zealand passport, and be accepted in places."* [European/Pākehā male wages/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years], while another talked about:

The right to remain to silent I have the right to be treated fairly and equitably by organisations - be they local government, national government, local administrations, retail establishments - I have a right as a citizen to be supported by the laws of the country, so I expect my right as a consumer, you know, to be honoured because that's the consensus we have in our society that these systems will work for us. [European/Pākehā female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Linked to these traditional rights but mentioned far less often were rights relating to 'safety' (10%) and 'freedom of religion' (5%).

13% of participants said 'access to bush/sea' was a right of New Zealand citizenship. This would appear to reflect the importance of the 'great outdoors' to New Zealand cultural identity, although the examples offered by European/Pākehā and Māori participants suggest that this was understood in different ways. For instance, one of the younger European/Pākehā participants said:

Even if it's not true, I associate being a New Zealander with being able to go for walks in the bush, access to land, being able to go on huge walks and go and camp pretty much wherever you want, within rights. [European/Pākehā male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

He referred to the selling of prime, private land to foreigners when mentioning this issue, while others talked about increased Department of Conservation restrictions on behaviour in national parks (for example, bans on pitching tents in many places). However, at least a couple of participants thought that Māori land and resource claims inhibited open access for the general public: *"recently there was some lakes I think in the North Island, it's mostly in the North Island ... they've got the lake bed but now they want the water and the air over it or something! (laughter)." [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].*

Responses from participants in the Māori focus group referred more specifically to the foreshore and seabed legislation that was passed in 2004 and other examples of government encroachment on the ability of Māori to freely use traditional lands and resources. For instance, one participant referred to the rights detailed in the Treaty of Waitangi when she spoke of how she thought of the foreshore and seabed when asked to consider the term 'citizenship'. This was: *"Because it's ours, it belongs to us. Why should we be labelled to get as much as we want for our people. It belongs to us. We shouldn't have a limit on what we can get from the sea."* [Māori female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

However, 'Treaty/indigenous rights' (8%) and 'equality of opportunity' (5%) were named by only a minority of participants. Although numbers were small overall it is not surprising, given the discussion above, that Māori were far more likely than other groups to name the former, while European/Pākehā were more likely to name the latter.

8% of participants also indicated that to 'physically discipline own children' was a right. For instance, one participant said:

I am against the anti-smacking legislation, cos I think ... it's a fundamental right of a parent to smack its child obviously I don't mean stepping over into violence - there's a whole world of difference between, you know, a smack and, you know, hitting a kid over the head with a piece of wood or something, you know. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 year].

Similarly, another participant said:

I think kids are given rights without enough background and the responsibility that goes with it. Forget about talking about rights and responsibilities to six- and seven-year-olds, just say 'this is what you do, this is how you behave' ... [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

These responses again must be viewed within the context of the particular interest in the repeal of Section 59 of the Crimes Act that participants demonstrated.

In summary: Although other rights were named, the four most frequently mentioned by participants might all be considered social rights: 'health', 'education', 'basic needs met' and 'welfare entitlement'. Notably, traditional political and civil rights associated with citizenship were hardly mentioned by participants. This suggests that there is still a strong sense of entitlement regarding social rights, despite more than two decades of neoliberal reform. This may reflect the more recent 'Third Way' politics which has placed a greater focus on 'social' issues (Porter & Craig, 2004).

One might anticipate that older participants, who remembered a time before the neoliberal reforms, would be most likely to support such social rights. Certainly, the over 60s were most likely to name the social rights except 'welfare entitlement', which was most frequently mentioned by the 46-60 group. In addition, New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients were most likely to consider 'health' and 'education' to be rights. Those with tertiary qualifications were much more likely to mention 'education' as a right of citizenship, as one might expect, although socio-economic status does not appear to be strongly associated with the other rights.

The assumption that main benefit recipients would most likely support social rights has been challenged by the research findings. Main benefit recipients were least likely to consider 'health' and 'education' social rights, with wage/salary earners offering strong support for both of these, even if they favoured 'basic needs met' and 'welfare entitlement' as rights less often. Similarly, one might imagine that economically marginalised groups like Māori and Pasifika peoples would be most likely to name the social rights. Yet, with the exception of 'welfare entitlement' – where the 'Other' ethnic groups were the surprising leaders – European/Pākehā mentioned these most frequently. But Māori did mention 'indigenous/Treaty rights' more often than other groups.

Although most participants thought social rights should be human rights, suggesting they considered them essential for all people, participants who received New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance, had high incomes and tertiary qualifications, were 61 years and over, European/Pākehā and/or male were most likely to believe this to be the case. This consolidates the previous section's finding that those who are most privileged in society tend to support 'health' and 'education' as a government responsibility more than those who are marginalised or disadvantaged. To understand these complex findings, they must be set within the context of participants' views on individual responsibility, which are explored in Section 2.


Do we have more rights and responsibilities today than in the past?

To end this section on government responsibility, it is worth noting participant perceptions of change in the rights and responsibilities of New Zealand citizens. Participants were asked whether they perceived any shift in balance between rights and responsibilities over time (for example, between their parents' and their own generation) and, more specifically, whether they thought we have more rights or more responsibilities as citizens today than in the past.

Figure 4 shows that the majority of participants (60%) who answered this question directly believed that we have 'more rights' today than in the past. Examples given included the way women, Māori and other groups have gained new rights over the past generation. For instance, the Christchurch women's focus group was particularly notable for its

considerable discussion about how women today had the right to vote, education and the DPB.

Figure 4: Responses to: 'Do you think we have more rights or more responsibilities as citizens today than in the past?' (n=50)



While in many cases this perceived increase in rights was regarded positively, for others it was an issue for concern. For instance, some of the resistance to the emphasis on children's rights embedded in the anti-smacking legislation mentioned earlier was articulated by a nurse. She discussed how young girls now had the right to have an abortion without parental knowledge or consent:

The reason I have a problem with that is if you then come down with an infection post-abortion your parents are meant to cope with that. If you've got the stress, you know, post traumatic stress after having the abortion your parents are going to be the ones who have to cope with that. It's, these things go on for years a lot of the legislation that gets brought in is brought in with the best of intentions without actually stopping and thinking what is also going to be the outcome. [Other' female wage/salary earner, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Indeed, one participant wanted to counteract what he perceived to be a growth in rights by developing an innovative institution:

... if I was Prime Minister if I was John Key the day after the election or the week after the election, I'd actually get the Human Rights Commission in and go 'you are now the Human Responsibilities Commission. Your job is to go out and check and make sure that the government is acting responsibly and we're fulfilling our obligations and our responsibilities and but at the same time that the people that we interact with are doing the same thing.' [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

A younger woman also contrasted the current situation with that of her grandparents:

... in a way, they had a stronger sense of responsibility to New Zealand as a whole the way that, like I think now if you tried to enlist that many people to go to war there might be a bit of a fight! (laughter). [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

22% of participants thought we had 'more responsibilities' today than in the past. Some explicitly framed the increased expectation that New Zealanders pay user-charges for services as an example of greater responsibility:

I guess from a monetary level we're expected to pay for more, so in that sense our responsibilities have increased and our rights have decreased. I mean if we think about our, yeah if we think about the generation above us who got free education, free health, state housing and housing for minimal amounts, you know, ... they really had the good life and now their ... children have reaped the benefits to a certain extent by inheriting ... their wealth whatever it might be, and now that generation is in a quandary because can they continue to pass that on to their next generation? So I think probably there's going to be a lessening of wealth in the generations because the rights and the responsibilities have decreased and increased. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, low income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Other participants linked responsibility with taxation and other financial burdens. One responded to the question regarding the balance between rights and responsibilities with: *"I don't know, I just feel it's not working. You know, the government's getting more from me than what I'm getting from the government really."* [Māori male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Another was more certain but noted that increased tax responsibilities did not fall upon all New Zealanders evenly, due to the progressive taxation system:

So if I look at myself I would say I have a hell of a lot more responsibilities than I have rights, in the sense that I lose over 50 per cent of my income each year and I get very little in return. Yet, I think there's a whole lot of people who are completely on the other side ... ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

This participant indicates the difficulty of responding to this question comparing today with the past. **14% of participants answered that New Zealanders had 'both' more rights and more responsibilities, while many others may not have responded at all because they found it too difficult to answer this question.** For instance, one participant, who interpreted 'responsibility' in terms of taxation, had difficulty with the question because: *"I'd have to know what I'd paid in taxes for the last 45 years and what my benefits added up to, you know, I mean, you know, I don't I can't see how you can equate that really."* [European/Pākehā retired male, middle income/tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

Another participant, speaking specifically about the welfare system, suggested that responsibilities still existed, they were just more flexible than in previous decades:

... some have stretched in a way that, in a way easier, bit more elastic, they're not so straight laced. That you [used to] say 'you've got to do that. There's no other way, you've got to have this, you've got to have that'. But now you say 'well, if you do it this way or do it that way, you have this benefit, better benefit'. You know, there's a bit more choice ... [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

A further responded to the question by noting:

... yeah, it's a tricky question. I don't think it's become more difficult but I think there are probably more, yeah, possibly there's more responsibilities. I'm not sure, I think it's just becoming harder, you know, everything is becoming so bureaucratic. Just buying a house or building like next door, ... or getting a job or, you know, like in the '70s there were only four people unemployed (laughter) in the whole of New Zealand and now it's really quite, a lot more difficult. Like, I'm in the process of trying to find part-time employment and it's, yeah, it's interesting ... how things have changed, yes, in a global environment with competition and – but whether it's harder now than twenty years ago, no I don't really think so. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, low income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Some of this uncertainty might also reflect the difference between rhetoric and reality regarding rights and responsibilities. A participant taking part in a benefit recipients' focus group indicated that there were 'more rights' today, using the way in which WINZ now placed a focus on client rights as an example. Then he proceeded to tell the group how a WINZ official took half an hour to tell him his obligations to look for work and report on time, but only a minute to outline his organisation's obligations to its clients. This suggests that *talk* of rights might be more evident than their practical implementation.

Interestingly, participants on main benefits were most likely to believe we have 'more rights' (40%) and least likely to think we have 'more responsibilities' (4%) today than in the past. This would seem to contradict the reality that main benefit recipients have become subject to more work-test obligations in recent years, although the above quotes suggest that responsibilities were interpreted far more broadly than this. Wage/salary earners and New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients were slightly less likely (both 29%) to think we have more rights *and* that we have 'more responsibilities' (13% and 6% respectively).

Socio-economic status does not appear to be a clear determinant of responses regarding perceived changes in the balance between rights and responsibilities. The low income/no tertiary qualification and high income/tertiary qualification groups were most likely to believe we have 'more rights' (46% and 38% respectively) and the middle income groups least likely (19-22%). Those most likely to say we have 'more responsibilities' were the high income/tertiary qualification (19%) and low income/tertiary qualification (15%) groups. Surprisingly, given one might expect the low income/no tertiary qualification group to have experienced more constraints on their citizenship rights, they believed this the least (7%). The middle income/no tertiary qualification group (22%) was most likely to believe that we had gained 'both' rights and responsibilities.

Age also does not provide much help in explaining these responses to perceived change in the balance of rights and responsibilities. The 46-60 group was most likely (42%) to say 'more rights', while the under 31s were least likely (25%) to say this was the case. The 31-45s group was most likely (13%) to say 'more responsibilities' (other groups ranged 5-8%) and the under 31s were most likely to say 'both' (10%).

The 'Other' ethnic group (57%) was most likely to believe we have gained 'more rights'. This is possibly because most of these participants had migrated to New Zealand and their frame of reference was less historical and more comparative with their country of origin. **Māori were second most likely (46%) to agree New Zealanders have 'more rights' today than in the past.** Although it is certainly the case that Māori have gained greater recognition for their rights emerging from their 'first peoples' status and from the Treaty of Waitangi rights over the past three decades, discussion in the Māori focus group and some interviews indicated a strong perception that Māori are still subject to discrimination. Despite this, substantially more Māori felt New Zealanders have 'more rights' today compared to European/Pākehā (33%) and Pasifika (22%) participants. Notably, the 'Other' group also offered the most responses saying we have 'more responsibilities' (29%), with European/Pākehā (14%), Pasifika (11%) and Māori (8%) relatively similar. Only European/Pākehā participants (14%) suggested that we might have 'both' more responsibilities and more rights at the same time. These findings may indicate that groups who have been more marginalised in New Zealand society (such as Māori and Pasifika peoples) are more likely to have perceived rights to have increased than other, less marginalised groups.

Females were more likely (37%) to believe we have 'more rights' than males (26%), while males were slightly more likely (11%) to think we have 'more' responsibilities than females (8%). This supports the claim made above regarding ethnicity, with marginalised ethnic

groups more likely to perceive rights as having increased. Certainly, female participants tended to respond with reference to the historical positioning of women and how women had gained many more rights over the last century.

Nostalgia

To help understand the findings above, it is important to note that many participants expressed 'nostalgia' for the past. Although it was not a question asked specifically of them, almost a third (32%) of the participants overall demonstrated some sense of 'nostalgia'. This clearly shaped their views on changes regarding rights and responsibilities. For instance, a middle-aged participant talked about when he was a young man:

... the basis on which I perceived society was very much around a free education and access to a free education and the only costs that were associated with people grumbling over a glass of beer in those days was, you know, the cost of exercise books have gone up dramatically, but it genuinely was a lot nearer to a free education than what we've got now It was based upon, the perceptions were based upon a community where most people generally worked close to their village so that they didn't travel huge distances to and from work they worked and lived and played in their own community, so the social networks were much stronger. And I think the other aspect was that the, this was pre-globalisation and what happened overseas took a lot longer to filter through to our knowledge ... And so I think the perception today is very much less egalitarian and it's also much less thinking of 'us' and 'we' and I think it's much more 'me' and 'I' and if you can afford you can access, if you can't you miss out. And what that has led to is, I think New Zealand unfortunately has moved very much more towards a 'them' and 'us' society. Those who have got financial resources can, those who don't have access to those resources cannot and don't. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Similarly, a woman in the same age group indicated that current policies were:

... draining all the heart out of the community the heart of the community, the heart of the country, is the people. If you look round here, nobody home, the heart's gone. You know - in my day - I'd be over at the neighbour's having a cup of coffee, the kids would be playing: there's no kids, gone. So you're destroying the heart, these people may all be good citizens working their arse off but where's the heart, what do the elderly do, who are home all day, what do the young mums do for support? You know, what do the disabled do? They're isolated, there's no life, they can't go out outside and hear human noises, human connection is not there. [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

However, it was not only older participants who felt nostalgic for the past. One of the younger participants became frustrated with the individual responsibility statement because:

... when my Dad was young ... he had it damn good compared to me and I don't, I mean, I wasn't there but most of my, most of the people my age think their parents had it a hell of a lot better than they do. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

She listed free milk in schools, benefits which were tied to changes in the average wage, Housing Corporation loans and less 'PC stuff' as examples of how things were better for the previous generation. User-pays and excessive building consents were also offered as signs of how younger people were more greatly burdened than their parents' generation.

It is important to note that there was some resistance to the idea that everything had been better in the past. One of the benefit recipients' focus groups was apparently unaware that wage regulation during the post-World War II period had ensured a 'family wage' sufficient for 'a man, his wife and 2-3 kids' to live on (Cheyne, et al., 2008). Once told about this, they were asked whether the job one of the participants had at The Warehouse paid such a 'living wage'. They agreed it did *not* but failed to perceive this as any worse than the challenges facing the generation before them. Yet many of the comments they made in response to other questions contradicted this position. For instance, they noted how benefits used to keep up with inflation and price increases and were thus more adequate for supporting a family than today. This perhaps illustrates both how a lack of knowledge about past policies and conditions make it difficult for some participants to imagine social rights not available to citizens in the present day (see Appendix). It also highlights the reality that citizens on benefits and low incomes have always struggled and did not necessarily experience the 'golden age' of the welfare state so frequently referred to in the international literature (Castles, 1996).

All main income source groups were very similar (ranging 29-36%) in terms of the level of 'nostalgia' they expressed in interviews and focus groups. Main benefit recipients offered the highest and New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients the lowest levels of 'nostalgia'.

'Nostalgia' amongst different socio-economic groups ranged only 25-38%. But those with low incomes and/or no tertiary qualification were most likely (33-38%) and middle or high income earners with tertiary qualifications (25-29%) least likely to be nostalgic.

43% of the 'Other' ethnic group demonstrated 'nostalgia', with European/Pākehā (39%) and Māori (31%) close behind. Pasifika participants offered fewer 'nostalgia' responses (11%), while Asians offered none.

'Nostalgia' was most evident in the 46-60 age group (46%) and least apparent in the under 31s (20%). The 31-45s (29%) and over 60s (33%) were more similar in their degree of nostalgia.

Males (34%) were only slightly more likely to express 'nostalgia' than females (31%).

In summary: This part of Section 1 has indicated that the majority of participants thought New Zealand citizens have 'more rights' than 'more responsibilities' and this reflected a change from the past, when responsibilities were perceived as having dominated. There were mixed attitudes as to whether this shift in the balance between rights and responsibilities was a positive or negative phenomenon. In that main benefit recipients and females were most likely to consider New Zealand citizens to have 'more rights' (and Māori were second most likely after the 'Other' ethnic group), it seems that those historically most marginalised in New Zealand society perceived that citizens have more rights today. But this trend was not apparent when it comes to socio-economic status or age. Such responses may have been shaped by a sense of 'nostalgia' for the past, which was expressed by almost a third of participants. But there is no clear cut trend for advantaged groups or disadvantaged groups to demonstrate higher levels of 'nostalgia'.

Section 1: Conclusion

Discussion thus far suggests that while neoliberal policy reforms may have reduced or changed the government's *actual* role in many social and economic activities, most participants still support government taking responsibility for funding and ensuring access to help the needy, health, education and, to a lesser extent, decent work/wages and housing.

Indeed, many participants framed these things as rights associated with New Zealand citizenship. That the rights they named were more 'social rights' than traditional legal or political rights may have been influenced by this study's focus, but the strength of the evidence suggests New Zealanders find these aspects of the welfare state very important. Most also considered that we have 'more rights' today than 'more responsibilities' (with many considering this a good thing, even if a third expressed 'nostalgia' for the past).

Importantly, however, viewpoints about government's responsibilities and the rights we have as citizens were heavily influenced by the demographic characteristics of participants – even if not always in predictable or consistent ways. In particular, main income source and ethnicity appear to be important variables for understanding attitudes to social citizenship. However, given the theoretical interests of this study, it is notable that there is no strong evidence that main benefit recipients, who have been subject to conditions that are not placed on other citizens, have been 'brainwashed' into believing that government is not responsible for their welfare; indeed, in most cases, the opposite is true. Furthermore, some of the tensions and contradictions evident in the findings presented here reoccur in the next section, indicating that it is difficult to generalise about the public's attitudes to social citizenship once we begin to explore these through indepth, qualitative data drawing on the words of citizens themselves.

SECTION 2: INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY

It was noted earlier that neoliberal reforms have attempted to place a greater focus on individual, rather than government, responsibility in a range of policy areas. The introduction of user-pays charges in health and education and a greater focus on the training, skills and motivations of benefit recipients, rather than the structural factors that keep them unemployed, are the best examples of this emphasis on individual responsibility. But the recent development of the KiwiSaver superannuation scheme has also been framed by this same language.

Although New Zealand is one of the 'liberal welfare states' that have always favoured individuals and families maintaining a significant role in providing for themselves (Castles, 1996), one might expect public support for individual responsibility to have strengthened during the 1980s and 1990s given this was the focus of many neoliberal reforms (see Humpage & Craig, 2008; Schmidt, 2002). As a result, this section deals first with general responses to a statement about individual responsibility before considering the specific types of activities for which participants felt individuals should be responsible. This section also reports on participants' ideas about how we might encourage greater individual responsibility amongst New Zealanders. Discussion then focuses on participants' support for different types of conditions that have been placed upon benefit receipt and their perceptions of which groups in society are deserving (or not) of assistance.

Should people take more responsibility to provide for themselves?

While the government responsibility statement discussed in Section 1 gave participants a chance to discuss their views on activities where government intervention may be appropriate, a further statement aimed to assess their opinions about where government should not take responsibility or intervene. This statement – *"People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves"* – reflects the rhetoric of neoliberal and neoconservative welfare reform, where the emphasis is placed on individuals taking responsibility for life's risks rather than government assuming responsibility to protect citizens from these risks (Humpage & Craig, 2008). It will be referred to in this section simply as the 'individual responsibility' statement.

As with the government responsibility statement, this statement had been previously included in the New Zealand Values Study. Data from that survey shows 40% of respondents agreed with the same statement in 1993. Support dropped to 33% in 1998, before rising to 37% in 2004 (P. Perry & Webster, 1999; Rose, et al., 2005). Thus, 3% *fewer* respondents wanted more individual responsibility in 2004 than eleven years earlier. As noted previously, this is so even though an increasing number of New Zealanders believed people live in need due to laziness and other personal behaviours rather than structural factors. These contradictory trends made it all the more necessary to use this statement in the context of focus groups and interviews where more complex analysis could be undertaken of individual responses.

Figure 5: Responses to: 'People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves' (N=87)




Figure 5 shows that a clear majority (88%) of the 67 participants who answered this question saw some role for individuals to take responsibility for themselves. But less than half (46%) agreed with the statement categorically, answering 'yes'. One participant who did provide a clear 'yes' response said:

'People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves.' I agree with that, yeah. I think one of the things that (pause) that can create a feeling of resentment and disparity between different, say, ethnic groups or social, socio-economic classes or whatever is feeling like a victim. And people taking responsibility to prove for themselves is empowering, yeah, and don't put people in a victim role and, you know, that's, that's also feeds the welfare mentality, I suppose ... [European/Pākehā female student, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Only a handful (12%) completely rejected the individual responsibility statement. One participant called it a "rubbish statement" that blamed victims because:

... I think the division of wealth is so great now it's just so marked, I think, you know, you have - and the ability to own a house and get your own place even though you are poor - you could, there's always been that ability 'well, I could if I worked, if I do something I will get something'. Whereas now, if you work hard, all you do is get higher rent and frigging smaller rent, you know, in a lot of cases it's just stupid. And then you get back to the meaning like government and what their duty is ... [Māori male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

These findings would seem to contradict those presented in the last section, which found that 82% of participants supported government taking responsibility for ensuring everyone is provided for in some way. However, the following discussion highlights both that many participants believed in a balance between government *and* individual responsibility and that many were ambivalent about the individual responsibility statement, agreeing with it in some circumstances and not others. All-in-all, the statement caused such a range of reactions it is difficult to take the results of quantitative studies asking this question seriously, because it can obviously be interpreted in many ways.

Importantly, more than two-fifths (42%) of the participants who responded to the individual responsibility statement were ambivalent. Many said *some* people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves or that *both* individuals and government should share responsibility of provision. After agreeing with the statement, one participant

qualified his position as to whether people need to take *more* responsibility for themselves by saying:

I'm sure there are people out there that don't, that think the world owes them a favour and things like that, and there are people out there that aren't for other reasons and, you know, that are beyond their control. So I think it does depend, but if you can get up there and do it, then there's no reason why you shouldn't be doing it. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Furthermore, many participants did not provide an explicit response to the statement because they rejected its premise outright. For some, this was because of their general distrust of government. For instance, one participant's first response to the individual responsibility statement was: *"Yeah, I think it's an easy way out for the government, you know, because it leaves them blameless."* [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years]. Others considered the statement an example of a particular brand of political rhetoric for which they had no sympathy. The immediate response from a participant in one of the wage/salary earners' focus groups was:

When you, when you pulled this [statement] out I just laughed and thought 'God, that smacks of the ACT Party!' (laughter) and I just thought – because it just hooks right into the debates that I have with my father who is an ACT supporter, and I just think about 'What about the little people?' So I get concerned about this statement, I think bloody ACT! (laughter). [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Other participants did not reject the statement outright but disputed the implicit focus on individuals, which ignores the societal context in which individuals live. For instance, one participant said:

... for most people it's actually impossible for them to take more responsibility to provide for themselves, given that, again, especially in the family kind of context - you know I have a great job, I earn more than the average wage. But to rent or buy a three bedroom house, which you know isn't too much to ask for a family of four in Auckland, the rent on that is more than the take-home pay of ... a full-time worker on minimum wage ... And then, of course ... child-care which at full-rate would be ... just about, yeah, astronomical, and so those kind of, those kind of living costs and ... before they were starting to bring in the PHO healthcare subsidies and that, to have a family and, \$80 to go to a doctor which simply means a lot of parents cannot, you know. So, and then I find myself in this obscure situation being more than, you know, earning more than the average New Zealander and yet, queuing up at a WINZ office, Work and Income office, applying for you know, a subsidy on this and a tax credit which - it rubs me the wrong way - for that, going through, jumping through huge hoops to get the kind of money for things that I ought not to need extra top ups for. And it's not because I have a great sense of entitlement that I should get these things. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

For some participants the focus on individuals also appeared to ignore what they considered to be a shared partnership between individuals, their families, communities *and* government. For instance, a young Pasifika participant said:

... I was trying to work out how to address the question cos – but now I've figured out why, why it's a stumbling block. When you speak to, I guess, a lot of Pacific Islanders and, in particular Samoans, the question is very individualistic and so I'm thinking: 'by myself?' Or what are you trying to get out, because when you think of, you know, us, we think

holistically. So 'people take more responsibility, should take more responsibility', people equals communities, you know, and it's not just a one-person thing which I kind of, almost, the question almost kind of suggested that, that the person themselves takes ownership of themselves. [Pasifika female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary, 30 years and under].

This resistance to the individual-centred emphasis of the statement was especially notable in the Māori and Pasifika focus groups but was not exclusive to them.

Many participants also wanted to unpack the statement, to make more explicit what was meant by each aspect of it:

.... I just think stuff like that is actually quite ridiculous because, you know, the correct answer is 'of course, people should provide for themselves'. But, you know, what do we mean by 'provide for themselves', 'take more responsibility'? And, I mean, part of the taking more responsibility to provide for ourselves may, in fact, be to curb other peoples rapacious tendencies, you know. ['Other' female wage/salary earner, unassigned income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Having deconstructed the statement, some participants wanted to rephrase it so that it better reflected what they perceived to be an individual's role:

'People should take more ...' - that implies that they're not taking responsibility. I do feel, while some of the things I say might sound reactionary-conservative, that there's a lot of people who struggle and would like to do this, they would like to take the responsibility to provide but circumstances don't allow them some people should take more responsibility, yes I do agree they're probably are some people, some beneficiaries who are skating along and saying 'I'm on a good wicket', but I don't think there are an overwhelming number. So they'd be, yeah, some people on the dole and the Unemployment Benefit and the like but I don't think it's a huge issue like you read about at times, I don't think we're being overwhelmed with people, bludgers. There's some, there always will be - I would rather say 'people should take more responsibility for helping provide for others'. ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Furthermore, other participants strongly agreed with the personal responsibility statement but saw themselves as *already* taking responsibility and thus felt affronted by any suggestion that they were not. For instance, a young Māori woman spoke of how, although she was receiving the DPB, she was responsible not only for herself but her children and that she was undergoing training because she wanted to improve her skills, rather than just sit at home. The benefit recipients' focus group in which she took part stressed in a number of ways that being a parent was an important responsibility and this group felt particularly aggrieved that WINZ does not appear to recognise it as such, instead regarding paid work as the main criteria for measuring individual responsibility. Another participant, who took part in the Māori focus group, was even more insulted by the individual responsibility statement: *"I still don't understand why that question came out. 'People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves.' We've provided for ourselves since we were born"* Later on she added: *"We do provide. We provide house, we provide the food, we provide the bills, we've actually provided everything."* [Māori female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Other participants, who agreed with the statement but had expressed contradictory views supporting greater government responsibility, illustrated how the idea of individual responsibility is so commonsensical in New Zealand that it is hard to disagree with the statement completely unless read in a particular social context. For instance, one woman's response to the statement was: *"My first reaction is absolutely! (laughter)."*

[European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, high income/ tertiary qualification, 30 years and under]. But earlier in her interview she indicated she believed government should provide a safety net for those who cannot provide for themselves and she supported 'free health' and 'free education'. Another participant felt much the same about these activities, yet also agreed with the individual responsibility statement because:

... the influence that the government's had in the last few, really, you know, has turned, is turning New Zealand into people ... who don't think for themselves, you know. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earners, middle income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Main income source, surprisingly, did not have a major effect on participant responses to the individual responsibility statement. Those on main benefits (40%) were slightly more like than wage/salary earners (33%) and New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients (35%) to offer a clear-cut 'yes' response. But the main benefit group was also more likely to answer 'no' (16% compared to 9% of wage/salary earners and no New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients), although the latter offered higher levels of 'sometimes/maybe' answers (41%) than the other groups (28-31%). Given these minimal differences, it is difficult to argue that such results support theoretical assumptions that recipients on benefits subject to obligations and work-tests tend to support individual responsibility more strongly than other groups.

Socio-economic status also does not appear to be a strong predictor for participant responses. The low income/no tertiary qualification group was the most likely to provide strong 'yes' support for the statement (43% compared to 29-38% for other groups), but when all the affirmative responses are combined, the high income/tertiary qualification group was most likely to agree (81% compared to 72% for those with low income/no tertiary qualification). In both cases, it was the middle income/no tertiary qualification group that was *least* likely to offer affirmative support, although the high income/tertiary qualification group provided the lowest number of 'no' answers (5%). While a clear majority of groups agreed with the statement in some way, these mixed results make it difficult to claim there was a clear trend for either income level or education level to influence attitudes towards individual responsibility.

Ethnicity *does* appear to strongly shape responses to the individual responsibility statement, although the small samples for each ethnic group make it difficult to be conclusive. Māori participants were substantially more likely than those identifying with other ethnic groups to offer an unambiguous 'yes', with 62% answering this way (18% percentage points higher than the next highest groups, Asian and 'Other'). Another 15% of Māori said 'sometimes/maybe' and only 8% said 'no'. This is surprising, because one might expect that Māori participants would be more likely to disagree with the statement, given the higher than average proportion of Māori receiving benefit payments and the history of systemic discrimination evident in government policy. However, discussion in the Māori focus group demonstrated that the participants associated the individual responsibility statement with Māori having greater self-determination over their own lives. Indeed, many examples were given of government legislation or policy taking away the ability of Māori to provide for themselves. Put most simply: *"Māori had solutions for all of these things that we're sitting down here trying to find today. We had our own governments, we had our own people running things, we had work."* [Māori male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Other participants offered examples to illustrate this point. For instance, in talking about the Tūhoe tribe that has maintained a relatively high level of self-sufficiency, including traditions of hunting and food gathering in the isolated Urewera region, one said:

Now, the Tūhoe nation came to be a nation of their own, they look after their people, they're still sustaining their people the way their ancestors did. Now the government's saying that we should take responsibility [but] if we all went back to our iwīs [sic] and done that, there would be no need for government to look after us because the Uruweras is probably one of the biggest cupboards down that area where they're actually looking after themselves and they're keeping themselves strong in there. [Māori female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

She had earlier said:

Now they've put in place DOCs [the Department of Conservation] because what, they're qualified to go in and look after our native trees? We have people that were, for mātauranga was handed down from generation to generation to do that but they no longer see ... that's all part and parcel of our culture to provide for our whānau and we provide that so it will be there a hundred years from now. It's diminishing because of – and how dare they say 'take responsibility', you know, 'take responsibility to provide for yourself'. We've been doing that for centuries. [Māori female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

A further comment came from another participant in the same focus group:

... when they say people should take more responsibility it would be different for my Dad's era to our era in regards to the L.A.W or the L.O.R.E which, once upon a time, I'd use. Like the shooting of pigeon, was a natural process, to – then it became controlled and now it's under law that you can't do it, but the logic behind it is still the same. You're questioning why weren't we able to take responsibility to feed our children, [that's] what's different to now and what's going to be different to the future. So, the decision-makers have a lot of control in that question there. Because they're the ones that make the laws at the end of the day. [Māori female wage/salary earner, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Asian and 'Other' participants were the next most likely to answer 'yes' (43% in both groups) and none disagreed with the statement. Discussion in the Asian and one of the wage/salary earners' focus groups indicated that in many Asian countries (notably China) there is a strong cultural emphasis placed on family responsibility, while government takes less responsibility for the kinds of social services offered in New Zealand. As such, one participant commented on the individual responsibility statement:

I think this concept goes exactly with Chinese morality people in China really like to be responsible for themselves In history, because China is agriculture country so people just get the habit of relying on themselves, in terms of land, farming, so it's thousands of years of history. So, nowadays people are still quite happy to rely on themselves, rather than on the government. [Asian female wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Previous experiences in other countries may also explain why the 'Other' ethnic group participants answered 'yes' or 'sometimes/maybe' in equal numbers and none responded with 'no'. For instance, one participant said:

Now, coming from the [United] States, I find this whole idea that university should be free is, just strikes me as sort of bizarre, I don't think government has an obligation to provide free education at that level. But through [primary and] secondary school, yes, I think that is a responsibility, it's part of those, the basic needs. ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

31% of European/Pākehā agreed with the statement, while slightly more were ambivalent (35%) and 12% answered 'no'. This was the highest number of 'no' answers, although Pasifika were close on 11%. **The same number of Pasifika participants (11%) offered clear-cut 'yes' responses to the individual responsibility statement, making them least likely to do so**. However, 44% said 'sometimes/maybe'. It has already been noted that some of this ambivalence was due to the individual focus of the question, which treated people as separate from their families and communities. As the next section will demonstrate, some Pasifika participants also indicated a strong belief that government should take responsibility for low socio-economic status groups. One participant said:

It's all very well for me to take responsibility when I'm well-paid, well-educated, I'm in a good job, so why ... if the standard is pitched according to my level, how is it going to be for families that are really struggling? [Pasifika male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Younger participants were willing to offer more clear-cut answers to the individual responsibility statement, even if their older counterparts more often agreed with the statement to some degree. Participants aged under 46 years (40-42%) offered 'yes' responses more often than their older counterparts (25-30%), especially those in the 46-60 years age group (25%). The only 'no' answers came from those aged 31-60 and the percentage was low (6-8%). However, when we add the 'yes' and 'sometimes/maybe' answers together, we find that participants 61 years and over are most likely to agree (83%) with the statement, then the 46-60s (75%), under 31s (70%) and finally the 31-45s (55%).

Closer analysis of the interview transcripts reveals that age alone does not explain these responses. Factors such as the family and work responsibilities of participants, as well as the insecurity they felt regarding housing affordability and rising food prices, were also important. Participants tended to be more ambivalent about the individual responsibility statement if they felt threatened by – or were simply more aware of – these wider social and economic forces that shape individual circumstances. This may help explain why no one in either the 61 years and over group (who are likely to be more financially secure and to have lived through more prosperous times) and the under 31s (many of whom had not yet taken on significant responsibilities, such as a mortgage or children) disagreed with the statement.

However, it is also possible that the responses of older participants reflected concern about the values of the younger generation. One participant talked of how young people expected 'everything on a plate' and would not take responsibility for their actions:

I mean sometimes there is no reason, there's no one to blame, you know, it's all too easy these days I think for people to say 'it's not my fault'. Well, yes, sometimes it is your fault, sorry, but that's the way it is. And there might be all sorts of other factors but at the end of the day we're responsible for our own behaviours. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Older participants were not alone in this belief, with a younger one stating:

... one of the issues that I've identified, or seems to be a pattern nowadays, is that people want consequence-free decisions, if you follow what I mean I used that argument in civil unions, but I think it applies to a lot of other things, I think ... it's, you know, I want to make a choice but then I don't want to suffer the consequences of making that choice. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

The major gender difference was again that males were more willing to offer ambivalent responses, while females chose not to answer if they could not offer a clear-cut answer to the

individual responsibility statement. Slightly more of the male sample (40%) than the female sample (33%) fully agreed with the statement (answering 'yes') but the two samples were almost equal in answering 'no' (9% and 10% respectively). While it is more surprising that no females answered 'sometimes/maybe' when 46% of males did so, it is important to point out that only 22 of 52 women in the study specifically answered this question. Analysis suggests that this inability or unwillingness to answer reflects considerable ambivalence about this question, which males demonstrated in their high level of 'sometimes/maybe' answers instead of declining to answer (with 33 of 35 males providing some response).

It is also worth noting here the comment of one male in response to this question, who was supportive of changes that had seen greater equality for women but linked these with the inability of many men to take responsibility for themselves:

... 'men need to be more sensitive, men [need] to cry and men need to do this, that and the next thing and men shouldn't do this, that and the other thing' and I was like 'okay, well, shit, what do we do then, how do we be men?' I've discussed this heaps with other guys my own age and similar age and it's just, you know, we don't really have a real concept of what it is to be a man and because I just feel that that's been really confused. And I don't know if I could really pin it down to anything, one thing but I think, I don't think that men really understand the responsibilities of being a man anymore and that's why there's just so many solo mums out there. Because you've got these guys who are just living for their own ends and not taking consequences into account and so they've got no real sort of sense, real idea of responsibility and of discipline and of dealing with the consequences of your actions. And I think political correctness has played a part in that too, because I believe that the way people are disciplined by the justice system these days is really soft and, you know, people know that they can do lots of really bad things and not get punished too harshly for it. I mean, you know, you might go and spend six months in jail for doing that sort of thing but, you know, really jail here is not such a bad thing - 'oh big deal' - and among certain groups, jail's got a certain mana attached to it, you know, it's like 'oh, he's done time' you know, yeah. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

This thoughtful response provided a gender-related explanation for what this participant believed to be significant shifts regarding the willingness of New Zealanders to take on individual and family responsibilities.

In summary: A clear majority of participants thought '*People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves*' to some degree, which would appear to contradict the last section's finding that most also supported the idea that '*Government should take responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for*'. Less than half the participants offered a categorical 'yes' to the individual responsibility statement and a similar amount were ambivalent, suggesting many people found it problematic and thus difficult to respond to in simple terms. This again indicates that the results of quantitative surveys which ask this question should always be read with care because they cannot take into account the specific meaning or context framing a respondent's answer. It remains, however, that a sizeable number of participants endorsed, at least to some degree, the idea that an individual should take some responsibility over their decisions and behaviours.

Ethnicity appears to strongly influence understandings of the statement, probably due to differing interpretations of what individual responsibility means to them. Notably, that Māori were most likely to agree with the individual responsibility statement counters popular myths that this group are 'welfare dependent'. However, it is clear that many of the Māori participants associated individual responsibility with notions of self-determination, which helps explain how they could support this statement while at the same time strongly

supporting the idea that government is responsible for ensuring everyone is provided for, as noted in Section 1.

Age and gender appear to be important variables only in terms of the degree by which older and male participants were willing to express their ambivalence, while younger and female participants tended to offer more clear-cut responses (or, in the case of women, not answer at all). Socio-economic status and main income source also do not have strong effects on responses to the individual responsibility statement. The latter result again counters predictions that main benefit recipients may have internalised the emphasis on greater individual responsibility found in welfare policy because benefit receipt has been subject to increasing conditions.

What should individuals be responsible for?

In addition to asking the general statement *'People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves'*, discussion in focus groups and interviews centred on what kinds of activities or behaviours participants thought individuals (as opposed to government) should be responsible for. Responses to this open-ended question have been coded into 23 different broad categories in Figure 6.

The first six categories are associated with political/legal responsibilities linked to citizenship, the next nine relate to economic responsibilities and another two are concerned with social responsibilities to New Zealand as whole. A further three relate to family responsibilities and the final three categories are associated with responsible behaviours. Only the seven activities most frequently mentioned are analysed in more detail.

Children and family

The two most commonly offered responses both concern an individual's responsibility to their family. **Over a third (37%) of all participants agreed that to 'discipline/teach your own children' certain moral behaviours was an individual responsibility.** It is important to note that this finding was heavily influenced by public discussion about the controversial repeal of Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961 in 2007. In the first focus groups, mention of this 'anti-smacking' legislation, which made it a criminal offence to physically discipline a child, was unsolicited and provoked by considerable public debate at that time. As it became clear that this issue was of significant concern, the researchers began to ask later participants about their viewpoint on the legislation, even if they did not bring it up spontaneously. Discussion about the 'anti-smacking' legislation provoked some very strong responses. For instance, a Māori participant commented:


... laws say that you can't take care of yourself because they've got the smacking thing, taking away the rights away of parents. I mean not to bash your child up but to discipline ... they've taken so much from the people, that the people have just lost all sense of what do they own, they don't even own their children anymore. [Māori female wage/salary earner, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Her comment, which was made in the Māori focus group, was framed by earlier discussion about the way laws and policy limited the ability of Māori to be self-determining. However, it was not only Māori participants who were concerned about this legislation. For instance, a European/Pākehā participant also said:

... I think government to a degree needs to trust people, you know, because part of this responsibility is trust. People know best how to spend their money, people know best how they want their schools to run, you know, they want, they know what they want for their

kids. You trust parents but, you know, the parents you can't trust! (laughter).
[European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Figure 6: Activities considered to some degree to be an 'individual responsibility' (N=87)
Affirmative responses ('yes' and 'sometimes/maybe')



His latter comment indicates an awareness that the legislation was a response to a certain cohort of parents (those who abuse children) who cannot be 'trusted'; the issue this participant had with the legislation was the way in which *all* parents were being affected.

Similarly, another participant said:

I think the government has over-stepped the mark and it's a shame that that [the legislation] got through. But I can understand why they've done it. I still think it's wrong it's the one-size-fits-all, it's the minority dictating to the main, majority. And the majority of New Zealanders know how to bring their children up and it's the minority who don't.

[European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Another went further, when referring back to the individual responsibility statement: *“This statement is saying that people should be responsible for themselves, but things like the anti-smacking bill is, a lot of people see [it] as removing some of their ability to be responsible.”* [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Participants receiving New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance (59%) were most likely to consider ‘discipline/teach own children’ as an individual responsibility, although 44% of those on main benefits also named this activity. Wage/salary earners were least likely to name both ‘discipline/teach own children’ (36%) as an individual responsibility. This finding is likely a function of the older age of most members of the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group. In-depth analysis of focus group and interview data suggests that older participants were concerned about the lack of responsibility some parents take ‘these days’, while others disagreed with government attempts to intervene in parenting. It is also possible that income support recipients were more likely than wage/salary earners to name ‘discipline/teach own children’ given past and present debate about using income support payments as a way of influencing the behaviour of parents.

There is no clear relationship between socio-economic status and views on ‘discipline/teach own children’. The low income/tertiary qualification group (62%) was most likely and the middle income/tertiary qualification group (19%) least likely to name this activity as an individual responsibility. Other groups ranged 43-46%.

Ethnicity appears to be an important variable regarding ‘discipline/teach own children’ but there is little clarity as to *why*. European/Pākehā were most likely to name ‘discipline/teach own children’ (53%), although both ‘Other’ (43%) and Māori (38%) participants offered strong support as well. Only 14% of Asian and 11% of Pasifika made this response. This may have been the result of the particular Pasifika and Asian focus group dynamics, although it is also possible that this idea is so ingrained and taken for granted in Asian and Pasifika cultures that it was not mentioned.

Older participants were more likely to name ‘discipline/teach own children’. 67% of those 61 years and over and 54% of those aged 46-60 named this as an individual responsibility, compared to 30-32% of the under 46s. This may well be because older participants are more likely to have raised a family, but interview data also suggests some resistance by this group to the idea of government intervention into families generally. For instance, a retired participant said of children: *“they have right to basic needs and nurturing and to be looked after if they’re born into this world but it is the responsibility of the parents to make sure they get it.”* [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over]. In reference to the anti-smacking legislation, another participant said that the legislation annoys her:

Because I was always ... brought up with a whack on the backside or hand, and I think you’ve got to be careful where you hit them, but I think some, they don’t have the mental type, mentality to be able to understand why you’re saying ‘no’, and so a little [slap], I think, as long as it’s kept to that is, is something, it really means business, rather than something, I mean you take ages [to] put it [in] ‘time out’ and you might get your house knocked down or anything! (laughter) Exaggeration, I know, at that size, but you do wonder sometimes. But no, I’m afraid I was quite annoyed when that one went through. [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

Males were slightly more likely to mention ‘discipline/teach own children’ (46% compared to 40% of females). Although the difference was not large, it may reflect the fact that traditional masculine gender roles frame men as disciplinarian or authority figures.

A similar number (34%) of participants gave responses coded as ‘care for family’. While this was, for some participants, linked to discussion about the ‘anti-smacking’ legislation, it also reflected a wider concern about family functioning. For instance, a retired participant said:

... I think everybody should take responsibility for their actions. I don’t say at five or six but that’s when it starts, just looking after yourself, keeping your nose clean and working toward that and as you go through school. And I think I heard my mother say one day when somebody had said to her ‘you had six children in the Depression years, oh you must have had to make sacrifices’ and she said ‘well, I prefer you didn’t use that word’. She said ‘we didn’t make sacrifices, we had six children and they were our responsibility and we took responsibility for them’. [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

Discussion in focus groups and interviews suggest that even more participants than Figure 6 indicates believed individuals are responsible for looking after their immediate family and that government should not intervene in unnecessarily. This is the case even if they did not offer ‘care for family’ as an answer to this particular question.

Participants receiving New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance (40%) were, again, most likely to consider ‘care for family’ as an individual responsibility. Wage/salary earners (38%) were close behind but only 29% of main benefit recipients offered this response. This finding is again likely linked to the older age of most members of the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group.

‘Care for family’ was mentioned more often by those in the low income/no tertiary qualification group (46%) and high income/tertiary qualification groups (43%). Other groups ranged between 31-33%. As with ‘discipline/teach own children’, socio-economic status thus does not appear to play a strong role in shaping attitudes in this case.

The ‘Other’ group was by far the most likely to name ‘care for family’ (71%). Support was weaker but still strong amongst Pasifika (44%), Māori (38%) and European/Pākehā (37%). One might assume that the very high level of support amongst ‘Other’ participants is associated with the fact that all members of this group had migrated to New Zealand at some point and there is a stronger emphasis on family responsibility found in many non-Western cultures. However, it is surprising that the Asian group (14%, all but one of which were migrants) mentioned this as an individual responsibility least frequently. Again, it might be that caring for family members is so culturally ingrained that it did not bear mentioning in this context. For instance, a young participant said that instead of individual responsibility: *“I think for the Asians, there’s more being - what do you call it? Xiao shun - a love and respect for one’s parents and ancestors.”* [Asian female wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under]. This concept was used to explain why Asian focus group participants considered it inappropriate for an adult child to place his or her parent in a rest home rather than care for them.

Those aged 31-60 were most likely to name ‘care for family’ (42-45%), although a third of the over 60s (33%) and the under 31s (30%) still did so. This comes as no surprise, because the middle age groups were more likely than their younger or older counterparts to be presently bringing up children and caring for ageing parents. One participant explicitly articulated this during an interview, telling how becoming a parent had changed his viewpoint:

... I've noticed that, growing up - cos I come from this area, and growing up in this area - and just the different changes are, now coming back with a family, there's all sorts of things going on that you notice that you wouldn't have noticed before. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Females were slightly more likely to mention 'care for family' (40%) than males (34%). In that femininity has traditionally framed women as carers and nurturers and male parents as discipline and authority figures, it does not come as a surprise that females were more likely to name this response, while males were more likely to mention 'discipline/teach own children'.

Work and tax

'Work' was the third most frequently offered response to the question about individual responsibilities, although only 28% of participants named this activity. This is notable given this study's concern with how a neoliberal emphasis on work as a responsibility rather than a right may have affected attitudes to social citizenship. Some participants saw paid work as a kind of moral obligation to broader society and thus were disturbed by the apparent lack of work ethic amongst some New Zealanders. A retired participant said:

.... when I come up, drive up from Dunedin to Alexandra and I see the apple orchards with the most magnificent fruit dropping on the floor and nobody there picking fruit because the students and the school kids won't go and pick it up, I think that is to me, that's criminal that we have to employ people from out of the country to come in and pick fruit. That to me is not looking after our people, it's doing our people a disservice, both the people who need the workers and the kids who aren't learning how to do a day's work. [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

However, others saw a wider range of benefits to paid work that encouraged them to regard it as a key individual responsibility. For example, a younger participant said:

.... I think it is too easy for people to not have to provide for themselves. And I think there should be more emphasis on people, you know, working hard and being taught the benefits of working and not just financial but the soft, of self-esteem that goes with it and the motivation that goes with it. I definitely noticed that myself when I started working was just how, overall, so many things improved, I mean (a) I had lots of money but (b) my self-esteem improved and my motivation improved and my energy levels improved and, yeah. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Wage/salary earners (38%) were most likely and main benefit recipients (28%) were least likely to name this activity. The New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group sat in between (35%). These findings do not come as a surprise, but it is notable that they were not more disparate, given the 'self-interest' argument would suggest that main benefit recipients should more heavily reject the idea of 'work' as an individual responsibility. While this might provide evidence that work-related conditions upon main benefit recipients have influenced responses here, it is also important to stress that fewer than two-fifths of any group named 'work'.

The middle income/no tertiary qualification group named 'work' (55%) most often. This may be because they felt particularly vulnerable in the labour market. However, the low income/no tertiary qualification group referred to 'work' (21%) the least, even though they might be considered equally, if not more, vulnerable to shifts in employment. All other groups ranged 29-38%.

Pasifika participants (11%) were least likely to name 'work'. Māori (38%) and European/Pākehā (35%) were most likely to name this as an individual responsibility, although Asian and 'Other' ethnic group participants were not far behind (both 29%). The outlier response of the Pasifika ethnic group may again have had something to do with the Pasifika participants involved in the study; the majority of whom were highly educated and earning middle-to-high incomes. However, in other discussion their belief in a strong work ethic was apparent.

Age was not a major variable in understanding why 'work' might be named as an individual responsibility. Although the 46-60 years age group (29%) was least likely and the under 31s most likely (35%) to give this response, the range between age groups was so slight that it is impossible to argue that the younger group's attitudes reflect a greater acceptance of neoliberal ideas than that of their older counterparts.

Gender influenced attitudes to 'work' as an individual responsibility, with males (43%) more than twice as likely as females (21%) to name 'work'. This may, again, reflect traditional gender roles which have seen men undertake a greater level of paid work than women.

A further 22% of participants referred to 'pay tax', which is commonly associated with work. However, it is important to note that participants offered rather mixed views on the issue of tax. Many made a direct connection between paying tax and public services provided by government and were thus happy to fulfil their tax obligations:

... I was discussing with someone the other day and they were saying 'oh, apparently there's some sort of loophole in the tax law where like legally you don't actually have to pay tax like' and they went on this whole spiel and I was like 'cool, so, you know, if I was the cops and those people rung me up it'll be "yeah, sorry, yeah, you haven't paid your tax, so we can't come to your aid"'. You know what I mean? I don't mind being charged tax because it pays for things like roads and police and blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Others, in contrast, found it difficult to see the connection between tax and services. One participant had paid tax in New Zealand for some years yet had been unable to access many tax-funded services while on a student visa. Having recently gained New Zealand citizenship, she was now particularly concerned about where her taxes went:

... taxes to me – and I'm really ignorant – but they seem very high for what I, it's like what am I going to get back? I want to see what my 39% on the dollar is going to and I want to know how it's helping me and it doesn't feel like it is, and the whole wage thing is around that, yeah, you make, I feel like I work myself to the bone and, what are they doing with all my money? ['Other' female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

This is an interesting comment given that, since the late 1980s, New Zealand has had one of the lowest income tax rates in the OECD (2009b). Yet, like this participant, New Zealanders have increasingly favoured tax cuts in the 2000s, not least because National Party election campaigns of 2002, 2005 and 2008 stressed the need for them. However, as noted earlier, when NZES (2008) respondents were asked whether 'government should reduce taxes and people should pay more for their own health and education', support for tax cuts was considerably lower.

Main income source was not a major variable when it comes to 'pay tax'. Responses ranged only between 24-29% across the three income source groups for 'pay tax', with main benefit recipients mentioning this activity most often.

The middle income/no tertiary qualification group named 'pay tax' (44%) most often. As with 'work', this may be because they feel particularly vulnerable in the labour market. However, while the low income/no tertiary qualification group referred to 'work' the least, it was the high income/tertiary qualification group that named 'pay tax' (19%) as an individual responsibility least often (compared to other groups ranging 23-25%). This was possibly because many perceived themselves as carrying the heaviest tax burden.

Pasifika participants (11%) were least likely to name 'pay tax' but Asian participants (14%) also named it only infrequently. In contrast, European/Pākehā (29%), 'Other' (29%) and Māori (23%) participants mentioned 'pay tax' a similar number of times. As with 'work', it is not entirely clear why such a difference in responses was apparent between Pasifika and Asian participants and other ethnic groups.

As with 'work', age was not an important variable for explaining 'pay tax' responses. The differing age groups ranged only 23-29%, with the 46-60s mentioning it most often and the 31-45s the least.

Gender may have some influence on attitudes to 'pay tax' as an individual responsibility. Females were slightly more likely to name 'pay tax' (27% compared to 23% amongst males). This is the opposite of the finding for 'work', possibly because the latter is a more active role than tax and one that men have traditionally been expected to participate in to a greater degree than women (who have usually fulfilled caring roles in the home).

Health and education

25% of participants made responses suggesting they thought it was individual's responsibility to 'look after and/or pay for own health'. This sits in tension with the 61% of participants who thought that 'health' was a government responsibility. In the context of individual responsibility, most participants referred to people eating responsibly, exercising and doing all they could to prevent costly health problems. This would suggest many participants either supported or had been influenced by the positive healthy eating and prevention campaigns that were promoted under Labour-led governments during the 2000s (some even mentioned these specifically). However, for others these campaigns were evidence of "*creeping socialism*." [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years]. For instance, one woman saw these campaigns as the sign of a broader problem:

... I hate this sort of food police thing, I hate that, I hate nanny state interfering in what I eat, what I put on my table, what I feed my children. I hope that I've got enough responsibility to know that I should be feeding my children fruit and vegetable for example, and not KFC every night. So somewhere along the line society has gone from 'you earn your living, you pay your bills, if you can't afford it you don't buy it, you look after ... your family and your elderly people and your young ones and your neighbours, and that's your life', you know, maybe it was a little life but it was a good life. And we've moved away from that and I don't know how it happened, I don't know whether it was government or just the way the world has become, wealthy and selfish or something, to 'well, woe is me, and ... I can't work and I'm getting depressed and the government's going to have to pay and, you know, I'm just going to sit back here and, and feel sorry for myself'. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

A smaller number of participants provided responses that explicitly referred to the necessity of paying for health directly through continued user-pays charges or private health insurance. One said:

... we've got private health insurance, because I wanted to provide, you know, the level of healthcare for my family that I'm able to. Because if there isn't ... if we didn't then we'd be another person waiting for - if we needed healthcare - we'd have to wait, so to me that's adding to the woes of the healthcare. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Main income source was not a major variable in explaining why some participants considered 'look after and/or pay for own health' an individual responsibility. 'Yes' responses across main income groups ranged only between 26% and 31%, with New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients offering the lowest and wage/salary earners the highest level of support.

Education may influence attitudes, with both low and middle income participants with a tertiary qualification much more likely (32% and 55% respectively) than their counterparts without a tertiary qualification (15% and 19%) to favour this activity as an individual responsibility. But this trend did not hold true for the high income/tertiary qualification group, which sat somewhere in between (29%).

European/Pākehā (35%) were most likely to make responses coded as 'look after &/or pay for own health', followed closely by the Asian and 'Other' ethnic groups (each 29%). Māori (15%) and Pasifika (11%) were much less likely to make this response. It is uncertain why; although 70% of Māori and 56% of Pasifika named 'health' as a government responsibility, perhaps indicating a resistance to this being seen as an individual responsibility, 63% of European/Pākehā did the same and yet this group most frequently named 'look after &/or pay for own health' as something for which individuals should be responsible.

A third of the under 31s (35%) and the 46-60 year olds (33%) thought 'look after &/or pay for own health' was an individual responsibility. There was no clear relationship between responses and age, with only a quarter of the 31-45 year group (23%) and the over 60s (25%) naming this activity.

Gender was a more important variable, with males (29%) much more likely to name 'look after &/or pay for own health' than females (17%). It is unclear why.

Only 7% of participants offered responses that supported individuals being responsible for 'educating yourself and/or paying for it'. Most comments coded in this category reflected a belief that individuals should do all they can to pursue education, both formal and informal, so as to become more self-aware, as well as more employable. For instance, one participant said:

Yeah, to me that would be responsible cos then you're making an educated decision, you're not just taking a second-hand opinion and going 'yeah, that's my opinion too' or, you know, you're actually, that to me that's being responsible [European/Pākehā male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

However, a handful of participants believed that paying for education (especially at a tertiary level) was an individual responsibility. A participant who had studied in the United States said:

I'm fine with, I would pay 10,000 a year, I would, yeah, I just think it's - and especially cos it's interest-free, that is like 'holy moly, that's fantastic, they don't know how good they have it!' (laughter) - So I'm fine with that, yeah, student loans, pay some fees I think that in order to get that quality we need to be able to pay for it. ['Other' female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].


Support for user-pays in social policy areas

Although only a small number of participants spontaneously mentioned that individuals should take a financial responsibility for health and education, it is worth noting that participants were also asked, at a later stage of the interview or focus group, whether they supported or at least accepted the idea of user-charges in social policy areas like health and education.

Figure 7 shows that half (51%) the participants who answered this question directly offered responses which suggested they fully supported ‘user-pays’ in these areas. For instance, an older participant said:

... I think the biggest mistake they ever made was when they stopped charging people to go to the doctor I don't care if they'd paid tuppence but when you go to the doctor you put something into the money bank for the health system. And we saw the number of people that didn't need to go when they started charging, because you could go into a doctor's room in the winter time, you'd go in and the room would be absolutely full of people coughing and carrying on and, and they brought in charging and you could walk into the doctor and get an appointment and there would be nobody there. [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

Figure 7: Support for user-pays in social policy areas (n=43)



A further 23% thought that ‘user-pays’ was either acceptable in some areas but not in others or were inevitable, even if they disagreed with it in principle. For instance, one woman said: *“I hate to think of having to pay for, you know, to send your five-year-old to school, I hate that. But ... I recognise that governments struggle to pay huge education costs.”* [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner paid work, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Another participant, who had lived for some years in Britain, recalled the shock of coming back to the user-pays system in New Zealand:

Coming back here, I must admit, I felt that every time I turned the corner, someone wants your money, everything, they sting you for everything. Whereas in the UK, you weren't, you know. I mean, even the little thing, like we sold a car, you know, \$25 to change the ownership, in the UK, you just send it off. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

But he did not necessarily consider the British health system to be better:

... although it's free, you know, you wait two weeks to get into the doctor's and stuff like that, so whereas here you can ring up the doctor in the morning and go and see them straight

away, pay for your \$50 and it's done. Health insurance, you know, covers all that sort of thing, so that's fine. I think the service is better [in New Zealand]. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

He later stated that he did not think New Zealand was big enough to support the kind of free and universal health system that the British NHS offers and was happy with user-pays: *"but I think that it needs to be the same sort of quality for everybody, even if they can't afford it, they should be able to get the access to that good health care."* [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years]. This latter statement drew upon an egalitarian discourse that was quite common amongst participants, stating that user-pays might be necessary but those who could afford to pay should not receive any better service: this went against a New Zealand sense of 'fairness'.

A quarter (26%) of the participants, however, fully disagreed with 'user-pays.' The following quote illustrates that some participants explicitly linked the introduction of user-pays with a move away from the guaranteeing of social rights:

... just that whole privatisation thing of social services, it's just crap. I mean it can't be, you can't make it into a money-making thing without screwing somebody which is what the private medical companies do, they charge huge medical insurances and they can afford to do it and they make money. And yeah, it's just, I mean, that's the [point] of the government, that's what it's meant to be there for and old age and young and medical and health and ensure that somebody has somewhere to live. You know, a safe warm place and ensure that they have enough to eat, that's what the government is there for. Otherwise it's pointless having a government. [Māori male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

However, other participants disagreed with user-pays in particular circumstances. One, for instance, described how her parents, aged in their 70s, were still working part-time because their skills were highly sought-after, yet this work put them just over the income limits for which they would have been eligible for the city council rates rebate and the Community Services Card. She felt it was unfair for user-charges to be applied in full in their case.

New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients were more likely to say both 'yes' (35%) and 'no' (18%) to 'user-pays' than other participants. Results were very similar results across all three responses for those receiving main benefits and wage/salary earners. For instance, 24% of the former and 22% of the latter offered a 'yes' response.

Socio-economic status appears to play only a small role in explaining support or disagreement with 'user-pays'. The middle income/no tertiary qualification group was both most likely to say 'yes' (44%) and 'no' (22%). Surprisingly, the high income/tertiary qualification group (14%) was least likely to fully support 'user-pays' although when 'sometimes/maybe' answers (19%) are added, it reported similar levels of affirmative responses to other groups with the exception of middle income earners with no tertiary qualification.

European/Pākehā were most likely to offer responses suggesting they fully supported 'user-pays' (22%), while Māori participants provided only 'no' responses (38%). This latter finding sits in tension with the relatively weak support by Māori participants for 'free health' and 'free education'. It suggests they may have held different understandings of what 'free health' and 'free education' means. The focus group was recruited through and conducted at an urban Māori organisation which provides some free health and educational services and this may have framed this group's responses to both the 'free health', 'free education' and the 'user-pays' question.

Once again, Pasifika and Asian participants were more ambivalent in their responses, with high levels of 'sometimes/maybe' responses (33% and 43% respectively). For instance, one Asian participant was not sure about 'user-pays' in New Zealand but was supportive of the national health insurance tax that working individuals have to pay in Taiwan which then entitles them to free or cheap health services without the waiting lists which she saw as a problem in New Zealand. Alternatively, one of the Pasifika focus group participants had visited Sweden:

One of the things I found out about Sweden is a lot of its citizens are actually taxed quite heavily, but when you look at the support for all people that live in Sweden it's very, very good. I'm a great supporter of that [universalised] system because it's fair for everybody. [Pasifika male wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

The over 60s (42%) and under 31s (35%) were most supportive of 'user-pays'. Those in the middle age groups (17-19%) were somewhat less likely to support this model. Yet, the two older age groups (over 45 years) were most likely to provide 'no' responses (17%). This suggests age may only partly explain the fact that the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients were more accepting of 'user-pays' than other income source groups.

Gender was mildly important for understanding support for 'user-pays'. Males were more likely to offer 'yes' responses (31%) and 'sometimes/maybe' (11%) than females (21% and 0% respectively), while females were slightly more likely to provide 'no' response (15%) than males (9%). This supports international claims that females tend to favour state intervention more than males (Svallfors, 2003), but it sits in tension with previously discussed findings.

Participate in democracy

Participants appeared to have a fairly passive understanding or awareness of traditional notions of citizenship. **'Participate in democracy', which includes references both to voting and keeping abreast of political issues, was only the fifth most common response (20%).** Many of the other activities associated with good citizenship ('jury service', 'loyalty to NZ' and 'be law-abiding'), were mentioned infrequently as individual responsibilities.

Wage/salary earners were least likely to name 'participate in democracy' (18%). New Zealand Super/Student Allowance (29%) recipients were most likely to do the same. Main benefit recipients sat between these two groups (24%).

Education may influence attitudes to 'participate in democracy' in lower income groups. The low income/tertiary qualification group named 'participate in democracy' (46%) most often. As this was almost double the number of low income/no tertiary qualification participants (25%) who offered this response, one wonders whether the former were more aware of what they had to lose economically than their low income/no tertiary qualification counterparts. All other groups mentioned this activity at much lower levels (11-19%) and only amongst those on middle incomes did tertiary education seem to make a difference.

Pasifika and Asian participants made no mention of 'participate in democracy' and, of the ethnic groups that did name it, Māori mentioned it the least (15%). Given the considerable level of distrust of government evident in the Māori focus group, a history of colonisation and recent political debates, this does not come as a surprise. It is, however, concerning that 'participate in democracy' did not come to mind amongst most participants from ethnic minority groups.

Older participants were more likely to mention ‘participate in democracy’. 42% of 46-60 year olds and 25% of over 60s did so. In comparison, only 16% of 31-45 year olds and only 10% of the under 31s named this activity as an individual responsibility.

Males and females named ‘participate in democracy’ in even numbers (23%).

Community and care

For most participants, ‘contribute to community’ (18%) and ‘care for others’ (17%, including neighbours, the elderly, the sick and disabled) were just as, if not more, important than formal aspects of citizenship. For instance, a main benefit recipient thought she demonstrated a high degree of responsibility by contributing to community activities:

I get really involved through sports with netball, so I sort of try and give a lot of time back, especially being on the benefit, I sort of feel like if I can give as much back in now while I can, I do. [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

It was not uncommon for main benefit recipients to stress their involvement in community or caring activities as a defensive response to the stigma associated with dependence on state support, but such comments were certainly not restricted to this group.

Although more indepth demographic analysis is not possible, it is notable that neither Pasifika nor Asian participants mentioned ‘care for others’ and ‘contribute to community’ at all, while Māori mentioned them infrequently. Given that we know both family and community are important to the cultures of all three ethnic groups, this comes as a surprise. It may indicate how a focus on *individual* responsibility shaped discussion in a way that did not bring community and family to mind, as noted earlier.

Other activities

Participants mentioned other activities they considered to be individual responsibilities, including ‘living within your means’ (13%), ‘care for the environment’ (13%), ‘bear consequences of own decisions’ (10%) and ‘follow social mores’ (7%). Very small numbers of participants mentioned these activities, so they have not been analysed according to demographic variables. But an older participant summed up many of them when saying that for him individual responsibility involved:

Having that attitude of ‘look, I’m grateful for what I get, so therefore what can I do? Well, I can be a law-abiding citizen, I can try and be supportive to other people and not interfere with their life, I can try to live on what the government is good enough to give me. Now I’d like more - we all would - but this is the reality, so how can I live within my means?’ That’s responsibility. [European/Pākehā male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

In summary: When considering the types of activities different groups of participants considered to be individual responsibilities, responses in many cases were shaped by the social and cultural contexts participants have experienced. For instance, the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group (most of whom were retired) and older participants were more likely to name ‘discipline/teach your own children’ and ‘participate in democracy’ in their responses, perhaps looking back nostalgically to a time when greater emphasis was placed on both. Similarly, gendered norms which associate unpaid, caring roles with femininity and paid work and authoritarianism with masculinity appeared to shape attitudes. Males were more likely to name ‘discipline/teach own children’ and ‘work’ and accept the idea of paying for health and user-pays more generally, while females were

more likely to name 'care for family' and 'pay tax' (which is a more passive activity than 'work').

However, there were some surprises. One might imagine that New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients and the older age groups would be more resistant to user-pay charges in social policy areas because they actually experienced and remember a time when both health and education were more or less free. Yet, they were most likely to fully support 'user-pays.' Similarly, we might expect income source to shape attitudes more, especially given the theoretical literature suggests that main benefit recipients may adopt more 'neoliberal' ideas towards work (Dwyer, 1998). Main benefit recipients were not more likely to name any of the activities offered as individual responsibilities. Even socio-economic status did not appear to affect attitudes very much, although those on low or middle incomes with a tertiary qualification were more likely to name 'health' and 'participate in democracy' as individual responsibilities, while those without a tertiary qualification and on middle incomes appeared to be more concerned than other groups with 'work' and 'pay tax'.

In regards to this study's broader interest in social citizenship rights, the fact that half the participants supported 'user-pays' in social areas and only around a quarter mentioned 'work' or 'pay tax' suggests that there is still uncertainty about whether being a 'responsible' citizen necessarily involves paid work and other financial responsibilities; certainly the fact that issues to do with family and children were named most often indicates that this is still the first thing many people think of when they consider the idea of individual responsibility.

How might we encourage greater individual responsibility?

After asking participants to consider whether people should take greater responsibility for themselves and then exactly what types of activities and behaviours people should be responsible for, participants were asked to consider *how* we might actually go about encouraging greater individual responsibility. The aim was to get a sense of whether they shared government's ideas that individual responsibility is largely demonstrated by participation in paid work.

In the early focus groups, participants were asked this very generally, with no examples provided, while in the Pasifika and Asian focus groups and in interviews open-ended questions were followed by discussion of two specific examples of attempts to encourage individual responsibility. The first related to the youth policies announced by the Labour and National parties in January 2008. Both aimed to encourage all young people under 18 to stay at school but the National Party also wished to exclude under 18s from any kind of benefit unless they were in school or work. The second example referred to the work-for-dole programme that was implemented in New Zealand between 1998 and 2001. Participants asked explicitly what they thought of these policies as a means to encourage individual responsibility.


Figure 8 indicates that responses have been coded into 15 different categories. Only the first five categories had sufficient numbers for more indepth analysis about the variables that affect responses about how we might encourage greater responsibility.

Education

'Education' was by far the most popular means for encouraging greater responsibility, with almost half (45%) the participants offering this response. However, the responses coded into this category were quite diverse. One woman placed an emphasis on improving parenting skills:

... I think more education around parenting, I think that would be incredibly important for the government to implement. Someone was telling me yesterday that in some Scandinavian country, in order to get your maternity benefit, you have to take basically like a month or something of like these really intensive parenting courses and unless you pass it you can't get your maternity benefit and I just think that'd be fantastic if we could do that. ['Other' female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Figure 8: Ways we might encourage greater individual responsibility (N=87)
Affirmative responses ('yes' and 'sometimes/maybe')



When asked, she said this should be for *all* parents not just benefit recipients. However, another participant who favoured a parental mentoring programme said, when asked the same question: *"yeah, unfortunately it does target beneficiaries, I'm afraid It does and, you know but, look, let's be honest about it, it's going to because that's who you can control, you know, you control the money."* [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years]. He felt this was justified because he believed there was no longer a sense of shame in receiving a benefit, something he thought should be reintroduced.

There was also strong support for life-skills education that included budgeting, gardening, cooking and car maintenance. When asked how to encourage responsibility, one participant talked about how he was surprised an older male he worked with did not know how to change the engine oil in his car:

... we were discussing – why ... are stuff like this not taught at high school? ... Like when I first went flatting I just had no concept of budgeting and of having to set money aside every week and I got myself into all sorts of financial trouble and it took me years to really get my shit together. And I would like to see, you know, when you're moving into the more senior years of high school, I'd like to see less focus, well, I'd like to see more diversity, more of a

choice of going 'okay, well you can do maths this year or you can do a year-long course in home skills and car maintenance and budgeting'. And, well, to be honest, I actually think it should [be] mandatory, I mean, probably one per cent of the population [is] going to use trigonometry but most of the people are going to have a car. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Many participants also believed that people need information about rights and services to take responsibility for themselves: *"it's letting people know what's available and letting them know that they have [a] right to use it and they have a responsibility not to exploit it perhaps."* [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients were more likely (58%) to favour 'education' as a way to encourage greater individual responsibility. This finding seems to be tied with older age of most of the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group (see below). Responses were fairly even between wage/salary earners (42%) and those on main benefits (40%).

Low and middle income earners with a tertiary qualification were the most likely to support 'education' (69% and 63% respectively). Those with no tertiary qualification were far less supportive (33-43%) but the fewest affirmative responses came from the high income/tertiary qualification group (31%). This does not come as a surprise, given those with a tertiary qualification are more likely to value the education they have had than those who have no tertiary qualification. This finding also complements earlier discussion, which found tertiary educated participants more likely to support 'free education'. But it also sits in tension with the fact that those without tertiary qualifications were more likely to think 'education' should be a government responsibility.

Older participants were more likely to support 'education'. 67% of those 61 years and over and 54% of 46-60 year olds named this activity compared to only 40% of under 31s and 32% of 31-45 year olds. It is not clear why this might be the case, but possibly this finding emerges from the greater awareness that older participants have of life's risks and the social forces that create them, which means they favour educative more than punitive measures for encouraging individual responsibility.

European/Pākehā and Asian participants were most likely to favour 'education' (both 57%). While 29% of the 'Other' ethnic group and 22% of Pasifika named 'education', only 15% of Māori did so. This result may relate to the fact that both the European/Pākehā and Asian ethnic groups are comparatively successful in mainstream education systems, especially when compared to Pasifika and Māori. The latter groups may thus place less emphasis on education as a useful tool. This, however, does not necessarily explain the relatively low level of support for 'education' as a means to encourage individual responsibility amongst the 'Other' ethnic group.

Males (49%) and females (42%) supported 'education' in fairly even numbers.

Incentives

'Incentives' were also a popular (31%) means for encouraging individual responsibility, although the examples offered again varied greatly. For instance, one woman described how her adult son, who has an intellectual disability and lives in her home, was penalised for accumulating assets: *"if you'd managed to save a bit or put it away so we can go on a holiday, it's knocked down, he gets a smaller benefit. And he's still mentally affected."* [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over]. For her, improving incentives involved dealing quite specifically with the financial rules of

the benefit system. Another participant talked at a much broader level of the need to give people an incentive to take part in democracy and politics:

The first thing I would do is introduce a referendum which was replicated every three years at the general election and as well as voting – giving the party vote and whether it was MMP or first past the post, it doesn't matter. Whatever the election process was – alongside of that, you would also undertake a second ballot and that is that you would, as a voter, be asked to indicate your five top priorities for government spending for the next three years and it would be 'law and order', 'health', blah, blah, blah. And as a leader I would then use that as, if you like, the KPI [key performance indicator] against which I would measure my government's performance for the next three years. So that would be the key performance indicator and within that I'm sure that 'education' would be up there. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Wage/salary earners were most likely (36%) to name 'incentives', although support was fairly even across all groups. 29% of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance and 24% of main benefit recipients made this response. This is an interesting result, because one might imagine the latter group would be most supportive of this form of encouragement. It perhaps reflects the fact that most main benefit recipients believed unemployment to be not simply a matter of personal motivation, which can be improved through incentives, but as something shaped by broader structural factors including a lack of well-paid, secure employment. This is especially so for the multiply-disadvantaged or those with significant caring responsibilities.

Level of education was important in shaping low and middle income group attitudes to 'incentives'. These were supported least by the low and middle income groups with no tertiary qualification (22-22%), while those with a tertiary qualification favoured them more (38-44%). High income earners with tertiary qualifications sat somewhere in between (33%). It is not clear what factors shaped these different opinions.

Age was somewhat important as a variable for 'incentives'. The number of participants naming this ranged from 25-29% amongst the under 46s and 33-38% across those aged over 45 years. Although the difference between the younger and older age cohorts is not huge, it does again suggest that older participants may have been more aware that unemployment is not necessarily or entirely the fault of the individual and thus punitive approaches may not be appropriate.

European/Pākehā were most likely to support 'incentives' (39%). They were followed quite closely by the Asian and 'Other' ethnic groups (both 29%). Māori (15%) and Pasifika (11%) were least likely to name this activity. It is not clear why this is the case.

31% of both males and females named 'incentives' as a means for encouraging individual responsibility.

Role-model values

21% of participants thought that if we 'role-model values', this could encourage greater individual responsibility. For instance, one participant drew on his experience working in the Navy to talk about the importance of following institutionalised codes of behaviour in a well-functioning society:

You know we talk about, in the Navy our key phrase is, you know, 'courage, comradeship and commitment' but we talk about what they actually mean there was as an officer in the Navy [who] told me 'there's great freedom in the Navy ... you follow the rules, you do what you're supposed to do and, you know, you've got incredible freedom to go and achieve' and

that's what people don't realise, that if you have a civil society there is great freedom because we can tolerate the eccentrics, we can tolerate, but we understand that there's a level of a code of behaviour. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients (24%) and wage/salary earners (22%) were most likely to believe 'role-model values' to be a way to encourage greater responsibility. Only 16% of main benefit recipients did so. This may again relate to the older age of the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group (see below). Support for this argument comes from the fact that 'discipline/teach own children' and 'care for family' – both reflecting a concern about certain moral values – were more likely to be named as individual responsibilities by older, retired participants.

There is no clear trend that socio-economic status influences support for 'role-model values'. Neither the low income/no tertiary qualification (11%) nor the high income/tertiary qualification (19%) groups named this activity very often, while about a third of the other groups (31-33%) considered it a good way to encourage greater responsibility amongst individuals.

Age was an important factor shaping support for 'role-model values' as a means to encourage responsibility. While a third (33%) of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance and a quarter (25%) of 46-60 year olds named this activity, only 19% of 31-45 year olds and 10% of under 31s did so. As noted above, this focus on values may reflect a broader concern about the role of parents and families in instilling a work ethic and other moral obligations amongst the young.

The 'Other' (29%) and European/Pākehā (24%) ethnic groups were the most likely to name 'role-model values'. Only 15% of Māori, 11% of Pasifika and no Asian participants named this as a way to encourage responsibility. Once again, it is not clear why exactly this might be so.

Males favoured 'role-model values' (26%) more than females (17%). Although there is little in the qualitative data to support this, such a result may again reflect the way in which masculine gender roles are associated with the disciplining of moral behaviour.

Sanctions

18% of participants favoured 'sanctions', usually as a means to teach people that their actions have consequences. For instance, when discussing whether education campaigns were sufficient means to achieve this, one participant commented:

Certainly education is important ... but at the end of the day you can go on educating people forever and a day and, and some people will never listen, never, you know – drink-driving's an example. So I think once ... you've spent a few years trying to educate your population you then get tough. Say 'okay, you're caught drink driving, you lose the licence on the spot'. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Similarly, another participant responded to the question of how we might encourage greater responsibility with:

Well, I don't know what you can put in place, but if you take away their comfort zone, all the hand-outs and all the cushions around them then and if they do criminal activity make the punishment so they remember it ... I mean, even when they go to jail, I mean it's like being

on a cruise! [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

She was one of a handful of participants who specifically mentioned that criminals are treated too well, often better than their victims.

A more subtle form of 'sanctions' was described by a former teacher, who said that in her teaching days, students were not allowed to move up a class:

... until you had reached a standard, a set standard virtually, and you could do everything that was asked of you, you didn't move on to Standard Two, you were just kept back. Now, it was in the modern era that people starting calling it 'failure', in our day it wasn't failure, it was simply we hadn't - no child, two children [don't] learn at the same speed. But you see now Standard One, Standard Two, Standard Three, it doesn't matter whether you've learned it or not ... [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

She strongly believed that removing such standards means that children today have no sense of achievement.

In regards to sanctions specifically related to unemployment benefits, a businessman indicated:

I think everybody has an obligation to work hard. And I think, in a way, the sanction is good because there has to be some accountability and without accountability, really, people just float. And, and so, you know, it makes people think, rather than 'oh, if that doesn't work for me I can do that,' then they could just end up flip-flopping and, and not really making any commitments and how long could that go on for, at the cost of the tax payer? [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Importantly, it was not only wage/salary earners, but also some main benefit recipients, that agreed with the current obligations placed on the unemployed. One main benefit recipient said:

Yeah, well, I've just gone through the process and I've actually found that it's been a good thing for me going in twice a week because it is about getting a job, it's about getting a job that's going to suit you ... I'm really surprised cos I had heard horror stories from other people but it worked for me in that I was actually able to talk to them and tell them where my situation was and they didn't just try and throw me into some job that I'm going to pop out of, you know, down the track. Cos, you know, when I was on the benefit years and years ago, you know, you could just disappear off the radar and you'd just be paid and no one would do anything ... But now they're actually actively trying to get you into work and those two appointments that you have a week they bring people in from different places, whether it be like Aviemore College or something like that and that's actually really good. At least they're giving you alternatives, you know, yeah it's a different system these days and it is actually improved, it's quite scary actually (laughter) in that respect! But for some people they hate it, you know, but that's because they don't really want to get into a job and they, they do just want to slack off and all that sort of stuff. [European/Pākehā male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

It is interesting that this participant not only uses the 'self-development' language of modern unemployment programmes but also situates himself as different to other unemployed people, which was something that a small number of other main benefit recipients also did.

Although a relatively small number of participants named 'sanctions' as a means for encouraging individual responsibility, making it difficult to analyse demographic variables with any accuracy, this is attempted below because of this study's central interest in the relationship between increasing conditionality and attitudes to social citizenship. Interestingly, and despite the participant's comments above, **main benefit recipients were much less likely (8%) to name 'sanctions' as a way to encourage greater responsibility than wage/salary earners (24%) and New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance participants (18%).** While presumably this was because main benefit recipients had either experienced these themselves or were aware of their impact on other benefit recipients, this finding challenges theoretical assumptions that this group would have internalised the beliefs about the need to encourage individual responsibility amongst benefit recipients through coercive and punitive work-activation policies.

'Sanctions' were strongly supported by those on middle incomes with no tertiary qualification (44%) and least by those on low incomes (8-11%). The middle income/tertiary qualification (13%) and high income/tertiary qualification (29%) groups offered more middling support. In that low income participants are likely to be or have been in receipt of a main benefit, the finding that they are least likely to name 'sanctions' further challenges the theoretical assumptions outlined above.

Younger participants were more likely to support 'sanctions'. The 31-45 age group was most likely to name this activity (26%), followed by the under 31s (20%) then the over 60s (17%). Few of the 46-60 age group (8%) supported 'sanctions' at all. Although the differences are not huge, these results do favour arguments that younger New Zealanders may more readily endorse neoliberal welfare policies than their older counterparts, possibly because they have known nothing else in their adult lives.

The 'Other' (29%) and European/Pākehā (24%) ethnic groups were most likely to support 'sanctions'. 15% of Māori mentioned this activity but no Pasifika or Asian participants did so. Although consistent with the other findings reported in this section, it remains unclear what shaped this result.

Gender influenced attitudes to sanctions. Males were almost three times as likely (29%) to mention this activity than females (10%). Once again, this may reflect traditional gendered norms.

Other activities

15% of participants thought that 'get alongside/support people' was a way of encouraging greater responsibility amongst individuals. For instance, one participant talked of the advantage of:

Really sitting down and spending a few hours like this and, and - you know, this is all about counselling, what we used to do at work - to find out what's happening for a person, you know Yeah, what are the, what can we do, structures and so on, rather than saying 'right turn up or you lose your dole', that's you know a wee bit draconian. [European/Pākehā male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Similarly, a woman who had been on a main benefit in the past talked of the support she needed to make the move into paid work:

... I found it really difficult being on a benefit and then being off a benefit, it was really scary. I'd been on a benefit since I was sixteen pretty - not consistently, I think different benefits - but to suddenly be working enough to not be on a benefit and be responsible for mine and

my kids' health and well-being was really scary. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Alongside other activities that placed an emphasis on personal relations – ‘engage/involve people’ (7%) and ‘value people’ (7%) – a small number of participants (7%) suggested that individuals might be more responsible if they had their ‘basic needs met’. This is interesting given the research’s interest in social rights. For instance, one man said:

I don't think the government should go about creating extra work through government departments, like they may have done in '50s, '60s, '70s [but] I do think the government needs to take responsibility for things like the minimum wage, \$12 an hour is not really a minimum wage. It's, people are working 40 hours on that, they're not going to survive. So, I think they have a responsibility in ensuring that the minimum standards are set at a level where people can actually afford to live. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

A younger man went further, making a connection between basic needs and responsibility:

... it's funny, cos you can't actually be responsible unless you have the basics intact, you know. Cos otherwise what is happening is all this energy is going to all these other things and you don't actually have time and energy ... to like be responsible, you just don't because you're too exhausted kind of thing. [European/Pākehā male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Although only mentioned by a handful of participants, it is interesting that some thought ‘less government regulation’, ‘keep more tax/subsidise’ and ‘make investment more attractive’ could be means for encouraging greater responsibility. In regards to the latter, one participant said:

.... I think you do it through a number of ways and I think the tax policy needs to change and certainly too you need to regulate and strengthen the investment sector, so that people have confidence and I think that the biggest thing in New Zealand, I think is after 1987 people lost confidence in the equities market ... Yeah, it is and you can see the level ... of the poor regulation and that and it's, if you can get that right – because, you know, I love free markets - but I believe that the government has a role to be a referee, right, and you make, you make the rules, you know firm, fair and flexible, yeah. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Others believed that to encourage ‘homeownership’, ‘abolish welfare/more user-pays’ or introduce ‘national service/teach discipline’ would develop greater responsibility within individuals. As an older participant said: *“the national service probably did a lot of good and then people knew a bit about discipline, a bit about loyalty and other things which perhaps aren't available to them now.”* [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

In summary: Getting participants to think about *how* we might encourage greater responsibility amongst individuals helped to identify their opinions about the appropriateness of different ways of changing social behaviour. Although only some of the participants were given concrete policy examples about incentives and sanctions, many went beyond these examples to talk about other means of encouraging individual responsibility. However, to focus on the four means of shifting behaviour mentioned most often, it is clear that different types of participants were more likely to favour certain activities to encourage greater responsibility.

Recipients of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance were more likely to support 'education' and 'role-model values' than 'sanctions', while main benefit recipients were least likely to name any activities. This is surprising given main income source did not appear to be a major influence on responses to the individual responsibility statement. However, it is possible the experience – or at least the potential threat – of being subject to activities aiming to encourage individual responsibility which made main benefit recipients wary of supporting any of them, but especially 'sanctions'. The results for the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group seem to be affected by the older age of most of these participants. There is some evidence that the neoliberal ideas shaping welfare policy since the 1990s have influenced the thinking of the younger generation, in that younger participants were more likely to name 'sanctions'.

Socio-economic status probably does not explain the findings regarding main benefit recipients' aversion to all activities aiming to encourage individual responsibility, given results were very mixed: low and middle income participants with tertiary qualifications favoured 'education' and 'incentives', middle income earners of all types favoured 'role-model values' and those without tertiary qualifications preferred 'sanctions'. Similarly, males were more likely to name 'sanctions' and 'role-model values', while women named 'incentives' more often than their male counterparts. The international literature would lead us to expect this more conservative focus on 'sanctions' and possibly 'role-model values' from men, while the traditional gendered caring roles expected of women may have shaped their responses.

Ethnicity seems to be an important factor in explaining responses regarding what might encourage individual responsibility but it is unclear why. As with many other questions, European/Pākehā were either the first or second most likely group to name all four activities. Asian participants favoured 'education' more than other groups. This may be because the Asian focus group discussed this at some length and may not necessarily be representative of the Asian population, although 'education' is known to be widely and highly valued in Asian cultures and Asian participants did not name the other activities at all. Participants from the 'Other' ethnic group were also more likely to name 'role-model values' and 'sanctions'. Pasifika did not name 'sanctions' at all and, similar to Māori, rated all other activities far lower than other groups. Interestingly, if one compares attitudes to just 'incentives' versus 'sanctions', Māori and 'Other' were about even in their support, while European/Pākehā were slightly more likely to favour 'incentives' and Pasifika and Asian participants were much more likely; so much so that their answers excluded any 'sanctions' responses. These findings are likely related to the diverse understandings of individual responsibility found amongst differing ethnic groups noted earlier.

Should conditions be placed on benefit recipients?

While general discussion about ways we might encourage greater responsibility amongst citizens allowed insight into participants' broad views about individual responsibility, this study was particularly interested in support for and the impact of conditions placed upon main benefit recipients. As noted earlier, the Keynesian economic model saw a clear role for government in ensuring those in need had a decent standard of living. Job creation schemes provided work for the unemployed during high unemployment, while a Domestic Purposes Benefit (DPB) was established in 1973 to support sole parents caring for children.


From the late 1980s, however, the introduction of work-activation programmes increasingly framed joblessness as the personal responsibility of the unemployed person. DPB recipients also became targets of this concern which was linked to welfare dependency. This meant that a range of conditions were placed on the receipt of main benefits, including a formalised

obligation to search for work that over the years has come to involve keeping a job journal, employers being asked to provide evidence that a benefit recipient has attended an interview and obligations to take any job offered or be financially penalised. From 1998-2001, recipients of the Unemployment Benefit (which was renamed the 'Community Wage') were also obligated to take part in a work-for-dole programme for at least 20 hours per week (Cheyne, et al., 2008; Humpage & Craig, 2008; Ramia & Wailes, 2006).

In an attempt to gauge views on different types of conditions that can be placed on main benefit recipients, participants comments have been coded into three categories: 'work-for-dole', 'work-tests' and 'other conditions', such as those proposed by the National Party to limit access to main benefits for young people if they chose to leave school but were not in work.

Figure 9 indicates that around a third of participants fully agreed with each of the three types of conditions identified. A further one-third to one-half of participants agreed with them in some circumstances or were ambivalent about them.

Figure 9: Support for conditions placed upon benefit recipients (N=87)



Work-for-dole

28% of participants fully supported 'work-for-dole', the most extreme condition named, while 48% offered ambivalent responses coded as 'sometimes/maybe'. When added together, 76% of participants supported 'work-for-dole' to some degree, although a quarter of participants (24%) disagreed with 'work-for-dole' completely. As noted in the Introduction, NZES data shows growing support for the idea that 'the unemployed should have to work for their benefits', from 68% in 1999 (the year after New Zealand's 'Community Wage' work-for-dole programme was introduced) to 73% in 2002 (a year after it was abolished). By 2008, support grew even slightly more to 75% (NZES, 1999; 2008). These levels of support are somewhat higher than that expressed in the qualitative study, possibly because the latter's coding schedule used was able to take account of the considerable ambivalence demonstrated in participants' responses.

The qualitative data also demonstrates the diverse reasons why participants thought 'work-for-dole' an appropriate condition to place upon main benefit recipients. For example, a participant who had received the Unemployment Benefit some years ago and was now working strongly supported 'work-tests' and 'work-for-dole'. He said:

.... when I first went on the dole I used to think 'I wonder why it is that they don't make us do anything for the dole, like they just give it to us, I wonder why we don't actually have to, you know, go and do some kind of work for it'? And then when they brought in work for the dole, by that point I was off the dole, and I thought 'well, this is brilliant', you know, but even back then I used to say 'I'd have happily gone and worked a day or two or three days a week for the dole if that's what they made me do' but they never did. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years]

He later went on to explain why he felt such conditions were appropriate:

Well, I mean, I think all citizens are subject to some form of obligation or another. I mean if you agree to go to work for [the name of his employer] then you agree that you're going to be there on time and you're going to adhere to a certain standard of, well, you're going to wear their uniform, you're going to adhere to a certain form of conduct that if for any reason you are asked to take a drug test that you'd do it or whatever. It's like, I mean, for someone on the Unemployment Benefit, you know, to say 'okay, well if you want to be on the Unemployment Benefit here are the terms. You have to turn up every second [day], you know, you have to do this that and the next thing', I mean everyone's got obligations of some sort on them. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

While this participant simply saw 'work-for-dole' as an extension of the obligations all citizens are subject to, others saw the implementation of work-related conditions as a way of ensuring the unemployed develop appropriate social behaviours, as another participant indicated:

I mean if you're able and a young person, why should you get the free benefit just for, you know, going out and hanging out with your friends and then just? ... You should do your bit for the community anybody who is able to go out and work, if you're sick because of certain things then I'm sure other senses of your body can do other things, so that's what I'm thinking. If you can work in one way or another, then you should contribute to that benefit that you're getting Otherwise it breeds things like laziness and things like that. [Pasifika male wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Importantly, however, many of the participants whose responses were coded as saying 'sometimes/maybe' indicated that they agreed with the idea of 'work-for-dole' in principle, but that it had not worked when it was implemented in New Zealand through voluntary organisations. For instance:

... I can see it has enormous problems but I agree with it in principle ... I can see it working well over the last few years when we've had a balance in, in favour of employees, there's been plenty of jobs out there. And I can see that working then but I, when jobs ... are short I can see all sorts of problems there, so I don't know about that one. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Another woman talked of her friend's experience of the Australian welfare system to illustrate her doubts about the practical implementation of work-for-dole programmes:

... they've had a work for the dole system where when you're on it for a certain amount of time, the - it was the Liberal government which is all for making money and commercialism and stuff - they decided, 'well let's get these people off the dole, let's go make them work for the dole' In theory it was a good political, you know, idea but in practice what was happening was, for instance, 12 people were grouped together at nine o'clock in the morning and were sent out to do something for the community. There wasn't much for them to do that day, so they literally gave them shovels and told them to move a sand dune from

there to there. Now one of the guys on that crew was an IT specialist [in] computing, he probably hadn't done any labouring before in his life, he had to shovel sand from one spot to another and he put his back out, so that's just, it makes no sense. It makes no sense, wouldn't it have been much better for him to go and do data entry or draw up a new computer programme or something, you know, cos just trying to move the numbers, there's no thought there. And he's injured for life. [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Others, often not aware of how work-for-dole programmes had been implemented in New Zealand the 1990s, liked the idea of the unemployed being asked to undertake work in the community, such as helping old people in their gardens or cleaning the streets of graffiti, in return for their benefits. For example, one participant said:

I've often wondered about the kind of the work for the dole thing, you know, just looking at it in an impersonal way, I think that's a great idea, you know, I think there's a lot of work that needs to be done like working, I don't know, replanting the sand dunes - I don't know whether that's done by PD [periodic detention] workers - or parks or and going to old people homes or even having a presence in the street. [European/Pākehā female student, low income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

There were further qualifications by some participants that the sick/disabled and perhaps even sole parents should be exempt, but that it was appropriate for other unemployed people to participate in 'work-for-dole'.

There is no evidence that main benefit recipients accepted 'work-for-dole' conditions more than other main income source groups, as the theoretical literature might suggest they would. New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients were most likely (18%) to support 'work-for-dole', followed by wage/salary earners (7%). No main benefit recipients offered a categorical 'yes' at all and this group also offered the most 'no' responses (12%), double that of the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance (6%) and six times that of the wage-salary earners (2%). However, because main benefit recipients offered a large number of 'sometimes/maybe' responses (16%), when the 'yes' responses of the two other groups are added to this category, results are more similar with 18% of wage-salary earners and 24% of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients offering affirmative responses of some kind. However, it remains that main benefit recipients were least likely to support 'work-for-dole'; this underscores the 'self-interest' argument that those on the main benefit are most likely to have been affected by conditions being placed on benefit receipt. It is less clear why New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients were most likely to support this form of conditionality, although discussion below indicates it may be linked to the older age of these participants.

Middle income/no tertiary qualification participants (22%, compared to 0-7% amongst other groups) were most likely to categorically support 'work-for-dole'. However, the low income/tertiary qualification group demonstrates the highest levels of ambivalence with almost a quarter (23%) of this group saying 'sometimes/maybe' (compared to 7-13% of the other groups). The middle income/tertiary qualification group was the only group to not give 'no' responses, but only small numbers of participants in any socio-economic status group (5-11%) did so, with the middle income/no tertiary qualification participants who supported 'work-for-dole' the most also indicating 'no' more often than other groups. These results provide no clear indication that socio-economic status plays a role in shaping attitudes to 'work-for-dole'.

There was no strong support for 'work-for-dole' amongst any of the ethnic groups. The Pasifika ethnic group offered the highest level of support for 'work-for-dole' (11%) and

offered no other responses. Support for 'work-for-dole' amongst European/Pākehā and Māori was only slightly lower (8% in both groups). European/Pākehā were most likely to say 'sometimes/maybe' (18%), while no Māori participants offered this answer. However, more than twice as many Māori (15%) than European/Pākehā (8%) said 'no'. There were no Asian responses to this question while 'Other' ethnic group members offered only a small number of 'sometimes/maybe' (14%) answers.

The over 60s age group was most likely to categorically support 'work-for-dole', with 17% saying 'yes' (no other answers were offered by this group). The under 31s and 46-60s, the only other groups who responded in large numbers to this question, were much more ambivalent. 5% of the former said 'yes' and 'no', but 15% responded 'sometimes/maybe'. For the 46-60s, 8% said 'yes' and 'no' but a quarter (25%) offered an ambivalent answer. While consistent with the finding above that the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group was most likely to support 'work-for-dole', it is unclear why this should be the case. While some older participants were concerned about what they perceived to be declining moral values (including a work ethic) within society, others remembered – and were critical of – the previous implementation of a work-for-dole programme in New Zealand.

Males expressed more ambivalence about 'work-for-dole', while females tended to provide answers that are more easily coded as 'yes' or 'no' responses. Very similar although small (6-9%) numbers of females offered each possible response while no males answered 'yes', 14% said 'sometimes/maybe' and 6% said 'no'.

Work-tests

Fairly even numbers of participants fully agreed (37%), partly agreed (33%) or disagreed (30%) with the idea of 'work-tests'. As with 'work-for-dole', participant experiences often shaped their attitudes towards 'work-tests'. When asked if she thought it appropriate to require the unemployed to take part in work-test activities, such as completing job diaries or being compelled to take any job offered, a participant in the Māori focus group responded:

Yeah, yep, fucking oath, they've got to get a job. If they don't, then they just become stagnant like my daughter's boyfriend where he just doesn't do anything. These kids have got to learn that – like in our day there was schemes, if we didn't do the scheme, we didn't have anything. [Māori female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

One participant agreed with all the changes over previous years to tighten up benefits, including 'work-tests' and 'work-for-dole', while at the same time acknowledging some of the weaknesses of its implementation in New Zealand. Formerly self-employed, he strongly believed in the importance of having a work ethic. This is implied in his description of a person he knew:

Oh I think he was on an Unemployment Benefit, he had kids ... and he says 'oh, I should be getting this and I should be getting that' ... instead of saying 'I should be getting a job and I should be doing this'. [European/Pākehā retired male, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

A younger participant framed his support for 'work-tests' in a different way. He believed it was fair to make someone take any job because *"they've been given an opportunity. Cos it could lead to bigger and better things, you've got to start somewhere."* [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

A smaller number of participants suggested extending 'work-tests', for example by introducing time limits on eligibility to main benefits:

Especially the dole, I think definitely it needs to be there, if you're made redundant and especially for an older person there needs to be some kind of benefit. I think it's too easily abused, though, so I think there should be - certainly for younger people - a period of time at which we say 'okay, we're gonna see you though this next six months, after that you're on your own' I'd put a time limit on it So six months, 12 months, whatever that is, absolutely maximum 12 months, after that you're on your own. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Although there was less ambiguity around 'work-tests' than the other types of conditions, about two-thirds of participants were either against or had some ambivalence about 'work-tests'. One young participant said:

... there's a lot of people on benefits especially long term or on Unemployment Benefits - they already feel like shit, you know, they've been made to feel like shit for being on a benefit anyway, they feel like they're at the bottom of the heap. Pressure, pressure, pressure, pressure that's not going to fix it, that's not going to make them ... suddenly go 'oh yes, I want to.' You know, I don't think that's the best way to do things I mean, I absolutely think we need to and that's part of being a good citizen, isn't it, that we need to support the people that need help more than us? You know, if we're strong, I've always thought that if you're feeling strong then people, then you let people lean on you if they need it because they're not so strong and when you're not so strong there will be someone for you to lean on. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Furthermore, the Māori focus group discussed the issue of credentialism, which means that it is increasingly difficult to get even a low-skilled, entry-level job without some form of basic qualification – even when an individual may have the appropriate knowledge to take the job. As one member of the focus group said:

And a person that has qualifications and a person that has knowledge, I'd rather take the person that has knowledge because at the end of the day, even though you have to have the qualification for that particular job but the person that has the knowledge ... knows everything about their job, you know. [Māori male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Notions of deservingness will be discussed in the next section, but it is worth noting here that **some participants felt that not all groups of unemployed people should be subject to 'work-tests'**. Some called for the general recognition of special needs:

Yeah, I don't think it should be made too difficult. I mean there's a human factor comes into these things, I think And you know there's, there's probably people out there that will never get a job because of all sorts of factors. [European/Pākehā retired male, middle income/tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

Others were more specific about who they felt should be exempt from 'work-tests'. A participant who received the Sickness Benefit and was paying over \$500 a month in prescription costs and \$1400 in one year for doctor's visits said:

Well, they want us disabled people, you know, to go out to work. Now how in the hell are we going to go out to work? I mean if you've got a sickness or a disability, ask yourself, would an employer employ somebody like that? Where we could take ages, you know, to do the job then they've got to change everything around, they've got [to] have suitable toilets and everything for a disabled person where they could get a normal person in and no problem. [European/Pākehā male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

A participant receiving a main benefit and acting as an advocate in the disability sector also supported this view, saying:

... what I find funny is when [former Minister of Disability Issues, Ruth] Dyson and that was talking about getting disabled people into work, as an example. Interestingly I found - and I've been to senior policy meetings and all that - what I found was interesting is they were telling us, they hadn't actually talked to the employers, they hadn't set up anything that would allow us to work, nothing, they had [simply] said we had to look for jobs. [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Others were more concerned about the unintended consequences of forcing people into work.

While a secondary school teacher generally believed that individuals are better off when not reliant on a benefit, he was wary of:

... saying people who received a DPB need to go out to work once their youngest child is six, it creates a lot of social problems in terms [of] like holiday care, after-school care and those kinds of issues it's also, it's removing the chance for that family to have some time together ... Yeah, because I personally think the more time the parents can spend with children, particularly as they are starting to mature, the more likely the children are to be better citizens. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Indeed, while many of the participants in one of the benefit recipients' focus groups agreed with 'work-tests' because they encouraged people to become more responsible, it was clear that they considered being a parent an important job and that this should be taken into account by WINZ when applying work-test activities and sanctions for failure to meet them. For instance, they talked of how WINZ could be more understanding if a person with children failed to turn up to an employment course or missed a job interview because their child was sick.

Another participant also believed parenting was a justified reason to be exempt from 'work-tests', but only for one person in each family:

... if there are two people sitting at home doing nothing, even looking after the kids which is something, and there is no reason that either of them shouldn't be at work, then one of them should be at work. One person can stay home, and that's fine, but I think one person should stay home and look after the kids and things like that, but if you have two people sitting at home like ... it still seems to be lazy. Again, if the opportunities are provided to ... you know, I don't think people should have to go and pick up rubbish cos that's the only job that the government can, you know, that they can get. [European/Pākehā male student, high income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Reiterating this latter point, some participants thought 'work-tests' generally to be appropriate but only: *"If there is any work for them to get. Like I say it's been hard. Now you've got to be qualified. For God's sake even a cleaner has to be qualified, you have to have certificates."* [Māori female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years]. As noted earlier, there was considerable resentment within the Māori focus group she took part in about this form of credentialism, which they thought excluded many from work.

However, a European/Pākehā participant who had a Masters degree in social research indicated that being well-educated also made 'work-tests' problematic:

... I remember one time with this guy from WINZ when I'd been for a job interview that they had sent me on, it was to do market research. And I felt like I was selling my soul to have to do this job ... that was such a dilemma for me because, you know, there's something feels really good to be working and earning money, but then when you feel like you're kind of selling your soul a bit ... yeah, cos for commercial gain that didn't kind of feel so good ... but for the WINZ guy it was just important I got off his books and rather than being a beneficiary, I was out there working again. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

There was a weak tendency for those on main benefits to support 'work-tests' more than other groups. Main benefit recipients were slightly more likely to say 'yes' (12%) and 'no' (16%) than both wage/salary earners (11% and 9% respectively) and New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients (10% and 6%). Main benefit recipients also offered the greatest number of 'sometimes/maybe' responses (20%), meaning that a third (32%) in total offered some affirmative response, compared to only 22% of wage/salary earners and 20% of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients. That main benefit recipients were most likely to be against 'work-for-dole' but most likely to support 'work-tests' suggests their attitudes to conditionality were rather more ambivalent than a simple 'self-interest' argument would anticipate.

This ambivalence often stemmed from the fact that many main benefit recipients agreed in principle with conditions being placed on benefit recipients because they knew of people who 'abused' the system. Yet, from their own experiences, they also knew the difficulties of applying a general rule to people with different needs and capabilities. They again drew on historical notions of 'deservingness'. For instance, although she herself had been on the DPB some years ago, one participant was very critical of recipients on this benefit because: *"I knew one woman who used to live near me, pardon me, she used to go out and have a baby every year so she'd get more benefit and a bigger house and this is a fact."* ['Other' retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over]. Yet she was able to offer many reasons why her own dependence on the DPB for many years had been justified.

Similarly, a participant who was currently on a main benefit but had worked previously as a counsellor explained:

I had one chap who spent that amount on tailor-made cigarettes and I said 'all right, I wouldn't presume to assume someone should quit smoking, that's got nothing to do with me' but I said 'look, we could look at the fact that if you bought tobacco you could cut your \$50 a week in those days to about \$20 dollars a week.' And I said 'well, if you did that you could save that \$30 and spend it on other things' 'Oh no way' he said 'they stain my fingers', so okay they, that was his priority. I don't think it's fair for him to then turn round and go and say 'I need more money'. [European/Pākehā male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

A third (33%) of middle income/no tertiary qualification participants said 'yes' to the idea of 'work-tests', while lesser support was offered by high income/tertiary qualification (19%) and low income/no tertiary qualification (14%) participants. This finding supports overseas evidence that those feeling economically vulnerable are more likely to be harsher on benefit recipients than other groups (Eardley, et al., 2000).

Māori were most likely (23%) to say 'work-tests' should be applied to benefit recipients, well above European/Pākehā and 'Other' (both 14%), the only other groups to say 'yes'. Māori also offered no 'sometimes/maybe' answers and only 8% rejected 'work-tests' completely. In contrast, European/Pākehā offered each of the three responses relating to 'work-tests' fairly evenly (14-16%). While the same number of (14%) of 'Other' participants said 'yes' and

'sometimes/maybe', none said 'no'. 11% of Pasifika participants said 'sometimes/maybe' and 'no'. These findings indicate considerable ambivalence across all groups about 'work-tests', with the exception of Māori. This differs greatly to 'work-for-dole', which few supported in any way.

The under 31s (20%) and the over 60s (17%) were most likely to offer a categorical 'yes' to 'work-tests'. Those in the 46-60 years group were most ambiguous with 21% answering 'sometimes/maybe' and only 8% 'yes'. After the 31-45 year olds (16%), this group was also most likely to answer 'no' (13%). Although few supported 'work-tests' overall, the greater ambivalence expressed by the middle age groups may, again, stem from their greater awareness or sense of vulnerability to the social risks facing benefit recipients.

Males were only slightly more likely to give 'yes' responses (14%) than females (12%) but they offered far more 'sometimes/maybe' responses (17%, compared to no females). As more females said 'no' (12%) than males (9%), this again suggests the former felt less comfortable offering ambivalent answers than males.

Other conditions

Some participants named or discussed 'other conditions' that could be or are placed upon benefit recipients. Although a similar number of participants (34%) were coded as agreeing with 'other conditions' as with 'work-for-dole' or 'work-tests', a much larger number (51%) were ambivalent about them and fewer (15%) did not support 'other conditions' at all.

The range of 'other conditions' named was quite wide. For instance, one participant thought that if the unemployed lived in rural areas where there was little work, their benefit should be conditional on them moving to an urban centre, while another wanted to limit income support only to those born in New Zealand. A third participant wanted conditions that enabled some form of accountability to be implemented:

.... it comes back to accountability - if you're getting funding for something, you have to be accountable for it and at least you're not having to write performance indicators as a beneficiary. You know, what's your key performance indicator is it, [for an] invalid beneficiary 'I'm sick a lot?' You know, so at least it's not that bad. I mean you have to be accountable for everything and I think it's good to target it so long as you take individual needs into account. [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Main income source appears to matter more for 'other conditions' than for 'work-for-dole' or 'work-tests'. As with 'work-for-dole', New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients were again most likely to support 'other conditions'. While a small minority of wage/salary earners said 'yes' or 'sometimes/maybe' (16%), only 4% of those on main benefits said 'yes' and 44% gave an ambivalent response. This again suggests that recipients of main benefits were most ambivalent about such conditions, although they did not disagree with them outright. In contrast, over a third (35%) of those receiving New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance said 'yes' and only 18% said 'sometimes/maybe'.

Socio-economic status does not seem to be an important variable for understanding support for 'other conditions'. Low income/tertiary qualification (23%), middle income/no tertiary qualification (22%) and high income/tertiary qualification (19%) participants were more likely to say 'yes' than those with low income/no tertiary qualification (14%) and middle incomes and a tertiary qualification (6%). But both low income groups offered strong but ambivalent support with 'sometimes/maybe' responses of 38-39%, meaning that when these are added to 'yes' answers, 53-60% agreed in some way while only 25-33% of the middle and high income groups did. However, the two low income groups also offered the

highest level of 'no' answers (11-15% compared to 0-5% amongst other groups). Income level rather than education seems to be the main driver here.

The 'Other' ethnic group was by far the most likely to offer 'yes' (43%) responses and did not give any 'no' or 'sometimes/maybe' answers. The remaining groups gave more mixed responses (with the exception of the Asian group who was not asked this question). For instance, 20% of European/Pākehā said 'yes', but 25% said 'sometimes/maybe' and 8% said 'no'. A far smaller number of Māori (8%) and no Pasifika peoples said 'yes' or 'no', but 38% and 33% were ambivalent respectively. Māori offered the highest number of 'no' responses (15%). It is uncertain why 'other conditions' provoked a much higher level of support than 'work-for-dole' or 'work-tests' across all groups, but particularly the 'Other' ethnic group. However, it may be related to the 'catch-all' nature of this category which captured a wide variety of possible conditions named by participants.

The over 60s were by far the most likely (42%) to categorically support 'other conditions'. Other groups offered less than half this level of support, with 16% of 31-45 year olds, 13% of 46-60 year olds and only 5% of under 31 year olds saying 'yes'. However, when the 'sometimes/maybe' responses are added, the over 60s were still ahead (52%) but the 31-45s were quite similar (45%), while minority support was offered by the 46-60s (38%) and the under 31s (25%). Yet, the two older age groups were also far more likely to say 'no' to 'other conditions' (13-17%) than the younger age groups (0-3%). Once again, older age appears to explain the heavier support for 'other conditions' amongst the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group.

Here too, males were more willing to offer ambivalent answers, while females were not. Although roughly equal numbers of male (17%) and female (15%) participants categorically supported 'other conditions', 40% of males said 'sometimes/maybe' while no females made this response at all. But 8% of females said 'no', compared to only 2% of males.

In summary: This section has identified that a noteworthy minority of participants support the increasing levels of conditionality placed upon main benefit recipients. Although the number of participants who fully supported 'work-for-dole', the most extreme condition named, was slightly lower than for 'work-tests' and 'other conditions', it remains that about a third of participants offered 'yes' responses and between 70-85% agreed with these conditions to some degree. However, 'work-for-dole' and 'other conditions' induced the highest level of ambivalence with around half of the participants supporting these conditions only for some benefit recipients or in some situations.

One of the main theoretical aims of this study was to test whether main benefit recipients are more likely to accept conditions placed on the rights of social citizenship than other New Zealanders, simply because they have been subject to such conditions and the welfare dependency discourse that surrounds them. This theoretical assumption is challenged by the results of this section, which found that the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group was the most likely to offer 'yes' responses to two of the three types of conditions discussed. This appears largely due to their older age, as the over 60s were the strongest supporters of two types of conditions and a close second runner-up on the third. While recipients of main benefits were slightly more likely to support 'work-tests' than other income source groups, they were more ambivalent about conditions being placed upon benefit recipients overall. Notably, however, most did not disagree with them outright.

Socio-economic status may play some role in influencing some attitudes towards conditionality, with middle income participants with no tertiary qualification most likely to

support ‘work-for-dole’ and ‘work-tests’ and second most likely to support ‘other conditions’. Males were also more likely to support all three types of conditions, although they were often ambivalent about it. Surprisingly, given previous findings in this study, there was no clear indication that ethnicity was important in understanding attitudes to conditions placed on benefit recipients.


Who is deserving?

The last section highlighted that some participants drew upon notions of deservingness when explaining why they felt it appropriate or not to place conditions upon different types of benefit recipients. It was noted earlier that the New Zealand welfare state has a long tradition of distinguishing between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ needy groups. A participant summed up this hierarchy of deservingness in an interview:

I’ve seen it at WINZ actually, there’s certain benefits that are a little bit better than other benefits. Unemployment benefits get shit, they’re the lowest scrum they’re the real baddies. Sickness benefit, yeah, they’ve got a little bit more prestige and mana in the place because they’re not unemployed, they’re sick and DPB, again, I guess while baby’s young and little then it’s all good but, again, when they’re older then mothers - if I had my way - will have had some education so that by the time the baby’s five they’re into getting their own work buzz and providing for themselves. [Māori female wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Although questions regarding deservingness were not asked of participants directly, many provided responses that clearly indicated their viewpoints on this issue and these have been coded accordingly in Figure 10. Only the ‘sick/disabled’, ‘DPB recipients’, the ‘unemployed’ and the ‘elderly’ are analysed in depth as these are the groups to whom government has traditionally extended financial assistance. Note, however, that because participants were not routinely asked about deservingness, the figures and interpretations offered are not representative of the entire study sample.

Figure 10: Attitudes towards the deservingness of groups (N=87)



Sick/disabled

Of those groups mentioned, the 'sick/disabled' were named as deserving most often by participants. As indicated in Figure 10, 30% of the participants who provided a relevant response offered a definite 'yes' and a further 18% said 'sometimes/maybe'. No one suggested this group was undeserving. Comments implying a certain level of deservingness for some groups and not others were often made in regard to other questions. For instance, a young man felt that under certain circumstances, 'work-tests' were fair but:

If someone's disabled then, you know, it's really quite hard for them to get out and get a job, let alone get to town - or get to the Work & Income, is it? - every second day, like that sounds to me like quite an effort, yeah. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

This finding counters the evidence found in public opinion data which suggests that the elderly are normally considered the most deserving of all 'needy' groups. For instance, the NZES shows that 94% of respondents indicated 'government should take responsibility to ensure a decent standard of living for the elderly' in both 1990 and 2008, suggesting attitudes about their deservingness have changed little. Unfortunately data for the sick/disabled is less reliable, but usually this group ranks behind the elderly (NZES, 1990; 2008).

Those on main benefits were much more likely (41%) to believe the 'sick/disabled' to be deserving. This is not surprising, given 11 out of 25 (44%) main benefit recipients were receiving either the Invalid's or Sickness Benefit at the time. However, 31% of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients and 29% of wage/salary earners also thought the 'sick/disabled' were deserving and no one offered a 'no' response. 18-19% of wage/salary earners and New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients thought the 'sick/disabled' were only 'sometimes/maybe' deserving, compared to only 3% of main benefit recipients.

Socio-economic status offers no clear explanation as to why participants thought the 'sick/disabled' to be the most deserving group. With low income earners, those with tertiary qualifications were most likely to say the 'sick/disabled' were deserving (54% compared to 40% of those with no tertiary qualification). In the middle income group, this trend was reversed; those without tertiary qualification (67%) were more likely to say this than those with tertiary qualification (25%). The high income/tertiary qualification group (52%) was more similar to the low income/tertiary qualification group than the middle-income earners.

European/Pākehā (45%) were by far the most likely to consider the 'sick/disabled' deserving. With the exception of Māori (8%), no other group offered a 'yes' response. 12% of European/Pākehā and 38% of Māori answered 'sometimes/maybe'. Exactly equal numbers of Asian (29%) and 'Other' (14%) participants responded 'sometimes/maybe' and 'no', while the Pasifika group provided only 'no' responses (22%). This is a surprising result, especially for Māori who have substantially higher rates of disability than other ethnic groups (Statistics New Zealand, 2007). It is unclear why European/Pākehā are so much more likely to consider the 'sick/disabled' deserving.

There is a clear tendency for those in older age groups to believe the 'sick/disabled' to be deserving more often than younger participants. 54% of 46-60 year olds offered 'yes' responses, while another 8% said 'sometimes/maybe'. Although only 42% of over 60s said 'yes', another 25% offered ambivalent answers, meaning they were slightly more likely overall to agree the 'sick/disabled' were deserving. Meanwhile, only 30% of the under 31s and 6% of the 31-45 year olds said 'yes', although 29% of the latter were ambivalent. This finding may be related to the fact that older participants were more likely to suffer from

sickness or disability themselves, due to their age, or simply because their life experience made them more aware of life's risks.

The females who offered a response to questions about the 'sick/disabled' being deserving all said 'yes' (29%), while males were again more mixed: 11% responded a clear 'yes' but 29% said 'sometimes/maybe'.

DPB recipients

The second most frequently named group were 'DPB recipients' and about a quarter (25%) of the participants said 'yes' they were deserving. Smaller numbers were ambivalent (7%) or disagreed (5%). As noted in the Introduction, there has never been strong public support for DPB recipients. However, NZVS data shows that support for increased spending on the DPB (even if it meant an increase in taxes), almost doubled between 1989 and 1993. Although dropping again, support between 1998 and 2004 was higher than in 1989 and there was also strong support (between 39% and 48% across the fifteen-year period) for spending to remain the same (P. Perry, 2004; P. Perry & Webster, 1993). This is the case even though DPB benefit recipients were targeted by the welfare dependency rhetoric accompanying welfare reform from the early 1990s and were subject to work-planning requirements between 1997 and 2002 (Cheyne, et al., 2008).

Participants in this study offered some insight as to why support for 'DPB recipients' has remained:

... I think in terms of the DPB we often hear, for example, 'oh, you know, girls get pregnant to go on the DPB'. You're only able to make that judgement in twenty years time when you see what the outcome has been as regards to their children and their family and their own life. And, in many cases, as soon as they're able they go to either training, re-training or job-seeking and, in fact, you see people bringing up their children fantastically well because they were able to stay at home with the child and support it. I'm also old enough to know that one of the main reasons for introduction of the DPB was so that women could get out of abusive relationships. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

However, a participant originally from Europe believed this strong support for sole parents to be culturally specific to New Zealand:

I was actually horrified when I first noticed how many mothers didn't have a job. And I'd never seen anything like that. And that was, it lead to a funny way of thinking too, cos a lot of people thought that you couldn't have a job if you had young children, or you shouldn't have a job if you had young children and there was also quite a strong emphasis on nuclear families, where, you know, they'd be, sort of totally, supposedly independent people. And, I was quite shocked when I discovered that, I couldn't understand how people could think that was right. And ... I could see all sorts of negatives about it. And, in fact, I thought it was more important to provide good quality child care, early childhood child care so that the women didn't have to have, say very, you know, very rich husbands to be able to afford child care, or, you know, that sort of thing ... ['Other' female wage/salary earner, unassigned income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

5% of participants thought 'DPB recipients' were not a deserving group. As one said:

... if you're going to have babies, right, your Mum and Dad are responsible for you until you are out working and earning money but you don't leave school, have a baby and then the next year have another one, possibly to a different father. [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

Others thought certain family-based policies simply encouraged the ‘wrong’ types of people to have babies. For instance, a childless participant who had experienced difficulties having children said: *“it seems to me that these people who often hit the headlines for being bad parents or whatever seem to have this ability to have children at a drop of hat!”* [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Wage/salary earners were less likely to believe ‘DPB recipients’ were deserving than income support recipients. Those on New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance (35%) were most likely to believe this group to be deserving, compared to 28% of those on main benefits and 20% of wage/salary earners. The latter group was the only one to say ‘DPB recipients’ were undeserving (9%). These findings are consistent with those relating to the ‘sick/disabled’. Although one might anticipate wage/salary earners to be less empathetic to any kind of benefit recipient if they have no or little experience of the welfare system themselves, it is unclear why New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients are most likely to be supportive of both ‘DPB recipients’ and the ‘sick/disabled’. It is, however, likely linked to the older age of this group (see below).

There is no clear trend for socio-economic status to shape responses regarding ‘DPB recipients’. The low income/tertiary qualification group (46%) was most likely to provide ‘yes’ responses. A third (33-36%) of low and middle income participants with no tertiary qualification believed ‘DPB recipients’ to be deserving, while only a quarter (24-25%) of those on middle or high incomes with tertiary qualifications did so.

The Asian and ‘Other’ ethnic groups offered only ‘no’ answers (14% in both cases). In contrast, European/Pākehā (33%) most often named ‘DPB recipients’ as deserving, followed by Māori (23%) and Pasifika (22%). Only small numbers of ‘sometimes/maybe’ responses were offered by Pasifika (11%) and European/Pākehā (10%). Similarly, only a small number of Māori (8%) and European/Pākehā (2%) offered negative responses. It is possible that because most Asian and ‘Other’ participants originated from countries where there is no equivalent to the DPB, this somehow shaped their responses. However, most ‘Other’ participants had migrated to New Zealand some time ago or were born here, while Pasifika participants fitted a similar profile yet offered greater (if not substantial) minority support.

The 61 years and over group was most likely to consider ‘DPB recipients’ deserving (42%) and provided no ‘sometimes/maybe’ or ‘no’ responses. The number of ‘yes’ responses for other age groups ranged from 16% amongst the 31-45 year olds to 25% and 29% amongst the under 31s and 46-60s respectively. Only the 46-60s (13%) and 31-45s (3%) said this group was not deserving at all. As with the ‘sick/disabled’, it is possible that the older participants considered ‘DPB recipients’ more deserving than other age groups because of their personal experiences; while perhaps not having received the DPB themselves, they are likely to have brought up a family and thus may support the idea of one parent staying home to care for young children.

Females were slightly more likely to believe ‘DPB recipients’ were deserving (29%) but were also more likely to believe they were not (8%); none offered ambivalent answers. Males were a little less certain about the deservingness of this group, with 20% saying ‘DPB recipients’ were deserving, 6% ‘sometimes/maybe’ and none answering ‘no’. These findings indicate that females are more empathetic to care givers, as is consistent with traditional gendered norms that still see women take on the most significant childcare roles. However, the difference in responses between females and males is not large.

Elderly

Surprisingly, few people mentioned the ‘elderly’ but those who did were much more likely to consider this group deserving (21%). Only a few participants said ‘sometimes/maybe’ (2%) or ‘no’ (1%). However, this may be because deservingness was not just associated with age but the behaviour of the person. As a retired person said:

Well, when you get to on the Super and what have you and you’ve worked hard all your life, and you’ve never collected a benefit of any sort and you’ve raised kids that are all, never collected a benefit either and they’re all working and producing - some of them are producing more New Zealanders, hopefully responsible ones - you’ve got a bit of pride I suppose. [European/Pākehā retired male, unassigned income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

Similarly, a younger woman responded:

It annoys me, then, you’ve got old people that have worked all their lives in a country, never left it, given their all for it and then sitting in their later part of their life, with no whānau around, snuggling under fucking blankets cos they’re too scared to turn a fucking heater on ... no way, that’s bullshit! And so there probably needs to be some more social services and work around that, to go in and make sure these people aren’t like that. I mean I would sooner not have the measly relief fund [from which she had received \$200 to pay bond on a rental property] if it was going to ensure that an old person was going to have firewood for the, you know. I mean, yeah, it would go without saying, yeah. [Māori female wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients were most likely to firmly believe the ‘elderly’ were deserving (35%). Only a few said ‘sometimes/maybe’ (2%) or ‘no’ (1%). This is likely because the majority of this main income source group were super annuitants rather than students. But all of the participants who mentioned the ‘elderly’ felt that they were deserving, with the exception of a very small number of wage/salary earners who answered ‘sometimes/maybe’ (4%) and ‘no’ (2%). It is likely this is because all New Zealanders can imagine themselves being elderly at some point, suggesting a degree of ‘self-interest’ in shaping participant attitudes.

The low income/tertiary qualification group (46%) was most likely to believe the ‘elderly’ to be deserving. This may be because many New Zealand Superannuation recipients were in this group. Those with middle income/no tertiary qualification (11%) and high income/tertiary qualification (10%) were least likely to believe this was the case, while 25% of the low income/no tertiary qualification and middle income/tertiary qualification groups did so.

There was more consensus amongst the different ethnic groups about the deservingness of the ‘elderly’ than the other groups discussed. All ethnic groups (with the exception of the Asian group, who did not make any responses regarding this issue at all) offered ‘yes’ responses, indicating they believed the ‘elderly’ to be deserving. But European/Pākehā (29%) were, once again, well ahead of other groups: ‘Other’ (14%), Pasifika (11%) and Māori (8%).

Not surprisingly, those aged over 45 (29-50%) were most likely to believe the ‘elderly’ to be deserving (with the over 60s offering the highest level of support). The ‘elderly’ were mentioned infrequently (10%) by the under 46 year olds. Only the 31-45 year olds offered ‘no’ responses (3%).

Females were far more likely (23%) to say 'yes' the 'elderly' are a deserving group than males (6%). However, 29% of males said 'sometimes/maybe', suggesting they were more ambivalent than females about this issue (none of whom offered this response at all). However, males (6%) were also slightly more likely than females (2%) to say 'no'.

Unemployed

The 'unemployed' were the group with the third highest number of responses but opinion was more mixed than for the other groups named: only 5% thought the unemployed were deserving, 13% said 'sometimes/maybe' and 16% said they were undeserving. These figures are lower than one might expect, given that in 2008 a majority (53%) of NZES respondents still supported the idea that it is government's responsibility to provide for and ensure a decent living standard amongst the unemployed. Interestingly, support for this idea was highest in the mid-to-late 1990s (peaking at 70% in 1993), when welfare dependency rhetoric was strongest and work activation was being extended, countering expectations that support for the unemployed would diminish in such a context (NZES, 1990; 1993; 1996; 2002; 2005; 2008).

It was noted earlier that the New Zealand public perceives the reasons for unemployed and need as individualised, with the number of NZVS respondents who considered 'laziness' as the cause of need growing from 38% in 1989 to 60% in 2004 (P. Perry, 2004; P. Perry & Webster, 1993). But only 38% agreed this was so when they were asked in the NZES (2008). Some of the participants in this study who thought the 'unemployed' to be undeserving appeared to be part of this wider trend, in that they saw unemployment as linked to the personal behaviour of the individual. For instance, a main benefit recipient said:

Well, you know you can't expect a disabled person or a sick person to go out to work, but if there's somebody normal, nothing wrong with them, why can't they go to work? They're too lazy, they don't want to go to work. [European/Pākehā male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

However, those who offered affirmative responses saw some degree of unemployment as inevitable or structurally created. An older participant said: *"There always seems to be about 3% unemployed, sometimes it goes higher and not very often lower so, I guess, that there's probably 3% of the population will always need to be provided for by the government."* [European/Pākehā retired male, middle income/tertiary qualification, 61 years and over]. Interestingly, the NZVS data shows that the number of respondents making this kind of response (considering 'need' to be caused by 'injustice') also rose between 1989 and 2004, from 30% to 40% (P. Perry, 2004; P. Perry & Webster, 1993).

Although the number of participants responding was quite small, demographic variables have been analysed for this response because attitudes towards the 'unemployed' are central to the study's interest in social citizenship. However, the findings below should be read with some caution.

Main income had a sizeable impact on whether people considered the 'unemployed' to be deserving. 12% of those on main benefits said 'yes' compared to only 2% of wage/salary earners and none of those on New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance. The latter two groups were also much more likely to say the 'unemployed' were undeserving (22% and 24% respectively); while no one on a main benefit indicated they believed this. This sits in contrast with previous results in this section, which have found the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance *most* likely to support the 'elderly' and 'DPB recipients'. However, that those on main benefits were most likely to see the 'unemployed' as deserving fits with their support for the 'sick/disabled' and with self-interest' arguments.

Responses indicating that the ‘unemployed’ are deserving were very even across different socio-economic groups. ‘Yes’ responses ranged only between 11% from the middle income/no tertiary qualification group to 19% amongst the middle and high income/tertiary qualification group.

European/Pākehā were the only group to provide ‘yes’ responses (8%) regarding the deservingness of the ‘unemployed’. ‘Sometimes/maybe’ responses were more common, with the largest number coming from Asian (30%), Pasifika (22%), ‘Other’ (14%) then European/Pākehā (12%) participants. While no Pasifika participants and only 8% of Māori participants offered ‘no’, this response was more common amongst the ‘Other’ (14%), European/Pākehā (20%) and Asian (30%) ethnic groups. Besides the fact that, once again, European/Pākehā were most likely to say the ‘unemployed’ were deserving, there is no clear pattern determining how ethnicity shapes attitudes to the deservingness of this group.

Participants of peak working age had much more mixed views on the deservingness of the ‘unemployed’ compared to the oldest participants. Those aged 46-60 year olds (13%), followed by those aged 31-45 years (3%), were the only ones to offer ‘yes’ responses indicating they thought the ‘unemployed’ to be deserving. The other age groups provided only responses of ‘sometimes/maybe’ (with the 46-60 and 30 years and under groups the highest at 21% and 20%) or ‘no’ (highest amongst the over 60s at 33% and, indeed, the only response made by this group). Notably, the oldest age group was far less likely to consider the ‘unemployed’ deserving than the ‘sick/disabled’ and ‘DPB recipients’; this may explain why previous discussion found this group more supportive of conditions being placed on benefit recipients than other age groups.

Females were slightly more likely (6%) than males (3%) to consider the ‘unemployed’ deserving. 11% of the latter also responded ‘sometimes/maybe’, while no females did. Males were, however, much more likely to say ‘no’ (20%) than females (13%).

Other groups

Few named ‘immigrants/refugees’ as deserving (5%), with 7% answering ‘sometimes/maybe’ and 13% saying ‘no’, this group was not deserving. This viewpoint was evident in some responses to the government responsibility statement. For example, one participant qualified his affirmative answer to the statement by saying: *“Well, yeah, only the real, true New Zealanders.”* [European/Pākehā male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years]. When pressed, he defined this as those people born in New Zealand, although he sounded doubtful that people of Samoan- or Indian-descent that were born here should be included.

Discussion in focus groups and interviews also highlighted strong concern by Māori about the assistance provided to refugees and immigrants. As one woman in the Māori focus group put it:

We’re actually helping out the tauiwi people instead of our own people. We’ve even got the Pākehās [sic] waiting in line 12 years [for a Housing New Zealand home] but we’re still helping them. They come off the plane, they get the benefit, they get a house. What do our people get? [Māori female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

In terms of ‘deservingness’, therefore, such participants framed Māori and other New Zealand-born citizens as having priority over migrants, whether New Zealand citizens or not.

Few people named ‘students’, the ‘employed’, ‘carers’ and ‘those without information/education’ but those that did generally thought they were deserving. The reverse

occurred for 'criminals' and 'younger people'. Responses were too few to analyse these other categories in more depth.

In summary: Participants' comments suggest that strongly defined notions of deservingness are alive and well in New Zealand, even if the 'elderly' were not named the most deserving group as is commonly found in other studies. Perhaps more so than in other sections, there are clearly-defined variances between different groups of participants regarding deservingness, although these findings must be interpreted carefully in that no specific questions were asked on this topic. In particular, main income source appears to be a significant factor, with wage/salary earners usually the *least* likely to consider any group as deserving. Meanwhile, the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group was most likely to name 'DPB recipients' and the 'elderly' as deserving, while main benefit recipients were most likely to see the 'sick/disabled' and the 'unemployed' as deserving. Although likely driven by 'self-interest' to a large degree, these findings also seem to be interlinked with age; older participants were more likely to name all groups as deserving with the exception of the 'unemployed'. This group was named most frequently by those aged 31-60. This would appear to relate directly to the fact that this age group is at the peak working age and thus more vulnerable to unemployment than older or younger participants.

Ethnicity also appears to strongly shape views on deservingness. European/Pākehā were most likely to name all groups as deserving. With the exception of the 'elderly' where responses were fairly even, the minority ethnic groups were far less likely to consider any of the key 'needy' groups in New Zealand to be deserving – but mixed results make it very difficult to determine why. Participants with low incomes and tertiary qualifications were most likely to name 'DPB recipients' and the 'elderly' as most deserving, but socio-economic factors did not appear particularly important. Gender was, however, with females more likely to name all groups as deserving. But, once again, males were more willing to offer ambivalent answers.

Although far from clear-cut, these findings do provide some evidence that participants were more likely to consider deserving those groups that are more like themselves, or they themselves are at risk of joining. Thus, the personal experience and context of participants shapes their views on deservingness, just as it did with their attitudes towards conditions placed on benefit recipients and different aspects of individual responsibility.

Section 2: Conclusion

The findings of this section sit in contrast with those of the last: although 82% of participants indicated they thought '*Government should take responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for*', slightly more (88%) thought that '*People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves*'. Indeed, 7% more participants categorically agreed (providing 'yes' responses) with the individual responsibility statement than that regarding government responsibility, with similar numbers of 'sometimes/maybe' responses and slightly more 'no' responses given for the latter.

There is some evidence to suggest that this finding reflects a neoliberal belief that social risks are more the concern of individuals than of government. For instance, small minorities indicated that 'health' and 'education' could be considered individual responsibilities in some way and around half of the sample (51%) fully supported the notion of 'user-pays' in social policy areas, while another 23% said they accepted this 'sometimes/maybe'. Furthermore, a sizeable proportion of participants supported the increasing levels of conditionality being placed upon main benefit recipients.

However, closer questioning of participants revealed that participant attitudes were far more complex than the findings of the individual responsibility statement question would suggest. For instance, when asked what activities individuals should be responsible for, 'work' was only the third most common response while those relating to children and family were given more frequently. In addition, when asked for their own ideas about how we might encourage greater individual responsibility, 'education', 'incentives' and 'role-model values' were more popular than 'sanctions', which is the primary means neoliberal welfare policies use to encourage main benefit recipients to behave in ways regarded as appropriate. Finally, although participants held quite strong ideas about which groups in society are deserving, they gave more 'yes' responses for the 'sick/disabled', 'DPB recipients' and the 'unemployed' than the 'elderly', suggesting that their views on these groups are not as negative as their views on conditionality might indicate. Indeed, there is considerable evidence to suggest that participants respond to questions about main benefit recipients and conditionality with little real knowledge of either this group's experiences or what such policies entail.

Finally, this section has again highlighted that attitudes towards individual responsibility are influenced by the key demographic variables of ethnicity, age and gender and, in some cases, main income source and socio-economic status. Of particular note was the finding that Māori may interpret notions of individual responsibility in relation to self-determination and that main benefit recipients do not necessarily conform to theoretical predictions that they have internalised neoliberal ideas about individual responsibility. Indeed, they were (with the exception of 'work-tests') less likely than other main income source groups to agree with conditions being placed on benefit recipients and to name 'sanctions' as a means for encouraging greater responsibility amongst individuals. This suggests that their experiences have made them *resistant*, at least in some ways, to neoliberal views on individual responsibility.

SECTION 3: EXPERIENCES OF CITIZENSHIP

Most of this report has focused on public attitudes to *social* citizenship, as indicated through discussion about government and individual responsibilities. The theoretical literature, however, suggests that ‘who we are’ can affect not only our understandings of social citizenship but also our conceptions of citizenship more generally, as well as our sense of belonging (Dwyer, 2004; van Oorschot, 2002). It has already been noted that there is a theoretical assumption that benefit recipients subject to work-related conditions may feel lesser citizens than other groups of people, one which has been supported by empirical studies conducted in Britain (Dean & Melrose, 1999; Dwyer, 1998; Lister, et al., 2003). There is also empirical research evidence showing that women, ethnic minority groups and others that have been historically marginalised do not feel themselves to be as equal as other citizens in society (Durie, 2003; Lister, 1997; Pearson, 2005).

Given such a background, this section explores participant responses to a third statement about the treatment of social security recipients as ‘second class’ citizens in New Zealand society. This aimed to tease apart perceptions of different levels of citizen status within New Zealand by getting participants to first consider a group that are highly stigmatised (benefit recipients), then to name any other groups they thought were treated as if they were ‘second class’ in New Zealand and finally to consider whether they, themselves, felt ‘first class’ in New Zealand society. Participants were also asked to consider what conditions people might need to feel valued and equal (‘first class’) citizens of New Zealand.

Are social security recipients made to feel like ‘second class’ citizens?

As with the other statements, the third and final statement – *‘People receiving social security benefits are made to feel like second class citizens’* – aimed to provoke discussion amongst participants. For brevity’s sake, it will be referred to as the ‘second class’ statement in this report. This statement was adopted because it has been asked in the International Social Survey Program (ISSP, 2000) survey, where half of the New Zealand respondents agreed or strongly agreed, while just under a quarter disagreed or strongly disagreed. In addition, this statement was used in British research, with Dean & Melrose (1999) finding that two-thirds of their qualitative sample agreed with it compared to half of the 1995 respondents to the quantitative British Attitudes Survey. It was anticipated that using the same statement would not only allow international comparisons but also the exploration of the differing responses given in qualitative and quantitative studies.

However, it is important to note that the term ‘social security benefits’ was confusing for some participants, who did not know what was meant by ‘social security’ or what benefits might be included in this category. This is interesting, because it shows the lack of currency the term ‘social security’ has in New Zealand today, when ‘income support’ is administered by Work & Income, which itself is a division of the Ministry of Social Development (Humpage & Craig, 2008). The researchers indicated that they wished participants to consider *main benefits* when answering this question, although some participants clearly also included at least New Zealand Superannuation and sometimes Student Allowance in their responses, as the comments provided below indicate. Also, many participants felt uncomfortable with notions of ‘second class’ and ‘first class’ status more generally which may also have influenced the findings presented in the following pages.

Figure 11: Responses to: 'People receiving social security benefits are made to feel like second class citizens' (n=59)




Figure 11 indicates that a clear majority (71%) of the participants who responded to this question believed that people receiving social security benefits are made to feel 'second class'. A further 19% thought that this might sometimes or may be true and only 10% of participants disagreed with the statement. Although excluded from the graph, it is notable that another 11% of participants who responded offered 'don't know' responses (and 22 participants made no response that could be coded at all).

Not surprisingly, main benefit recipients were most likely (64%) to fully agree with the statement. 9% said 'sometimes/maybe' and none disagreed. Several of these participants indicated that they do not tell people they are on a benefit because it is so stigmatised, with one noting:

... you can't get credit, you can't, you know, you go to a loan shark and they offer you all this money that you've got to pay back and you think 'well, shit', you know, but you can't get credit, can't get HP [hire purchase]. You are a second class citizen. [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Some of those receiving Sickness or Invalid's benefits indicated they might be less affected by the stigma associated with main benefits, but they felt its consequences nonetheless. One noted:

Well, I've never ever thought of it until I've come round this table and I suppose like [name of another participant] I feel a bit sort of second class citizen because I am receiving a benefit, I feel less like it because I've had brain injury and I'm not just, you know, like I think the unemployed are, and the people who used to be on the DPB years ago, they were thought of as being the worst, like everyone was called 'dole bludgers'. [European/ Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Wage/salary earners offered fewer responses than other groups to this statement, with 52% saying 'yes', 17% 'sometimes/maybe' and 7% 'no'. But their support was not as low as one might anticipate, possibly because of the previous experiences of some, who had either been on a main benefit in the past or knew someone who had. For instance, one high income participant said in response to the 'second class' statement:

I would say they shouldn't be, but they are And I think it was really interesting because we had to make the switch when my Dad left us, feeling it first hand, we had to make a switch from being nice independent and you could survive on your own to having to go into Work and Income and get a DPB. I know that my Mum found it very humiliating and she was

made to feel second class, just going through that process alone. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Another wage/salary earner with a post-graduate degree talked of how this stigma does not necessarily come from society generally but from family attitudes and values:

... I remember the first time I walked into a Work and Income office, to get an Accommodation Supplement or something. Thinking 'shit, I've never been more employable or employed (laughter), never earned more money in my life and now I'm applying for welfare' and, and the whole thing of I could just hear my father sitting on my shoulder going 'oh, you shouldn't need the government, you know, should be self-reliant' and ... it was, yeah, there was a huge kind of a family-related stigma to ... kind of fronting up there. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

It is also notable that wage/salary earners made up the majority of the small numbers of participants who answered 'don't know' (11%, figures not shown in Figure 11). Several stated that they simply could not answer because they had never been on a benefit. One participant responded:

I guess, I just don't have the knowledge. I wouldn't know in the sense that I've never been on one of those benefits, I haven't got the experience and, to be honest, in my family, I mean, you know, most people are workers of some description and if they have been on a benefit, I mean, they, they didn't talk about an experience like that that I could, you know, I could relate to. ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

The latter part of his response indicates some of the stigma associated with main benefit receipt in New Zealand. Another participant articulated this stigmatisation more clearly:

I've never had to deal with social welfare or WINZ or any of those so I don't know but I'm sure they're trained to not make them feel that way [but] there's always talk about bludgers and the dole and it's always in a negative context, and I suppose if you were one of those and you read it enough and heard it enough you would feel like somebody's trying to make you feel like a second class citizen. So, yes, I can see where the statement's coming from but how potent ... and real it actually is, I just don't know. ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Those on New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance were somewhat less likely than main benefit recipients or wage/salary earners to fully agree (35%) with the 'second class' statement. However, large numbers were ambivalent (29% said 'sometimes/maybe') while a full 18% said 'no'. This suggests that attitudes may be influenced by the varied treatment that different types of benefit recipients receive based on the level of 'deservingness' society accords them. Although the experience was not uniform for all New Zealand Superannuation recipients, most reported that receiving this income support payment did not make them feel 'second class'. One noted:

... I went into see WINZ, you know, when I turned 65 and ... they couldn't have been nicer really. I mean, it was such a contrast to having been there with other people, and myself, one period of my life when I was unemployed. [European/Pākehā retired male, low income/tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

Another retired participant said:

... it's funny when I signed up for the Super and I went into the Work & Income, I felt out of place But then when I stopped and thought about it I thought 'well, no, I am entitled to

this'. I mean I was brought up with the ethic of work hard and get your independence and you don't want to be a burden to anybody so all those things are proud to be in a country that you are able to do that, I suppose. [European/Pākehā retired male, unassigned income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

Yet the same participant later noted that he did not feel 'second class' because:

... I've earned it it's a different benefit than ... a thirty-five year old getting the dole it's a different benefit, I don't even class it as a benefit in many ways. It's a ... of right. [European/Pākehā retired male, unassigned income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

A participant in the one of the wage/salary earners' focus groups also highlighted how students were treated more favourably than main benefit recipients:

The students I think are valued a lot higher than people on the Unemployment Benefit, so even though they might get less [money], there's a sense of that they're actually achieving something So, students aren't second class citizens in the same way. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

The only student to take part in the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance focus group indicated that he did not feel 'first class' yet but he was working his way towards it through his study. He felt that he would eventually be considered 'first class' once he finished his degree and this distinguished him from someone who was on the Unemployment Benefit.

Socio-economic status influenced responses to the 'second class' statement as much as main income source. As we might expect, those on low incomes (and thus more likely to be either a current or former benefit recipient) were most likely to agree (54% of both those with and without tertiary qualifications said 'yes', although 15% of the latter said 'no'). But the number of 'yes' responses from the high income/tertiary qualification (48%) and middle income/no tertiary qualification (44%) groups were not much lower, although 10% of the former also said 'no'. The middle income/tertiary qualification group was least likely to say 'yes' (38%), slightly less likely than the low income/no tertiary qualification group to say 'no' (13%) but most likely to say 'don't know' (19%). In fact, there were large numbers of participants who felt they could not answer this question in both the middle and high income groups.

European/Pākehā (59%) were most likely to fully agree with the 'second class' statement. They were followed by participants from the Māori (46%), 'Other' (43%) and Pasifika (33%) groups. Asian participants offered only 'no' responses (43%). This reflects discussion in the Asian focus group where, with the exception of one participant who had been on the DPB, perceptions of benefit recipients were very much reliant on media images. For instance, when asked why he perceived welfare dependency to be a big problem, particularly amongst Māori and Pasifika peoples, one participant said: "*Most[ly] from [the] news.*" [Asian male wage/salary earner, low income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years]. When asked if anyone else thought this was big problem, another answered: "*Yeah, but this like, we know that's a problem, but then we think 'Oh, Māori they think that's our land, that's our country, we have the right.'*" [Asian female wage/salary earner, middle income, tertiary qualification, 46-60 years]. In this way, their views on social citizenship were shaped by media representations of Māori.

It is perhaps not surprising that no Māori or Pasifika participant offered 'don't know' responses. Given the socio-economic disadvantage of both ethnic groups as a whole, it is likely they had either received a main benefit or knew someone who did. While only 8% of

European/Pākehā said 'don't know', almost a third of the 'Other' group (29%) indicated they didn't know whether social security recipients are made to feel 'second class'. Although this might relate to the fact that most of this group had migrated to New Zealand, it seems unlikely given they had lived in the country for some time.

The 46-60 years age group was most likely to agree (67%) with the 'second class' statement. Only a small number said 'sometimes/maybe' (13%) or 'no' (4%). Although the over 60s were most likely to answer 'no' (17%) and least likely to fully agree (25%), 33% of this age group also answered 'sometimes/maybe', meaning over half (58%) provided affirmative responses of some kind. The two younger age groups were much less ambivalent with 45% of each saying 'yes' and 5-6% 'no'. Given strong evidence that recipients of New Zealand Superannuation are treated much better than other benefit recipients by WINZ, it is possible that this result is less a function of age and more of their particular (and recent) experiences of receiving a benefit.

There is little difference in male and female responses to the statement, although again females tended to be more clear-cut in their answers than males. 50% of the females said 'yes' and 6% 'no' but none responded 'sometimes/maybe'. Males were similar in their 'yes' responses (46%) but also more likely to respond 'sometimes/maybe' (17%), 'no' (9%) and 'don't know' (9% compared to 6% of females).

Is it appropriate that social security recipients are made to feel like 'second class' citizens?

In addition to understanding how participants thought social security recipients were perceived and treated in society, **the study also attempted to get a sense of whether they considered it *appropriate* that this group be made to feel like 'second class' citizens.** Interestingly, when asked about this, only 3% of participants answered 'yes', 55% said 'sometimes/maybe' and another 41% said 'no'.

The reasons offered to explain these responses were varied. Some participants who answered 'yes' individualised the experience of stigma: *"I think if they're made to feel like a second class citizen it's possibly because they may not be completely entitled to what they're receiving."* [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

Another participant said she felt 'second class' and that she did not tell people she was on the DPB: *"But then going into, you walk into the [name of town] office and I know why we get treated the way we do, it is just staring you in the face."* She later explained: *"there's so many kids there and they have got more than one kid, you know, they've got kids galore and they're so young and you're just thinking, 'well, what's, this is a vicious circle, you know, it's sad so I don't know how to solve that one'."* [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Other participants strongly believed that stigma serves a useful purpose in discouraging people from receiving assistance. For example, one participant who defined 'welfare' very broadly, said:

I strongly believe that the welfare state ... is undermining not only the expectation that people are, you know - how shall I say? - responsible for themselves and, and, you know, contribute somehow, it's discouraged it in some people. And, you know, I wouldn't say that I'd want to see some people starving in the street but what I'm talking about is the sort of middle class welfare like Working for Families where I'm paying tax so someone who's got two kids who's on 20,000 more than me can get a benefit, it's nuts. ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

However, some main benefit recipients highlighted that they were able to support the idea that social security recipients should be treated as 'second class' because they regarded themselves as different from other main benefit recipients. For example, participants in one of the main benefit recipients' focus groups moved easily from talking about how they felt stigmatised by WINZ processes and, in the case of the women with children, misunderstood as lazy when in fact they were caring for sick children to talking about 'layabouts' who sat at home watching television all day. Despite all having had considerable experience of being subject to WINZ obligations and conditions, they largely seemed to accept this in principle, even while offering reasons why it was inappropriate to apply such conditions in their situation. Similarly, they seemed the least surprised or concerned by the idea that we might categorise people as 'first class' or 'second class', while other, particularly high income, participants found it difficult to answer or resisted the notion of class-based distinctions. All of these findings support arguments made in the theoretical literature about the impact of increasing conditionality on welfare recipients. The fact that this focus group was made up of entirely Māori and Pasifika participants with no tertiary qualification, however, complicates this simple reading of the results because it may be that other factors besides main income source influenced the opinions of these participants.

Interestingly, wage/salary earners were least likely (2%) to say 'yes' benefit recipients should be made to feel 'second class'. 9% also answered 'no'. New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance (24%) and main benefit (16%) recipients were more likely to disagree but almost a quarter (24%) of both groups said some benefit recipients should be made to feel 'second class' or sometime. This seems to sit in tension with the findings about deservingness presented in Section 2.

The middle income/no tertiary qualification group (22%) were most likely to disagree that it is appropriate that benefit recipients be made to feel 'second class', although those on low incomes both with and without tertiary qualifications also offered strong 'no' (15-18%) and 'sometimes/maybe' (25-31%) responses. The only group to say 'yes' was the high income/tertiary qualification group but only 5% offered this response, with 10% saying 'no' and 10% saying 'sometimes/maybe'. It is notable that few participants in this category answered the question at all.

It is difficult to accurately gauge whether ethnicity is a variable when it comes to whether participants thought it appropriate that benefit recipients be made to feel 'second class'. This is because two of the ethnic-specific focus groups were not asked this question in as much detail as in other groups or interviews.

The older two age groups were more likely (17-29%) to say 'no' it was not appropriate for social security recipients to be treated as 'second class' than the younger two groups (5-6%). However, both the two younger groups (20-23%) and the over 60s (25%) were far more likely to provide 'sometimes/maybe' responses than the 46-60s age group (8%). Only one person who answered this question said 'yes' and they were in the 31-45 age group.

The few females who responded to this question offered only 'no' (9%) answers, while the males were more likely to say 'sometimes/maybe' (11%). 1% of males said 'yes' and 3% said 'no'.

In summary: Responses to the 'second class' statement illustrate that the majority of participants believe that social security recipients are treated in a way that is not equal to other citizens. That main benefit recipients were most likely to agree with the statement, while those on New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance were most likely to disagree, suggests a difference in the way that the latter are perceived and treated compared to individuals on main benefits and this shaped their opinions relating to the

statement. It appears the older age of the majority of the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group may also have had an impact, although it was the peak working age (46-60) group that was most likely to agree social security recipients were treated 'second class'.


It is interesting that, once again, the low income groups and the high income/tertiary qualification group were most likely to agree with the statement, suggesting that being well-paid and/or well-educated allows individuals to be more aware or understanding of inequality in New Zealand than middle income groups who may be more vulnerable to economic and social change. The same may be said of being a member of the ethnic majority group, given European/Pākehā were most likely to agree with the statement. However, strong support for the statement was offered by all groups – even the Asian group, whose attitudes on this issue were clearly shaped more by the media than personal experience. Finally, it is interesting to see that while there was little difference between the sexes, females again offered less ambivalent answers than males.

In regards to whether it is *appropriate* for social security recipients to be treated as if they are 'second class', it was found that wage/salary earners, younger, high income earners and males were most likely to agree. This might be expected because again these groups are least vulnerable to many of the social and economic risks facing New Zealanders and thus perhaps more likely to believe that the needs of benefit recipients are more to do with personal, rather than structural, inadequacies.

Why might social security recipients feel 'second class'?

Given the findings above, it is interesting to explore whether participants thought the 'second class' treatment of social security recipients was due to their own behaviours or broader societal factors. When asked to consider *why* benefit recipients might feel 'second class', participants offered a range of reasons, which are depicted in Figure 12. For the purposes of further analysis, only the three most highly-rated responses have been considered.

Figure 12: Reasons why benefit recipients might feel 'second class' (N=87)
Affirmative responses ('yes' and 'sometimes/maybe')



For instance, some participants described how recipients of main benefits are always assumed to be in the wrong until proven otherwise. One described how a friend's benefit was stopped without any warning:

.... no you don't get told, I mean it just stops going into your bank account. It seems to me like the prime directive for something like WINZ is you NEVER stop the benefitUntil you're absolutely sure of your case and then you call in [the] damn client and try and sort that out, you don't just bloody stop it. [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

Another woman provided a detailed description of the recent 'work-first' changes to the welfare system, which require the unemployed to attend a work-related seminar *before* being able to apply for the Unemployment Benefit:

I was taking somebody for an application for a Sickness Benefit a little while ago and I sent my flatmate ... because he was going past, to get the form, and they wouldn't give him the application form. And I thought that was very strange. And he asked and explained and they still wouldn't give it to him. I went in myself and they said they wouldn't give him the application because he had to go to a seminar first. And I was saying 'but he's sick, I'm actually driving him to his doctor this morning, we were lucky that we got a cancellation, the doctor can see him, how can you want him to go to a seminar when he's sick? Like, we've got to go to the doctor's.' And they eventually relented and said, and I explained that, you know, he was in no state to go to any seminar. They explained that it was, the seminar was to make sure that he knew all his entitlements and that they looked after him and all that sort of stuff. And, and then we had to have an appointment with somebody, and saying 'well, you know, do you actually want him to go to seminar like that, and talk to him and you can find,' and, this was like within weeks of me going to this community forum where we heard from one of the ministers, telling us how wonderful it was that unemployment numbers had gone down such a lot, and so that meant that WINZ could spend more time supporting those who were looking for work and supporting people on the Sickness, and that was what it meant, supporting them, it meant that instead of accepting their application when they, for whatever reason, thought they ought to put one in, they had to wait until they'd been through a seminar. ['Other' female wage/salary earner, unassigned income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Income source seems to influence beliefs about why social security recipients might feel 'second class'. Over half of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance (59%) and main benefit (56%) recipients believed that benefit recipients felt 'second class' because of their treatment by 'WINZ/ACC officials and policies'. However, only (40%) of wage-salary earners believed this to be the case. These results likely reflect the experiences of the income support recipients, but it is notable that although New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance participants were less likely than main benefit recipients to believe social security recipients were made to feel 'second class', they were slightly more likely to blame government officials and policy.

Low income and middle income participants with no tertiary qualification were most likely (57% and 67% respectively) to believe 'WINZ/ACC officials and policies' were a reason why social security recipients would feel 'second class'. This may possibly be because they have had more experience of the welfare system, given their relatively low educational levels, which likely makes them vulnerable in the labour market. There was weaker support amongst the low income/tertiary qualification (46%) and high income/tertiary qualification (43%) groups. Once again, those with a middle income and a tertiary qualification were least likely to offer this reason (31%).

Support for 'WINZ/ACC officials and policies' was fairly even across the different ethnic groups (with the exception of the Asian group who were not asked this question). However, European/Pākehā (55%) and 'Other' (57%) were slightly more likely to make this response than Māori (46%) and Pasifika (44%). This is perhaps surprising given Māori and Pasifika are, as a group, disproportionately more likely to receive a benefit themselves or know someone who does and/or have a low income.

Those aged over 45 were more likely (58%) to name 'WINZ/ACC officials and policies' than other groups. There was, however, still strong support amongst the under 31-45s (42%) and under 31s (40%).

Females were more likely (52%) to believe 'WINZ/ACC officials and policies' was an issue than males (37%). This may relate to the greater interaction female participants tend to have with government welfare agencies, due to either having children or because of the weaker participation of women generally in the labour market.

Stigma

A large number of participants named factors that might be collectively labelled 'societal factors' because they relate to issues beyond the control of the individual benefit recipient. For instance, a small number of participants noted reasons such as 'struggle financially' (9%) and 'elitism/concern about tax money' (6%) amongst richer New Zealanders.

Most strikingly, a third (33%) of the total sample felt that 'stigma' was an important factor in explaining why social security recipients feel 'second class'. This referred to a broader societal perception of benefit recipients as lazy and undeserving, rather than the specific actions of the WINZ/ACC officials (although the two are clearly related) or poverty. A woman described why she thought benefit recipients were treated 'second class':

Firstly, because they have to go and ask for help, secondly, cos of the way that they're treated when they get there and, thirdly, cos of the way other people think about them on the whole. They might say 'oh, beneficiaries, oh, but I don't mean you', well, they may not mean you, but they still mean beneficiaries, yeah. [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Similarly, another woman described how she felt 'second class':

Because I've been treated with suspicion or as if what I'm saying about my life isn't what my life is I think when you, definitely being on an Invalid Benefit affects the kind of health care you get. [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Other participants noted that they felt not only 'looked down upon' for using free or low-cost services (such as public hospital dentists) but also that these services were of inferior quality to those charging standard fees.

A wage/salary earner further elaborated that benefit recipients were stigmatised:

... because, you know, people perceive them - and I'm, you know, I'm probably one of them - that, that they're not fulfilling their role in society. 'People receiving social, are made to feel' - like, yeah, I mean they have an option, eh. They can not receive the social security. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Although he later qualified this response by describing some cases where benefit receipt was justified, he made clear that the first assumption of many New Zealanders is that citizens fulfil their role in society only if they work.

However, when participants in one of the benefit recipients focus groups were asked if they felt like 'second class' citizens simply because they were on a benefit or because they were not working, a female DPB recipient said: *"I don't think it's the work thing, because I sort of feel that I am working as a mother."* [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years]. Another woman, also on the DPB, added: *"Yeah, I certainly feel like I'm working for it, blimey."* [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

A wage/salary earner also demonstrated awareness that benefit recipients are easily and quickly stigmatised in New Zealand and how such stigma is racialised, by talking about assumptions that are made. He told two stories that illustrated his point:

First of all there's a British family that I was reading about recently, the parents have been on their benefits the whole of their working life. Their children have grown up and have had on and off employment and have had quite dysfunctional relationships, divorces and what have you. The parents have never owned their own vehicles, they've always used public transport and they've always lived in a state house and I'm talking about the Royal family The second one is of a similar vein, but it's not quite so humorous, is that I was reading in our [local newspaper] just yesterday in Manukau that there is a Samoan family who are often, people assume they are beneficiaries, and this guy, this father of five has become the first I think it's Samoan - or it's certainly Pasifika anyhow, but we'll say Samoan - the first Samoan doctor/lawyer/barrister, he's a GP whose just become a lawyer. That person is not a beneficiary but because he's Samoan a lot of people would assume, if they saw him walking down the street, they'd make that assumption. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Main benefits (40%) were most likely to consider 'stigma' to be a reason why social security recipients might feel 'second class'. Presumably this is because of their own experiences while receiving income support. However, almost a third of both wage/salary earners (31%) and New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients (29%) did the same.

Responses were fairly similar across all socio-economic groups. However, low income/high education participants were most likely to offer this answer (38%) and those with high income/high education least likely (29%).

European/Pākehā (51%) were far more likely to name 'stigma' as a reason for social security recipients feeling 'second class'. Māori (15%) and 'Other' (14%) offered considerably lesser support and the Pasifika and Asian groups none at all. That so few Māori and Pasifika participants indicated 'stigma' to be a reason is surprising, given that both ethnic groups face considerable negative stereotyping as being disproportionately 'welfare dependent'. However, later discussion reveal that this may be because they perceive such 'stigma' to stem from *ethnicity* rather *income source*.

'Stigma' was more popular as a reason amongst the 46-60 age group (42%) than other age groups (25-33%). It is not clear why this might be the case, but it may relate to the already noted awareness of, and perceived vulnerability to, life's risk found amongst this middle age group.

Gender was not an issue regarding 'stigma'. 37% of males offered this response compared to 35% of females.

Low self-esteem

A far smaller number of participants though that feeling 'second class' had more to do with personal factors associated with benefit recipients themselves. Given that many participants suggested that benefit recipients are heavily stigmatised, it is notable that being 'lazy' (3%) or 'dependent' (3%) or feeling 'second class' because social security recipients 'feel guilty' for not working (2%) were not more common. **However, 13% of participants did consider 'low self-esteem' (13%) to be a reason for social security recipients feeling 'second class'.** Self-esteem is, of course, linked with the 'stigma' discussed above. However, one participant, after indicating several reasons why benefit recipients might feel 'second class', said that only the individual can allow 'stigma' to have an impact:

... I think you're made to feel second class citizens by, they have a personal sense of shame that they are having to be in this situation and that's a portion of the people I think some are made to feel second class citizens by their interaction with the staff WINZ and what have you. I think that, and the comment there is, of course, something that are made to feel second class citizens by media and, and politicians and beneficiary bashing. So, I think they get people get it from different directions but it's the individual that feels. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance participants (24%) were most likely to believe 'low self-esteem' was a factor. 14% of wage-salary earners (14%) but only 4% of main benefit recipients thought the same. That the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance participants were more likely to consider 'low self-esteem' as a reason for benefit recipients to feel 'second class' sits in tension with the fact that they were also most likely to support 'WINZ/ACC officials and policies' as a reason. While hardly mutually exclusive or unconnected, they do represent differing arguments about whether structural or personal factors are most important for shaping benefit recipient experiences.

Support for 'low self-esteem' was quite similar amongst different socio-economic groups (11-19%). The high income/tertiary qualification group was the exception, with very few of its members believing this to be an issue (5%).

'Low self-esteem' was a response offered by 29% of 'Other', 16% of European/Pākehā and 11% of Pasifika participants. No Māori and Asian participants mentioned this issue. While clearly ethnicity seems to be a factor, there is no evidence to explain *why* this might be the case.

The over 60s were most likely to name 'low self-esteem' but even then only a quarter (25%) did so. The under 31s (15%) and 46-60s (13%) offered lower but similar support, while the 31-45s did not mention it at all.

Gender again did not appear to be an issue, with 13% of females and 11% of males naming 'low self-esteem'.

In summary: It is troubling that this section has found that almost half the participants believe that 'WINZ/ACC officials and policies' make benefit recipients feel 'second class'. While this relates not only to the conditions and obligations placed upon benefit recipients but also the general procedures and relations both government agencies have with their clients, it does suggest that policy changes do matter when it comes to experiences of citizenship and belonging.

It is interesting, however, that New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients were slightly more likely than those on main benefits to believe 'WINZ/ACC officials and policies' were an issue, given they were least likely to agree with the statement that social


security recipients were treated as ‘second class’. This may relate to the fact that older and low/middle income participants with no tertiary qualification were more likely to name ‘WINZ/ACC officials and policies’, as this response was associated with both demographic groups. Less surprising is that main benefit recipients and those with low income but a tertiary qualification were far more likely to name this and ‘stigma’ as issues, while those on New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance and wage/salary earners were more likely to believe in the personal failing implied by ‘low self-esteem’.

It is surprising that Māori and Pasifika participants did not rate ‘WINZ/ACC officials and policies’ and ‘stigma’ more often, given their disproportionate representation amongst income support recipients and/or low income households. One might also expect gender differences to be more substantial; however, although females were much more likely to name ‘WINZ/ACC officials and policies’, they offered ‘stigma’ and ‘low self-esteem’ in similar numbers as males.

What other groups are made to feel ‘second class’ in New Zealand?

Given citizenship has long been conceptualised as gendered (Lister, 1997; Orloff, 1993) and racialised (Durie, 2003; Pearson, 2005), focus group and interview discussion in most cases also allowed participants to name groups other than benefit recipients whom they thought were treated as ‘second class’ in society. The number of participants who responded directly to this line of questioning was relatively small, so no indepth analysis of how demographic differences has been offered. However, this brief section gives some sense of the awareness participants had of other fault lines of inequality in New Zealand, asides from that based on main income source.

Figure 13: Other groups that might feel ‘second class’ in New Zealand (N=87)
Affirmative responses (‘yes’ and ‘sometimes/maybe’)



Māori

Figure 13 shows that of all the groups named as possibly feeling ‘second class’ in New Zealand, ‘Māori’ were mentioned most often with 20% of participants naming this group. In illustrating why they thought Māori might feel ‘second class’, some participants offered historical examples. For instance, a Māori participant in the women’s focus group spoke of

how the soldiers who took part in Māori battalions had not received the same entitlements as their European/Pākehā counterparts when they returned from World War II. Participants in the Māori focus group, however, offered more contemporary examples, in particular the 2007 'terror raids', which saw a wide variety of social activists arrested under the Firearms Act and the Terrorism Suppression Act on suspicion that they were part of a 'terrorist' plot said to be led by members of the Tūhoe tribe (Stuff, 2010). As noted, Tūhoe have a long tradition of asserting their right to self-determination and, given their location in the isolated Urewera region, have maintained a relatively high level of self-sufficiency, including traditions of hunting and food gathering. Speaking of the raids, which had taken place only a few weeks before, one participant said:

No, I don't feel like we've been treated like first class citizens and this is just the timing of it and what we were talking about in regards to the anti-terrorism raids. I do feel justified though in regards to the legal outcome that's come along and I know some of them, they definitely don't feel like first class citizens [Māori female wage/salary earner, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Women/mothers/DPB recipients

'Women/mothers' (15%) were the group second most frequently mentioned as likely to feel 'second class', while 5% thought 'DPB recipients' could feel this way. Responses have been coded separately for these groups because, although most DPB recipients are women, it is clear that many participants felt that 'stigma' was more strongly associated with gender than with welfare status. Notably, many of the references in both cases were historical rather than contemporary ones. For instance, the women's focus group discussed how the introduction of the DPB in 1973 attempted to overcome discrimination against lone mothers, who often had to put their children up for adoption if they had no financial means to support them. Indeed, one of the participants told the group:

I was actually adopted before [the DPB was introduced] in 1970. So, I was an original love child! (laughter) And I had to be adopted out, but, yeah, three years later much to my heart broken mother. [Māori female benefit recipient, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Another woman in the same focus group had put her own child up for adoption as the legislation to introduce the DPB was going through Parliament and reflected on how different things would have been better, both for herself and her child, if her daughter had been born only six months later.

Immigrants

'Immigrants' (10%) were also considered likely to feel 'second class' in New Zealand by a small number of participants. For example, one participant responded to the question about what other groups might feel 'second class' by saying:

Perhaps immigrants Because of skin colour or, or language difficulties. They might arrive with a PhD but have to drive taxis and that happens all the time. And so they feel, it must be very demeaning for them, I feel quite sad for them. I don't think there's any reason why any Kiwi, New Zealand-born Kiwi should feel demeaned but ... I think - because I think that's a ... personal thing - but someone who has been brave enough or been forced perhaps out of their own country to move to a new country and has gone through all the hoops of getting to New Zealand and then, you know, tries so hard and often it's a real struggle for them ... I really empathise with them. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Similarly, another participant responded:

Oh, gosh I really think Māori are totally marginalised, yeahAnd I would say minorities, Asians - oh bless them, there's a huge Asian population in this, in this part of Manukau - I think their, they can be quite marginalised too. I think immigrants, possibly in general immigrants, and then breaking it down into categories of Pacific immigrants and Asian immigrants and, not European immigrants. ['Other' female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

It is notable that both these comments suggest that ethnic majority members should not feel marginalised, yet this is exactly the experience described by some participants below and in responses to further questions discussed in the next section.

Other groups

The other groups listed in Figure 13 were named only by a very small number of people. **While it might not come as a surprise that 'Pacific peoples' (7%) should be named as feeling 'second class', it was more unexpected that the 'middle class' (2%) and 'European/Pākehā' (1%) were.** Previous discussion suggests that these responses may have been influenced by the way in which neoliberal reforms impacted on middle- as well as low-income earners during the 1990s and into the 2000s. The 'race' debates that emerged around the foreshore and seabed in the mid-2000s also appear to have shaped these feelings of marginalisation.


In summary: This part of Section 2 has illustrated that participants perceived other fault lines of inequality in New Zealand, beyond those associated with benefit receipt discussed in the last section. That 'Māori', 'immigrants' and 'Pacific peoples' were three of the four most likely named groups indicates an awareness of the significant ethnic inequalities that exist in New Zealand and may reflect the dominant political discourses which are heavily focused on ethnicity. It is interesting that 'Māori' were the group most often named as likely to feel 'second class' in New Zealand, given that some participants in the study felt that biculturalism and Treaty claims settlements 'privileged' Māori over other groups. But clearly a large number of participants responding to this question recognised that 'Māori' as a group face both historical and continuing disadvantage. While this finding may reflect considerable discussion around 'Māori' issues in the Māori focus group, it is notable that these were neither exclusive to this forum, nor limited to Māori participants.

What is perhaps more surprising is that 'women/mothers' were the second most likely group to be named, with the closely related 'DPB recipients' ranked fifth in the list of groups identified. Again, this finding may be linked to discussion in the women-specific focus group, but once again consideration of these issues were not exclusive to that forum and it is evident that – despite improvements in the last four decades – participants still perceive gender inequalities to be a major problem.

Do participants feel 'first class'?

Having been questioned about benefit recipients and other groups who may feel 'second class', participants were asked if they, themselves, felt like a 'first class' citizen in New Zealand. **Figure 14 demonstrates that about a third of participants responded 'yes' (34%) they felt 'first class'.**

Figure 14: Responses to: 'Do you feel like a first class citizen?' (N=87)



A similar number (32%) of the participants said 'no' they did not feel 'first class'. Of these many indicated how important the socio-political context is in shaping responses to this question. One such participant explained:

.... I just feel that the people in general in New Zealand don't feel valued I think people are just feeling that they are being ignored or not listened to, feel that the government's making all of the decisions for them, feel that, (pause) that over the last few years, life has become much harder for them. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

That almost a third (30%) offered 'sometimes/maybe' responses suggests some difficulty in answering this question. For many this was because of the situational nature of feeling 'first class' or because of issues with *who* was defining whether they were 'first' or 'second class'. For instance, when asked if she felt 'first class' a Pasifika participant said:

For me the response, the first thing I had to think about was who's defining first class, firstly? If I'm defining it then, yeah, I feel first class, you know? I abide by the laws, I'm, you know, I'm responsible, you know, I contribute to the New Zealand society but if someone else is defining first class and defining me, you know, I know that the media or government then, well, it depends on, you know, what their level is cos I think for myself being Samoan maybe I don't make the cut, but personally, yep, I'm first class. [Pasifika female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Some of the small number (4%) of the participants who answered 'don't know' did so because they had simply never thought about this way of classifying people before. When asked if she felt like a 'first class' citizen, one woman responded: *"(pause) I don't, I don't! (laughter) I don't feel like, I don't know if I feel like anything in particular, I certainly don't feel like a first class citizen, no."* When asked if she felt like a 'second class' citizen, she paused and then responded: *"No, I don't think I do, I feel stuck. Yeah, that's how I feel! (laughter) I feel like a stuck citizen (laughter), you know, how are we going to get away from where we are now?"* [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Others resisted the concepts of 'first' and 'second' class completely, often reframing the question in giving their response: *"I'm a good citizen perhaps ... rather than first class."* [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over]. Similarly, a retired male said: *"Oh, I don't like classing People are either good citizens or not I think."* [European/Pākehā retired male, middle income/tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

In another case, the question provoked a monologue about class in New Zealand society:

I was born into a working class family and I'll die a working class. I have very strong views that part of the - it seems to me anyhow, in my opinion - and part of the way that I interpreted the introduction of Rogernomics etc was along the lines ... that if you pushed the right papers at the right times and in the right directions we could all end up millionaires. Now I think unless you win Lotto, you've got, you know - the average person's probably never going to and certainly I don't aspire to. I think one of the things ... I could see clearly, in my view, New Zealand moving towards a class society and I think that has continued. So I see myself as having come into a working class family, I will leave as a working class person and I'm very proud of it. But I think New Zealand has, is moving towards an increasingly class-based society. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

A very surprising result is that wage/salary earners were less likely to feel 'first class' than their peers on income support, especially those on a main benefit. 36% of main benefit and 35% of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients answered 'yes' compared to 22% of wage/salary earners. Main benefit recipients were also much more likely to answer 'sometimes/maybe' (36% compared to 24% of those receiving New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance and 20% of wage/salary earners). Finally, those receiving income support were far less likely to answer 'no' (16% for main benefit and 12% for New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients) than their working counterparts (38%).

There are a number of possible explanations for this result, some of which would seem to counter theoretical expectations about the impact of conditionality upon welfare recipients. **In the case of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients, previous discussion has highlighted a strong societal belief that these groups are more deserving than other benefit recipients; this was reflected in comments made by participants.** A retired participant felt 'first class' because: *"You feel you've achieved something (laughter) ... getting to 65 and, no I'm pretty proud of it, really."* [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

While this participant looked back on her life to assess her 'first class' status, a young student looked forward in explaining why he felt 'first class':

I s'pose the sort of benefit that I'm receiving is a bit different to other ones, in that you know sort of training to do something rather than just getting money for free ... No, no I don't feel like a second class citizen at all, I've sort of, you know, training to ... do something ... I'm training to be a responsible citizen. [European/Pākehā male student, high income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

These reasons for feeling 'first class' were different for main benefit recipients, whom society generally frames as less deserving than the retired or students. **Many main benefit recipients positioned themselves as 'first class' because they wished to challenge any suggestion that they were not equal citizens.** In making this argument, a Māori focus group participant responded angrily:

With that second class citizen, if you go into social welfare, you make an appointment, you are classed second hand. Which they are working for me. I'm not working for them, without me they have no job. But the other thing with the government there is they're only allowed to tell you 20% of what you're entitled to. You find out the other 80%. That is not fair on our people. Where we have to ring up and ask what we're entitled to. I take our parents there to fight what they're entitled to, we walk out with it knowing what we're entitled to. So it

shouldn't be our job to find out that other 80%. Without us they wouldn't have a job. It is their job to tell us what we are entitled to. I don't class myself as a second class citizen, I class them as a second class citizen. [Māori female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Other main benefit recipients who said they felt 'first class' distinguished between their own feelings of self-worth as compared to another's view of them. When asked whether he felt like a 'first class' citizen in New Zealand, a Māori participant said:

I do inside ... inside myself ... [but] My lifestyle, nah, I still feel second class, yeah. Yep. Just my lifestyle of living is the traumatic side of, you know, why I class myself as second class citizen, yeah. [Māori male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

There was considerable discussion in the Auckland benefit recipient group of how context was important when thinking about the question of feeling 'first class'. In particular, participants noted that they often felt like 'second class' citizens at WINZ but in other situations (such as within their family) they would consider themselves a 'first class' citizen. One young Māori woman described how when she put on her uniform to go to work she felt like a 'first class' citizen, because people came to her for advice and requested her help. When asked, she indicated that she felt 'first class' not just because she was in paid work but because she was viewed as knowledgeable and respected, something that did not occur at her local WINZ office.

The situational nature of feeling 'first class' or 'second class' also helps to explain why so many wage/salary earners did *not* feel 'first class'. A high income wage/salary earner said she normally felt 'first class' but:

... I was really trying to figure out something to do with my job and I needed to talk to someone who knew, so I rung up ... the Department of Labour and I was asking them, and they didn't know so they referred me to somebody else and they referred me to somebody else, nobody knew, basically someone was like 'well, I, we can't tell you'. And I'm like 'but you're the people who, this is your job and you can't tell me'? I just couldn't believe it, I just felt totally like nobody wanted to listened to me, so that was sort of my [experience of being a] second class citizen. ['Other' female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Furthermore, many wage-salary earners, especially those with higher incomes, resisted any association with the class-based divisions suggested by the 'first class' question. For instance, when asked whether he felt like a 'first class' citizen in New Zealand, a high income participant who did not support the idea of a welfare state responded firmly:

Absolutely not, I mean, I would say I'm thoroughly average ... in all respects, you know, I'm neither rich nor poor, I'm neither particularly bright nor, nor totally dumb. You know, I think, yeah, I'm just totally average. ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

It is worthwhile continuing with the response he made when asked what people would need to feel 'first class', because it illustrates his resistance further:

I actually don't know if I'd want to feel first class in the sense that, well, first class in the sense of being proud of my achievements and in that way maybe, you know, for the modest achievements that I've every time I write a good report I feel pride and if that's being a first class citizen, yes, then I feel number one. You know ... that I certainly feel good in that way, if I think about, you know, if I have a barbecue in the back yard and have friends

around, yes, I feel great. If first class means feeling better than someone else I don't know whether we want, whether we want first class citizens. ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Another high income professional resisted using the 'first class' concept because he associated this with a snobbish mentality that he disliked: *"there are groups in Auckland that try to make everybody else feel second class The Parnell/Remuera crowd, the café society, the Ponsonby coffee society, the Television New Zealand celebrity crowd."* ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Other wage/salary earners did not see themselves as 'first class' because they felt disadvantaged in the current socio-economic context, including because of user-pays in health and education:

... it's quite hard to phrase this. I'm basically white middle class and in a lot of ways I sort of feel that (pause) there's (pause) you're not entitled to - people on a Community Services Card, for example, are entitled to more, entitled to cheaper health care. People who earn more can get insurance so you're sort of in the middle, like you can be, I'm not talking about ... Yeah, middle white, middle class, right, so you can't afford the insurance and you're not entitled to the Community Services Card for the, you know, for the cheaper health care - I'm just talking health care here, but it flows over. Therefore you've actually got to find more money to pay for your health if you sort of see what I'm saying. ['Other' female wage/salary earner, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

It is interesting that, like a previous European/Pākehā participant, she associates understandings of 'first class' and 'second class' status with 'race' or ethnicity, although in her case she feels she is penalised for being 'white'. It is also noteworthy, as with the other participant, she associated being a 'first class' citizen with being born in New Zealand. For her, this was because she found that being overseas-born created some difficulties in gaining New Zealand citizenship later on, even though she grew up here. Both of these issues are discussed later in this section.

There is no clear relationship between socio-economic status and feeling 'first class'. The high income/tertiary qualification (33%) and middle income/high education (31%) groups were most likely to *disagree* that they felt like a 'first class' citizen. The middle income/no tertiary qualification group (44%), on the other hand, was most likely to say 'yes', followed by the low income/tertiary qualification group (38%). Those in the low income/no tertiary qualification (39%) and middle income/high education (31%) groups were most likely to say 'sometimes/maybe'.

Ethnicity is an important factor in explaining feelings of being 'first class', but in different ways for different ethnic groups. Around a third of European/Pākehā (33%), Māori (31%) and Asian (29%) participants said 'yes' they felt 'first class', but the 'Other' (14%) and Pasifika (11%) ethnic groups were much less likely to provide this response. A further 23-33% of European/Pākehā, Māori and Pasifika said they 'sometimes/maybe' felt 'first class'. In terms of 'no' responses, the 'Other' ethnic group was ahead with over half (57%) stating they did not feel 'first class', followed by 43% of Asian participants, 33% of Pasifika and 21% of Māori.

That European/Pākehā were most likely to say they felt 'first class' should not really come as a surprise, given being part of the dominant ethnic group in New Zealand affords them more privileges than minority ethnic groups. A handful of European/Pākehā participants recognised this; one said he did not feel particularly 'first class' but he also did not feel 'second class': *"because ... I was born in New Zealand, it's because I'm white, English-*

speaking, yeah." [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Māori participants who considered themselves 'first class' often indicated that, despite being treated as 'second class', they felt 'first class' because of their status as first or indigenous peoples. As one participant in the Māori focus group said: *"I never did class myself as second ... always tāngata whenua."* [Māori female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

In contrast, discussion in the Pasifika focus group indicated that the predominantly negative representations of Pasifika peoples in the public sphere made it difficult for these participants to ever fully consider themselves 'first class'. For instance, a young female participant stated:

I guess coming from a Pacific point of view, like, I still see myself as Samoan first and I don't see myself as a first class citizen in New Zealand and I feel more at home in Samoa and I guess that's because I'm kind of tired of fighting the stereotype, you know, 'Pacific are the worst this, worst that'. And always trying to come above that, but it's kind of historical, so we're fighting the stereotypes now that the government actually created back in the 1960s and '70s, so it's kind of like they created the problem and now they expect us to fix it. And that's not fair. [Pasifika female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Another young woman in the same focus group followed with:

Yep. I was like definitely the same, feel the same with being first class. But it really does come down to identity as well and the one thing that I'm most proud of is what's making me not feel like first class and that's my, who I am kind of thing. [Pasifika female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

These results suggest that many migrants to New Zealand (and their descendants) are not made to feel particularly welcome and do not feel they are ever fully accepted by their New Zealand-born peers. They are supported by discussion in the Asian focus group, where a young woman began by saying that she felt there is only *one* class:

(pause) Yeah, I think to me, there's no distinction. Yeah. But however, what [name of participant] was saying, I think there could be some distinction because originally I'm not from New Zealand, so maybe when I'm in Taiwan, I would definitely feel first class and things, you know, because everyone else is Taiwanese at least, but you know, when if we see like Europeans in Taiwan, it's quite different, yeah, but then in New Zealand it's a different case, because it's quite multicultural, but then I think deep inside, you know, there is still some distinction, one way or another. [Asian female home-maker, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Age does not seem to be a particularly important factor in explaining why some groups may feel 'first class' and others do not. All age groups ranged between 30-38% for 'yes' responses and 20-32% for 'sometimes/maybe' responses. However, it is notable that the 31-45 years group was less likely to answer 'yes' and more likely to provide an ambivalent answer than other groups. Again, all groups were similar in regards to 'no' responses (ranging only between 29-30%) with the exception of the over 60s, of whom only 8% said 'no'. However, more participants in the two older age groups said 'don't know' (8% compared to none of the younger participants).

Gender also does not appear to be an important factor. Males were only slightly more likely (31%) to say 'yes' they felt 'first class' than females (27%) but again they showed more

ambivalence with 40% of males saying 'sometimes/maybe', while no females responded this way at all. The latter (29%), however, were a little more likely to say 'no' than males (23%).

In summary: Many participants found it difficult to identify themselves as 'first class' because they negatively associated it with superiority or class consciousness, while others said they felt 'first class' exactly because they wished to resist such hierarchies or divisions. This helps explain why wage/salary earners and high/middle income earners with tertiary qualifications were most likely to say 'no' they did not feel 'first class', while main benefit recipients and Māori were second most likely in their respective categories to say 'yes'.

Overall there are few clear cut patterns to the resistance to 'class'-based ideas of inequality (as in the United Kingdom – see Dean & Melrose, 1999), with varied groups framing this resistance differently. Main benefit recipients did so in terms of human rights, perhaps as a result of WINZ policies that have used this rhetoric in recent years. Māori framed their resistance to being considered 'second class' in terms of indigenous/Treaty rights, no doubt influenced by the bicultural discourse that endorses such rights in a public policy context. Wage/salary earners with high incomes resisted categorising themselves as 'first class' drawing on a discourse of 'class egalitarianism', which has commonly been articulated in New Zealand history even though class differences have been more evident than this discourse suggests (Belich, 2001). Indeed, some of this group's resistance to being 'first class' may be linked with an awareness of, and sense of discomfort with, recent growth in income inequality (OECD, 2008).

What do citizens need to feel 'first class'?

The purpose of the 'do you feel first class?' question was to get participants thinking about the kind of conditions people might need to feel valued and equal citizens of New Zealand. Once framed in this manner, participants felt more comfortable with the 'first class' concept, although some still found it difficult to articulate what it might take to get citizens feeling this way. As noted earlier, some even resisted the notion that this would be desirable.

All responses to the 'what do citizens need to feel "first class"?' question have been grouped into the 26 categories depicted in Figure 15 below. Note that these results include multiple responses from some participants, while others offered none at all. Only the top five conditions participants considered necessary to feel like a 'first class' citizen had sufficient responses to analyse further regarding demographic variables.

Relational and recognitive factors

Participant comments suggest that the way in which people relate to each other, including recognition of their needs and rights, were the most important factors shaping whether they felt 'first class' or not.

The condition mentioned most frequently was 'respect/kindness', with almost a third (30%) of responses falling into this category. For instance, in responding to the question about what people need to feel 'first class', one participant said:

It's how they're treated and ... not just from parents at schools and ... everywhere. It's a matter of people respecting other people. You must have respect, and respect is earned but at the same time it's taught, it's taught from the young age. [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].


Main benefit recipients (44%) were much more likely to name responses categorised as 'respect/kindness' than wage/salary earners (27%) or New Zealand Superannuation/Student

Allowance recipients (18%). The responses of main benefit recipients often concerned their treatment by WINZ officials. For instance, a participant receiving the Sickness Benefit said that to feel ‘first class’:

Well, I would like a bit of politeness and I would like them to tell you what you’re entitled to - not find out six, a couple of months later that ‘oh, I’m entitled to this, I’m entitled to that’. They should tell you all your rights. [European/Pākehā male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Those on low incomes (38-39%) were also more likely than those on middle (22-25%) and high incomes (19%) to name ‘respect/kindness’. Interestingly, education level had little impact on responses, suggesting that there is a relationship between low income itself and a perceived need for recognition. However, given the findings above, this is likely linked to the fact that many of the low income participants were main benefit recipients.

Figure 15: Conditions needed to feel like a ‘first class’ citizen in New Zealand (n=73)
Affirmative responses (‘yes’ and ‘sometimes/maybe’)



Māori (54%) were most likely to name 'respect/kindness' as necessary for feeling 'first class'. However, they were closely followed by the 'Other' (43%), then the Pasifika (33%) and European/Pākehā (25%) ethnic groups (no Asian participants made this response). These findings are not surprising given the last section found that many ethnic minority participants associated 'second class' status strongly with ethnicity.

Those aged 46-60s (33%) were more likely to name 'respect/kindness' than other groups (17-25%). While one might assume participants in this age group were at the peak of their earning power and status in society, it has already been noted that they also appeared to be particularly aware of the vulnerability and social risks we face as citizens.

Females (35%) were substantially more likely to mention 'respect/kindness' than males (23%). This desire for 'respect/kindness' is likely linked to the fact that many participants (probably women) considered 'women/mothers' a group treated as if they are 'second class' in society.

Another 20% of participants thought that 'feeling valued' was an important condition for feeling 'first class'. A wage-salary earner said that to be 'first class', individuals needed to feel: *"Valued. Yeah and so on a benefit, say, it's regardless of your monetary status."* [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under]. Another participant offered a further reason why people today might not 'feel valued':

... you can't just have a job now, you have to be a professor, you know, you can't just be good at school, you have to be a prefect, you know, the higher the expectation and unfortunately 90% of the population can't aspire that. The top 10%, great, they've always been there but to expect everybody to attain that is, it's just not realistic. Now we're saying disabled people should be that level too, so you're ignoring needs. So when you do that you take, that changes all sorts of attitudes across the board, a job isn't a job, it's got to be a better job so you create an environment where everyone feels inferior, nobody feels good enough. [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Main benefit recipients were most likely (36%) to say 'feel valued', while only 18% of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients and 11% of wage/salary earners named this condition. Once again, this seems related to the stigma associated with main benefit receipt.

29-31% of the two low income groups identified 'feel valued' as important, compared to 10-13% of other income groups. Thus, once again income level rather than education seems to be the determining factor for whether participants considered 'feel valued' to be a precondition for feeling 'first class'.

European/Pākehā (36%) were most likely to name 'feel valued'. Although Māori (31%) and the 'Other' ethnic group (29%) was not far behind, followed by Pasifika participants (22%). This finding comes as a surprise because one would expect the majority ethnic group to already feel far more valued than their minority ethnic group counterparts. It is not clear why no Asian participants offered this response.

A quarter (25%) of the two older age groups gave 'feel valued' as a response. This is perhaps for the same reasons noted for 'respect/kindness', although the over 60s were unlikely to be facing the same challenges of those a generation younger. However, their responses were still somewhat higher than for the two youngest age groups, only a minority (13-15%) of whom named 'feel valued'.

Females (27%) were, again, well ahead of males (9%) in naming 'feel valued' as a prerequisite for feeling 'first class'. This may be for similar reasons as outlined for 'respect/kindness'.

Other responses that suggested feeling 'first class' is associated with human relations rather than material conditions included the 8% of participants who said 'love from family' was important. As one participant noted:

But at the end of the day, if my children were happy and my wife was happy and we were all happy, and we were living in a cardboard box rather than a house, in a mansion, I think at the end of the day, it's the same sort of thing. If your kids come running to you at the door when you come home from work, that's to me that's pretty important. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary educated, 31-45 years].

A smaller number said people needed 'encouragement' (3%) and 1% indicated that having 'boundaries set by parents' at an early age was crucial to developing the sense of self-worth associated with feeling 'first class'.

Financial factors

From the point of view of social citizenship, it is very interesting almost a quarter (24%) of participants said that to feel 'first class' New Zealand citizens need to have their 'basic needs met'. One participant articulated this as *"Clean air, clean water, roof over their head. Standard of living which meets the basic needs, food, shelter, clothing."* [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years]. This suggests a sizeable minority believed a basic level of economic and social security necessary to participate and feel equal in New Zealand.

Wage/salary earners (29%) and main benefit recipients (24%) were more than twice as likely than New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients (12%) to name 'basic needs met'. That few of the latter group conceived this as a condition necessary for feeling 'first class' strongly suggests that the extremely low levels of poverty amongst the elderly in New Zealand means relatively few older people struggle with having their 'basic needs met' (OECD, 2008). Wage/salary earners may have been slightly more likely than main benefit recipients to name this condition because many New Zealanders in paid work still struggle to meet ends, due to this country's relatively poor wages and salaries (OECD, 2008).

Yet socio-economic status does not appear to play a strong role in shaping 'basic needs met' responses. The middle income/no tertiary qualification group (33%) mentioned this factor as important to feeling 'first class' most frequently, while high income/tertiary qualification participants offered this response the least (19%). The low income/no tertiary qualification and middle income/tertiary qualification groups both sat in between on 25%.

The 'Other' ethnic group (43%) named 'basic needs met' more than other ethnic groups. Although almost a third (29%) of European/Pākehā said the same, few Māori (15%) and Pasifika (11%) and no Asian participants gave this answer. The reasons behind these results are unclear.

Responses amongst the differing age groups were very similar (25-35%), with those aged 31-45 years most likely and those aged under 31 years and 61 year olds and over least like to name 'basic needs met'.

There was also little difference amongst the sexes, with 25% of females and 20% of males indicating that to have 'basic needs met' was important to feeling 'first class'.

Another 23% of participants indicated that ‘money’ was crucial to feeling ‘first class’, although 8% of the 73 participants who directly answered this question said explicitly that money was *not* important, if that meant being rich was necessary to feeling ‘first class’. However, of those who provided affirmative responses, some indicated that a certain amount of money *was* necessary to actually have your ‘basic needs met’ and to participate in society. For instance, a participant in the Māori focus group said that if government really wanted people to take responsibility then:

Give the right people the money so we can carry on and do what we’re doing. Aroha’s a big word but in today we need much more than aroha to provide, we really do, because we’re living in the 20th century here. [Māori female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

While a very similar number of wage/salary earners (29%) and main benefit recipients (28%) named ‘money’, no New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients did so. This likely relates to the relative wealth of this group.

A third (33%) of the participants in the middle income/tertiary qualification group named ‘money’ as important to feeling ‘first class’. A quarter (24-25%) of all other income groups also did, with the exception of the low income/tertiary qualification group (8%). This is contrary to expectations that both low income groups would name ‘money’ and also sits in tension with the findings for ‘basic needs met’, which the middle income/no tertiary qualification group named most often. It is, however, possible that middle income groups, which are neither poor nor rich, feel particularly vulnerable financially.

Almost half (46%) of the Māori participants thought ‘money’ important to feeling ‘first class’, with all other groups’ responses ranging only between 18-29%. This is quite different from ‘basic needs met’, where the ‘Other’ ethnic group was far more likely to name this response and few Māori did. This suggests that, while there may be some overlap, ‘money’ and ‘basic needs met’ were not considered the same thing. It is unclear why Māori were more inclined to name ‘money’ over ‘basic needs met’, given the poor socio-economic status of this group as a whole.

As with ‘basic needs met’, the 31-45s (35%) were most likely to name ‘money’ but a sizeable minority of under 31s (25%) and 46-60s (17%) did the same. This, again, seems to reflect the significant financial responsibilities of most middle aged New Zealanders. That no one from the over 60s group provided this response again supports the argument that this group is the most financial comfortable in New Zealand.

26% of males mentioned ‘money’ while only 17% of females did. This is interesting, given females were slightly more likely than males to name ‘basic needs met’, and again suggests that participants did not consider these two responses to mean the same thing.

Another 8% thought that ‘to work’ was necessary to feeling ‘first class’. ‘Work’ is obviously linked to having ‘money’ or having ‘basic needs met’ but some participants made a definite distinction between them. When a Sickness Benefit recipient who was keen to get back to work after an injury was asked if feeling ‘first class’ was more about having enough income to pay the bills or about working itself, he replied: *“It’s about going to work.”* When asked what he needed or what kinds of rights you might need to feel ‘first class’, he responded:

... for me, it’s basically not ... the rights or anything, it’s not to do with, nothing with the government, it’s actually based on myself, just waiting for operation, once all that’s done I’m off to work! (laughter) Because I know that’s my responsibility and I’m, yeah, and I know there’s a lot of doors that’ll open up for me as well. [Māori male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

However, a DPB recipient highlighted that work is a gendered activity. When indicating why she did not feel 'first class', she said:

I don't know if that's sort of male versus female, it's probably the males that are working that don't understand what it's like to be a mother (laughter), that could be a sexist comment but it's them - when I think of what makes me not feel like a first class citizen - [it] is their comments, a working man. [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Importantly, almost as many participants (5%) disagreed that 'to work' was necessary to feeling 'first class'. A middle-income participant said:

... I work as well but I don't enjoy what I am doing, and it makes me feel like I'm not realising my full potential. So, perhaps being a first class citizen would be about being happy and feeling like you're realising your full potential and contributing. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Perhaps the 7% who stated 'not be dependent' illustrate that the crucial issue for participants was not so much paid work but a sense of independence from charity and handouts. Another 3% thought having your 'own home' (i.e. not rented but owned) was important to giving people a sense of belonging and security that is necessary to feel 'first class'.

Personal factors

Other responses were focused on the behaviours or characteristics of the individual, rather than the treatment they receive from others or the broader structural conditions in which they live. **18% of the sample who responded felt feeling 'first class' was linked to the 'self-esteem' of an individual.** For instance, a participant said: *"I don't know whether it's all about, you know, the job, or whether you feel like you contribute, I think some of its kind of in-built. There's part of your psyche."* When asked if he meant 'self-esteem' he continued: *"Yeah, yeah. Yeah, it is, I think maybe, certainly linked to esteem ... So, you know, that's not something, necessarily, a government can change."* [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Although relatively small numbers of participants gave this response, it is worthwhile considering 'self-esteem' in more depth given 'low self-esteem' was named as a reason why benefit recipients might feel 'second class' by a considerable minority of participants. **In general, those participants who faced the least disadvantage were slightly more likely to name 'self-esteem' as necessary to feeling 'first class'.** The number of responses given by different main income source groups ranged only four percentage points. **Wage/salary earners, however, were most likely (20%) and main benefit recipients were least likely (16%) to offer this response.**

The number of participants mentioning 'self-esteem' was also fairly even (11-19%) across most socio-economic groups, with the exception being the high income/tertiary qualification group (29%). It is unclear why this group thought 'self-esteem' to be more important than other groups.

While we might expect the European/Pākehā group (22%) to have mentioned 'self-esteem' most frequently, given their relative advantage in society, Māori did so slightly more often (23%). Both were well ahead of Asian and 'Other' participants (both 14%). No Pasifika participants mentioned 'self-esteem' at all. It is possible that Māori interpreted 'self-esteem' as feeling pride in one's culture and heritage, but there was no specific discussion of this in the interview data to support this claim.

Those aged 46-60 were most likely to name 'self-esteem' (25%) but the other age groups were not far behind (15-17%). The reasons for these results are not obvious.

Males (23%) mentioned 'self-esteem' more than females (15%); this is interesting, because academic research would suggest low self-esteem to be a bigger issue for women than men (Josephs, Markus, & Tafarodi, 1992; Usmiani & Daniluk, 1997).

Another 14% of participant felt that to feel 'first class' it was necessary to have 'education'. In regards to the latter, one participant said:

... I think if people have access to and take up education and see education as something that is lifelong not something that you finish when you leave school. I don't think you can very often see yourself in any other context but, but being - as you termed it - a first class. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle-income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

6% of participants named having a 'purpose in life' as an important factor in feeling 'first class'. A retired participant said:

Yeah, you've got to get up in the morning and have something to do, you can go to bed at night and think 'oh well, I've done that for today', even if it's not much, you feel as though you've done something. [European/Pākehā retired male, unassigned income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

A smaller number of participants thought a 'sense of gratitude', being 'willing to ask for help' (both 3%) and 'luck' (1%) were important conditions for feeling 'first class'.

Societal factors

A further group of responses relate not so much to the inter-personal relations between citizens but rather that of the individual and broader society. 11% of the participants who answered this question thought a citizen needed to 'contribute to society' to feel 'first class', while 10% said 'belonging' and 5% said to 'fulfil responsibilities' were important. For instance, one participant described himself as a 'first class' citizen because:

[I p]ay my taxes and I work a full-time job, I provide food for myself and clothing and rent a house which I live in with my brother, yeah, so ... I feel I do, yeah. You know, I work a job that, you know, gives time back to the community, being a team player in the community, it's definitely something I'm proud of and, yeah I feel I'm a first class citizen. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Indeed, several older participants wished for a return to a time when these social obligations were more obvious. In explaining what one might need to feel 'first class', a retired participant said:

I think, I'd like to say go back to the 1950s! (laughter). Yeah, I mean they had family structure, life was simpler in many ways even though, you know, women worked harder physically ... the people had a better idea of their place, people did have purpose and their purpose was valued. [European/Pākehā male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Another participant offered a more detailed analysis of the role expectations played in previous eras:

... when I was growing up we were taught, you know, your washing had to be clean, you know, and your neighbours talked about it, 'your nappies are nice and white', yeah, that was - your curtains were hung straight - that was a sign of a good housekeeper. And women in those days aspired to being a good housekeeper cos all the neighbours knew you. So your status came from that because you wanted other women to see you at that level, you see, which made you a good wife and a good mother and so that's the level you were. Doesn't happen now, there is no expectation of that side and I understand people working and all that sort of stuff but I think it's unfortunate that the basic things have been lost and that's why we have so much of this individuality thing now we struggled with that expectation. That was an expectation that we really wanted to have, you know, and it sounds so dumb now but it meant something for your peer group to be pleased with you and that that meant something. Now that doesn't seem to apply, it doesn't matter: 'I want to go, I don't care what I'm using' and if you do that you take away empathy, understanding and all that sort of stuff so it starts there. It starts at the house and works its way out and it really is impacting more now. [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

A younger woman indicated that she also prioritised these values and, as such, felt she was not yet 'first class' but was well on her way to becoming so as she tried to instil these values in her daily life:

I think I'm becoming every day more and more first class and, for me, that represents integrity, it represents upholding truth, justice, human rights, codes of conduct, good old Kiwi, good old fashioned Kiwi values that I'm beginning to more and more appreciate every year that passes and that I become a little bit wiser and develop more compassion and realise we are in this boat together, you know, we are part of community, society. So I think I'm slowly getting near first class, but I attribute it to my parents and how they raised me and coming back to those morals and principles, being made to go to Sunday School and made to go to Girl Guides and all these things have really served me well. And also because I have had to go through a lot of those trials and tribulations in my life, where I have been humbled to have to go onto benefits and be in that areas, it's really, I've developed that compassion. And it makes me realise, like I said, part of our whānau is that the older ones start stepping up, cause it takes a village to raise a child and it comes back to those basic, you know, principles truthfulness, being true, following values, good Kiwi old fashioned principles so yeah I think I'm fortunate that I've learnt. I'm a work in progress. [Māori female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years]

Other factors

11% of participants identified that 'power/status' was also linked to feeling 'first class'. In most cases, examples referred to how celebrities or sports stars were considered above ordinary New Zealanders. But also coded in this category were a small number of references from Māori participants which indicated they felt 'first class' because of the status and identity as members of a particular iwi or as 'first peoples'. As one participant said when asked if she felt 'first class':

I always do. I was born, I come from a long line of chiefs. If I was treated like a first class citizen, no way. It does not fulfil the needs of my people and myself in terms of the government, do they fulfil our needs? Because that's what they're really there for: no. But in terms of am I a first class citizen? Yes I am, I feel that. That's only me. Nobody out there in government made me feel that way. I feel that way because of my whakapapa. [Māori female wage/salary earner, middle-income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60s years].

Another 2% of the participants thought that a citizen needed to 'be born in New Zealand' to feel 'first class'. Some participants noted this in the context of talking about their concerns that immigrants to New Zealand find it difficult to feel they belong, while others strongly believed that no one born outside of New Zealand *should* be given the same 'first class' status as native-born citizens.

11% of the sample indicated that having 'information about rights etc.' or 'equality before the law/of opportunity' were important to feeling 'first class', while 5% thought an individual needed to have their 'freedoms respected'. In making these responses, participants appeared to draw upon a human rights discourse. **6% thought that 'being consulted/heard by government' was one aspect to ensuring these rights were being addressed, while 1% thought to 'feel safe' was important.**

In summary: The most noteworthy finding from this part of the study is that relational/recognitive factors such as 'respect/kindness' and 'feel valued' are far more likely to be named as necessary for feeling 'first class' by participants from groups that have traditionally faced disadvantage. For instance, main benefit recipients were much more likely to name 'respect/kindness' and 'feel valued', while other responses were more evenly spread amongst income source groups. The evidence suggests that this may not only be because of their status as benefit recipients but also because of their low income. That 'respect/kindness' was the response offered most often by Māori, Pasifika, and the 'Other' participants indicates that ethnicity also impacts on one's sense of being recognised and valued in New Zealand society. It is interesting, however, that European/Pākehā were most likely to name 'feel valued'. Some of the interview and focus group comments made by participants from this group indicate this was because of the strong policy focus on ethnic issues in New Zealand, as well as growing income inequality. Both make some members of the ethnic majority feel marginalised. Females were also more likely to offer the relational responses than males. This comes as no surprise given females are socialised to respond to and recognise the needs of others more than males. This difference may also be linked to the fact that female participants may have felt more disrespected or devalued than their male counterparts.

It is also of note that 'self-esteem' was slightly more likely to be named by those who face the *least* disadvantage (wage/salary earners, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years, males) in New Zealand society, the exception being Māori who were both well ahead of other ethnic minority groups. Interestingly, there is no apparent relationship between responses regarding 'self-esteem' as a condition for feeling 'first class' and 'low self-esteem' as a reason for benefit recipients feeling 'second class'.

There was also no clear relationship between 'money' and 'basic needs met' and belonging to a disadvantaged group in the way discussed above. Age did not seem to be a particularly important factor shaping views about what is needed to feel 'first class' in New Zealand, with the notable variation being that the 31-45 year olds were much more likely to mention 'money' and 'basic needs met' (both 35%) than other groups. While presumably this is because they are most likely to be struggling to be bringing up families and facing problems with housing affordability, one cannot say this group is disadvantaged as a whole. Interestingly, while the over 65s did not mention 'money' at all, they supported 'basic needs met' (along with 'feel valued') more than anything else. This seems to reflect a view that a basic income is a right, even if they did not necessarily suffer from financial need themselves.

Māori rated 'money' highly but had lower responses for 'basic needs met' and Pasifika did not offer either response very often at all. This suggests that recognition and respect of their ethnic identities may be more important for these groups than material forms of justice. However, it is possible that the disproportionately high number of individuals with high

education and high income levels in the Pasifika focus group explains this result to some degree, in that this group was particularly concerned with issues of identity over material disadvantage. Yet, the 'Other' ethnic group named 'basic needs met' more than other groups, while mentioning 'money' far less frequently, and certainly less frequently than the Asian group for whom it was the top response. This indicates that the recognition and respect noted by Māori and Pasifika may not be as relevant to other ethnic minority groups or the ethnic majority, European/Pākehā, who named 'basic needs met' more often than other factors (although the variation between their responses was fairly small). Notably, the Asian ethnic group named only 'money' and 'self-esteem' as factors, with the former mentioned much more frequently than the latter.

Overall, these findings suggest that to ensure all citizens feel 'first class' we need to address relational, recognitive *and* redistributive factors. But groups more vulnerable to disadvantage (such as females, main benefit recipients and Māori) tend to favour recognitive measures aiming to remedy a sense that these groups are devalued or stigmatised in society, while more advantaged groups tended to mention redistributive measures concerned with the material conditions of individuals.

Section 3: Conclusion

Seeming to confirm the premise drawn from international theoretical literature that main benefit recipients are not treated the same as other citizens, Section 3 has found that the majority of participants believe 'people receiving social security benefits recipients are made to feel like second class citizens'. 'WINZ/ACC officials and policies' and 'stigma' were the most common reasons offered in explaining why this might be the case, suggesting that these inequalities in treatment are real rather than simply a perception emerging from the 'low self-esteem' of individuals who receive a main benefit. Not surprisingly, it was mostly those with experience of being on a main benefit or those more vulnerable to life's contingencies (such as participants of peak working age who were raising families) that believed these things to be true. In addition, less vulnerable participants were more likely to believe it is *appropriate* for social security recipients to be treated as if they are 'second class'.

Interestingly, however, the same advantaged groups were least likely to identify themselves as 'first class' because they associated this concept with negative attitudes to superiority or class consciousness, while more disadvantaged groups said they felt 'first class' exactly because they were resisting such hierarchies or divisions. This is exactly the opposite of what we might anticipate from international research (Dean & Melrose, 1999). However, it is less surprising that groups more vulnerable to disadvantage tended to favour recognitive measures aiming to remedy the sense of being devalued or stigmatised that these groups have in society, while more advantaged groups were more likely to mention redistributive measures concerned with the material conditions of individuals.

SECTION 4: CITIZENSHIP KNOWLEDGE, IDENTITY AND BELONGING

Previous discussion has given a sense of the varied levels of 'belonging' experienced by differing types of New Zealanders when considering whether benefit recipients and other groups might feel 'second class' in society, whether participants themselves felt 'first class' and what conditions they consider as prerequisites to feeling this way. However, given a lack of New Zealand research about public attitudes to citizenship generally, the study also explored whether certain types of New Zealanders are more likely to have knowledge about citizenship, its rights and responsibilities. This is because a lack of knowledge may contribute to feeling 'second class' amongst some groups and individuals. Furthermore, participants were explicitly asked whether they viewed citizenship as an important identity and where they found their greatest sense of belonging. These questions aimed to help explain why citizenship identity is generally considered to be weak in New Zealand compared to other countries (McMillan, 2004a; Pearson, 2005).


What is associated with the word 'citizenship'?

The first question focus group and interview participants were asked was: 'What is the first thing that comes into your head when you hear the word "citizenship"?' This aimed to see what currency the term had in their minds and to assess what activities it was associated with. Figure 16 presents both the first response participants offered, alongside a figure representing all of the responses made to this question combined; this 'all responses' category may include 2-4 different answers offered by the same participant and does not take into account the order in which responses were given. With the exception of 'being part of society', every response was mentioned more often overall than as a first response. Only the most frequently offered responses are analysed in more depth. Note that the 'other' category included positive responses such as 'lucky to live in New Zealand', as well as a small number of responses indicating that participants did not know what citizenship meant for them; as one stated it, citizenship was *"a question mark"* [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Passport/travel/migration

Responses coded as 'passport/travel/migration' were mentioned more often (37%) than any other overall, although 'being part of society' (25%) and 'passport/travel/migration' (24%) both ranked similarly as the *first* thing mentioned by participants. It is important to note, however, that in associating citizenship with 'passport/travel/migration', participants often referred to the experiences of others, rather than their own. For instance, a European/Pākehā participant said of the term 'citizenship': *"I don't relate it to me, it's something that immigrants do as part of the process ... of becoming New Zealand citizens. It's probably got a much wider meaning than that, but that's the first thing that comes to my mind."* This is the case even though she later talked about how she was *"very proud of my New Zealand passport. It's ... even [in] a little leather pouch that says 'God's own' on it"* [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Figure 16: Responses to: 'What is the first thing you think of when you hear the word "citizenship"?' (n=79)



When considering total responses only, those on main benefits were most likely (48%) to mention 'passport/travel/migration', although substantial numbers of wage-salary earners (33%) and New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance (24%) recipients did the same. However, closer analysis reveals that those on main benefits rarely spoke about such things in regard to themselves, possibly because they could not afford to go overseas. As such, they usually associated citizenship with other people (immigrants) obtaining a New Zealand passport. This was most obvious in one of the benefit recipients' focus groups where the first three answers to the question about the term 'citizenship' were "Immigrants" [Māori male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under], "Papers" [Pasifika female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under] and "Permits" [Māori female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under]. Although two in the focus group were born overseas, all participants spoke of 'immigrants' as 'other' from themselves.

The reasons why so many main benefit recipients associated 'passport/travel/migration' with citizenship may also be a function of socio-economic status. The low income/no tertiary qualification group (46%) were most likely to associate 'passport/travel/migration' with citizenship, with around a third of other groups mentioning this (with the exception of high income/tertiary qualification group who were somewhat lower on 24%). It is possible that those with no tertiary qualification and on lower incomes had a narrower conception of citizenship, focusing on the most obvious or traditional notions associated with passports,

travel and migration. This may be because their low education and income levels precluded some of the knowledge and experiences that shaped other participants' responses.

Māori (46%) Pasifika (44%) and Asian (43%) participants were more likely to mention 'passport/travel/migration' than European/Pākehā (33%). While Asian and Pasifika may have offered high responses because they or their family migrated to New Zealand and thus experienced 'becoming a citizen', this is less likely to be the case for Māori. Qualitative analysis of responses, particularly those from the Māori focus group, suggest that the term 'citizenship' is often viewed negatively by Māori and associated with breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi and a lack of Māori control over immigration. This may explain why the 'passport/travel/migration' response was mentioned frequently by this group, even though Māori are unlikely to be migrants to New Zealand themselves. It is notable that although European/Pākehā mentioned this aspect of citizenship less often than other groups, a third did. While many of this group migrated to New Zealand, this finding probably also reflects the frequency with which European/Pākehā (especially younger ones) travel.

The 31-45 age group was most likely to mention 'passport/travel/migration' (35%). The 46-60s the least likely (4%), while the under 31s (20%) and over 60s (17%) mentioned this in similar numbers.

Males (40%) were slightly more likely than females (33%) to mention 'passport/travel/migration'.

Aspects of collective consciousness

In addition to the more functional aspects of citizenship associated with 'passport/travel/migration', many participants indicated that they associated citizenship with a collective consciousness as 'New Zealanders'. **Almost a third (30%) of the participants mentioned some aspect of 'belonging' when they heard the word 'citizenship'.** The immediate response to the 'citizenship' question by one participant was *"Oh acceptance, full acceptance, I suppose."* [European/Pākehā retired male, unassigned income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over], while for another it brought back memories of when she officially gained New Zealand citizenship, having migrated from Britain years before. This was: *"When I passed [the] last stage of acceptance within the New Zealand community and it's a most wonderful feeling that you are there and feeling part of such a wonderful place."* [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

Wage/salary earners were more likely (20%) than other main income source groups (8-12%) to name 'belonging'. This is possibly because of the stigma associated with benefit receipt in New Zealand.

Those with middle incomes and no tertiary qualification were more likely (44%) to associate citizenship with 'belonging'. Other socio-economic groups ranged 29-38%, with the exception of low income earners with a tertiary qualification who mentioned 'belonging' far less often (13%).

Pasifika participants (44%) were most likely to associate citizenship with 'belonging', while European/Pākehā (39%) were the only other group to name this. Focus group data suggests that this result may be linked to the way in which Pasifika peoples in New Zealand are made to feel like they do *not* belong, even after living here for years or being born in New Zealand. In this case, they referred to the *absence* of a sense of belonging that they thought *should* come with citizenship; certainly that participants from no other ethnic group mentioned 'belonging' suggests it remains elusive for migrant/minority groups in New Zealand. The qualitative data indicates that European/Pākehā (39%), being from the most advantaged group in society, *already* felt they belonged.

'Belonging' was also far more likely to be mentioned by the over 60s (42%) than other age groups (15-17%). Possibly this is because 'belonging' is generally something that develops over time, or possibly because they were less likely to have recently migrated to New Zealand than other age groups.

Males (20%) named 'belonging' in association with citizenship more often than females (12%), suggesting that as long as female disadvantage continues, women will not feel they belong to the same degree as men. There is certainly international evidence to suggest that citizenship has traditionally been an identity associated with masculinity (Lister, 1997).

A quarter (24%) of the participants also named 'national identity' as something they associated with the term 'citizenship'. This pertains to a New Zealand identity at the level of the nation-state. Participants often referred to being a 'New Zealander' and a 'New Zealand citizen' as if they were the same thing. For many participants, this identity as a New Zealander/New Zealand citizen was very positive. One participant focused on the values associated with New Zealand when she said she was:

... proud of being a New Zealand citizen because New Zealand has got quite strong morals, yeah, I find anyway compared to some other countries. It likes to stand alone and likes to do its own thing and do it right yeah, no nuclear and all that kind of thing, yeah. [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

As with 'belonging', wage/salary earners (22%) were slightly more likely to name 'national identity' than other income source groups (12-18%). It is unclear what is driving this trend, but that wage/salary earners were most likely to name these two positive concepts associated with citizenship more often than other groups does suggest that the relative advantage most wage/salary earners enjoy encourages them to think more positively about citizenship than income support recipients.

The differing socio-economic groups named 'national identity' in similar numbers (14-29%). However, the low income/no tertiary qualification group (29%) was most likely and the high income/tertiary qualification group least likely to give this response. This would seem to counter the argument about advantage above but may, again, suggest that participants with less education and low incomes conceive citizenship in its narrower, more traditional sense than those with greater incomes and education.

Pasifika participants were once again most likely to name 'national identity' (33%), although Asian (29%) and European/Pākehā (24%) were close behind. Few of the 'Other' (14%) and no Māori associated citizenship with this factor. The latter finding may be associated with the negative perceptions of citizenship amongst Māori noted before, as well as the relative importance of indigenous and tribal identities to this group. But it is unclear why the 'Other' group was less likely to mention 'national identity' than other groups with migrant backgrounds or European/Pākehā.

The two older age groups (both 17%) named 'national identity' only a little more often than younger groups (both 10%). This may possibly be because the older generation are more likely to accept traditional notions of citizenship as tied to the nation-state, while younger people are increasingly regarding themselves as 'global citizens' (Hall, Williamson, & Coffey, 1998; Schattle, 2008).

There was only a one per cent difference between males (13%) and females (12%) when it comes to participants associating citizenship with 'national identity'.

'Participation' (23%) was also a popular response when participants were asked what they associated with citizenship, while 'being part of society' (11%) was less common. In each case, reference was made to a collective consciousness that may have been formalised at the national level but may equally be at the community or neighbourhood level. For instance, one man spoke of citizenship as:

It's an agreement probably from both sides on the individual and then on the government that you'd have to do certain things to be a citizen and accepted as a citizen. I suppose that's it. [Māori male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

In addition, 8% of participants associated citizenship with 'government control/ assimilation'. Although a small number of comments were made by other participants, most of the responses coded into this category came from the Māori focus group, where it was made clear that 'citizenship' held very negative, colonial associations:

It's like what I said, Māori's becoming common [i.e. as a concept, replacing notions of hapū or iwi]. Citizen, is, that word makes us become common. We're unique. Our iwi, our hapū is unique and our ancestors made that possible for us to be here for that, so we're removed away from that by just putting us in the class of everybody. [Māori female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

However, for others, citizenship was less about a relationship with government and more about a connection with other New Zealanders:

It's part of a society that you've bought into. I mean maybe you were born into it and some of us bought into it and we accept it, I want to be a part of this. It's not - yes, a country is part of it and the physical place is part of it - but it really is more the society to me. That you're saying 'I want to be part of this and I'll accept the responsibilities of being part of it'. ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years]

Rights and responsibilities

19% of participants mentioned 'responsibilities' when asked what citizenship meant for them. This reflects a traditional understanding of citizenship as a formal status given in return for certain duties being taken up by citizens. For instance, one participant indicated that:

.... you have an obligation to serve on a jury, you have an obligation to serve your country if and when you're called upon. You have a responsibility, I think, to participate in a democracy and that is just as simple as voting. You have an obligation to pay your portion of the tax burden, although I have issues around that. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Others, however, saw their 'responsibilities' in a more abstract manner. After first saying she associated 'citizenship' with belonging, another participant said:

Probably with that belonging there's a sense of responsibility also you're part of something, you're not just a visitor popping through, you're ... something more than that. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

It is also possible that mention of 'responsibilities' was associated with neoliberal rhetoric about individual responsibility and self-reliance, which is why this response has been analysed in depth despite the relatively small number of participants who gave it.

Main benefit (28%) followed by New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance (24%) recipients were more likely to name 'responsibilities' than wage/salary earners (18%). This

suggests that being subject to work-related conditions that aim to encourage 'individual responsibility' may have shaped the understandings of citizenship articulated by income support recipients, especially those on a main benefit.

Socio-economic status also plays a role in shaping 'responsibilities' responses. The low income/no tertiary qualification group (31%) was most likely to name 'responsibilities' closely followed by the middle income/tertiary qualification group (25%). The remaining groups ranged from between 11-19%.

European/Pākehā (24%) and Māori (8%) were the only ethnic groups to name 'responsibilities'. They were also most likely to support the 'individual responsibility' statement, although it has been noted this was for quite different reasons.

The numbers naming 'responsibilities' were very similar across the age groups, ranging only between 4% amongst 46-60 year olds and 10% of 31-45s.

Males (25%) were slightly more likely than females (17%) to name 'responsibilities', although it was noted in Section 2 that both sexes responded similarly to the 'individual responsibility' statement.

Almost as many participants who named 'responsibilities' as something they associated with citizenship also mentioned 'rights' in this context (16%). The response of one participant, for example, was: *"Citizenship? That I am the country I am born in, I'm a citizen of here, New Zealand, I've got a New Zealand passport and the right to vote in the government."* [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Given the close association with earlier discussion about rights, it is worth analysing these results in depth, despite the relatively small number of participants making this response. **Although income support recipients were more likely than wage/salary earners to name 'responsibilities', they were also more likely to name 'rights'.** Over half (56%) of main benefit and 41% of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients also associated 'rights' with citizenship compared to only 29% of wage/salary earners. It is possible this focus on 'rights' reflects recent WINZ discourse about human rights but equally it could reflect that income support recipients feel disadvantaged and sense they have fewer rights than other citizens.

Education may affect 'rights' responses made by participants: the high income/tertiary qualification group (33%) was by far the most likely to name 'rights', followed by the middle income/tertiary qualification group (19%). Other groups ranged between 0-8%.

Pasifika (22%) were most likely to name 'rights', compared to 15% of Māori, 12% of European/Pākehā and no responses amongst other ethnic groups. This sits in tension with earlier findings, as European/Pākehā were far more likely to name the 'rights' associated with citizenship in Section 1.

When it comes to age, there was little difference in the number of 'rights' responses. The 46-60s age group named 'rights' most often but only 8% did so, while no one over 60 did the same.

Very similar numbers of males (29%) and females (31%) associated 'rights' with citizenship.

Interestingly, only 5% of participants clearly articulated that citizenship involves *both* 'rights' and 'responsibilities' over all their responses. Similarly, although 'voting' is one of the key responsibilities of citizenship, this was associated with citizenship only by 6% of participants.

In summary: This section illustrates that who you are affects what you know and feel about citizenship. In many cases, members of advantaged groups in society (participants who are male, high income with a tertiary qualification and/or older in age) were more likely to provide responses naming what they associated with the word 'citizenship'. In particular, these groups were more likely to associate citizenship with positive concepts such as 'belonging' and 'national identity', as well as 'rights'. The major exception is that some minority ethnic groups were often more likely than European/Pākehā to name the five aspects of citizenship analysed in depth. In addition, although one might expect those with high incomes and/or a tertiary qualification to have travelled and thus to name 'passport/travel/migration', this was most often mentioned by main benefit recipients and low income participants with no tertiary qualifications (although often in reference to others, rather than themselves). It also appears that participants without tertiary qualifications were more likely to name 'belonging' and 'national identity'. These are the most traditional conceptions of citizenship and education may contribute to broadening views on this status and identity.

Finally, there is mixed evidence as to whether being subject to work-related conditions has shaped main benefit recipients' views on citizenship or whether those too young to remember a time before neoliberalism tend to accept its emphasis on individual responsibility. While 'responsibilities' were most likely to be named by those on income support (especially main benefits), they were also far more likely to name 'rights' than wage/salary earners. Meanwhile, the responses of participants 30 years and under were not substantially different from other age groups, with small numbers of responses across the board.

What characterises a 'good citizen'?

Participants were also asked how they would characterise or describe a 'good citizen'. This question aimed to assess their implicit knowledge of citizenship, which might be articulated by talking about specific activities or behaviours that citizens may engage in, rather than abstract terms such as 'belonging', 'rights' and 'responsibilities'. The range of responses is presented in Figure 17. Only the eight most common responses are analysed in more depth.

Relational activities

Participants most often responded with answers suggesting they thought being a 'good citizen' is mostly about being a good person. **Thus, the largest number of responses were coded into the category 'help others' (45%).** For instance, a participant in one of the benefit recipients' groups said in response to the question about what makes a 'good citizen':


Well, there's this old lady who used to live on our street, she used to like make us breakfast before I used to run off to primary school, if that counts as something, you know, that was cool, yeah. [Māori male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Main income source was an important influence shaping responses. Wage/salary earners (38%) were far less likely to mention 'help others' than those on main benefits (52%) or New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance (53%). This confirms the 'self-interest' argument, which assumes income support recipients (who are being 'helped' by the government) might mention 'help others' more than wage/salary earners.

Socio-economic status appears to have no major affect on 'help others' responses. The middle income/no tertiary qualification group mentioned 'help others' most often (67%), followed by low income participants with tertiary qualifications (54%) and no tertiary qualifications

(50%), then the middle income/tertiary qualification group (44%). Those with high income and a tertiary qualification were far less likely (24%) to make this response.

Figure 17: Activities or behaviours associated with being a 'good citizen' (N=87)
Affirmative responses ('yes' and 'sometimes/maybe')



The 'Other' (57%) and European/Pākehā (55%) ethnic groups were most likely to say 'help others', followed by Māori (38%). Asian (14%) and Pasifika (11%) participants were much less likely to offer this response.

The over 60s were most likely to say 'help others' (67%), followed by the 46-60s (58%). The under 46s mentioned 'help others' far less often (29-40%). This finding provides some support for the claims made by some older participants that moral standards were higher and there was a greater community spirit in the past.

Half (51%) of all female respondents mentioned 'help others', but only 40% of males did the same. This finding would seem to support arguments that responses are shaped by gendered norms about the appropriate behaviours of women and men.

A similar number of people offered responses coded as 'participate in community' (44%), which included activities such as volunteering and involvement in sports clubs. For instance, in one of the wage/salary earners' focus groups, a participant articulated this in a general sense: *"Contributing to society, the greater good, whatever ... Rather than taking from."* ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years]. Another participant in the same group was more specific:

... good citizenship is mostly passive, it's like, you know, abiding by the law, you know, do your part in terms of, you know, getting involved in the community, getting out and join the rugby club or helping at the, helping coach the netball team and all that sort of things make you a good citizen. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

A further participant considered everyday 'neighbourliness' to be the sign of a 'good citizen':

I definitely think it starts in the community first, like, even just being good to your neighbours, you know, like things like that that seem to have gone by the by whereas years ago everybody knew everybody else, you knew your neighbours, you know you could go over and have a cup of coffee, I know that sounds stupid, but it just doesn't seem to happen anymore. People aren't as friendly and they don't seem to care if your alarm's going off or you know, sort of things get over-looked. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Those receiving New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance (59%) mentioned 'participate in community' most frequently, while 44% of wage/salary earners (44%) did so. Main benefit recipients were least likely (32%) to believe this was a sign of a 'good citizen', which is surprising given they favoured 'help others' so strongly.

There is no clear relationship between this activity and socio-economic status. The low income/tertiary qualification group (62%) was most likely to name 'participate in community', although they were closely followed by the high income/tertiary qualification group (57%) and the middle income/no tertiary qualification group (56%). The middle income/tertiary qualification (31%) and low income/no tertiary qualification (29%) groups were less likely to mention this activity.

The 'Other' ethnic group again offered the most responses coded as 'participate in community', with 86% of such participants saying this was important. Only 47% of European/Pākehā, 31% of Māori, 29% of Asian and 22% of Pasifika participants did the same. It is unclear why the 'Other' group was substantially more likely to consider this a sign of a 'good citizen'.

The over 60s (67%) and 46-60s (54%) were again most likely to say 'participate in community', with the other age groups offering this response much less often (32-35%). This may be due to the same nostalgia for past times mentioned in regard to 'help others'.

Finally, females were almost twice as likely (60%) to say 'participate in community' than males (33%). This probably further reflects gendered norms that frame women as caregivers and the 'glue' that holds families and communities together; certainly, women are more likely to be involved in community activities, often due to their greater role in caring for children (Statistics New Zealand, 2001).

A quarter (26%) of the participants also considered 'good morals/norms' important to being a 'good citizen'. For example, when asked if a 'good citizen' was someone who works, one young woman stressed that this was not the case:

There was a time when I was a full-time mother, but that didn't lower my attitudes, or my standards. So I would say that working wouldn't really have anything to do with the person themselves. [Māori female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Responses were fairly even amongst main income source groups for 'good morals/norms'. 29% of both the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance and wage/salary groups mentioned this, compared to 20% of main benefits recipients.

The number of 'good morals/norms' responses was also pretty similar across the different socio-economic status groups (22-31%). The middle income/no tertiary qualification group mentioned this the least and the low income/no tertiary qualification group named it most often.

European/Pākehā (33%) and Pasifika (31%) were more than twice as likely to name 'good morals/norms' than other ethnic groups (14-15%). It is unclear why this is the case.

Surprisingly, the under 31s (40%) were most likely to mention this characteristic as one of a 'good citizen', with the 46-60s (33%) and over 60s (25%) close behind. Only 13% of the 31-45 age group did the same. That the youngest age group named this response most often seems to contradict earlier findings that older participants were more likely to support 'help others' and 'participate in community', which one could argue are both associated with 'good morals/norms'. It is possible, however, that younger participants linked this latter behaviour with other issues, such as concern with environmental or international human rights issues (Hall, et al., 1998; Schattle, 2008).

31% of females mentioned 'good morals/norms' as a sign of being a 'good citizen', while only 23% of males did. As women have often been framed as the 'moral police' of society (Lister, 1997), this finding once again seems to fit with traditional gender norms.

20% of participants indicated that 'good citizens' were those that 'don't intend harm'. For instance, when responding to a question about whether a 'good citizen' is one who works, a participant said:

Although you could be a good citizen - and it's a fine line, isn't it? - because there's a lot of emotion behind people working and then paying taxes and that tax going towards other people's dole money, so that's the issue there, I guess. But, I mean, you could be a really, really, good citizen and do lots of volunteer work and be out there for the community and still be on, you know, Sickness Benefit or the dole or whatever, so yeah. I usually think it comes down to the word 'intent', what you're intending, what your intent is, yeah. If you intend to help people and do right. [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

A further 16% of participants mentioned being 'friendly/open' and 14% 'care for family' as signs of being a 'good citizen'. The latter referred most often to quality parenting whereby children's material and psychological needs are met.

Political activities

A second grouping of responses refer to some of the more traditional activities associated with political understandings of citizenship. For instance, 'law-abiding' was the third most frequently mentioned (39%) characteristic of a 'good citizen'. This included references to laws relating to wearing seatbelts and following the speed limit.

'Law abiding' was mentioned least often by main benefit recipients (32%), then by wage/salary earners (40%) and most often by New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients (47%). This latter result is likely a function of age (see below), but it is possible the struggle of living on a main benefit recipient may have led some recipients to break rules (such as reporting all income from paid work) that they consider justified given their circumstances.

Education may shape beliefs that to be 'law abiding' is the characteristic of a 'good citizen'. The spread of responses ranged from 46% amongst those with low incomes and a tertiary qualification to 33% amongst the middle income/no tertiary qualification group. But it is

notable that the three groups with tertiary qualifications were a little more likely (38-46%) than the two groups with no tertiary qualifications (33-35%) to name 'law-abiding'.

European/Pākehā (49%) and Pasifika (44%) were most likely to mention 'law-abiding', then the 'Other' ethnic group (29%). Māori (15%) and Asian (14%) participants did so far less often. In the case of Māori, there is some explanation for this, given considerable frustration with the colonial laws by which Māori have had to abide. For instance, when a Māori interview participant was asked to characterise a 'good citizen', he demonstrated the complexity of this seemingly simply question in a Māori context:

Wow, you see that still comes, being Māori it'll come back to the Treaty, I mean, when Māori signed the Treaty the agreement was that we would - well, there's all sorts of debates going on - but we basically agreed to be citizens and for being, agreeing to be citizens we then gave up some of our rights but we also gained supposedly the protection of the Crown Ah, so you know, if I come back to that, basically the agreement was that I suppose we agreed to be governed by the government really as our duties as a citizen. I'm not sure what happens if we don't, we break the laws of that government whether we, well, get around to that, but also I mean that's duty, that's what we should do, but then the other thing is on the onus of the controlling body which I'll call 'the government', which is that they have a duty to be a good government to the citizens. And so it's that give-and-take thing, and, you know, how do you define being a good government, how do you define being a good citizen, you know? You can create laws but laws are just transitory things anyway, you know, some laws, people will break laws - in fact, probably everyone will break laws - that doesn't remove citizenship. [Māori male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

The over 60s (50%) and 46-60s (46%) were more likely to mention 'law abiding', than the under 46s (32-35%). This again may reflect nostalgia for the past, or simply that individuals tend to become more conservative (and law abiding) as they get older, while young people are more likely to challenge traditional rules and laws.

Half (51%) of the female participants who responded to this question said 'law abiding', compared to only 29% of males. Once again, this is likely associated with traditional gendered norms, which associate passivity and lawfulness more often with femininity than masculinity.

24% of participants named activities, such as voting and calling government to account when necessary, that have been categorised under 'participate in democracy'. One participant placed an emphasis on the former when defining a 'good citizen' as:

Someone who votes If you've got a right and you're not taking advantage of it, then you don't deserve, well, you know, it's not good You're not making a difference and you should, you have a responsibility, especially, ... possibly as a female, because we only had the vote so late, you know, and as a poor person because if we don't stand up for ourselves, you know, we deserve what we get. [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients (41%) made responses coded as 'participate in democracy' most often, while wage/salary earners (22%) and those on main benefits (16%) offered lesser support. This is consistent with previous findings, which have found the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group more likely to name many characteristics of a 'good citizen'.

High and low income participants with tertiary qualifications (33% and 31% respectively) were most likely to name 'participate in democracy'. Low and middle income earners with no

tertiary qualifications also offered similar (21-22%) responses, suggesting that a tertiary qualification makes one more likely to associate being a 'good citizen' with democratic duties such as voting. It is unclear, then, why the middle income/tertiary qualification group offered far less support (13%).

57% of the 'Other' ethnic group made responses coded as 'participate in democracy'. Although not as far ahead of other groups as with 'participate in community', this figure still compares starkly with the 33% of Pasifika, 27% of European/Pākehā and no responses from participants from other ethnic groups.

Age was again a factor in shaping 'participate in democracy' responses. The under 31s (20%) mentioned this activity as a sign of a 'good citizen' less than half as often than the two older age groups (both 42%), while only 6% of the 31-45s did. Although all of the participants were over 18 (and thus eligible to vote), there is international evidence to show that the likelihood to vote and other such democratic duties tend to increase with age (Blais, Gidengil, Nevitte, & Nadeau, 2004). This fact might explain such a finding.

There was little difference between males (25%) and females (23%) naming 'participate in democracy'.

Economic activities

'Pay tax' was mentioned by 21% of participants as a sign of a 'good citizen'. As one participant indicated, this just made common sense:

.... financially taxes just go towards running everything, you know, like people don't want to pay tax, don't want to pay petrol tax but that's where the money for the roads comes from, so it's logical really. Taxes have to be there to pay for stuff. [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

However, it is interesting that 'pay tax' was almost always mentioned along with other characteristics or activities, such as the following:

I try not to hurt people, I pay my taxes, I work, I go to work on time. I mean, there's all that social programming that I do, go to work on time, sort of not late, do my job, pay my taxes, don't whinge - well, I suppose I do whinge a bit about taxes but, you know. Try to obey the road rules when I drive, yeah. [Māori male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

28% of wage/salary earners mentioned 'pay tax', compared to 18% of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients and only 8% of main benefit recipients. Although all income support recipients pay tax on their benefit, it is likely that tax was a bigger issue for wage/salary earners because their contribution to the tax system is more obvious and because recent election campaigns have placed a significant focus on reducing the tax burden of wage/salary earners.

Education seems to play some role in shaping 'pay tax' responses. Those with no tertiary qualification and receiving low and middle incomes were least likely to say 'pay tax' (7% and 22% respectively), while those with tertiary qualifications were more likely to say this (31% amongst low income and 44% of middle income earners). However, the number of responses from the high income/tertiary qualification group (14%) was similar to that of participants without tertiary qualifications.

Once again, the 'Other' ethnic group (43%) was most likely to mention 'pay tax'. Asian (29%), Pasifika (22%) and European/Pākehā (20%) participants named this activity a similar

number of times, while only 8% of Māori did so. It is possible this latter finding is related to Māori views that citizenship is a negative identity; they thus may have resisted seeing tax (which supports the current system) as a sign of a 'good citizen'. It is unclear, however, why the 'Other' group was so much more likely to mention 'pay tax'.

Almost half (46%) of the 46-60 age group mentioned 'pay tax', compared to 20% of the under 31s, 17% of the over 60s and only 3% of the 31-45 age groups. While we might assume the middle age groups feel the burden of tax more than their younger and older counterparts, thus explaining the 46-60 age group finding, this argument does not explain why so few 32-45 year olds named the same activity.

Females (26%) were more likely to say 'pay tax' than males (15%). As noted earlier, they were also more likely than males to consider 'pay tax' an individual responsibility.

'Work' was also mentioned by 21% of participants when they were asked what characterised a 'good citizen'. Some were rather blunt: *"They'd have a job."* [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years]. Others framed these activities in terms of a broader economic contribution to society:

To me a good citizen is someone who most of all is what I would call a 'productive economic agent' in the sense that I don't require them to be rich or successful but what I would like them to do is not to live on my pocket. You know, in the sense someone who at least makes, however small, that contribution, is its net positive, in some way. So it's not someone who just basically lives on other people's backs all the time. ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

In regards to 'work', wage/salary earners (31%) were again most likely to name this as a sign of a 'good citizen', while only 18% of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance and 4% of main benefits recipients did so. This finding does not come as a surprise and it demonstrates how income support recipients did not necessarily associate being a 'good citizen' with paid work as government policy often does.

Middle income/tertiary qualification participants (38%) were most likely to name 'work'. They were followed by low income earners with tertiary qualifications (23%), middle income earners with no tertiary qualifications (22%) and then high income/tertiary qualification participants (19%). These findings do not point to any clear relationship between socio-economic status and this response.

The Pasifika (44%) and 'Other' ethnic groups (43%) gave 'work' as a response. The other groups did so far less often: European/Pākehā (18%), Asian (14%) and Māori (8%). It is uncertain what was driving the large number of responses by Pasifika and 'Other' participants.

As with 'pay tax', the 46-60 age group was most likely to mention 'work' (33%). In addition, the under 31s were again second most likely to name this response (30%), followed by the over 60s (17%) and the 31-45s (6%).

Females (23%) said 'work' was a sign of a 'good citizen' only a little more often than males (17%).

Other activities

Being a 'good citizen' was also associated with 'care for the environment' by a quarter (24%) of the participants. In the following case, this was linked to a broader awareness of the world around them:

A good citizen shows respect to the environment that they live in and the people around them and has understanding of consequences, of how they live and how they treat where they live. Whether that's noise or dog shit or traffic or being aware of domestic violence next door or people that are perhaps more dependent than yourself even. [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/tertiary educated, 31-45 years].

Responses relating to 'care for environment' ranged only between 20-27% across all three main income source groups. Wage/salary earners were most likely and main benefit recipients were least likely to name this activity as the sign of a 'good citizen'.

Education may be important in understanding this response. The low and middle income groups with tertiary qualifications ranked it most highly (both 38%) while their counterparts with no tertiary qualifications did so less often (21-22%). However, the higher income/tertiary qualification group (10%) said 'care for environment' the least.

The 'Other' ethnic group (43%) was mostly likely to name this activity, compared to 33% of European/Pākehā and 14% of Asian participants. Neither Māori nor Pasifika participants mentioned this at all.

Age did not seem an important variable in explaining 'care for environment' responses, ranging only 23-25% across all age groups.

Males (27%) mentioned 'care for environment' more often than females (20%).

A smaller number (15%) of the participants suggested 'loyalty to New Zealand' was a characteristic of a 'good citizen'. In some cases, this simply referred to pride in New Zealand, as one participant illustrated:

I can like visualise my ideal New Zealand citizen Funnily enough it's an Indian man! (laughter) But he's got a big smile on his face because it's this guy I remember from my citizenship ceremony and just how, like totally excited he was.... And I just thought to myself 'that guy is going to be such a great asset to our country', just the way that he presented himself, he was very confident but just really happy and excited to be a Kiwi and it was just so incredible seeing someone like that. I really thought to myself 'that's what I need to aspire to'. I mean, I don't just want to sit around and complain about the Prime Minister, I actually want to make a difference and, yeah, people who want to make a difference. So yeah, Indian man! (laughter). ['Other' female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

However, for others 'loyalty to New Zealand' was a much more formal activity, as articulated by another participant:

Being a good person, is it, should equate to the same thing or maybe, maybe not. A citizen I see as being loyal to the government as opposed to being a good person and loyal to people, so I see citizenship as being almost loyal to a government, a government idea, a national idea in a way. [Māori male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Similarly, a further participant was concerned about the loyalty of new immigrants to New Zealand citizenship:

I think the other thing that concerns me about this citizenship is that because, I guess, we're in a more a trans-national kind of, you know, multi-national relationship, people are using citizenship as a stepping stone to something else and I think that particularly perturbs me, that people come and immigrate to New Zealand and then they are going off to Australia ...

[European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

However, others indicated that loyalty to a particular nation was increasingly out-dated, with a younger participant noting:

I think people are still kind of conforming to this old idea about being subordinate and not speaking out against rules and, you know, if anything that's been pushed more now, you know, just don't ask questions basically. But I think people are starting to move, you know, people who are thinking, they're definitely starting to rethink what it is to be a citizen and that's why I say again it's more of a global idea these days, more people are actually seeing that we're a globe, more the same as opposed to being too nationalistic about things ... [European/Pākehā male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Perhaps for similar reasons, only 2% of participants mentioned 'fight for your country' as a characteristic of a 'good citizen'. This example indicates that ideas about what makes a 'good' citizen can change over time or context, as explained by a participant:

... during the wars, the two World Wars, you were a good citizen if you, you know, went and put yourself in the firing line for your country, you know, and made sacrifices that's one way that could have been seen as being a good citizen. It really depends on social, economic climate or, you know, how much under threat people are, that we are as a nation or so, yeah, maybe when, when white people arrived here a good citizen was somebody who showed that like noble savage, you know, the way to God! (laughter). [European/Pākehā female student, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

It is interesting to note that 13% of the participants made comments that were categorised as 'adopt New Zealand values'. This included the idea that immigrants should make an effort to assimilate to a New Zealand culture. **6% also said a 'good citizen' would 'emphasise similarities not differences'.** While at times this latter comment was made in regard to seeing the shared valued amongst New Zealanders, at other times it was a direct reaction to what were perceived to be inappropriate divisions created by Māori emphasising their difference from other New Zealanders. For instance, one participant talked of how:

... when I went overseas I felt really well really proud to be a Kiwi and I thought ... our, the thing between the Māoris [sic] and that, you know, Pākehās [sic] was really good back then. But coming back after I was away 10 years, coming back I realised that things had, they weren't like that anymore at all and it had got really quite bad and I don't feel - this is a tricky thing to say - I don't feel it's our fault. I feel it's moved the other way, you know, it's been brought on by - I'm not saying them - but trying to create - how do you put it? Like the apartheid thing, you know, trying to segregate themselves and I think that's what's wrong, that why do that, why stay together, you know? [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

This kind of comment was reiterated by a participant who was concerned about the Tūhoe tribe's negotiation with the Crown for a Treaty claims settlement even though they did not sign the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi: *"And I think that you ought to be in a situation where your focus should be on a unity of people because we're only a small country, we're all here together, we can't have the separation."* [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years]. The one person who said a 'good citizen' would 'laugh at self/not be PC' was reacting to a similar frustration with rights-based discourses articulated by Māori and other marginalised groups in recent years.

Finally, 1% of participants each considered a good citizen to be an adult who was 'independent' (that is, not dependent on support from government or even family), and to be someone with 'high status/recognition'. This latter comment reflected a concern that you had to 'be someone' (i.e. rich or a celebrity) to be a 'good citizen' in New Zealand. For instance, when naming his idea of a 'good citizen', one participant said: *"Probably a politician cos he's, he's part of running the country or helping Helen Clark, do what they do, yeah, I suppose they got more of a recognition about that area, whereas, me ... I'm just living from year to year, as days go by."* [Māori male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Mixed and changing views of citizenship

As a means for providing a context for the above findings, participants were also asked if they thought the idea of what constituted a 'good citizen' had changed over time (for instance, in the past generation since their parents were growing up). **Only 37 participants responded to this question, but 76% of them thought that views on what made a 'good citizen' had shifted over time.** For instance, one participant thought ideas had changed:

Enormously cos we're ... much more materialistic, much more profit, much more sort of applauding wealth and people that seem to be successful, successful in every kind of, you know People are much more out for themselves, much more individual, our family, our wealth, even within families, it's - there's a lot less sharing, you know, it's much more, it's sort of, just my right to be fantastically happy and indulged and against the, perhaps, what even the family and the smaller group of community and ... [European/Pākehā female on main benefit, low income/tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

Given the small numbers who responded to this question, an indepth analysis is not possible but it is notable that ethnicity and age seemed to be the most important factors influencing participants who made this response. For instance, minority ethnic groups were far *less* likely to say that ideas about citizenship have changed, while the 46-60s age group was most likely to indicate change *had* occurred.

The remaining 24% of participants indicated that the activities or behaviours associated with being a 'good citizen' had not varied; instead people were simply not participating in these as much.

In summary: Main income source, age and gender are the most obvious variables shaping views about the characteristics of a 'good citizen'. Relational and political activities were most often noted by New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients (with the exception of 'help others'), female participants and those aged over 45 (except for 'good morals/norms'). Members of the 'Other', then European/Pākehā and Pasifika ethnic groups, offered the most responses in regards to these relational activities. In some cases this may link back to discussion of the activities participants associated with citizenship in Section 3, which found that those from the most disadvantaged groups in society were more likely to focus on relational issues. But in that New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients and older participants were also likely to name these characteristics of a 'good citizen' complicates this simple reading of the findings above.


Strikingly, wage/salary earners, high income/tertiary qualification participants, males, the 'Other' ethnic group and the 46-60 age group were more likely to name 'pay tax' and 'work' as the sign of a 'good citizen'. This is important because neoliberal rhetoric about individual responsibility has portrayed these as the central aspect of 'active citizenship'. That these activities were mentioned infrequently by other groups suggests that this message has not been widely accepted by New Zealanders. In particular, main benefit recipients rarely

nominated 'pay tax' or 'work' as characteristics of a 'good citizen'. This challenges the theoretical assumption that they would have internalised the messages about individual responsibility gained through their experience or greater knowledge of work activation policies. The rather ambivalent results from enquiries about whether notions of citizenship have changed over time also call into question any impact such policies have had and highlights considerable ambivalence about whether changes in attitudes result from shifts in top-down notions of citizenship or simply from a lesser desire amongst citizens to act as 'good citizens'.

What characterises a 'bad citizen'?

In addition to characterising a 'good citizen', participants were asked to consider what attitudes or behaviours a 'bad citizen' might have. Although in many cases participants simply offered the reverse of their previous answers regarding a 'good citizen', this supplementary question did highlight some further activities that we might consider aspects of citizenship, as Figure 18 shows. Only the four most frequently offered responses have been analysed in more depth.

Figure 18: Activities or behaviours associated with being a 'bad citizen' (N=87)
Affirmative responses ('yes' and 'sometimes/maybe')



Criminal activities

'Breaking the law' was by far and away the most likely activity associated with being a 'bad citizen', with almost half (49%) of the participants naming this. For instance, one participant

said: *“stealing would be a big one for me that’s just such a drain, you’re not creating anything you’re just taking what someone else has created.”* [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

However, participants offered quite a wide range of criminal activities that they considered characteristic of a ‘bad citizen’. One noted that this included:

... businesses that are very unethical because I think that’s a big thing from what I’ve learnt about at, you know, uni[versity] and everything like that, that just, they don’t necessarily directly steal, but they do in other ways and things like evading taxes and yeah. And, yeah, sort of unethical business practices, destroying, raping the environment, destroying the environment, things like that. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Wage/salary earners (60%) were substantially more likely to say ‘breaking the law’ was the sign of a ‘bad citizen’ than those receiving New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance (47%) or a main benefit (32%). This finding is consistent with findings earlier, in that wages/salary earners were more likely to name ‘law abiding’ as a characteristic of a ‘good citizen’.

Socio-economic status does not seem to shape responses greatly. The middle income/tertiary qualification group was far more likely (69%) than other groups to name ‘breaking the law’, with their counterparts without tertiary qualifications mentioning it least commonly (33%). However, around half of low income/no tertiary qualification (50%) and high income/tertiary qualification participants (48%) also mentioned ‘breaking the law’.

71% of the ‘Other’ ethnic group noted ‘breaking the law’ compared to 67% of Pasifika, 57% of Asian and 47% of European/Pākehā participants. The lower number of references to this characteristic by Māori (31%) may be explained by Māori focus group discussion about colonial and modern day laws that restrict the ability of Māori to be self-determining. For instance, one participant indicated that:

... there’s laws that have been put in place to make it totally impossible for us to provide. Going to the moana to gather food is providing, providing for your family. And going to the ngahere to get kai is providing. [Māori female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

It is notable that although the 46-60 years age group was most likely (58%) to name ‘breaking the law’ as a characteristic of being a ‘bad citizen’, the under 31s (50%) also mentioned this frequently, followed by the 31-45s (39%). Perhaps surprisingly, this was least mentioned by the over 60s. This sits in tension with the fact that older participants were more likely to say being ‘law abiding’ is a sign of a good citizen’.

Males (49%) were only slightly more likely to mention ‘breaking the law’ than females (44%).

Relational activities

Participants often linked ‘breaking the law’ with two relational behaviours: ‘being selfish’ and ‘being disrespectful of people’. **26% named ‘being selfish’ as a characteristic of a ‘bad citizen’.** One participant explained a perceived selfishness in New Zealand with the following example:

So, if none of us want to be nurses, if there’s a development of a culture that looks down on nursing as being something that’s not quite glamorous enough, or it’s too hard not well paid enough, we want to be better paid ... then, there’s not going to be enough nurses, as in,

we don't all have to be nurses, but there's got to [be] enough of us who want to be. ['Other' female wage/salary earner, unassigned income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Wage/salary earners (20%) were somewhat less likely to say 'being selfish' than those on main benefits (36%) and moderately less likely than New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients (29%). In that main benefit recipients often associated 'being selfish' with being financially stingy or not helping others in need, this finding is consistent with their high number of references to 'help others' as a sign of being a 'good citizen'.

The low income/tertiary qualification group (54%) was most likely to name 'being selfish'. Far fewer of their no tertiary qualification counterparts (29%) and the middle income/no tertiary qualification group (33%) did so. Interestingly, this characteristic was mentioned far less often by the high income/tertiary qualification group (19%) and barely at all by middle income/tertiary qualification participants (6%).

Participants from the 'Other' (43%) and European/Pākehā (37%) ethnic groups were most likely to mention 'being selfish', while this was noted infrequently by Māori (8%) and not at all by Pasifika and Asian participants. This is surprising because the cultures represented in the latter three ethnic groupings all place a strong emphasis on the collective over the individual, suggesting that they would find 'being selfish' a negative attribute.

The under 46s were less likely (19-20%) to name 'being selfish' than the over 45s (33-38%). This finding again suggests nostalgia amongst the older group for a time when moral norms placed a greater focus on helping others and contributing to community.

Females (31%) were more likely to say 'being selfish' was the sign of a 'bad citizen' than males (20%). This is not surprising given that gendered social norms put a premium on women helping others and sacrificing their own needs for their family and community.

In addition, 23% of all participants who attempted to characterise a 'bad citizen' named being 'disrespectful of people' as an attribute.

Wages/salary earners (29%) were most likely to name this characteristic, compared to 20% of main benefit and only 12% of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients. This is surprising given previous findings, suggesting that the latter two groups placed a greater emphasis on relational issues.

The impact of socio-economic status on responses once again seems insignificant. The middle income/no tertiary qualification group mentioned 'disrespectful of people' most often (38%), but their tertiary-educated counterparts did not mention it at all. The low income/tertiary qualification group (15%) was least likely to mention this behaviour, while the high income/tertiary qualification group (29%) sat in between.

The 'Other' ethnic group (57%) was by far most likely to name 'disrespectful of people'. Although 25% of European/Pākehā participants did the same, far fewer members (8-14%) of the other ethnic groups did so. This is, again, surprising given what we know about the cultural attributes of peoples included in the Māori, Pasifika and Asian categories.

The 46-60s (46%) were most likely to say being 'disrespectful of people' was the sign of a 'bad citizen', compared to between 13% and 17% of other groups. Notably, the over 60s group (17%) offered few references to this characteristic, despite some of its members expressing considerable concern about weakening moral and social norms when responding to other questions.

Males (29%) were more likely to offer this response than females (19%). This is possibly because of the stronger association of masculinity with discipline and authority, which are linked to 'respect'. Yet, traditional norms of femininity are also associated with taking care and being respectful of others' needs, so it is perhaps surprising that females were less likely than males to name this characteristic.

Far smaller minorities also indicated 'care only about profit' (9%) was the sign of a 'bad citizen', along with 'dishonest/can't trust' (8%), 'being racist' (6%) and 'not participate in democracy' (6%). Even fewer participants said people who 'interfere unnecessarily' (in reference to 'busy body' neighbours rather than government intervention, 3%) and 'being angry' (associated with violence, 3%).

Welfare-related activities

15% of participants said a person who did 'not work and can' was a 'bad citizen'. This is a striking minority finding, given this study's focus on the impact of neoliberal rhetoric about individual responsibility on social rights of citizenship, including that to work. There were often some qualifications, however, as this participant indicates when he confirmed he thought a 'bad citizen' was someone who did not work, by saying:

I think it is, unless you disabled in one, some way from - that you can't go out and, and hunt and gather for your family, so to speak And then, of course, you might have to for, actually, go to welfare and maybe expect a hand-out of some sort but if you're able-body and -mind and things, in my view, you should be able to go out and fetch for your family. [Pasifika male wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Given its importance to this study's interest in social citizenship, it is worth analysing the 'not work and can' response in more detail, even though only small numbers of participants offered comments that have been coded into this category. **Not surprisingly, wage/salary earners (22%) were far more likely to consider 'not work and can' as a sign of a 'bad citizen' than main benefit (8%) and New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance (6%) recipients.** This is presumably related to the latter group's stronger belief that 'work' is an important part of being a 'good citizen'.

Relatively similar numbers of the two middle income groups named this response (25-33%), while only 7-15% of other groups mentioned it. Perhaps not surprisingly, given they are likely to have a very vulnerable position in the labour market, the low income/no tertiary qualification group (7%) named this response the least often. However, that the high income/tertiary qualification also mentioned 'no work and can' infrequently suggests that such vulnerability does not completely explain this finding.

Asian (29%) and Pasifika (22%) participants were a little more likely than other groups (12-15%) to mention 'not work and can'. This is possibly because cultures from Asia and the Pacific Islands tend to place a strong emphasis on a 'work ethic', even though such groups are sometimes very vulnerable in the New Zealand labour market. It has also been highlighted that Asian views on welfare and benefit recipients were heavily influenced by the media and only one member of this ethnic group had personal experience of the welfare system.

Those aged 46-60 (25%) gave this response more often than other age groups. Their responses were relatively similar (8-15%). Notably, however, the oldest participants were least likely to name 'not work and can'. This is possibly because even though most no longer worked, they still considered themselves to be 'good citizens'.

Surprisingly, females (17%) were slightly more likely than males (11%) to name 'not work and can'. However, this finding is consistent with the fact that females were more likely to name 'work' as the sign of a 'good citizen'.

Demonstrating a 'victim mentality' was also considered the sign of a 'bad citizen' for 10% of participants. Some participants indicated that this was the result of too much focus on people's rights rather than responsibilities. This was referred to as: *"the whole, 'nobody's ever done anything for me, I'm not doing anything for anyone else' kind of attitude"* [European/Pākehā male student, high income/no tertiary qualification, under 31s years].

Others articulated this concern by characterising someone who does 'not meet responsibilities (3%) as a 'bad citizen'. For example, in responding to the 'bad citizen' question, one participant said:

Well, I would preface this answer by saying that ... I believe in the inherent good in everybody. And I think that people who perhaps are negative citizens are the result of some factor in their life that's made them result in being a negative citizen, I don't think they're born negative citizens. But I think people who perhaps do not contribute positively to their community have been brought up in a way that whereby they believe that there is rights without responsibilities. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

In the context of earlier discussion about individual responsibility regarding 'health', it is perhaps surprising that only 3% of participants thought a 'bad citizen' was one who does 'not look after own health'. This included: *"just eating all the wrong foods obviously, there's that health thing, not getting enough exercise, drinking too much, smoking. Lying in the sun all day."* [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

National identity and participation activities

Substantial minorities of participants mentioned activities that have been categorised as 'disloyalty/no pride in New Zealand' (13%) and 'not adopt NZ values (11%)'. This response was directly associated with immigrants who were perceived as not integrating into New Zealand society. For instance:

I think accepting the citizenship buys into or accepts the mores the social standards of that society. This is going to sound reactionary but I don't have much time or patience for the politically correct view of, well, 'if Tongans' - and I'm just picking a group - 'come here they have a right to retain their cultural identity and their cultural habits and, and social activities'. Well, no, if they want to retain that they stay in Tonga. Not that we're picking on Tongans, it's just ... ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Similarly, an older participant said:

[Immigrants] ... *a lot of them aren't bad but I've got an old-fashioned idea what, 'when you're in Rome, you do as the Roman's do' and I think there's, you know, I'm not pointing at any specific ones but I think if they're going to immigrate to a country you should try and blend in as much as you can with the culture that's already set in place there I don't know whether out of place - like these some of these religious things, that they won't take their burqas off or whatever it is, you know, in court you know, those head things - well they should be, if they're prepared to come here and live, they've got to be prepared to live by our law.* [European/Pākehā retired male, unassigned income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over].

Another 2% of participants were even more explicit and said that to 'be an immigrant' itself characteristic of being a 'bad citizen'. When asked who she might consider to be a 'bad citizen', one participant simply answered: *"Asians. Asians. Muslims. (laughter) Nah!"* [Māori female wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years]. However, this attitude was not widely supported amongst the participant sample as a whole.

In addition, 6% of participants said 'not participate in democracy' was the sign of a 'bad citizen'. Again, this was not indisputably supported. For instance, one participant said:

... not voting, it's just as bigger statement as voting just, you know, that's where it is, just because you don't vote doesn't mean you have a lesser right than anyone else. In fact, not voting is a statement in itself that just says that 'well, it's not going to make any difference anyway' and a lot of the time it doesn't, because the goals of most parties are the same, a lot of self-interest involved. [Māori male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Finally, in contextualising the findings indicated above, it is important to note that **25% of participants indicated that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between a 'good citizen' and a 'bad' citizen'**. For instance, it was noted that we have all behaved 'badly' at some point (for example, by breaking the speed limit), despite generally being 'good citizens', and even the worst kind of citizens had *some* 'good' in them. Those on main benefits, participants from low income groups, Māori and Pasifika and those aged under 31 and over 60 were most likely to say it was difficult to distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' citizens. Females and males were roughly similar in their likelihood to discuss this issue.

In summary: Overall, 'breaking the law' was the activity most likely to be associated with being a 'bad citizen', followed by failings in relational factors that enabled people to get along with others. 'Not work and can' was mentioned only by a minority of participants, suggesting that even if many believe in greater individual responsibility, they do not necessarily see an individual as a 'bad citizen' if they do not participate in paid work. In particular, main benefit recipients were far less likely to name this characteristic than wage/salary earners, again suggesting that their attitudes have not been heavily shaped by government rhetoric about the value of paid work as a sign of 'active citizenship'.


It is also notable that wage/salary earners on middle incomes were not only more likely to say 'not work and can' but also 'breaking the law' and 'disrespect of people', the three responses we might associate with a more conservative viewpoint. 'Being selfish' was the only characteristic noted more often by those on main benefits and low income/tertiary qualification participants. The 46-60 age group was most likely to offer all responses (although the over 60s were similarly high in mentioning 'being selfish'). The 'Other' ethnic group led all other groups for each response with the exception of 'not work and can', where Asian and Pasifika participants rated highest. Pasifika participants also mentioned 'breaking the law' frequently, while European/Pākehā were second most likely to say 'being selfish'. Males were more likely to say 'breaking the law' and 'disrespectful of others', while females noted more often 'being selfish' and, more surprisingly, 'not work if can'. These findings make it more difficult to establish a clear-cut trend that certain groups favour certain characteristics as a sign of 'bad citizen' more than in the case of 'good citizen'. But the range of responses offered suggests a diverse and dynamic understanding of citizenship and the activities associated with it.

How important is citizenship as an identity?

Having got a sense of what participants associated with the term 'citizenship', they were then asked how *important* citizenship was as an identity for them. This was of interest

because research suggests that citizenship is a passive identity for many New Zealanders (McMillan, 2004a; Pearson, 2005). A lack of knowledge about the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, as well as what characterises a ‘good citizen’, might also be explained by citizenship not being an important identity to individuals.

Figure 19: Responses to: 'Is citizenship an important identity for you?' (N=87)



Half (47%) of the participants who responded directly to this question thought that citizenship was definitely an important identity for them. This was often because they identified with ‘New Zealand values’ in some way. Some participants were concerned about those values changing:

It [citizenship] is becoming more important as I get older Because I am concerned that we're going to have to fight for our identity as what is actually a 'New Zealander'. I think it's changing so much that I think, I feel as if people of my generation are sort of being marginalised as to what we actually are, do we fit in? [European/Pākehā male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

In particular, he was concerned that the New Zealand history he learned as a child was being re-written with, in his view, too much emphasis on Māori issues: *"In the future, you know, will I be disadvantaged because, quite frankly, cos I'm not Māori, will I be disadvantaged, will I be a second class citizen? They are very real concerns."* [European/Pākehā male on main benefit, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

A further 13% of participants said citizenship was ‘sometimes/maybe’ important to them, depending on the context. This was particularly the case for participants who had immigrated to New Zealand, as the importance of their New Zealand citizenship had to be weighed against other priorities. For instance, a participant who was originally from the United States noted:

If, to become a New Zealand citizen, I'd have to give up my American citizenship, it was not important enough for me to give up my American citizenship ... but when I could get it [without relinquishing his US passport], yeah, I thought 'this is good, I want to be part of it.' ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

A full 40% of participants said that citizenship was not important to them at all. Some had just never thought about it: *"Not really, not all [the] time, not every day sort of thing. It's not an everyday thought at all, no."* [European/Pākehā retired female, low income/no tertiary qualification, 61 years and over]. But this did not necessarily mean that being a ‘New Zealander’ was not important, as many participants did not connect this identity with citizenship:

... being a New Zealander is what makes me think about identity. To me it's got very little to do with citizenship in the sense that to me it's, you know - the reason I think of myself as a New Zealander is because, you know, my mother is a New Zealander and my grandparents were New Zealanders and there's a certain history my family has in this country. But it's not necessarily just because I've got that piece of paper in my pocket called a 'passport' or a 'citizenship', you know, that to me is quite independent. ['Other' male, high income/tertiary-educated, 31-45 years].

Theoretical assumptions would lead us to believe that citizenship might be a less important identity for those on main benefits, due to the conditions placed upon them which arguably restrict their rights as citizens. **Main benefit recipients (24%) were least likely to say 'yes' they considered citizenship an important identity and 20% said 'no' (none offered ambivalent answers).** But only slightly more wage/salary earners (29%) said 'yes' and a greater number (29%) said 'no'. In comparison, 35% of New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients (35%) said 'yes' they found citizenship an important identity, 18% said 'no' and 6% said 'sometimes/maybe'. This questions the idea that income source influences participant feelings about the importance of citizenship.

Participants with tertiary qualifications were more likely to say that citizenship is important to them, right across the three income categories. This is possibly because tertiary-educated participants simply had more awareness of citizenship as a concept. Interestingly, it was the low income/tertiary qualification group that offered 'yes' responses most often (46%), followed by the middle income/tertiary qualification (38%) group and then those with high incomes and a tertiary qualification (29%). The middle income/no tertiary qualification group offered only 11% 'yes' responses, while responses from the low income/no tertiary qualification group were almost double that figure (21%). However, the former group offered a considerable number of ambivalent responses (22%), far more than any of the other groups (0-13%). The middle income/no tertiary qualification and high income/tertiary qualification groups were most likely to say 'no' citizenship was not an important identity for them (both 33%). The low income/no tertiary qualification group was next on 25%.

The 'Other' ethnic group (43%) was most likely to say citizenship was definitely important to their identity. This is not surprising given many of this group had migrated to New Zealand and so had formally applied to become New Zealand citizens. However, 29% also said it was not important, possibly because of the practical and identity issues that immigrants face, as noted earlier. Indeed, one would expect the same kind of results amongst the Asian participants (as all but one migrated to New Zealand) but they said citizenship was not an important identity at all, favouring the national identity of their home country or 'New Zealander' more than 'New Zealand citizen'. European/Pākehā were the second most likely group to consider citizenship important (37%) followed by Pasifika (22%). The latter result is surprising because discussion in the Pasifika focus group placed much emphasis on the need for citizenship for entitlement to services and legitimacy in New Zealand. However, the next section indicates that the greatest source of belonging for Pasifika participants was 'family' and this fact may have shaped their responses to this question. Māori (8%) were least likely of all ethnic groups to see citizenship as important. This reflects the negative connotations that many Māori associated with citizenship, in particular the failure of New Zealand governments to fulfil its promise of Article Two of the Treaty of Waitangi.

Older participants (33-42%), particularly those 61 years and over, were more likely to consider citizenship important than those under 46 years (23-25%). The only 'sometimes/maybe' answers came from those in the 46-60 years (21%) and 31-45 years (6%) groups. However, despite age being important in 'yes' responses, the number of participants saying citizenship was *not* important to them was similar in all age groups (25-

29%), with the minor exception of the 46-60 years group (only 17% of whom offered 'no' responses). These results suggest that younger participants did not find the notion of citizenship particularly relevant to their identity. This may be due to either a weakening of citizenship as an identity in recent years or simply because citizenship becomes a more important identity as individuals age.

Gender had a minor influence on whether citizenship was considered an important identity, with 52% of males versus 43% of females answering 'yes'. Interestingly, given that males have tended to offer more ambivalent answers to previous questions, females this time offered more 'sometimes/maybe' responses (18%) than males (8%). The number of participants who indicated citizenship was not important to them was very similar amongst females (39%) and males (40%). These results may relate to claims that traditional notions of citizenship have been heavily masculinised and that women do not as readily associate with them as a result.

In summary: A similar number of participants found citizenship important (47%) and not important at all (40%). Participants who were on the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance, tertiary-educated (with the exception of those on a high income), from the 'Other' ethnic group, older and male were most likely to find citizenship important. In contrast, participants who were wage/salary earners, on a middle income with no tertiary qualification or high income with a tertiary qualification, Māori and aged 46-60 years were most likely to say 'no'.


These are interesting findings, for they suggest a polarisation about the importance of citizenship in contemporary times. However, this polarisation clearly follows existing lines of inequality; while in many cases those most advantaged in society (older, tertiary educated and male participants) found citizenship important, other advantaged groups (wage/salary earners, high income earners and the middle-aged) were also most likely to say citizenship was *not* important to them. The most noteworthy finding of this section, however, was the predominantly negative and quite distinct views on citizenship expressed by many Māori participants, whose perspectives were shaped by the Treaty of Waitangi and New Zealand's colonial legacy.

Why is citizenship important as an identity?

While the last section identified that citizenship was important (at least to some degree) to the majority of participants, it is interesting to consider *why* this identity was central for them.

Figure 20 shows the nine categories used to classify the reasons offered by participants. Only the three most frequent responses have been analysed in more depth.

Figure 20: Reasons why citizenship is important (N=87)
Affirmative responses ('yes' and 'sometimes/maybe')



Pride in New Zealand

Citizenship was important to 30% of participants because they felt 'pride' in being a New Zealand citizen. As noted before, this often related to their appreciation of the values and achievements associated with New Zealand, as the following quote shows:

Being self-sufficient, I think, is a really big thing about being a New Zealander and I'm really proud of that. You know, knowing how to fix things and ... not having that throw-away society, although that's getting lost these days. You know, I hold on to those old things from New Zealand from the pioneering days, I've got books on pioneering women and what they went through and also the Māori culture and that's embraced more here than it is in some other mixed countries and I think that we've done reasonably well at trying to integrate the two, it's a really hard thing to do and ... I feel really proud of New Zealand for having that shared culture and trying still to make it work, you know. [European/Pākehā female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients were more than twice as likely to say they feel 'pride' (59%), compared to 24% of those on main benefits and 22% of wage-salary earners. Discussion below suggests this finding is associated with the older age of the New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients.

In regards to socio-economic status, the two middle income groups were most likely say 'pride' was a reason they considered citizenship important (38-56%). Those with high income and a tertiary qualification (19%) and low incomes with no tertiary qualification (25%) offered the least number of responses. While there appears to be no direct link between education level, 'pride' may thus be associated with income level, even if this does not rise or diminish with income but rather seems associated with middle income earners.

European/Pākehā were most likely to say citizenship was important to them because they felt 'pride' in being a New Zealander (45%). This is not surprising as they are the majority ethnic group and thus the 'national' culture is most closely associated with this group. 'Pride' did not seem very important amongst Asian (14%), Pasifika (11%), Māori (8%) and the 'Other' ethnic groups (0%).

The over 60s were most likely (50%) to say 'pride' was the reason why they considered citizenship important. There were fewer 'pride' responses amongst the under 31s (35%) and the 46-60s (33%) and this factor did not seem very important for most aged 31-45 years (16%) at all. It is not clear why older participants were more likely to associate 'pride' with citizenship, but possibly they had greater knowledge of (or simply more time to reflect on) New Zealand's historical achievements and this shaped their responses.

Males were considerably more likely to say 'pride' was a reason why they felt citizenship was important (40%) than females (23%). Again, in that a 'national' culture is often more strongly associated with a masculine than a feminine identity (Lister, 1997), this finding does not come as a major surprise.

Other responses associated with 'pride' in New Zealand include the fact that some participants 'like New Zealand values' (10%); have a sense of 'belonging' (9%); like the 'lifestyle/landscape' (9%); and appreciate the uniqueness of 'Māori culture' (6%). A further 3% of participants appreciated the particular style of 'democracy/politics' (3%) that exists in New Zealand.

Travel-related reasons

A further 18% considered citizenship important for 'practical' reasons related to travel. This included the ease of travelling on a New Zealand passport and the entitlement it provided to certain services. For instance, one participant only discovered when she was in her 40s and wanted to travel overseas that she did not actually have New Zealand citizenship; although she had lived in the country since she was a small child, she was born elsewhere and has never officially been naturalised. Thus, getting a New Zealand passport was a practical hurdle to overcome before she could go on her trip.

Wage-salary earners were most likely to see citizenship as 'practical' (22%). They were followed by those receiving New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance (18%) and then those on main benefits (12%). There is no obvious explanation for these findings.

The middle income/tertiary qualification (25%) and high income/tertiary qualification groups (24%) were most likely to consider citizenship important for 'practical' reasons. This is possibly because those with higher incomes and education are more likely to travel. However, 15-18% of the low income groups still mentioned this factor, while no one in the middle income/tertiary qualification group did so.

Both Pasifika (44%) and Asian (43%) participants were most likely to say citizenship was important for 'practical' reasons, which is not surprising as large numbers of these groups had earlier associated citizenship with 'passport/travel/migration'. However, 'practical' reasons were infrequently mentioned by participants from the 'Other' ethnic group (3%) and not at all by Māori, even though the latter had also associated citizenship with 'passport/travel/migration' in great numbers.

Those over 45 years were more likely (21-25%) than those under 46 (15-16%) to consider citizenship important for 'practical' reasons.

17% of both males and females named 'practical' reasons for citizenship being important to them.

Although related to these 'practical' reasons, a further 16% of participants offered responses that indicated being a New Zealand citizen 'gives respect overseas'. This is particularly because New Zealanders are generally well-liked and regarded as hard-working overseas. A Pasifika participant talked about how difficult it was to give up her Samoan passport:

Well, at first I didn't want to, because I don't want to give up my right as a Samoan because I'm so proud to be a Samoan. But, and then I looked at different things in different places that, you know, the others were saying about the passport, that New Zealand passport can give you the right to enter other countries without visas, you know, like we travelled to Sweden and Germany, you don't need visas to enter those countries. As soon as they see a New Zealand passport, 'oh yeah, you're fine' and they let you go, you know, because they think that New Zealand is the country that, you know, people are good coming from here, they are good ... [Pasifika female wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Again, it is worth analysing this response in more depth, despite the small number of participants offering this answer, because it relates to the issues of respect and recognition highlighted in Section 3.

The New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance group was more than twice as likely to offer this response (29%) than the other two groups (12-13%). This is perhaps surprising, given that older people are frequently considered to be one of the most respected groups in society, but there was certainly a feeling amongst this group that being identified with 'New Zealand' was a source of both an inner pride and of external respect and recognition.

'Gives respect overseas' was most commonly mentioned by the low income/tertiary qualification group (31%) but least by those with low income/no tertiary qualifications (7%). The middle income groups were much more similar (19-22%) and only slightly ahead of the high income/tertiary qualification group (14%). This finding confounds a simple argument that low income participants were less likely to go overseas and thus experience such 'respect' themselves, especially when the low income/tertiary qualification group was more than twice as likely (31%) to offer this response than those with high incomes and a tertiary qualification (14%). It is possible that low income participants were simply more perceptive to issues of respect given their experiences in other aspects of life.

'Gives respect overseas' was most often mentioned by Pasifika participants (33%). This comes as no surprise given discussion above about the difficulties faced while travelling on passports from Pacific Island nations. European/Pākehā (18%), 'Other' (14%) and Māori (8%) named this factor far less often, while Asian participants did not mention it all.

The differing age groups ranged only between 13-20% when offering this response, suggesting age was not an important variable. The under 31s group was most likely to name 'gives respect overseas' and those aged 46-60 least likely, with the over 60s (17%) and the 31-45s (16%) somewhere in between.

Male and female participants (17% and 15% respectively) were remarkably similar in terms of naming citizenship as important because it 'gives respect overseas'.

Legitimacy in New Zealand

A further 10% of participants also indicated that being a New Zealand citizen gives 'legitimacy in New Zealand' by justifying their rights to live in the country, participate in its democratic processes and to access its services. As a Samoan participant indicated:

... in New Zealand and they find that you're not, you know, Palangi, European then you kind of have to sort of - what do you call it? - legitimise you being a New Zealand-born, you know, like you have to justify being in New Zealand. [Pasifika female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Being able to say 'I'm a New Zealand citizen' countered these kinds of attitudes. Indeed, this issue was discussed mostly by American and Pasifika participants, with participation in democracy being more important to the former and entitlement to services being more important for the latter. For instance, an American-born participant said citizenship:

... feels really important to my identity, it's strange ... It's really great to be able to say in this kind of like [expressive noise] voice when people ask me, as they often do, 'oh, so how long are you here for?', cos they think I'm just on holiday. 'Well, actually I'm a New Zealand citizen' and the validation of like ... I have a right just as much as anybody else to bitch about the Prime Minister, to vote ... like that ... was really important but I think the validation is probably the most important thing. Because the publication I work for is like a very Kiwi-orientated publication, I had a little bit in the beginning where I wouldn't talk and I would think to myself 'oh, they're not going to take me seriously because they don't think I'm a Kiwi and I don't understand', but now that I can say 'well, actually I'm a New Zealand citizen as well' it kind of, it makes me feel a lot better about things. [Other' female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

In contrast, another Samoan participant explained that his New Zealand citizenship was not important to him until he married and had children:


I think if you become a parent and also you're married you're no longer just thinking about yourself. You're actually starting to think about your wife, your children. So, it's important that you look at citizenship and entitlement to, like if I lost my job, if I'm a New Zealand citizen I would be able to access the income support and benefit system, but if I wasn't then it would be really difficult for me to actually support my family until I found another job ... [Pasifika male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

In summary: Different groups of New Zealanders found citizenship important for varied reasons. However, this section's findings suggest that 'pride' especially is associated with advantaged groups (older, New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance, middle income, European/Pākehā and/or male participants). The other categories were far more mixed as to who was more likely to name them but, notably, Pasifika peoples appear to find New Zealand citizenship particularly important for 'practical' reasons and because it 'gives respect gained overseas' and, although this was not analysed in depth, 'gives legitimacy in New Zealand'. This suggests that they value citizenship more because of their marginal status both in New Zealand and overseas. It is notable that no similar trend was apparent amongst the other minority ethnic groups, although it must be stressed that Māori offered few responses, possibly due to the reservations they had about citizenship which were noted earlier.

Where is belonging found?

Given that two-fifths of the participants identified that citizenship was not a particularly important identity for them, it was necessary to ask where they *did* find their greatest sense of belonging (i.e. where they felt at 'home' and could be themselves). They were told that this might not necessarily be a geographical space but could include the belonging found within a family or ethnic group. Figure 21 shows that participant responses were coded into ten different categories. Only the three most common responses were analysed in more depth.

Figure 21: Responses to: 'Where do you get your greatest sense of belonging?' (N=87)
Affirmative responses ('yes' and 'sometimes/maybe')



Family

'Family' (22%) was the most common response. This comes as no surprise given the family is where most people have their strongest and most meaningful relationships. As one participant said:

.... the most important thing to me is the family and nothing takes precedence over that. I'm a nurse but on my Census form I write 'mother', I'm a mother 24/7. I'm a nurse for a set amount of hours, even full time, and it's actually something I try and encourage other people to do. Because, to me, if we all did that then the government would have to turn round and say 'oh, this mother business, there's a lot of people out there doing it'. ['Other' female wage/salary earner, low income/no tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

'Family' was far more important to wage/salary earners (33%) than those on main benefits (12%) or New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients (10%). This is a surprising finding. It might be possible that lack of access to targeted subsidies and other state assistance forces the wage/salary earner group to rely more on their families for financial and other support. It is also possible that the wage/salary earners in this study just happened to be those individuals who were more likely to have children or close family relationships.

'Family' was the most important site of belonging for those with high incomes and a tertiary qualification (43%) and least by those with low incomes (7-8%). This could possibly support the hypothesis about financial support offered above. Education does not seem to be an important factor.

The 'Other' (43%) and Pasifika (44%) ethnic groups most often found their greatest sense of belonging in 'family'. It comes as a surprise that Asian participants did not mention this at all and Māori did only infrequently (8%) given the cultures of both groups place a significant emphasis on family.

Age matters when it comes to 'family' being a source of belonging, with 35% of the under 31s mentioning this but none of the over 60s doing so (with other groups ranging between 16%

and 29%). This may be because some of the younger participants were still living with, or were particularly close, to their primary family, while the older participants often had grown children who had left home some years before.

Surprisingly, males were more likely (26%) to offer responses indicating they got their greatest sense of belonging from 'family' than females (17%). This would seem to contradict traditional gender norms that associate masculinity with 'public' spaces (such as paid work) and femininity with the private space of family.

Community

20% of the participants also offered responses which suggest their strongest sense of belonging comes from being part of a 'national community'. It must be noted that responses coded under the 'national community' category included references not only to being a 'New Zealander' but also to nations outside of New Zealand, some of which could also be conflated with 'ethnic group' (for example, 'Chinese'). However, it remains that a substantial minority of participants gained a sense of belonging from being associated with a particular nation-state.

'National community' was important for a similar number of participants from each main income source group. Those on main benefits (24%) and wage/salary earners (22%) were only slightly less likely to name this site of belonging than those receiving New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance (17%).

'National community' was also an important source of belonging for low and middle income participants with tertiary qualifications (31% in each case). But far fewer participants from the low income/no tertiary qualification (14%), high income/tertiary qualification (14%) and middle income/not tertiary education (11%) groups mentioned this site of belonging. These results suggest no clear trend for socio-economic status shaping such responses.

The Asian ethnic group (57%) was by far the most likely to name 'national community' as their most important site of belonging. This was probably because most were recent immigrants and still felt strong ties to their home countries. For example, one participant said she got her greatest belonging in China because: *"I think friends, family, your memory, your history, most of the time is there, so that's why it makes you feel 'Oh that's more feel comfortable and close'."* [Asian female wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years]. Participants from the Pasifika (22%), European/Pākehā (20%) and 'Other' (14%) ethnic groups lagged far behind the Asian participants, while no Māori made this response at all.

Responses were relatively similar across age groups when it comes to 'national community', ranging only between 13% (for 31-45s) and 25% for those over 45 years. Interestingly, the number of responses from the under 31s age (20%) group was more similar to the older age groups than the 31-45s.

Females (21%) were slightly ahead of males (17%) in making this response.

Almost as many participants (18%), considered 'local community' to be their place of greatest belonging. 'Local community' most often related to a geographical space that ranged in size from the immediate neighbourhood to regional areas. For instance, one participant said: *"Yeah. I enjoy being a Westie. Yeah, born and raised in West Auckland. So I definitely feel a strong West Auckland identity."* [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 30s years and under]. Meanwhile, a participant born in the United States said:

I do not identify with huge swabs of America, there is, I identify with New Zealand probably more as a country but Montana is home and that's whenever I, it still comes out subconsciously at home when [I] talk about 'at home', my wife has finally accepted that that's what I mean. ['Other' male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

Once again, it is worth analysing this response indepth, despite the small number of responses, because it connects with earlier discussion about a collective consciousness, the activities associated with citizenship and the characteristics of 'good citizens'. **Main income source was not an important variable for analysing this response.** The number of participants naming 'local community' as a site of belonging was very even across main income source groups (ranging between 18-20%).

The same can be said for socio-economic groups (ranging from 13-20%), with the exception of the middle income/no tertiary qualification group (33%). Ironically, it is this group's tertiary-qualified counterpart that was least likely to name this response. Thus there is no clear relationship between either income or education level in explaining 'local community' responses.

Māori (38%) were more likely to indicate 'local community' provided a sense of belonging than any other group. In that this term encompasses references to iwi, hapū and other culturally-based communities, this findings comes as no surprise. European/Pākehā (16%) were less than half as likely to make this response, while only 11% of Pasifika and no Asian participants did so. This seems unusual but a similar number of Pasifika participants made references that were coded as belonging emerging from an 'interest group', such as a church or community-based group, which is likely to be linked to both their local community and their ethnic identity.

The 31-45s (26%) were most likely to give responses that were coded as 'local community' being the site of their greatest sense of belonging. This compared to 17% amongst the over 45s and only 10% in the under 31s. It is possible that this age group is particularly community-focused because they are most likely to have young children.

Interestingly, however, males (29%) were twice as likely to name 'local community' than females (12%), even though women are actually more likely to be involved in community activities than men (Statistics New Zealand, 2001).

Citizenship

Notably only 6% of participants indicated that 'citizenship' was their most important form of belonging. The most clear-cut case of this was offered by a woman with weak family ties who considered getting a New Zealand passport after over 30 years residing in the country as a very significant event for her and her sense of belonging in New Zealand. **But almost the same number of participants (5%) rejected the idea of any nation-based identification, indicating they felt like a 'global/human being' that belonged to a global community of human beings.**

It is also worth including two quotes that illustrate citizenship may, indeed, simply be the final endpoint of belonging gained in other domains, even for immigrants to a country. In explaining why she eventually decided to apply for New Zealand citizenship, one Italian-born participant said:

... originally my being away from where I grew up was sort of being, you know, exploring the world, and learning, and, and that, but I think, I suppose it's, you know, you grow where you're planted, or transplanted and, and it came with realising, after a few years, that I had

kind of sprouted roots a bit, and ... that I was heavily involved in doing all sorts of things, and that, that wasn't the stuff of transient habitation. ['Other' female wage/salary earner, unassigned income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

It was at this point – when she realised New Zealand was *home* – that she took out citizenship. For another, American-born participant taking out New Zealand citizenship helped to complete her growing sense of belonging:

I didn't feel that sense of belonging for quite a long time ... I've been here for six years and for the first, at least, year or two, yeah, I didn't have any, I just felt like such an alien in so many ways, there were just so many things about growing up and being an adult in America and then coming here and having to pretty much start over. But, I guess, this sense of belonging started to happen, probably around the time when I decided to take out citizenship - which was a year and a half ago - cos it did take about six months to actually get the application approved and go through all of that stuff. So, yeah, it was at that time. And it was really quite cool to get that passport in the mail and like, 'hey, look at me!' (laughter). ['Other' female wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 30 years and under].

Ethnic group

13% of participants indicated their 'ethnic group' was where they gained the greatest belonging. It is important to note there is some overlap between 'local community' and 'ethnic group', at least for Māori and Pasifika participants where the local communities they referred to were not necessarily geographically but often tribally- or culturally-based. Thus, in some cases, comments have been coded in both categories. In addition, references made by Māori participants to their iwi or hapū affiliations have been coded under the category of 'ethnic group'. One example of this comes from a Māori man who, in discussing why his tribal affiliation was more important than his identity as a citizen, said:

... I'm sort of part, half-Māori, half-European, [but] it's that Māori side that gives me the ... identity that I have. So, yeah, but it might be also the fact that, really, cos I was born here and grew up here and that citizen, I take citizenship for granted in a way, dunno? But then, you know, if because I belong to a tribe ... it's not something that's, I mean, you're born as part of that tribe, it's not given to ... you don't, there's no rights that say, you know, 'if you do this you are no longer a citizen' or there's rules, you're just part of it, which is probably more encompassing, yeah. [Māori male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

A little later in the interview, when discussing why being a New Zealander probably seemed more important when overseas, the same participant returned to why being Māori was more important when a New Zealand citizen: *"physically it's the first [thing] people see, is Māori and then that's the judgement, they base everything else on. So, yeah, so it is an important thing to me."* [Māori male wage/salary earner, high income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years]. These quotes illustrate, first, that tribal affiliation is both more relevant and more permanent than citizenship to this participant and, second, that *other people* also find his 'Māoriness' more obvious than his status as a citizen. For another Māori participant, who was adopted into a European/Pākehā family: *"being Māori is the foremost for me."* [Māori female wage/salary earner, high income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years]. This is because knowing her true ethnic identity filled a gap in her sense of belonging that being a New Zealand citizen could not even begin to overcome.

Comments from Pasifika participants indicated that while, as a rule, they gained their greatest sense of belonging from their 'family', there were times when citizenship was

considered important as an identity. A Samoan participant said, in response to the question about belonging:

... it is a good question because it's kind of funny when we go to Samoa, anyway, like here you've got a part saying 'people that are New Zealand citizen they go that way and for visitors they go the other way'. And to go there, to your own birth country and you're holding a New Zealand passport with you, you have to go the visitors side, so it's feels quite funny in a way Even though you're going home for a holiday and things like that. But when you come here, you have a sense of pride that you're actually coming home and you say 'oh, yeah, I don't have to go that way', this is more or less my home country line that I'm following in anyway. So, I guess, you could say that we're more New Zealanders now than Samoan, though the old things, the old things that you, you're always Samoan down the bottom there somewhere. [Pasifika male wage/salary earner, middle income/tertiary qualification, 46-60 years].

This quote highlights that although Pasifika participants considered citizenship important for 'practical' reasons, becoming a New Zealand citizen also brought with it mixed feelings regarding their identity and belonging with their original national/ethnic community.

Although it is impossible to analyse 'ethnic group' responses by the key demographic variables because the numbers reporting this answer were too small, it is notable that participants from the European/Pākehā and 'Other' ethnic groups did not make any comments at all that could be coded into this category.

Other sites of belonging

Smaller numbers of participants said they gained their greatest sense of belonging at the local level from 'friends' (11%), an 'interest group' (8%, such as a church or club), 'at work' (7%) and 'at home' (6%). Given the focus of this study on neoliberal reforms that position work as the first form of welfare, it is important to note that most of the references to belonging 'at work' suggested this was because it provided a family-like atmosphere. However, one participant did note how work offered him a greater sense of belonging than being a father because: *"I think that sort of sense of identity comes more from other people's perceptions and it's like, yeah, not as many people see me being a dad as see me being a postie."* [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years]. The interviewer asked whether this was also related to his position as a worker and he answered:

.... I like that, I'm proud of the fact that I go out and pay my way and earn my money and, yeah, I mean it was a really cool day for me when I was able to get off the dole and, and go and earn a wage, yeah. It gave me a real sense of self-esteem, I mean, I was pretty low before that and, yeah, it was cool. [European/Pākehā male wage/salary earner, middle income/no tertiary qualification, 31-45 years].

In this way, his strong awareness of societal perceptions about work shaped his sense of belonging. However, this experience was not a common one amongst the participants.

In summary: This section has confirmed some expectations, including that younger and Pasifika participants find 'family' particularly important, while Māori find 'national community' far less central than 'local community' or 'ethnic group'. In contrast, Asian participants found 'national community' (and 'ethnic group', although this was not analysed in depth) very important, which is not surprising when one accounts for the fact that they did not necessarily refer to New Zealand but rather their (relatively recent) country of origin in most cases.

However, this section has also offered some very interesting, counter-intuitive findings. One might expect that females would be more likely to name 'family' and 'local community' as sites of belonging given their greater likelihood to be caring for children and to participate in community activities. The theoretical literature around citizenship (Lister, 1997; Williams, 1989) would also lead one to expect females to have less affiliation than males with 'national community', but the opposite was found to be true. In addition, it is perhaps a little surprising that wage/salary earners and high income/tertiary qualification participants were not most likely to name 'national community' (given they are more likely to have experienced the importance of this identity while travelling overseas). Instead, they were more likely to name 'family' than those on income support and/or low incomes and the only category that main benefit recipients and low income participants were most likely name was 'national community', even though this is not usually fully activated until an individual leaves the country and travels overseas. While many of the main benefit participants had travelled in the past, their current financial position limited these opportunities at present. This finding thus appears to be related to those on main benefits, low incomes and with no tertiary qualification offering narrower, more traditional understandings of citizenship than other groups.

Section 4: Conclusion

This fourth section of the report has indicated that existing inequalities in New Zealand heavily shaped knowledge of citizenship and its importance as a sense of identity. For instance, members of more advantaged groups were more likely to associate citizenship with positive concepts such as 'belonging', 'national identity' and 'rights', while also being more likely to regard citizenship as an important sense of belonging. However, it has been noted that these trends are not clear-cut, even if variables such as main income source, age, gender and ethnicity are often important in understanding participant responses, including those regarding the reasons why citizenship is an important identity and where a sense of belonging is found.

In particular, it is uncertain whether the attitudes of main benefit recipients or those too young to remember a time before neoliberalism have been shaped by their experiences as much as we might expect, particularly in regards to whether citizenship is associated with 'rights' or 'responsibilities'. That few participants characterised 'good citizens' as ones who 'pay tax' and 'work' or 'bad citizens' as those that do 'not work and can' further questions assumptions we might have about the impact of neoliberal rhetoric and policy on public attitudes. Indeed, participant responses to both these questions suggest they prioritise relational factors (regarding inter-personal behaviours and how people 'get along') well above issues of whether a person is in paid work or not when it comes to defining a 'good citizen'. This helps to explain earlier results indicating that social citizenship rights are still valued by the majority of participants. It also suggests that such support is based on a collective consciousness – perhaps even a sense of solidarity – with other New Zealanders.

SECTION 5: POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The Executive Summary reviewed the key findings of this study. Rather than to repeat them here, this section considers in more detail the policy implications that emerge from the conclusions drawn in this report.

1. This study has indicated that many New Zealanders still strongly support the idea that key social services, such as health, education and a welfare safety net, are *rights* of citizenship. They thus believe the government has a responsibility to continue to fund these and to ensure access to all New Zealanders. All major political parties should be wary of the electoral implications of ignoring or significantly diminishing New Zealand's social policy institutions in the future. During the 1990s, National-led government favoured a focus on economic over social policy, resulting in higher rates of child poverty, income inequality and declining health on some indicators (OECD, 2008; 2009a). Although no doubt other issues were at play, the New Zealand public rallied in 1999 to elect a government that articulated their concerns about social policy (Humpage & Craig, 2008). That New Zealand has yet to radically improve (and in some cases, improve at all) on many of these social indicators suggests that public concern with social policy issues will remain.

2. Alongside strong support for the idea that government has major social policy responsibilities is a belief that individuals also have a responsibility to care for themselves and their families. These seemingly contradictory beliefs do not emerge from participant ignorance or confusion but rather because they distinguish between different policy areas, groups of people or contexts in ways not apparent in the results of quantitative public opinion surveys asking questions about government and individual responsibility.

Participants considered children and family to be the most important individual, rather than government, responsibilities. This is not surprising, given New Zealand's 'liberal' heritage has long regarded the family as a private sphere that should not be subject to intervention by government except in the most exceptional circumstances (Cheyne, et al., 2008; Humpage & Craig, 2008). When considering family and child policy political representations should be wary of the way in which legislative changes, such as the repeal of Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961, have touched a sore point within many New Zealanders. Given the strength of participants' concern about perceived interventions in the sacrosanct space of the family, this likely includes policies focused only on main benefit recipients, such as making benefit payment conditional on parents ensuring school attendance or attending parenting education. Importantly, these findings do not mean that participants thought government should not try to *support* families, through social services or redistributive policies such as 'Working for Families'.

3. Although the study found considerable minority support for various kinds of conditions to be placed upon benefit receipt, particularly amongst older, male and middle income participants with no tertiary qualification, the majority of participants were either against or rather ambivalent about conditions such as 'work-for-dole' or 'work-tests'. Indeed, when they were asked about the ways in which we might encourage individual responsibility amongst New Zealanders, which is an implicit goal behind conditionality within the welfare system, they were far more likely to favour 'education' and 'incentives' over 'sanctions'. It would thus not be politically astute to significantly tighten the conditions placed on benefit recipients, particularly those targeting DPB recipients and the sick/disabled.

4. There is evidence to suggest that the interaction main benefit recipients have with government agencies like WINZ is detrimental to their sense of belonging and their rights as

full and equal citizens in New Zealand. Numerous participants believed that WINZ (and to a lesser extent ACC) officials treat main benefit recipients with disrespect and suspicion. The policies of such agencies also do not account for the realities of their lives, such as significant parenting responsibilities or sickness and disability. That many participants who were *not* main benefit recipients also believed that '*People receiving social security benefits are made to feel like second class citizens*' indicates that knowledge of this treatment is widespread and that it is part of a broader stigma against main benefit recipients in New Zealand society. While some participants thought that such treatment and stigma was necessary to discourage 'welfare dependency', the majority did not. New Zealanders and their political representatives should be deeply concerned about the implications this sense of 'second class' citizenship has on belonging and identity in New Zealand and the threat it holds for a shared and collective consciousness as citizens.

5. There is also evidence of substantial differences in citizenship knowledge that are linked to existing socio-economic inequalities and are likely to consolidate problems in bringing New Zealanders together as a cohesive society. In particular, it is notable that members of advantaged groups in society (those who are male, high income with a tertiary qualification and/or older in age) were more likely to not only have knowledge of citizenship rights and responsibilities but also associate citizenship with positive concepts such as 'belonging' and 'national identity', as well as 'rights'. While it makes sense that participants found other sites of belonging (family, national and local community) more important than citizenship, it does appear that a fundamental opportunity to use citizenship as a unifying identity that goes beyond cultural, social and economic boundaries has been largely lost. Indeed, at times citizenship is more often used as an exclusive identity, as with the case of Pasifika peoples feeling that they can never belong in New Zealand as long as other New Zealanders question their status as 'legal citizens' – no matter how long they have lived here.

Governments overseas have attempted to solve problems like this through a greater focus on citizenship education, an area where New Zealand has only directed minimal focus. However, although this study has highlighted a lack of knowledge about the rights and responsibilities of citizenship as an issue amongst some groups of New Zealanders, that knowledge gaps follow existing lines of socio-economic inequality in New Zealand suggests they cannot be solved through simply improving citizenship education. Needed is a strategic vision for New Zealand that identifies our similarities and shared rights and responsibilities within a multicultural framework of acceptance and tolerance of difference. Such a task is complex, especially given evidence from Māori participants that there is a need for a continuing, indeed enhanced, focus on the recognition of Māori rights as a means for incorporating Māori within a positive citizenship identity. Thus, government must consider how we might balance the needs of Māori with those of other ethnic groups in New Zealand, while also addressing the social and economic inequalities that have emerged since the neoliberal reforms undertaken during the 1980s and 1990s. This study suggests that only this combined focus is likely to overcome the uneven and unequal experiences of citizenship that are evident amongst New Zealanders.

APPENDIX

Sampling framework and sample attributes

It was noted in the Introduction of this report that one of the key innovations of the research was its focus on understandings of citizenship expressed by a range of citizens. The following pages offer a more detailed explanation of the variables used to analyse the interview and focus group data and of the specific characteristics of the study's participant sample. This part of the report acts as a supplement to Table 2 (found on page 29), which briefly highlighted the attributes of the research participants.

Main income source

There is research evidence to suggest that source of income can influence people's understandings of social citizenship (Dean & Taylor-Gooby, 1992). In particular, it is thought that those who have been subject to work activation requirements and thus have had some conditions placed on their welfare entitlement will likely feel less of an equal citizen than wage/salary earners who are not subject to such conditions (Dean & Melrose, 1999; Dwyer, 1998; 2004; Lister, et al., 2003).

In that some types of benefits have more conditions placed upon them than others, it was important to ensure representation across a number of benefit types in this study. Those on the Unemployment, Domestic Purposes, Invalid's or Sickness benefits have been categorised as being on '**main benefits**'. These are often subject to considerable stigma, although not necessarily to the same degree; for instance, the unemployed and sole parents have traditionally faced greater public scrutiny and moralising than the sick and disabled. Nonetheless, each of these benefit types have had an increasing number of conditions placed upon receipt of the benefit in recent years. In contrast, those receiving New Zealand Superannuation or Student Allowance have historically been regarded to be far more 'deserving' of assistance and are not considered 'welfare dependent' in the same way as main benefit recipients. Despite obvious differences between the elderly and students (in terms of age and stage of life), these two groups were thus combined to form a second benefit recipient group constituted by those on '**New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance**'.

The third main income source group is '**wage/salary earners**' (including the self-employed). It was originally intended to separate this group into two: those receiving wages/salary only and those also receiving tax credits and/or supplementary support payments available to low-to-middle income individuals and families. It proved too difficult to identify the latter group when recruiting participants, so two general 'wage/salary earners' focus groups were held, along with numerous interviews with individuals who fell into this category. It was hoped an additional focus group would be conducted with business people, given they might be expected to have quite different viewpoints on social citizenship than other New Zealanders but recruitment proved too difficult. Some self-employed people did take part in interviews but they have been included in the wage/salary earners group simply because their numbers were too few to constitute a main income source group of their own.

The main income source of participants was roughly equal between wage/salary earners (45 of 87 or 52%) and those who received income support of some kind (42 of 87 or 48%). Of the former group, 18 of 87 (21%) were in 'professional' occupations such as law, teaching, research or publishing. Eight of 87 (9%) were in managerial positions, including in a bank, a water company and a non-profit organisation. Seven participants (8%) were involved in community or personal services, four (5%) were self-employed, either doing consultancy

work or running their own business, and another three (3%) were in sales positions. A further three (3%) had 'other' paid occupations, such as machinery operator or tour guide. Two participants were of working age but neither undertook paid work outside the home nor received a benefit, calling themselves a 'housewife' or 'homemaker'. They have been coded as having their main income source as paid work because they lived on the earnings of a working partner and are likely to share similar views to them.

Of the 42 research participants whose main income source was income support of some kind, 25 (21%) listed their occupation as 'benefit recipient', although at least eight were also employed in part-time work. Nine of these participants received the Domestic Purposes Benefit, nine the Invalid's Benefit, five the Unemployment Benefit and two the Sickness Benefit. 12 (just under 14%) of all participants identified themselves as 'retired' (although three still did some kind of paid work) and five (just over 5%) were students (the majority of whom also worked part-time). Thus, it is noteworthy that 71% of the participants in the 'New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance' category were retired, a factor important to keep in mind when interpreting the attitudes of that group.

It must also be noted that not only did considerably more female (52) than male participants (35) take part in the study, but the former were twice as likely to receive income support as males. This may influence the attitudes of income support recipients more generally; however, because the main difference was amongst those aged 61 years and over, it is likely this impacts more on the 'New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance' group than the 'main benefit' group.

Socio-economic status

There is considerable evidence that class, income level and education can have an impact on attitudes to social citizenship (Eardley, et al., 2000; Orton & Rowlingson, 2007; Svallfors & Taylor-Gooby, 1999). These are often combined to determine an individual's 'socio-economic status'. There are numerous ways in which this can be measured (see Salmond, Crampton, King, & Waldegrave, 2006) but in this study '**socio-economic status**' refers to a simple composite category of income level and education that has been created to give a general sense of socio-economic status. The five categories used are thus: '**low income/no tertiary qualification**', '**low income/tertiary qualification**', '**middle income/no tertiary qualification**', '**middle income/tertiary qualification**' and '**high income/tertiary qualification**'. There is no 'high income/no tertiary qualification' category because only two participants were coded into this category and in both cases they had professional jobs similar to those gained with tertiary qualifications. They were thus included in the 'high income/tertiary qualification' category. Discussion below provide greater detail as to what each of these categories means in terms of the study's sample.

Income level

It is difficult to be certain that differences in attitudes towards social citizenship are the result of income source (and the experience of being on one of the main benefits or not), rather than simply low income (and the financial struggle that comes with this). As such, an attempt was made to recruit participants from households with a range of income levels, although it is notable that participants with higher incomes were less likely to volunteer or agree to take part in the research. Participants were asked for *household income*, rather than personal income, because this usually gives a better sense of the total resources available to them. However, the accuracy of the data given in the demographic information form is uncertain because some participants found it difficult to determine their household income level, while others appear to have inadvertently entered only their personal income. In addition, the highest income bracket participants could choose on the demographic

information sheet was \$75,000+, which is rather low for total household income. This probably encouraged participants to believe that individual income was being sought. It became clear in interviews that some participants in the over \$75,000 per annum bracket earned considerably more than this amount as individuals and thus the upper end of the income scale is likely to be somewhat distorted.

Nonetheless, the income levels indicated by participants have been coded into three broad income brackets: **'low income'** (under \$30,000 per annum), **'middle income'** (\$30,001-60,000) or **'high income'** (over \$60,001). These categories give us some *general* idea of the level of financial resources available to participants and the proportion of participants in each income bracket. Overall, research participants had relatively low annual household incomes, with 42 of 87 (48%) living in households earning under \$30,000 per annum. In contrast, only 22 of 87 (25%) lived in households receiving over \$60,000 per annum, which were classified as having a high income. In that New Zealand's gross median household income was \$66,900 and the gross mean household income was \$78,500 in 2007 when the study started (B. Perry, 2008), the majority of research participants were still relatively poor overall. Although this finding may result from some of the problems discussed above, in the same year the median annual income for individuals was \$26,500 and the mean was \$25,000 (B. Perry, 2008). This suggests that even if the personal, rather than household, income of participants was below \$30,000, almost half of them were below or just over the median and mean annual income in New Zealand.

Education

While income level can be an important variable for understanding support for social citizenship rights, education can often mitigate this effect (van Oorschot, 2002). For instance, a high income participant who would not personally gain from improving the social and economic security of main benefit recipients may still support this activity because their tertiary studies have made them aware of the existence of significant income inequality and poverty in New Zealand. This study's participants were spread across the spectrum in terms of education. Overall, 11 of 87 (almost 13%) had no qualification whatsoever, while 20 (or 23%) had only a secondary school education (this includes a small number who were currently studying for tertiary qualifications). Almost 13% (11) had some kind of trades or industry qualification and 11% (10) had an undergraduate diploma or certificate. 18% had an undergraduate degree, while 22% had completed postgraduate studies. When compared to Statistics New Zealand (2006a) Census figures, the proportion of participants with no qualification is less than half the national figure (25%), while the number with a post-graduate qualification was more than four times higher (5%). The number with other types of qualifications were similar to national averages.

As noted above, education level and income level were combined to form a composite 'socio-economic status' category. For this purpose, participant education levels were categorised simply as **'no tertiary qualification'** (ranging from no secondary school qualifications to diploma or trade courses, even those that may have been studied at tertiary institutions) and **'tertiary qualification'** (undergraduate degrees and above).

Ethnicity

The literature further suggests that ethnicity and country of origin can be important variables in understanding attitudes to social citizenship (Lister, et al., 2003). In particular, it seemed likely that Māori citizens would understand citizenship and conditionality differently than other New Zealanders because of the historical experiences of colonialism and institutional racism and their continuing impact on upon Māori (Durie, 2003; Meredith, 2000). As such, a specific Māori focus group was organised to ensure that a sufficient

number of Māori individuals were included in the study so as to analyse Māori ethnicity as a variable.

There is also evidence to suggest that citizens from immigrant backgrounds, including first and second generation Pasifika peoples, may find it easier to reflect on the concept of nationality than their Pākehā counterparts but consider their citizen status to be more 'conditional' due to their migration experience (Lister, et al., 2003; Liu, 2005; Ward & Lin, 2005). Although financial constraints meant that 'Pasifika' and 'Asian' focus groups were not part of the original sampling frame, extra funding was gained so that it would be possible to explore ethnic differences in understanding social citizenship and also the impact migration might have on these attitudes. As a result, one 'Pasifika' and one 'Asian' focus group were held, both in Auckland.

Participants were asked to identify which ethnic group/s they belonged to and most participants (52 of 87 or 60%) identified as either European or Pākehā (coded as **'European/Pākehā'**). This figure is somewhat lower than for the New Zealand population as a whole (78% in 2006 – see Ministry of Social Development (2009)). Overall, 13 of 87 (almost 15%) participants identified as **'Māori'**, with 6 taking part in the Māori focus group, four participating in other focus groups and three completing individual interviews. 9 of 87 (10%) participants have been categorised as **'Pasifika'** but it is important to mention that all but two of the 'Pasifika' participants identified as Samoan (although two of the latter identified with other ethnic groups as well). All but one of these participants took part in the 'Pasifika' focus group. 7 of 87 (8%) of all participants have been identified as **'Asian'**; however, all but one participant identified as Chinese and 6 of the 7 'Asian' participants took part in the 'Asian' focus group. Although clearly limited for interpretative purposes, the inclusion of focus groups targeting minority ethnic groups does mean that the percentage of participants for each group was similar to their relative proportion of the New Zealand population (15% for Māori, 7% for 'Pacific peoples' and 9% for Asian peoples - see Ministry of Social Development (2009)). Finally, 6 participants (7%) were coded within the **'Other'** ethnic group category; these included people who identified as American (2), Canadian (1), Indian (1), Italian (1) and Australian (1).

Although not one of the major variables used for analysis, it is worth noting that the majority of participants were born in New Zealand (60 of 87 or 69%). However, 39 of the 61 New-Zealand born participants (64%) had at least one foreign-born parent, a fact that may impact on their understandings of citizenship and belonging. Overall, 27 of 87 (31%) of the participants were overseas-born, which is a little higher than for the New Zealand population as a whole (23% in 2006 – see Ministry of Social Development (2009)).

Age

There is some evidence to suggest that age can influence attitudes to social citizenship (Eardley, et al., 2000; Svallfors, 2003), although there is debate as to whether this is simply because attitudes change as individuals get older or because there is a specific generational effect. Certainly, there is some evidence that New Zealanders born since the 1980s and who have grown up under the neoliberal era have more individualistic and consumerist attitudes when compared to the previous generation that experienced and benefited from a stronger focus on social citizenship rights (Faris, Lawson, & Todd, 1996; Todd, Lawson, & Jamieson, 2000).

As a result, an attempt was made to include participants from a range of ages in the study. All participants were at least 18 years of age and the oldest were in their 70s, but more participants were recruited in the 31-45 age range than in younger or older groups. Overall, only 17 out of the 87 participants (20%) were in the **'under 31s'** age group, while 13 (15%)

were coded as '**over 60s**'. In contrast, 33 of 87 (38%) of the participants fell into the '**31-45s**' age group and 24 of 87 (28%) were in their '**46-60s**'. Based on rough calculations of the New Zealand population's age structure in 2006, the number of participants in the two middle age groups (especially those aged 31-45) was disproportionately high, while the older and younger cohorts were generally proportionate to that of the total population (Statistics New Zealand, 2006b).

Gender

In addition to analysing whether welfare recipients understand social citizenship differently than other citizens, the study was interested in the impact of gender. Walby (1994) and Lister (1997) argue that citizenship generally has long been conceptualised as gendered yet Breitkruez (2005) notes that neoliberal reforms have purported to be gender neutral. To test whether gender was an important variable in understanding of social citizenship, an exclusively female focus group was conducted. Overall, slightly more '**females**' than '**males**' participated in the research, with 52 (60%) out of 87 participants being women. These figures were skewed by not only the women's focus group but also the fact that more women than men were able or willing to participate.

It is important to stress that the female participants also tended to be poorer than their male counterparts, making it difficult to determine whether attitudes expressed were shaped by gender or socio-economic status. 30 of the 52 (58%) female participants were coded into the 'low income' group and only 8 (15%) were categorised as 'high income'. The sampling was skewed by the large number of women in the \$15,001-30,000 bracket. The high number of men in the highest bracket is also notable. It is likely then that the relatively low household income of participant as a whole is influenced by over-sampling of women who appear to be relatively poor. However, although there were slightly more female than male participants in each age group, the spread was fairly even, with the exception of the over 60s age group where there were considerably more women.

Geographical location

Although there was no specific evidence to suggest that geographical location within New Zealand would be an important variable for understanding attitudes to social citizenship, it was important to recruit participants from both the North and South islands, as well as urban and regional areas to enable conclusions to be made about New Zealanders as a whole. Three focus groups were thus conducted in Christchurch, while another six took place in Auckland. Unfortunately a poor response to focus groups organised in regional Canterbury and Auckland meant that these did not go ahead as planned. In addition, 17 individual interviews were undertaken in Auckland, two in the wider Auckland region, 14 in Christchurch and four in the South Canterbury region (Ashburton and Methven). With a total 93% of participants living in one of the two main urban areas (compared to 72% of the New Zealand population), urban/regional dynamics were also not able to be analysed.

In total, just over half (46 of 87 or 53%) of the participants lived in Auckland city authorities, including Manukau, North Shore and Auckland Central, while 35 (40%) lived in Christchurch city (across a range of suburbs). Given it is unlikely that there would be substantial attitudinal differences evident between participants from these two urban areas, the study's data has not used geographical location as a variable for analysis of participant responses.

Levels of awareness

Finally, although it was not a major variable analysed, it is worth noting the levels of awareness and knowledge participants had of both politics and the welfare system as a

contextual factor shaping the attitudes described in this report. It is important to stress that the categories of **'strong'** or **'some'** awareness and knowledge were qualitatively coded based on the responses offered by participants rather than a question specifically asked of them. The remainder of participants were considered to have **'no'** awareness.

Upon this basis, only a quarter (24%) of the participants appeared to have had a 'strong' awareness of politics, with another 16% having 'some' awareness. Only 9% had a 'strong' awareness of welfare, with another 22% having 'some' knowledge. These latter figures are surprisingly low given 48% of participants made comments that indicated they were either using some form of 'welfare' now or had so in the past; others may also have done so but were unwilling to acknowledge this.

Importantly, wage-salary earners and income support recipients were equally likely to be one of the 40% of participants who demonstrated 'some' or 'strong' knowledge of politics but, ironically, awareness of welfare seemed marginally higher amongst wage/salary earners than any other group. Not surprisingly, those on main benefits noted the highest level of past or present welfare use. While New Zealand Superannuation/Student Allowance recipients reported relatively low use, almost a quarter of wage/salary earners acknowledged some use either currently or in the past.

There appeared to be no vast difference in knowledge of politics based on socio-economic status. However, middle income/no tertiary qualification participants were most likely to have 'strong' awareness of politics while the low income/tertiary qualification group was most likely to have awareness overall. More importantly, low income participants (especially those with no tertiary qualification) were much more likely to have experience of welfare but, surprisingly, a sizeable minority of high income/tertiary qualification participants appeared to have used welfare in the past. This was much less common in other groups. Low income/tertiary qualification participants were again most likely to have awareness of welfare, even though they had generally used welfare less than those with low income/no tertiary qualification.

The 'Other' ethnic group had the highest level of awareness of politics, followed by Māori participants. Given that Māori participants were most likely to have had some use of welfare, but one of the lowest apparent levels of awareness of welfare, this result may have been influenced by the very politicised responses of the Māori focus group. Pasifika participants were less likely to have knowledge of politics, as well as use and awareness of welfare. That the Pasifika focus groups participants were highly educated and had relatively high household incomes, might explain the latter results but not the low level of political awareness. Asian participants were least aware of politics and welfare, as well as least likely to have used welfare. Not surprisingly, European/Pākehā were almost as likely as Māori to be aware of politics and second most likely to have experience of welfare after the same group. They were also second most likely to have an awareness of welfare, although this was only just over half the level of 'Other'.

The 46-60 years age group had much higher degree of political awareness than other groups, with the under 31s demonstrating the least awareness. In the case of awareness of welfare, the 46-60 years group seemed to have the greatest level, but this time the 31-45 years group had the least awareness. Levels of past or present use of welfare were pretty similar across all groups, except for the 61 years and over age group who demonstrated much lower levels of use.

Finally, males had a slightly higher awareness of politics, while females demonstrated the same with welfare. This is not surprising given females were more likely to have used welfare in the past or present.

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